Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged in federal court with possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty. At sentencing, a dispute arose over whether he was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction under California Penal Code § 311.11, which criminalizes possession of images depicting a minor “personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.” The defendant argued that the California statute was broader than the federal definition of child pornography and therefore should not trigger the federal mandatory minimum.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming agreed with the government and found that the prior California conviction qualified as a predicate offense, applying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). The defendant appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the mandatory minimum sentence de novo. Employing the categorical approach, the appellate court examined whether the elements of the California offense categorically matched the federal generic offense of possession of child pornography. The Tenth Circuit concluded that California Penal Code § 311.11, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, criminalizes conduct such as “any touching” with sexual intent, which can include nonexplicit, nonsexual images far removed from the federal definition of child pornography. Because the California statute sweeps more broadly than the federal generic offense, the prior conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 2252A(b)(2).The Tenth Circuit held that the mandatory minimum sentence was improperly applied and therefore vacated the defendant’s sentence, remanding the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Two cousins alleged that the defendant lured them into his trailer with candy and sexually abused them when they were young children. As a result, he was charged with two counts of engaging in a sexual act with a minor under twelve years old, allegedly occurring on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. The indictment specified that the victims were Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required for federal jurisdiction under the applicable statutes.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the trial. The government sought to prove the defendant’s non-Indian status primarily through the testimony of two law enforcement witnesses, who based their conclusions on reviews of various databases and documents. No direct genealogical or enrollment evidence was introduced. At the close of the government’s case, the defendant moved for acquittal under Rule 29, arguing that the government had failed to prove his non-Indian status. The district court denied the motion, relying on the witnesses’ testimonies. The jury convicted the defendant on one count, and he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government had presented sufficient evidence that the defendant was a non-Indian. Applying de novo review, the court found that the government’s evidence was inadequate to establish non-Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by circuit precedent. The court held that, because non-Indian status is an essential element of the charged crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 in the Tenth Circuit, the conviction could not stand without such proof. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Agnes Mukantagara and her son, Ebenezer Shyaka, were admitted to the United States as refugees in 2005. Two years later, USCIS paused Mukantagara’s refugee status and revoked her travel documents due to suspicions that she had participated in the Rwandan genocide. After an investigation, USCIS concluded in 2016 that Mukantagara had participated in the genocide and terminated her refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). This determination also affected her son’s status, and both were placed into removal proceedings. During those proceedings, the immigration court found Mukantagara credible and granted her asylum, rejecting the government’s allegations, but denied asylum to Shyaka, finding he no longer qualified as her dependent due to his age.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the immigration court’s grant of asylum to Mukantagara and affirmed the denial for Shyaka. On remand, the immigration court again granted asylum to Mukantagara. Shyaka pursued further review before the Tenth Circuit, and both the BIA and the Tenth Circuit abated their respective appeals pending the outcome of the present litigation. Subsequently, Mukantagara and her son filed suit against USCIS in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging the termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of discretionary immigration agency actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to the first step of the refugee termination process under § 1157(c)(4), which involves a nondiscretionary eligibility determination. Therefore, the district court retains jurisdiction to review USCIS’s eligibility determination. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mukantagara v. Noem" on Justia Law

The defendant faced fourteen serious federal charges, including multiple counts related to methamphetamine distribution and a firearms offense, which exposed him to the possibility of life imprisonment and asset forfeiture. He, his attorney, and the government negotiated a plea agreement under which the defendant would plead guilty to a single count of methamphetamine distribution in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. However, at the scheduled change-of-plea hearing, the defendant hesitated and expressed a need for further information before deciding to enter a guilty plea. His attorney, citing a breakdown in their relationship, requested to withdraw from the case.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held an ex parte discussion with the defendant and his attorney to address the attorney’s request. During this conversation, the court explained possible consequences if the attorney withdrew, including potential delays and the government’s ability to withdraw its plea offer. The defendant ultimately decided to proceed with the plea agreement. The district court then conducted the plea colloquy but failed to explicitly inform the defendant of his right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(D). The defendant did not object to this omission at the time.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations and whether the failure to explicitly advise the defendant of his right to appointed counsel warranted reversal. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not participate in plea negotiations by merely advising the defendant about the status of the plea offer and available options regarding representation. The court further held that the omission regarding the right to appointed counsel did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had previously been informed of this right and demonstrated an understanding of it. The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Eckstein" on Justia Law

Early in the morning, a security guard at a hotel in Oklahoma City called 911 to report an unauthorized individual, Dawawn McCoy, refusing to leave a guest’s room and appearing unable to walk. Sergeant Cassidy of the Oklahoma City Police Department responded, found McCoy noncompliant and apparently under the influence, and requested medical evaluation. After medical personnel determined McCoy did not need immediate attention and he refused care, police were instructed to arrest him for trespassing. Cassidy called for additional officers, and together the officers attempted to handcuff McCoy, who resisted physically by pulling his hands in and kicking. The officers used pepper spray and a taser to subdue him. Once handcuffed, McCoy was rolled onto his stomach and restrained further. For approximately ninety seconds, according to the district court’s findings, McCoy had stopped resisting but officers continued to apply force by holding a knee on his back and pressing his legs upward. McCoy stopped responding verbally and showed signs of medical distress. Officers later attempted resuscitation and administered Narcan, but McCoy died six days later in the hospital.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, LaQuita Bruner, as administrator of McCoy’s estate, brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference claim but denied it as to the excessive force claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude excessive force was used after McCoy was subdued.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court held that, based on the facts found by the district court, the officers’ continued use of force after McCoy was subdued was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bruner v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

Kesters Merchandising Display International, Inc. and SurfaceQuest, Inc. are competing manufacturers in the architectural materials industry. Kesters produces MicroLite, a lightweight, seamless material. Around 2014, the parties collaborated to market samples of MicroLite wrapped in SurfaceQuest film, with Kesters supplying photographs and product guides. Subsequently, SurfaceQuest began independently selling and marketing its own lightweight beam wrapped in its film, utilizing photographs of MicroLite in promotional materials. Kesters alleged that SurfaceQuest misrepresented MicroLite as its own in various advertisements and communications with customers.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the initial lawsuit. Kesters claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, arguing that SurfaceQuest’s use of MicroLite images and representations damaged its business. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. The district court granted summary judgment to SurfaceQuest, finding that Kesters had neither established a presumption of injury nor presented evidence of actual injury resulting from the alleged false advertising.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo under the summary judgment standard. The appellate court determined that injury could not be presumed because Kesters failed to show that only two significant competitors existed in the relevant market or to provide evidence of cross-elasticity of demand. Furthermore, Kesters did not present evidence of actual injury, such as a causal connection between SurfaceQuest’s advertising and lost business opportunities. As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to SurfaceQuest and the denial of Kesters’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Kesters did not provide evidence supporting the required element of injury for its Lanham Act claim. View "Kesters Merchandising Display International v. SurfaceQuest" on Justia Law

During a shopping trip at Walmart, William Montgomery was stopped by a store employee and subsequently by Officer Armando Cruz, who suspected shoplifting after Montgomery declined to show a receipt. Officer Cruz directed Montgomery to raise his hands, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search his pockets. Without conducting a pat-down, Officer Cruz reached into Montgomery’s pockets, removing a prescription bottle and a wallet, and looked for Montgomery’s driver’s license. Montgomery was detained briefly, but Walmart employees determined he had paid for the items and he was released.Montgomery filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that Officer Cruz violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets and wallet without proper justification. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his actions did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that factual disputes existed regarding whether Officer Cruz had patted Montgomery down before reaching into his pockets and whether Montgomery had consented to the search of his wallet.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, accepting the district court’s factual conclusions, Officer Cruz’s search of Montgomery’s pockets without a pat-down or arrest constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the subsequent search of Montgomery’s wallet was not justified by consent, as any statement made by Montgomery after the illegal search could not retroactively legitimize the search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Cruz. View "Montgomery v. Cruz" on Justia Law

A hospital district alleged that a medical device manufacturer used its dominant market share in tip-location systems (TLS) for catheters to manipulate the market for peripherally inserted central catheters (PICCs). Bard, the manufacturer, sells PICCs with a proprietary stylet that is necessary to integrate with Bard’s TLS. The hospital claimed this arrangement effectively forced hospitals to buy Bard’s PICCs to use the TLS, resulting in higher prices, and brought suit under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act for unlawful tying and monopolization. The hospital sought class certification for clinics and hospitals that had purchased Bard PICCs.Initially, the United States District Court for the District of Utah granted Bard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the tying claim, holding that the hospital lacked antitrust standing since it purchased only the tied product (PICCs) and not the tying product (TLS). The court concluded the hospital did not show it was compelled to buy Bard’s PICCs as a result of owning Bard’s TLS. The court allowed the monopolization claim to proceed, but later denied class certification, finding the proposed class did not meet certification requirements. After the Tenth Circuit denied interlocutory review of the class certification denial, the hospital voluntarily dismissed its remaining claim to facilitate an appeal from final judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the tying claim, holding that the hospital was not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws and therefore lacked antitrust standing. The court found that purchasers of the tying product or competitors are generally better positioned to challenge tying arrangements. The Tenth Circuit also dismissed the appeal from denial of class certification, ruling it lacked jurisdiction under circuit and Supreme Court precedent when the underlying claim was voluntarily dismissed. View "North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of individuals was involved in drug-related activities at a house in Kansas City, Kansas, with Brandon West operating as a seller and user of methamphetamine supplied by his cousin David Carr, who sourced the drugs from James Poterbin. On April 18, 2019, after a drug purchase went awry and money was lost, West contacted Carr and Poterbin, believing that Mariah Vieni had stolen drug proceeds. Vieni’s boyfriend, D.B., was held at the house and, upon Carr and Poterbin’s arrival, was subjected to violence including beating, stabbing, and being shot. The incident led to federal charges against several participants, including Poterbin.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas tried Poterbin alongside Carr. The jury convicted Poterbin on all counts: conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine, kidnapping, and using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to a total of 480 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Poterbin challenged his convictions and sentence on appeal, raising arguments about the admission of certain evidence, sufficiency of the evidence, and procedural reasonableness of his sentence, among other issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding Poterbin’s post-conspiracy drug sales was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and limiting instructions provided to the jury. The court found sufficient evidence supporting all convictions, rejected arguments regarding the credibility of witnesses, and determined that the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements did not amount to plain error. The court dismissed Poterbin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims without prejudice, allowing them to be raised in a collateral proceeding. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Poterbin’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Poterbin" on Justia Law

A member of the United States Army National Guard, Stacy Gonzales, worked as a local disease intervention specialist at the Finney County Health Department in Kansas. Her position was funded primarily through Aid-to-Local grants distributed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), which set substantive job expectations and supervised both state and local disease intervention specialists. Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined and paid by Finney County, but her day-to-day work, training, and performance evaluations involved significant oversight from KDHE. When KDHE decided not to renew the Aid-to-Local grant in 2010 due to perceived performance deficiencies, Finney County was forced to terminate Gonzales’s position, resulting in her unemployment.The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that KDHE had violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by discriminating against Gonzales based on her military service obligations. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the threshold issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The district court granted summary judgment to Kansas, concluding that KDHE was not Gonzales’s employer because it did not have direct authority to hire, fire, supervise, or determine her salary or benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the definition of “employer” under USERRA includes entities that exercise control over employment opportunities, not limited to direct authority over hiring, firing, or pay. The court found sufficient evidence that KDHE retained significant control over Gonzales’s employment opportunities to preclude summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Department of Health & Environment" on Justia Law