Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kesters Merchandising Display International, Inc. and SurfaceQuest, Inc. are competing manufacturers in the architectural materials industry. Kesters produces MicroLite, a lightweight, seamless material. Around 2014, the parties collaborated to market samples of MicroLite wrapped in SurfaceQuest film, with Kesters supplying photographs and product guides. Subsequently, SurfaceQuest began independently selling and marketing its own lightweight beam wrapped in its film, utilizing photographs of MicroLite in promotional materials. Kesters alleged that SurfaceQuest misrepresented MicroLite as its own in various advertisements and communications with customers.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the initial lawsuit. Kesters claimed false advertising under the Lanham Act, arguing that SurfaceQuest’s use of MicroLite images and representations damaged its business. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. The district court granted summary judgment to SurfaceQuest, finding that Kesters had neither established a presumption of injury nor presented evidence of actual injury resulting from the alleged false advertising.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo under the summary judgment standard. The appellate court determined that injury could not be presumed because Kesters failed to show that only two significant competitors existed in the relevant market or to provide evidence of cross-elasticity of demand. Furthermore, Kesters did not present evidence of actual injury, such as a causal connection between SurfaceQuest’s advertising and lost business opportunities. As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to SurfaceQuest and the denial of Kesters’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Kesters did not provide evidence supporting the required element of injury for its Lanham Act claim. View "Kesters Merchandising Display International v. SurfaceQuest" on Justia Law

During a shopping trip at Walmart, William Montgomery was stopped by a store employee and subsequently by Officer Armando Cruz, who suspected shoplifting after Montgomery declined to show a receipt. Officer Cruz directed Montgomery to raise his hands, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search his pockets. Without conducting a pat-down, Officer Cruz reached into Montgomery’s pockets, removing a prescription bottle and a wallet, and looked for Montgomery’s driver’s license. Montgomery was detained briefly, but Walmart employees determined he had paid for the items and he was released.Montgomery filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that Officer Cruz violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets and wallet without proper justification. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his actions did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that factual disputes existed regarding whether Officer Cruz had patted Montgomery down before reaching into his pockets and whether Montgomery had consented to the search of his wallet.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, accepting the district court’s factual conclusions, Officer Cruz’s search of Montgomery’s pockets without a pat-down or arrest constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the subsequent search of Montgomery’s wallet was not justified by consent, as any statement made by Montgomery after the illegal search could not retroactively legitimize the search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Cruz. View "Montgomery v. Cruz" on Justia Law

A hospital district alleged that a medical device manufacturer used its dominant market share in tip-location systems (TLS) for catheters to manipulate the market for peripherally inserted central catheters (PICCs). Bard, the manufacturer, sells PICCs with a proprietary stylet that is necessary to integrate with Bard’s TLS. The hospital claimed this arrangement effectively forced hospitals to buy Bard’s PICCs to use the TLS, resulting in higher prices, and brought suit under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act for unlawful tying and monopolization. The hospital sought class certification for clinics and hospitals that had purchased Bard PICCs.Initially, the United States District Court for the District of Utah granted Bard’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the tying claim, holding that the hospital lacked antitrust standing since it purchased only the tied product (PICCs) and not the tying product (TLS). The court concluded the hospital did not show it was compelled to buy Bard’s PICCs as a result of owning Bard’s TLS. The court allowed the monopolization claim to proceed, but later denied class certification, finding the proposed class did not meet certification requirements. After the Tenth Circuit denied interlocutory review of the class certification denial, the hospital voluntarily dismissed its remaining claim to facilitate an appeal from final judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the tying claim, holding that the hospital was not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws and therefore lacked antitrust standing. The court found that purchasers of the tying product or competitors are generally better positioned to challenge tying arrangements. The Tenth Circuit also dismissed the appeal from denial of class certification, ruling it lacked jurisdiction under circuit and Supreme Court precedent when the underlying claim was voluntarily dismissed. View "North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of individuals was involved in drug-related activities at a house in Kansas City, Kansas, with Brandon West operating as a seller and user of methamphetamine supplied by his cousin David Carr, who sourced the drugs from James Poterbin. On April 18, 2019, after a drug purchase went awry and money was lost, West contacted Carr and Poterbin, believing that Mariah Vieni had stolen drug proceeds. Vieni’s boyfriend, D.B., was held at the house and, upon Carr and Poterbin’s arrival, was subjected to violence including beating, stabbing, and being shot. The incident led to federal charges against several participants, including Poterbin.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas tried Poterbin alongside Carr. The jury convicted Poterbin on all counts: conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine, kidnapping, and using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to a total of 480 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Poterbin challenged his convictions and sentence on appeal, raising arguments about the admission of certain evidence, sufficiency of the evidence, and procedural reasonableness of his sentence, among other issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that any error in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding Poterbin’s post-conspiracy drug sales was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and limiting instructions provided to the jury. The court found sufficient evidence supporting all convictions, rejected arguments regarding the credibility of witnesses, and determined that the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements did not amount to plain error. The court dismissed Poterbin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims without prejudice, allowing them to be raised in a collateral proceeding. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Poterbin’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Poterbin" on Justia Law

A member of the United States Army National Guard, Stacy Gonzales, worked as a local disease intervention specialist at the Finney County Health Department in Kansas. Her position was funded primarily through Aid-to-Local grants distributed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), which set substantive job expectations and supervised both state and local disease intervention specialists. Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined and paid by Finney County, but her day-to-day work, training, and performance evaluations involved significant oversight from KDHE. When KDHE decided not to renew the Aid-to-Local grant in 2010 due to perceived performance deficiencies, Finney County was forced to terminate Gonzales’s position, resulting in her unemployment.The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that KDHE had violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by discriminating against Gonzales based on her military service obligations. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the threshold issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The district court granted summary judgment to Kansas, concluding that KDHE was not Gonzales’s employer because it did not have direct authority to hire, fire, supervise, or determine her salary or benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the definition of “employer” under USERRA includes entities that exercise control over employment opportunities, not limited to direct authority over hiring, firing, or pay. The court found sufficient evidence that KDHE retained significant control over Gonzales’s employment opportunities to preclude summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Department of Health & Environment" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped a motorist for driving without a front license plate and failing to use a turn signal in a high-crime area of Denver known for gang activity. The driver, Antoan Raban, was identified as a member of the Tre Tre Crips gang and was driving in rival Bloods gang territory. During the stop, a known Crips gang member, Deshay Armstrong, parked nearby, watched the officers, and called Raban’s phone. Raban did not have identification, and a records check revealed violent and weapons-related convictions. Officers called for backup, removed Raban from his car to fingerprint him, frisked him, and found no weapons. While preparing to take fingerprints, an officer conducted a protective sweep of Raban’s car and discovered a loaded pistol and ammunition.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Raban’s motion to suppress, finding that under the totality of the circumstances—including the high-crime area, Raban’s gang affiliation, Armstrong’s presence, and Raban’s ankle monitor—the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Initially, the district court questioned whether the officers genuinely intended to return Raban to his car but later reconsidered and found it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Raban might be released with a citation and allowed to reenter his vehicle.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. It held that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Raban was presently dangerous and that he might regain access to a weapon in his car if released. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Raban’s conviction, holding that the protective sweep was lawful under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances. View "United States v. Raban" on Justia Law

The case centers on Brett Dewayne Cole, who was charged with three counts stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, K.Z., a member of the Choctaw tribe. In May 2019, K.Z., then ten years old, disclosed to school personnel and a nurse examiner that Cole had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at their family home, including acts of touching and oral and anal penetration. Cole denied any inappropriate conduct. During trial, the government sought to introduce testimony from three witnesses—Cole’s half-sister, half-brother, and stepcousin—about prior instances in which Cole allegedly molested them as children, with these incidents occurring when Cole himself was a juvenile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Cole’s case. At the first trial in January 2023, evidence of Cole’s prior acts as a juvenile was admitted over his belated objection, but the jury failed to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In a second trial held in March 2023, similar evidence was presented, and the jury convicted Cole on all counts. Cole appealed, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not permit admission of the prior acts because he was a juvenile at the time, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that acts of child molestation committed as a juvenile qualify as “crimes” under Rule 414 and are admissible. It further found that the district court properly balanced the probative value against any prejudicial impact and did not abuse its discretion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Cole’s conviction. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

Max and Peggy Lancaster transferred approximately $3.8 million in property to a family LLC owned by their adult children, receiving a promissory note and other loan-related documents in exchange. They subsequently applied for Medicaid benefits in Oklahoma but were found ineligible due to their financial resources exceeding Medicaid’s asset limit. The Lancasters challenged this determination in federal court, arguing that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the Oklahoma Health Care Authority violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act, which requires prompt provision of benefits to eligible individuals. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the Agencies’ asset calculation was erroneous and deprived them of a federally protected right.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the Agencies’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the promissory note received from the LLC was a countable resource under state law and not a bona fide loan. As a result, the court concluded the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits because their assets exceeded the threshold set by law. The Lancasters appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, which clarified the standard for determining whether provisions of the Medicaid Act confer individually enforceable rights under § 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Medina, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does not clearly and unambiguously confer a private right enforceable via § 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Lancasters’ claims, holding that there is no individually enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(8) for the purposes of this lawsuit. View "Lancaster v. Cartmell" on Justia Law

Several Utah-based companies and individuals, including Standard Insurances and related entities, challenged actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) following an audit. Standard Insurances, a micro-captive insurance company, had provided insurance to its affiliated companies, seeking certain federal tax benefits under 26 U.S.C. § 831(b). After an audit initiated in 2022, the IRS determined that Standard was not a legitimate micro-captive insurance company, issued deficiency notices, and adjusted the tax liabilities of Standard and its insureds. The IRS concluded that Standard’s transactions lacked economic substance and were not genuine insurance transactions, resulting in increased taxable income for Standard and decreased deductions for the insured entities.Following the issuance of deficiency notices, Standard petitioned the United States Tax Court for redetermination of its tax liabilities and made advance payments. While those proceedings remained pending, Standard filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the claims were barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and the Tax Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which prohibit suits in federal court that restrain the assessment or collection of federal taxes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that Standard’s claims sought relief that would restrain the IRS’s assessment and collection of taxes, and thus were barred by the DJA and AIA. The court found that none of the judicially created exceptions to these statutes applied, as Standard had an available remedy in tax court and could pursue further review if necessary. The court rejected Standard’s arguments that its claims were not subject to the statutory bars and concluded that federal court jurisdiction was precluded in this instance. View "Standard Insurances v. IRS" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was employed as a conductor for a railway company and alleged that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). Specifically, he claimed that in January 2019 he refused to allow the train’s engineer to perform a task—lining a switch—due to safety concerns, opting instead to perform the procedure himself. The plaintiff asserted that this refusal was in defiance of a purported “standing order” directing engineers to line switches to expedite train movements. He argued that allowing engineers to leave the controls unattended while lining switches created a hazardous condition.Following his termination for a separate incident in February 2019, the plaintiff pursued complaints through several forums. First, he challenged his dismissal before a Public Law Board, which found that he had violated safety rules but ordered reinstatement without backpay due to disproportionate punishment. He also filed a complaint with OSHA, asserting retaliation for reporting safety concerns and insisting on safe practices. An administrative law judge (ALJ) subsequently dismissed this complaint, finding no credible evidence of a standing order, no proof that the plaintiff had refused to work as required by the statute, and no evidence of a hazardous safety condition at the relevant time.The plaintiff then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, which granted summary judgment to the railway company. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish that he engaged in protected activity under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b)(1)(B) because he did not refuse to work and was not confronting an imminent hazardous condition. Therefore, he could not make a prima facie case of retaliation under the FRSA. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Berberich v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law