Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Construction Law
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Defendant-appellant Antoine Frazier appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a roadside search of his vehicle in 2019. A Utah state trooper pulled defendant over for speeding. The trooper did not begin the standard procedures necessary to issue a citation. Instead, he immediately began trying to contact a canine handler with the local sheriff’s office, so he could come to the scene and perform a dog sniff of the vehicle. At first, the trooper tried contacting the deputy via the instant-messaging system on his vehicle’s computer. When the deputy failed to respond to several messages, the trooper tried callling him on the radio. When the deputy again failed to respond, the trooper asked dispatch to locate him and send him to the scene. Approximately thirty minutes from the initial stop did the canine search defendant's vehicle, alerting to potential contraband. In this time, a records check from dispatch revealed defendant had pled guilty in 2006 to manslaughter; a pat-down search revealed defendant had a .22 caliber pistol in his pants pocket. Defendant was ultimately arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and for possession of fentanyl and cocaine with the intent to distribute. Defendant argued the evidence obtained from that search was inadmissible because the trooper improperly prolonged the traffic stop to facilitate a dog sniff and thereby obtain probable cause to search his vehicle. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the trooper departed from the traffic-based mission of the stop by arranging the dog sniff, "an investigative detour that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion and that added time to the stop. ...The trooper’s consultation of the DEA database, a second investigative detour, only aggravated that ongoing violation. Accordingly, the evidence discovered because of that seizure is tainted by its unlawfulness and is inadmissible." View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

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Defendant Veng Xiong was convicted by jury on one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, and on weapons possession charges. On appeal, Defendant challenged his two firearm-related convictions based on what the Government admitted was an erroneous constructive possession charge tendered to the jury. The Tenth Circuit concluded Defendant did not meet his burden to show that there was a “reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Xiong" on Justia Law

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Colorado Center Development, LLC, the owner of certain property in Denver, Colorado, hired J.E. Dunn Construction Company to construct an office building (the Project). Colorado Center purchased from Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company a Builder’s Risk insurance policy (the Policy). The Policy provided protection against “direct physical loss or damage caused by a covered peril to ‘buildings or structures’ while in the course of construction, erection, or fabrication.” J.E. Dunn hired plaintiff Rocky Mountain Prestress, LLC (RMP) as a subcontractor to perform work including “engineer[ing], supply[ing,] and install[ing] all precast concrete components, connections, and erections aids” and “[s]upply[ing] and install[ing] grout and/or patching of all connections required by the engineering for the structural integrity of the precast.” Because of “potential concerns that arose at another project” relating to “sinking pillars/columns,” J.E. Dunn requested RMP to retain a third-party engineering firm to investigate “potential structural issues” with RMP’s work on the Project. The engineering firm concluded that the Project required “repairs to insufficiently grouted joints between precast concrete column and pilaster elements” at 264 locations throughout the structure. The engineering firm began its investigation in August 2016, and the final grouting repair work was completed in February 2017. In the meantime, in November 2016, RMP submitted a claim to Liberty seeking coverage under the Policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company on three independent grounds: (1) RMP had not shown that the claimed loss was fortuitous; (2) the claimed loss did not constitute “direct physical loss or damage” as required for coverage under the policy; and (3) even if there might otherwise have been coverage, the claimed loss fell within the policy’s exclusion for defective workmanship. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision based on the defective-workmanship exclusion. View "Rocky Mountain Presstress v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance" on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal were commercial general liability policy exclusions that barred coverage for damage to “that particular part” of the property on which an insured is performing operations, or which must be repaired or replaced due to the insured’s incorrect work. The Tenth Circuit concluded the phrase “that particular part” was susceptible to more than one reasonable construction: it could refer to the distinct component upon which an insured works or to all parts ultimately impacted by that work. The Court surmised the contract had to then be interpreted consistent with the mutual intent of the parties, with the ambiguity resolved most favorably to the insured and against the insurance carrier. The Court adopted the narrower interpretation of the phrase “that particular part,” under which the exclusion extends only to the distinct components upon which work was performed. This conclusion was contrary to the district court's interpretation, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "MTI v. Employers Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether Aspen Insurance (UK) Ltd. And Lloyd’s Syndicate 2003 (collectively, “Aspen”) had to reimburse Black & Veatch Corporation (“B&V”) for costs B&V incurred due to damaged equipment a subcontractor made for power plants in Ohio and Indiana. The district court held Aspen did not have to pay B&V’s claim under its commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policy because B&V’s expenses arose from property damages that were not covered “occurrences” under the Policy. Because the only damages involved here were to B&V’s own work product arising from its subcontractor’s faulty workmanship, the court concluded that the Policy did not provide coverage and granted Aspen’s motion for partial summary judgment. B&V appealed. The Tenth Circuit found that the Policy contained a choice-of-law clause, making the Policy subject to New York law. The Court also found a trend among state supreme courts that supported the contention that construction defects could constitute “occurrences” under CGL policies, and that contractors have coverage for the unexpected damage caused by defective workmanship done by subcontractors. The Tenth Circuit predicted the New York Court of Appeals would decide that the damages here constituted an “occurrence” under the Policy, and as such, vacated the district court’s summary judgment decision and remand for further proceedings. View "Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Insurance" on Justia Law

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In 2015, Wichita and affiliated tribes made plans to build a History Center on a plot of land held by the federal government in trust for the Wichita Tribe, Delaware Nation, and Caddo Nation jointly. One of those neighbors, the Caddo Nation, claimed the land may contain remains of ancestral relatives. Before the Wichita Tribe began construction, Caddo Nation sued the Wichita Tribe for allegedly violating the procedures required by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) throughout the planning process. Caddo Nation sought an emergency temporary restraining order preventing Wichita Tribe from continuing construction until it complied with those procedures. When the district court denied that request, Caddo Nation appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals without seeking further preliminary relief. In the intervening year while the case was on appeal with the Tenth Circuit, Wichita Tribe completed construction of the History Center. The Tenth Circuit concluded it had no jurisdiction over this appeal because the relief Caddo Nation requested from the district court was moot. View "Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from a grant of summary judgment against Plaintiff-Appellant Parker Excavating, Inc. (“PEI”) on its civil rights claim against Defendants-Appellees Lafarge West, Inc. (“Lafarge”), Martin Marietta Minerals, Inc. (“MMM”), and Nick Guerra, an employee of Lafarge and MMM. Lafarge, a construction company, was the primary contractor on a paving project for Pueblo County, Colorado (“the County”). PEI, a Native American-owned construction company, was a subcontractor for Lafarge. MMM replaced Lafarge as the primary contractor. PEI’s participation in the project was terminated before it entered into a new subcontract with MMM. PEI alleged Lafarge retaliated against it with a letter of reprimand and a demand to sign letters of apology after PEI Vice President Greg Parker complained that County employees discriminated against PEI on the basis of its Native American ownership. In separate orders, the district court granted summary judgment on PEI’s 42 U.S.C 1981 retaliation claim to: (1) MMM and Guerra, because PEI could not show its opposition to County employees’ discrimination was “protected” opposition under section 1981; and (2) Lafarge, because PEI could not show Lafarge took an adverse action against it. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Parker Excavating v. LaFarge West" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Ralph Rogerson, a licensed pest-control applicator in Kansas, challenged a regulation of the Kansas Department of Agriculture on the ground that it required excessive pesticide treatment in preconstruction applications. He filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Department, claiming that the regulation: (1) was preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) because it conflicted with pesticide labels approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and (2) was preempted by the Sherman Antitrust Act because it limited consumer choice and competition through retail price maintenance. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas rejected both claims, and Plaintiff appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: the Kansas regulation was neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by FIFRA. And Plaintiff conceded the absence of an essential element of his Sherman Act claim. View "Schoenhofer v. McClaskey" on Justia Law

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In 2009, Jacquelyn Jacks bought a manufactured home from CMH Homes, Inc., on an installment plan. The purchase was financed through CMH Homes under a manufactured home retail installment contract. The contract contained an arbitration agreement, which provides that all disputes arising from, or relating to, the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. By its terms, the agreement also covered all co-signors and guarantors, and any occupants of the manufactured Home (as intended beneficiaries of the arbitration agreement. Jacks moved into the home with her husband and their children. Five years later, the Jacks family sued CMH Homes, CMH Manufacturing, and Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance (not a party to this appeal). They claimed: (1) CMH negligently installed and repaired the manufactured home’s water system, which caused toxic mold to grow; (2) the manufactured home was unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of CMH; (3) the manufactured home was not fit for habitation. Jacks also sought to rescind her purchase of the manufactured home, along with her agreement to pay Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance the indebtedness incurred to purchase the home. The CMH defendants removed the case from state to federal court and moved to compel arbitration and stay the court proceedings. The district court granted the motion to compel as to the claims of Jacks, but denied the motion as to the remaining plaintiffs who were not parties to the installment contract. Defendants had argued that Jacks’ husband and their children were likewise bound by the arbitration agreement, even though they never signed the contract. The district court held that “the single sentence in the Arbitration Agreement generically referencing ‘any occupants of the Manufactured Home (as intended beneficiaries of this Arbitration Agreement)’ was not sufficient to make the nonsignatory plaintiffs third party beneficiaries of the Arbitration Agreement and subject to being compelled to arbitration. The district court also rejected Defendants’ contention that the nonsignatory plaintiffs were “bound to arbitrate their claims” under “the doctrine of equitable estoppel.” Defendants timely appealed the district court’s partial denial of their motion to stay and to compel arbitration. The Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s judgment and affirmed it. View "Jacks v. CMH Homes" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Savant Home, Inc., a custom home designer and builder, held a registered copyright to a floor plan of a three-bedroom ranch house (“Anders Plan”). Savant built a model house embodying that plan in Windsor, Colorado (“Savant house”). In June 2009, Ron and Tammie Wagner toured the Savant house and hired builder Douglas Collins and his firm, Douglas Consulting, LLC (jointly, “Collins”) to build a house. Collins, in turn, contracted with Stewart King to design the house. After Collins and Mr. King completed the Wagners’ house, Ms. Wagner hired them to build a second house. Savant sued Collins for copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, civil conspiracy, trade dress infringement, and other claims, alleging defendants copied the Anders Plan by building the two houses. The district court granted Defendants summary judgment on two grounds: (1) Savant failed to offer evidence of inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning and (2) no reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion. Savant appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court as to the first ground and therefore did not address the second. View "Savant Homes v. Collins" on Justia Law