Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A citizen of El Salvador entered the United States near El Paso, Texas, in February 2023 without proper documentation. He was detained and placed in removal proceedings, where he conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He alleged that he had been detained and abused by Salvadoran authorities on several occasions, including being beaten and subjected to harsh conditions, and pointed to his and his mother’s limited involvement in a human rights organization as evidence that he was targeted for political reasons. He also described a general pattern of young men in his neighborhood being suspected of gang affiliation by police.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that, while the petitioner’s testimony was at times lacking in detail, he was not found to be non-credible. However, the IJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish a nexus between his alleged persecution and any protected ground such as political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The IJ also determined that the mistreatment described did not rise to the level of torture under the CAT and that internal relocation within El Salvador might be possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the petitioner had not met the requirements for asylum, withholding, or CAT relief, and rejected claims of an unfair hearing.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that the petitioner had not shown persecution on account of a protected ground, nor that he was more likely than not to face torture if returned. The court also found no due process violation, determining that the IJ adequately developed the record and that there was insufficient evidence of prejudicial translation errors. The petition for review was denied. View "Bonilla-Espinoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A group of oil-and-gas royalty owners in Oklahoma, represented by Chieftain Royalty Company, sued EnerVest Energy’s predecessor in 2011 for allegedly underpaying royalties. After EnerVest acquired the wells, the parties reached a $52 million settlement in 2015 to be paid to the class after expenses and attorneys’ fees. Class counsel sought 40% of the fund as fees, plus expenses and an incentive award for the class representative. Two class members objected to the fee and incentive awards.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma approved the settlement, awarding 33.33% of the fund for attorneys’ fees and a 0.5% incentive award. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the settlement but reversed the fee and incentive awards, holding that Oklahoma law applied and required a lodestar analysis (not solely a percentage-of-the-fund), and that incentive awards must be based on time spent on case-related services. Following remand and a clarifying decision from the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc., the district court reapplied the statutory factors, found a 33.33% fee reasonable (supported by a 2.15 lodestar multiplier), and adjusted the incentive award based on the representative’s service. A subsequent Tenth Circuit appeal led to vacatur of the fee award on procedural notice grounds, then the district court reinstated the same fee after proper notice.On this third appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma law does not impose a hard ceiling on percentage fees or lodestar multipliers. The district court properly applied Oklahoma’s statutory factors, conducted a thorough reasonableness analysis, and did not abuse its discretion by awarding 33.33% of the fund ($17,333,333.33) as attorneys’ fees. The fee award was affirmed. View "Chieftain Royalty Company v. Enervest Energy Institutional Fund XIII-A" on Justia Law

Christopher Singer, a previously convicted felon, was investigated in connection with a drive-by shooting in Oklahoma City. Police found spent and live ammunition in his possession, leading to federal charges for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Singer pleaded guilty to this charge. At sentencing, the United States Probation Office presented a report noting Singer’s three prior Oklahoma state convictions: two for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645, and one for robbery with a firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed Singer’s objections to the presentence investigation report. Singer argued that his prior convictions under § 645 should not be classified as categorical crimes of violence for purposes of the United States Sentencing Guidelines or as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because the statute could apply to assaults against unborn victims, which federal law does not include in its definitions of “crime of violence.” The district court, relying on prior Tenth Circuit precedent in United States v. Taylor, overruled Singer’s objection, determined the convictions qualified under both the Guidelines and ACCA, and sentenced Singer to 180 months, the mandatory minimum under ACCA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentencing determination de novo. The court concluded that Oklahoma’s § 645 does criminalize assault and battery with a dangerous weapon against unborn persons. Guided by its own precedent, notably United States v. Adams, the Tenth Circuit held that because federal law excludes crimes against unborn persons from its definition of “crime of violence,” Singer’s prior convictions under § 645 do not categorically qualify as such under the Guidelines or ACCA. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s sentencing decision and remanded for resentencing consistent with this ruling. View "United States v. Singer" on Justia Law

A group of affiliated pest-control companies discovered that employees of a competing firm, Aptive Environmental, LLC, had bribed members of their organization to obtain confidential sales data stored in a password-protected system. The misappropriated data was allegedly used by Aptive to recruit sales representatives for the competitive summer sales season, an activity crucial to both businesses’ revenue. Upon learning of these actions, the companies sued Aptive and several individual employees, asserting claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), and Utah’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the CFAA claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded the statutory loss requirement, specifically a loss from technological harm. The court denied motions to compel broad discovery into damages, limiting disclosures but allowing the possibility of further tailored discovery. On summary judgment, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation linking Aptive’s alleged misappropriation to unjust enrichment, granting judgment for Aptive on the RICO, DTSA, and UTSA claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed these decisions. It held that the district court erred in dismissing the CFAA claim, clarifying that the statute does not require loss from technological harm and that investigative costs can qualify as statutory losses. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of broad discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. Regarding summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the outcome for the RICO claim due to lack of causation evidence but reversed in part for the DTSA and UTSA claims, holding that reasonable royalties and injunctive relief do not require the same proof of causation as unjust enrichment. The CFAA, DTSA, and UTSA claims were remanded for further proceedings. View "Moxie Pest Control (Utah) v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

A Kansas man was convicted in 2009 for the murder of a woman, Kathleen, but was acquitted of killing her husband, Carl. After spending twelve years in prison, he was exonerated when evidence emerged showing Kathleen had killed both herself and her husband, framing him for the crime. The exonerated man died shortly after his release. His widow, as executor of his estate, filed a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by the police during the investigation that led to his conviction. Specifically, the claims against the two lead detectives included fabrication and suppression of evidence (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count II).The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the detectives’ motion for summary judgment on both counts, rejecting their assertion of qualified immunity. The district court found that a jury could conclude the detectives withheld material exculpatory evidence, failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, and fabricated inculpatory evidence. The court also found that a reasonable jury could determine the detectives acted at least recklessly, and that clear legal precedent established the officers’ obligations. The district court further denied summary judgment to the Unified Government (the detectives’ employer) on municipal liability claims, because those claims depended on the detectives’ alleged constitutional violations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the legal questions related to qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on both counts, concluding the estate’s claims were supported by controlling law and sufficient factual allegations. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction, since it did not independently resolve the underlying constitutional claims. View "Coones v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in federal court with possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty. At sentencing, a dispute arose over whether he was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction under California Penal Code § 311.11, which criminalizes possession of images depicting a minor “personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.” The defendant argued that the California statute was broader than the federal definition of child pornography and therefore should not trigger the federal mandatory minimum.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming agreed with the government and found that the prior California conviction qualified as a predicate offense, applying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). The defendant appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the mandatory minimum sentence de novo. Employing the categorical approach, the appellate court examined whether the elements of the California offense categorically matched the federal generic offense of possession of child pornography. The Tenth Circuit concluded that California Penal Code § 311.11, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, criminalizes conduct such as “any touching” with sexual intent, which can include nonexplicit, nonsexual images far removed from the federal definition of child pornography. Because the California statute sweeps more broadly than the federal generic offense, the prior conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 2252A(b)(2).The Tenth Circuit held that the mandatory minimum sentence was improperly applied and therefore vacated the defendant’s sentence, remanding the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Two cousins alleged that the defendant lured them into his trailer with candy and sexually abused them when they were young children. As a result, he was charged with two counts of engaging in a sexual act with a minor under twelve years old, allegedly occurring on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. The indictment specified that the victims were Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required for federal jurisdiction under the applicable statutes.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over the trial. The government sought to prove the defendant’s non-Indian status primarily through the testimony of two law enforcement witnesses, who based their conclusions on reviews of various databases and documents. No direct genealogical or enrollment evidence was introduced. At the close of the government’s case, the defendant moved for acquittal under Rule 29, arguing that the government had failed to prove his non-Indian status. The district court denied the motion, relying on the witnesses’ testimonies. The jury convicted the defendant on one count, and he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government had presented sufficient evidence that the defendant was a non-Indian. Applying de novo review, the court found that the government’s evidence was inadequate to establish non-Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by circuit precedent. The court held that, because non-Indian status is an essential element of the charged crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 in the Tenth Circuit, the conviction could not stand without such proof. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Agnes Mukantagara and her son, Ebenezer Shyaka, were admitted to the United States as refugees in 2005. Two years later, USCIS paused Mukantagara’s refugee status and revoked her travel documents due to suspicions that she had participated in the Rwandan genocide. After an investigation, USCIS concluded in 2016 that Mukantagara had participated in the genocide and terminated her refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). This determination also affected her son’s status, and both were placed into removal proceedings. During those proceedings, the immigration court found Mukantagara credible and granted her asylum, rejecting the government’s allegations, but denied asylum to Shyaka, finding he no longer qualified as her dependent due to his age.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the immigration court’s grant of asylum to Mukantagara and affirmed the denial for Shyaka. On remand, the immigration court again granted asylum to Mukantagara. Shyaka pursued further review before the Tenth Circuit, and both the BIA and the Tenth Circuit abated their respective appeals pending the outcome of the present litigation. Subsequently, Mukantagara and her son filed suit against USCIS in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging the termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of discretionary immigration agency actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to the first step of the refugee termination process under § 1157(c)(4), which involves a nondiscretionary eligibility determination. Therefore, the district court retains jurisdiction to review USCIS’s eligibility determination. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mukantagara v. Noem" on Justia Law

The defendant faced fourteen serious federal charges, including multiple counts related to methamphetamine distribution and a firearms offense, which exposed him to the possibility of life imprisonment and asset forfeiture. He, his attorney, and the government negotiated a plea agreement under which the defendant would plead guilty to a single count of methamphetamine distribution in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. However, at the scheduled change-of-plea hearing, the defendant hesitated and expressed a need for further information before deciding to enter a guilty plea. His attorney, citing a breakdown in their relationship, requested to withdraw from the case.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held an ex parte discussion with the defendant and his attorney to address the attorney’s request. During this conversation, the court explained possible consequences if the attorney withdrew, including potential delays and the government’s ability to withdraw its plea offer. The defendant ultimately decided to proceed with the plea agreement. The district court then conducted the plea colloquy but failed to explicitly inform the defendant of his right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(D). The defendant did not object to this omission at the time.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations and whether the failure to explicitly advise the defendant of his right to appointed counsel warranted reversal. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not participate in plea negotiations by merely advising the defendant about the status of the plea offer and available options regarding representation. The court further held that the omission regarding the right to appointed counsel did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he had previously been informed of this right and demonstrated an understanding of it. The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Eckstein" on Justia Law