Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mica Martinez was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Martinez sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim about his trial counsel’s inadequate investigation and presentation of testimony from his grandfather, mother, and uncle. He also claimed that his sentencing was fundamentally unfair due to witness testimony about his use of a racial slur and argued for reversible cumulative error.The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Martinez’s conviction and sentence, finding sufficient evidence of malice aforethought and holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently. The OCCA also rejected Martinez’s claim that the introduction of a racial slur during sentencing denied him a fair proceeding, concluding that any error was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the comment. The OCCA denied Martinez’s applications for postconviction relief, including his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of trial counsel’s investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The court held that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law or rely on an unreasonable factual finding in rejecting Martinez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court also found that Martinez failed to point to any clearly established federal law regarding the introduction of inflammatory evidence, and the OCCA did not base its decision on an unreasonable factual finding. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of relief on the cumulative error claim as well. View "Martinez v. Quick" on Justia Law

A federal inmate, Dustin Rowland, developed a hernia after a pretrial detention fight. A physician deemed the hernia "reducible and stable," recommending non-surgical treatments. Rowland, desiring surgery, utilized the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Administrative Remedial Program, which involves a four-step grievance process. His initial requests were denied, but a later appeal led to approval for a surgical consultation. However, Rowland's final appeal was denied for procedural reasons, and he did not correct the deficiency. He eventually received surgery but filed a lawsuit claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, seeking damages under Bivens, injunctive relief for post-operative care, and a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Rowland's Bivens claim, granted summary judgment against his injunctive relief claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Rowland's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens claim, noting that Rowland's case presented a new context not covered by previous Bivens cases and that the BOP's Administrative Remedial Program provided an adequate alternative remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the injunctive relief claim, as Rowland failed to exhaust administrative remedies specifically for post-operative care. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FTCA claim, emphasizing the jurisdictional requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Rowland's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. View "Rowland v. Matevousian" on Justia Law

Ngozi Iweha, a Black woman born and educated in Nigeria, was hired as a staff pharmacist at Larned State Hospital (LSH) in Kansas. She alleged that she faced a hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Incidents included exclusion from projects, insensitive comments about Nigeria, and a confrontation with a coworker involving "slave trade beads." She was eventually placed on administrative leave and terminated following an investigation into her workplace conduct.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the incidents described by Iweha did not amount to a hostile work environment as they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive. The court also determined that Iweha failed to show that her termination was pretextual. The court noted that the employer's progressive discipline policy was discretionary and that the investigation into Iweha's conduct was independent and thorough. Additionally, the court found that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, as her complaints did not specifically allege discrimination based on race or national origin.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the incidents described by Iweha were not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. The court also found that Iweha failed to demonstrate that the reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court noted that the investigation into her conduct was independent and that the decision to terminate her was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The court also upheld the finding that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Iweha v. State of Kansas" on Justia Law

In the early hours of November 13, 2021, DeAnna Suazo was found dead outside her home on the Taos Pueblo, New Mexico, under her running vehicle, showing signs of being run over. Her boyfriend, Santiago Martinez, after a failed polygraph test, admitted to pushing Suazo to the ground and running her over. Martinez was indicted for second-degree murder in Indian Country. Several pretrial motions were adjudicated, leading to three separate appeals.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted Martinez's motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements to the FBI, ruling that he should have been re-Mirandized before the post-polygraph interview. The court also ruled inadmissible certain text messages between Suazo and Martinez, which the Government argued were not hearsay but showed their effect on Martinez. Additionally, the court excluded witness testimony of a prior incident where Martinez allegedly assaulted Suazo, ruling it inadmissible under Rule 404(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's suppression of Martinez's post-polygraph statements, holding that the initial Miranda waiver was valid and did not require re-advisement before the post-polygraph interview. The court also reversed the exclusion of the text messages, agreeing with the Government that they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to show their effect on Martinez. Lastly, the court reversed and remanded the exclusion of the prior assault testimony for reconsideration, given the changed evidentiary landscape with the admissibility of Martinez's statements. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Les and Gretchen Howell invested in a silver-trading scheme called the Silver Pool, operated by Gaylen Rust through Rust Rare Coin. Les invested about $1.2 million and received $3.2 million in profits, while Gretchen invested $96,450 but lost $74,450. Les used his profits to buy land and build a house in Kingman, Arizona, and made Gretchen a joint tenant. The Silver Pool was later exposed as a Ponzi scheme, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought an enforcement action against Rust. Jonathan O. Hafen was appointed as the receiver to recover assets fraudulently transferred through the scheme.The United States District Court for the District of Utah granted Hafen summary judgment against Les and Gretchen on fraudulent-transfer claims under Utah’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), ordering them to return Les’s $3.2 million profit. The court also awarded Hafen prejudgment interest at a 5% rate. The Howells sought reconsideration and clarification of the judgment, particularly regarding Gretchen’s liability. The district court clarified that Gretchen was liable for $1.5 million, representing half of the $3 million Les invested in the Kingman property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s application of the Ponzi presumption under the UVTA and the reliance on expert reports. However, it found that the district court erred in calculating the judgment against Gretchen. The appellate court held that the judgment should reflect the value of Gretchen’s interest in the Kingman property at the time of transfer, not the amount Les invested. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine the correct amount of the judgment against Gretchen. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s rulings. View "Hafen v. Howell" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Kansas's restrictions on private parties partially filling out mail-ballot applications before sending them to registered voters. Plaintiffs, VoteAmerica and Voter Participation Center (VPC), argue that these restrictions violate their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. They seek an injunction to prevent Kansas officials from enforcing the law.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court applied strict scrutiny to the law, finding that it violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court held that the mailing of prefilled applications was protected speech and that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court also found that the law infringed on the plaintiffs' associational rights and declared the law unconstitutionally overbroad.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that the prefilled applications should be considered separately from the cover letter included in the mailings. It then concluded that mailing the prefilled applications constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment. However, the court rejected the application of strict scrutiny under the Meyer-Buckley framework, finding that the law did not restrict access to a fundamental avenue of political discourse. The court also rejected the argument that the law was subject to strict scrutiny due to speaker discrimination, as the law's speaker-based exception did not reflect a content preference.The Tenth Circuit held that the proper level of scrutiny for the law is intermediate scrutiny, as the law is a content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulation. The court reversed the district court's rulings on the overbreadth and freedom-of-association claims, remanding for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims. The court also remanded the free-speech claim for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, applying intermediate scrutiny. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. The Act makes clear that MOHELA’s debts and obligations are not debts or obligations of the State. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.410. This includes any judgments against MOHELA. The State’s lack of legal liability for MOHELA’s debts and judgments is a strong indicator that MOHELA’s finances are independent from the State’s. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978.In sum, the third Steadfast factor weighs against arm-of-the-state status. MOHELA receives no direct financial assistance from the State, has the ability to generate its own revenue, retains control over its own funds, and the State bears no legal liability for MOHELA’s debts or judgments.d. Factor Four: State or Local AffairsThe fourth Steadfast factor considers whether the entity is concerned primarily with state or local affairs. This factor examines the entity’s function, composition, and purpose. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528; Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1253. Here, the district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of arm-of-the-state status, and we agree.MOHELA’s primary function is to help Missourians access student loans needed to pay for college. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. This is a statewide concern, not a local one. MOHELA’s activities are not confined to any particular locality within Missouri; rather, they are intended to benefit residents across the entire state. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366 (noting that MOHELA was established to perform the “essential public function” of helping Missourians access student loans).Moreover, MOHELA’s board is composed of members appointed by the Governor and representatives from state agencies, further indicating that its focus is on statewide, rather than local, affairs. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. The fact that MOHELA’s profits are used to fund education in Missouri, including providing grants and scholarships for Missouri students, also supports the conclusion that MOHELA is concerned with state affairs. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366.In conclusion, the fourth Steadfast factor weighs in favor of arm-of-the-state status.3. The Second Step of the Arm-of-the-State Test: The Twin Goals of the Eleventh AmendmentBecause the Steadfast factors point in different directions, we proceed to the second step of the Hennessey test and consider the twin goals underlying the Eleventh Amendment: avoiding an affront to the dignity of the state and the impact of a judgment on the state treasury. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.As discussed above, the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. This means that a judgment against MOHELA would not impact the state treasury. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978. The lack of impact on the state treasury is a strong indicator that MOHELA is not an arm of the state. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.Regarding the dignity of the state, MOHELA operates with substantial autonomy and is financially independent from the State. The State has not clearly demarcated MOHELA as sharing its sovereignty. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 529. Therefore, treating MOHELA as an arm of the state would not accord with the dignity interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment.In conclusion, considering the twin goals of the Eleventh Amendment, we determine that MOHELA is not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Good v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

Angelo Brock, an independent distributor for Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC, filed a class-action lawsuit alleging wage and hour violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law. Brock claimed that Flowers misclassified its delivery drivers as independent contractors to avoid paying proper wages. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on an Arbitration Agreement within the Distributor Agreement between Brock and Flowers. The district court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado found that Brock fell within the "transportation workers exemption" under § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which exempts certain transportation workers from arbitration. The court concluded that Brock's class of workers, who deliver Flowers goods intrastate, are engaged in interstate commerce because they play a direct and necessary role in the flow of goods across state lines. The court also determined that the Arbitration Agreement did not allow for arbitration under Colorado law, as it was inconsistent with the FAA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit agreed that Brock's class of workers is engaged in interstate commerce, as their intrastate deliveries are part of a continuous interstate journey of goods. The court found that Flowers retains significant control over Brock's operations, indicating that the goods' delivery to retail stores is the final leg of an interstate route. The court declined to review Flowers's argument that the Distributor Agreement is not a contract of employment, as it was not raised in the lower court. Additionally, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of arbitration under Colorado law. View "Brock v. Flowers Foods" on Justia Law

In April 2023, Colorado Governor Jared Polis signed a law raising the minimum age for purchasing firearms in Colorado from 18 to 21. The law was set to take effect on August 7, 2023. Plaintiffs, including two individuals and a firearms advocacy group, filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect. The district court granted the injunction on the day the law was to take effect, halting its enforcement. Governor Polis appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado initially found that the plaintiffs had standing, except for the advocacy group, and determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Second Amendment challenge. The court concluded that the law was not consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation and that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Governor Polis appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the law was consistent with historical firearm regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Second Amendment claim. The court found that the law was a presumptively lawful regulation imposing conditions on the commercial sale of firearms, which did not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment's protections. The court also determined that the plaintiffs did not establish irreparable harm and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the enforcement of the law. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunction. View "Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a transgender woman, was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and prescribed hormone replacement therapy (HRT) while detained at the Oklahoma County jail. After being transferred to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC), she continued her HRT regimen. However, upon her transfer to the Dick Conner Correctional Center, a staff psychologist evaluated her and concluded she did not have gender dysphoria. Based on this evaluation, the prison physician at the Davis Correctional Facility, where she was subsequently transferred, decided to taper and discontinue her HRT.The plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against the prison physician and the health services administrator. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference because the discontinuation of HRT was in compliance with correctional policy, which required a confirmed diagnosis of gender dysphoria for HRT to continue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference by discontinuing the plaintiff’s HRT based on the psychologist’s evaluation and the correctional policy. The court found no evidence that the defendants knew or strongly suspected that the psychologist’s diagnosis was incorrect. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s disagreement with the diagnosis and the course of treatment did not constitute a constitutional violation. The court also rejected the argument that the defendants were required to arrange for a second evaluation, as there was no indication that they suspected the initial diagnosis was wrong. View "Johnson v. Sanders" on Justia Law