Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case centers on Brett Dewayne Cole, who was charged with three counts stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, K.Z., a member of the Choctaw tribe. In May 2019, K.Z., then ten years old, disclosed to school personnel and a nurse examiner that Cole had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at their family home, including acts of touching and oral and anal penetration. Cole denied any inappropriate conduct. During trial, the government sought to introduce testimony from three witnesses—Cole’s half-sister, half-brother, and stepcousin—about prior instances in which Cole allegedly molested them as children, with these incidents occurring when Cole himself was a juvenile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Cole’s case. At the first trial in January 2023, evidence of Cole’s prior acts as a juvenile was admitted over his belated objection, but the jury failed to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In a second trial held in March 2023, similar evidence was presented, and the jury convicted Cole on all counts. Cole appealed, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not permit admission of the prior acts because he was a juvenile at the time, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that acts of child molestation committed as a juvenile qualify as “crimes” under Rule 414 and are admissible. It further found that the district court properly balanced the probative value against any prejudicial impact and did not abuse its discretion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Cole’s conviction. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

Max and Peggy Lancaster transferred approximately $3.8 million in property to a family LLC owned by their adult children, receiving a promissory note and other loan-related documents in exchange. They subsequently applied for Medicaid benefits in Oklahoma but were found ineligible due to their financial resources exceeding Medicaid’s asset limit. The Lancasters challenged this determination in federal court, arguing that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the Oklahoma Health Care Authority violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act, which requires prompt provision of benefits to eligible individuals. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the Agencies’ asset calculation was erroneous and deprived them of a federally protected right.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the Agencies’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the promissory note received from the LLC was a countable resource under state law and not a bona fide loan. As a result, the court concluded the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits because their assets exceeded the threshold set by law. The Lancasters appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, which clarified the standard for determining whether provisions of the Medicaid Act confer individually enforceable rights under § 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Medina, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does not clearly and unambiguously confer a private right enforceable via § 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Lancasters’ claims, holding that there is no individually enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(8) for the purposes of this lawsuit. View "Lancaster v. Cartmell" on Justia Law

Several Utah-based companies and individuals, including Standard Insurances and related entities, challenged actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) following an audit. Standard Insurances, a micro-captive insurance company, had provided insurance to its affiliated companies, seeking certain federal tax benefits under 26 U.S.C. § 831(b). After an audit initiated in 2022, the IRS determined that Standard was not a legitimate micro-captive insurance company, issued deficiency notices, and adjusted the tax liabilities of Standard and its insureds. The IRS concluded that Standard’s transactions lacked economic substance and were not genuine insurance transactions, resulting in increased taxable income for Standard and decreased deductions for the insured entities.Following the issuance of deficiency notices, Standard petitioned the United States Tax Court for redetermination of its tax liabilities and made advance payments. While those proceedings remained pending, Standard filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the claims were barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and the Tax Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which prohibit suits in federal court that restrain the assessment or collection of federal taxes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that Standard’s claims sought relief that would restrain the IRS’s assessment and collection of taxes, and thus were barred by the DJA and AIA. The court found that none of the judicially created exceptions to these statutes applied, as Standard had an available remedy in tax court and could pursue further review if necessary. The court rejected Standard’s arguments that its claims were not subject to the statutory bars and concluded that federal court jurisdiction was precluded in this instance. View "Standard Insurances v. IRS" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was employed as a conductor for a railway company and alleged that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). Specifically, he claimed that in January 2019 he refused to allow the train’s engineer to perform a task—lining a switch—due to safety concerns, opting instead to perform the procedure himself. The plaintiff asserted that this refusal was in defiance of a purported “standing order” directing engineers to line switches to expedite train movements. He argued that allowing engineers to leave the controls unattended while lining switches created a hazardous condition.Following his termination for a separate incident in February 2019, the plaintiff pursued complaints through several forums. First, he challenged his dismissal before a Public Law Board, which found that he had violated safety rules but ordered reinstatement without backpay due to disproportionate punishment. He also filed a complaint with OSHA, asserting retaliation for reporting safety concerns and insisting on safe practices. An administrative law judge (ALJ) subsequently dismissed this complaint, finding no credible evidence of a standing order, no proof that the plaintiff had refused to work as required by the statute, and no evidence of a hazardous safety condition at the relevant time.The plaintiff then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, which granted summary judgment to the railway company. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish that he engaged in protected activity under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b)(1)(B) because he did not refuse to work and was not confronting an imminent hazardous condition. Therefore, he could not make a prima facie case of retaliation under the FRSA. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Berberich v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in a violent incident that began as a fistfight between two groups at an apartment complex in Oklahoma and escalated into a gunfight. The defendant, who was present with an AK-47, fired more than twenty rounds into a crowd after shots were fired by others, resulting in the death of a bystander, Larintino Scales. Evidence at trial included various eyewitness accounts, forensic analysis, and expert testimony regarding bullet trajectories. The defendant was charged with several offenses, including voluntary manslaughter and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The jury convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter and felon in possession, but acquitted him of other charges. The district court denied a pretrial motion alleging bad-faith destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence, allowed expert testimony on bullet trajectories, and overruled objections to the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding self-defense. The court departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines, imposing the statutory maximum sentence of fifteen years.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s challenges to his conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the late-discovered bullet fragment lacked potentially exculpatory value. Any error in the admission of the government’s expert testimony was found to be harmless, and the expert was deemed qualified. The prosecutor’s closing statements were not found to misstate the law of self-defense. Finally, the appellate court concluded the sentence was substantively reasonable, as the district court adequately considered relevant sentencing factors and the seriousness of the offense. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Holt" on Justia Law

Jose Antonio Duque-Ramirez, born in Mexico, entered the United States unlawfully as a child and lived in Oklahoma City for over two decades. He married a U.S. citizen, has U.S.-citizen children, and attempted but failed to adjust his immigration status through various legal avenues. In October 2023, he was stopped by law enforcement while driving with security gear and firearms in his vehicle. He was found to be unlawfully present in the U.S. and subsequently indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits firearm possession by noncitizens unlawfully in the country.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma first rejected his facial challenge to the statute, assuming without deciding that he was among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. After pleading guilty, withdrawing his plea, and raising a new as-applied Second Amendment challenge (relying on recent Supreme Court precedent, including United States v. Rahimi), the district court again denied his motion to dismiss, reasoning that historical laws supported disarming those who had not demonstrated allegiance to the sovereign.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The Tenth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Duque-Ramirez was among those protected by the Second Amendment. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and Rahimi, the court held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, specifically citing founding-era laws that disarmed persons who had not demonstrated allegiance. The court concluded that an individualized determination of dangerousness was not required and affirmed the conviction, rejecting Duque-Ramirez’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge. View "United States v. Duque-Ramirez" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers with the Kansas Highway Patrol observed a black Jeep Grand Cherokee traveling eastbound on I-70 with a temporary registration tag that appeared to be unsecured and “flapping or blowing up,” rather than lying flat against the vehicle. The officers believed this constituted a violation of Kansas law regarding license plate attachment. Upon stopping the vehicle, they noted the driver, Miguel Munoz, appeared abnormally nervous and immediately volunteered that he and his wife were traveling to a funeral in Kansas, providing vague details. During the stop, an officer also noticed an image of Jesus Malverde, which the officers associated with drug trafficking, hanging inside the Jeep. After further questioning, Munoz consented to a search, leading to the discovery of fentanyl tablets and a firearm.Munoz was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was not justified at its inception and was unreasonably extended. The district court held a suppression hearing, found the officers’ testimony credible, and denied the motion. The court concluded the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of a violation of Kansas Statutes Annotated § 8-133(c) (requiring license plates to be securely fastened) and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly extend the stop based on Munoz’s conduct and the items observed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 8-133(c), as interpreted by the Kansas Supreme Court, and that the extension of the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Munoz’s motion to suppress and his conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Munoz" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a motorcycle accident in Oklahoma with his girlfriend as a passenger. After socializing with friends and drinking alcohol, and possibly vaping marijuana, he drove his motorcycle at or below the speed limit but lost control on a dark, shoulderless road, resulting in a crash that caused his girlfriend’s death. At the scene, law enforcement observed signs of possible intoxication, such as the odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes, and administered sobriety tests. The defendant’s blood sample, taken shortly after the accident, revealed a blood alcohol level below the legal limit and the presence of other substances, but the forensic toxicologist could not definitively state whether he was impaired at the time.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted the defendant for involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country, predicated on violating the Oklahoma misdemeanor DUI statute for driving under the combined influence of alcohol and other intoxicants. At trial, the jury was instructed using the Oklahoma statutory language but, during deliberations, asked the court to clarify whether “under the influence” required mere presence of substances or actual impairment rendering the defendant incapable of safe driving. The district court declined to clarify, instructing the jury to rely on the given instructions. Shortly after, the jury convicted the defendant, and the court imposed a sentence of forty-one months in prison.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide a clarifying supplemental instruction in response to the jury’s explicit legal uncertainty. The appellate court found this error was not harmless because it likely affected the verdict, given the jury’s demonstrated confusion about the correct legal standard. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kirby" on Justia Law

A Black male employee worked as a sales representative for an insurance company, where he was required to obtain and maintain licenses to sell insurance in various states, including New York. He applied for a New York license but failed to respond to requests for information from the New York Department of Financial Services, resulting in the denial of his application. The denial was not timely communicated to the employer due to an internal error, which eventually led to corrective actions by the company. After the denial was discovered, the employee was informed that his continued employment in sales required the New York license. He was offered a chance to transfer to another department but was not selected for that position. Separately, the employee requested and was approved for intermittent FMLA leave, but he missed work for an extended period beyond what was approved. He was ultimately terminated for failing to obtain the required New York license and for not informing the company about the denial.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging retaliation under the FMLA and ADAAA, and race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. It found the employee had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence of pretext to support his retaliation claims, concluding the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination was not shown to be false or a pretext for unlawful conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in its analysis of the prima facie case of race discrimination but found this error harmless. The appellate court held the employee failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext regarding both his discrimination and retaliation claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on all claims. View "Plump v. Government Employees Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a series of crimes that began when he picked up an acquaintance from a motel and, instead of taking her home, brought her to his house where he and his girlfriend assaulted her. During the assault, the defendant’s girlfriend held the victim at gunpoint with the defendant’s shotgun. The defendant subsequently forced the victim into the trunk of his car, drove her to the motel, and confronted another individual in a motel room, threatening him and stealing his possessions as well as his car keys. The defendant and his girlfriend then left the scene, with the stolen items and the shotgun in the original car, and the defendant driving the stolen car. During their flight, the victim managed to escape, and law enforcement later apprehended the defendant and recovered both the shotgun and the stolen property.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of several offenses, including carjacking, robbery in Indian Country, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The defendant moved for acquittal on the § 924(c)(1)(A) count, arguing insufficient evidence that he carried a firearm during the robberies because he did not have the shotgun on his person during the “taking” phase of the offenses. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found the defendant guilty, specifying that he carried (but did not use) the firearm during the robberies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. The court held that “carrying” under § 924(c)(1)(A) includes constructive possession and transportation of a firearm during the commission or flight from a continuing offense such as robbery. The court concluded that evidence supported the jury’s verdict, as the defendant constructively carried the firearm during his escape from the robberies. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. McHenry" on Justia Law