Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, C&M Resources, LLC and Winter Oil, LLC, acting on behalf of a putative class of royalty owners, alleged that Extraction Oil and Gas, Inc. underpaid royalties owed under oil and natural gas production agreements. This case is the third attempt by the plaintiffs to pursue these claims, all arising from the same set of facts. In the two prior lawsuits filed in Colorado state court, the trial courts dismissed the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, as required by statute. The plaintiffs did not appeal those dismissals.In the present case, originally filed in state court in 2019, proceedings were stayed pending the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Antero Resources Corp. v. Airport Land Partners, Ltd. After the stay was lifted in 2023 and discovery commenced, Extraction determined that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million and removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act. The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely and that Extraction had waived its right to remove by participating in state court litigation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the remand motion, finding that the removal was timely based on information obtained during discovery and that the bankruptcy proof of claim and other documents from prior cases did not trigger the removal clock.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court properly denied remand and correctly applied collateral estoppel, precluding the plaintiffs from relitigating the exhaustion requirement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Extraction, finding no error in the lower court’s rulings. View "C&M Resources v. Extraction Oil and Gas" on Justia Law

Over a fourteen-month period, the defendant and his wife engaged in a scheme to purchase seven high-end used vehicles from Kansas dealerships, financing the purchases with bank loans obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations on loan applications. After acquiring the vehicles, they altered title documents to remove the banks’ liens, enabling them to obtain false clear titles. These clear titles were then used to either sell the vehicles or secure title loans for cash. The defendant made few or no payments on the original car loans, and the fraudulent activity involved both Kansas and Georgia vehicle registrations.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially indicted both the defendant and his wife on seventeen counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The court severed the wife’s case after she agreed to testify against the defendant in exchange for dismissal of her charges, though she ultimately did not testify. At trial, the government dismissed one count and renumbered the remaining charges. The jury convicted the defendant on all sixteen counts, and the district court imposed concurrent forty-six-month sentences. After sentencing, the government dismissed all charges against the wife.On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence for seven of the defendant’s convictions. The court reversed the bank fraud conviction on Count 2, finding no evidence that the defendant aided or abetted his wife’s fraudulent loan. It also reversed the wire fraud conviction on Count 9 due to insufficient proof of the interstate commerce element. However, the court affirmed the money laundering convictions on Counts 12 through 16, concluding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant’s transactions were designed, at least in part, to conceal or disguise the proceeds of bank fraud. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Three trade associations representing state-chartered banks challenged Colorado’s decision to opt out of a federal law, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA), which sets national standards for interest rates that state banks may charge. In 2023, Colorado exercised its opt-out right under DIDA and announced it would enforce its own interest-rate caps on loans made to Colorado borrowers, including those made by out-of-state banks. The trade associations argued that Colorado’s opt-out should only apply to loans made by banks physically located in Colorado, not to loans made by out-of-state banks to Colorado residents.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado agreed with the trade associations. It granted a preliminary injunction preventing Colorado officials from enforcing the state’s interest-rate caps against out-of-state banks making loans to Colorado borrowers. The district court found that the plaintiffs had a viable cause of action under Ex parte Young, were likely to succeed on the merits, and would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court also determined that the balance of equities and public interest favored the plaintiffs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the phrase “loans made in such State” in DIDA’s opt-out provision refers to loans in which either the lender or the borrower is located in the opt-out state. Therefore, Colorado’s opt-out applies to loans made by out-of-state banks to Colorado borrowers, and DIDA no longer preempts Colorado’s interest-rate caps for those loans. The Tenth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction, finding that the district court erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "National Association of Industrial Bankers v. Weiser" on Justia Law

A marketing and e-commerce company based in Nevada provided services for the Kanye 2020 presidential campaign at the request of a group of Arizona-based political consultants (the Lincoln defendants). The company began work without a written contract, relying on assurances that terms would be formalized later. It created campaign materials, built a website, and managed digital operations, but was never paid for its work. The company sued Kanye 2020 and the Lincoln defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.The District of Wyoming found it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Lincoln defendants and transferred those claims to the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, citing concerns about potential statute of limitations issues. The court dismissed the claims against Kanye 2020 for failure to state a claim, but did so without prejudice. Kanye 2020 moved for reconsideration, seeking dismissal with prejudice, but the Wyoming court declined, stating it no longer had jurisdiction after the transfer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory transfer order. The court affirmed the dismissal of the contract claims against Kanye 2020, finding the complaint failed to plausibly allege the existence of an oral or implied contract or unjust enrichment, as there were insufficient communications or notice to Kanye 2020 regarding payment expectations. However, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider Kanye 2020’s motion for reconsideration. The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether the dismissal of the claims against Kanye 2020 should be with prejudice. View "SeedX v. Lincoln Strategy" on Justia Law

Paul D. Russell, a civilian employee at the Irwin Army Community Hospital in Fort Riley, Kansas, alleged that his female supervisor, Major Tamara Tran, discriminated against him and other male employees, creating a hostile work environment based on gender. Russell cited several incidents, including gender-segregated meetings, differential treatment in access to the supervisor, public criticism, changes to his job title, exclusion from leadership communications, and an attempt to appoint a less qualified female employee as acting chief during Tran’s maternity leave. An internal Army investigation found that Tran had discriminated on the basis of gender, violating Army policy, but cleared Russell of any wrongdoing.After exhausting administrative remedies, Russell filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, claiming a violation of Title VII due to a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army, finding that Tran’s actions, while motivated by gender bias, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to meet the legal standard for a hostile work environment under Title VII. The court noted that the internal investigation’s findings did not address the required severity or pervasiveness analysis.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Russell argued that the district court applied an overly stringent standard in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, but the Tenth Circuit held that Muldrow did not alter the established requirement that hostile work environment claims must show conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive. The Tenth Circuit also found that Russell had waived his argument regarding the weight of the internal investigation report. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the severity or pervasiveness standard remains controlling for hostile work environment claims under Title VII. View "Russell v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

While serving a federal sentence in Bureau of Prisons custody, the defendant was temporarily housed at a federal facility in Oklahoma. There, he used a distress alarm to summon a correctional officer and, when the officer arrived, exposed himself and masturbated in view of the officer through his cell door window. This was not the first such incident; the defendant had previously been disciplined for similar acts of public masturbation on four occasions at another federal prison. The government charged him with indecent exposure under Oklahoma law, assimilated through federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the case. Before trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior acts, including disciplinary logs and incident reports, to show intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. The district court conducted the required analysis and admitted the logs and incident reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and after balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. The first trial ended in a mistrial, but at retrial, the evidence was again admitted, and the jury convicted the defendant. The district court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the admission of the prior-acts evidence and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant had waived his argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and forfeited his argument under Rule 803(6), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 403. The court also found no plain error in admitting the evidence as business records and concluded that the district court properly applied the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Bartlesville, Oklahoma police officers responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Willis Gay Jr., who reported his son Thomas Gay was behaving erratically and possibly under the influence of drugs. Willis informed the officers that Thomas was unarmed but had made furtive movements toward his back pocket. Upon entering the home, the officers observed Thomas holding an innocuous object and appearing disoriented. Officer Lewis immediately pointed his Taser at Thomas and, after a single command, tased him. Officer Pitts drew her firearm. Thomas retreated into a bedroom, where Officer Lewis tased him again, but the Taser failed to incapacitate him. A brief struggle ensued, and as Thomas moved toward the bedroom door, making a motion toward his back pocket, Officer Pitts shot him twice, resulting in his death within minutes of the officers’ arrival.The Estate of Thomas Gay sued the officers in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the motion, finding that disputed facts could allow a reasonable jury to conclude the officers violated Thomas’s clearly established constitutional rights. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Thomas was unarmed and not holding any object when shot, and that the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the district court’s factual determinations, as the record did not blatantly contradict those findings and no legal error was committed. The court further held that, under clearly established law, the officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable, precluding qualified immunity. View "Burke v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Late one night in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Jason Roybal led police officers on a low-speed chase in a stolen car. After stopping, Roybal leaned out of his vehicle and fired a BB gun at the officers. The officers responded by firing their guns. Roybal then exited his car, dropped the BB gun, and fled on foot toward a civilian-occupied vehicle. The officers shot and killed Roybal as he was running away. The personal representative of Roybal’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, specifically claiming that Roybal was unarmed and fleeing when he was shot.The case was initially filed in New Mexico state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity and arguing that the complaint omitted key facts, such as Roybal firing a BB gun and running toward an occupied car. They also asked the district court to consider dash- and body-camera footage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that it could not consider the videos at this stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly refused to consider the video evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a violation of Roybal’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the officers’ conduct was not justified by the circumstances described, and the right at issue was clearly established by precedent. View "Fuqua v. Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after years of being teased and picked on by his housemates, fatally stabbed one of them during a night of drinking and verbal taunting. The defendant, a member of the Choctaw Nation, lived with several relatives in Oklahoma. On the night in question, the group engaged in typical banter and name-calling, with the victim and another housemate calling the defendant derogatory names, including in the Choctaw language. After retreating to his room, the defendant emerged with a knife, confronted the victim, and, following a struggle, stabbed him multiple times, resulting in the victim’s death. The defendant admitted to the stabbing during a 9-1-1 call, expressing remorse and attributing his actions to the ongoing verbal abuse.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The defendant did not dispute that he killed the victim but argued that he acted in the heat of passion, seeking a conviction for voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. The district court, over the government’s objection, instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. At the government’s request, and over the defendant’s objection, the court also instructed the jury that “words alone” cannot negate malice aforethought and create heat of passion. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the “words alone” instruction was legally correct and whether it improperly affected the jury’s deliberations. The court held that the instruction accurately reflected longstanding legal principles: mere words, no matter how aggravating or insulting, are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute adequate provocation for heat of passion manslaughter under federal law. The court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sockey" on Justia Law

Mary Timmins worked as general counsel and litigation counsel for the Green Mountain Water and Sanitation District in Colorado. During her employment, she discovered that certain members of the District’s Board were engaging in conduct she believed to be corrupt and potentially unlawful, including violating open meetings laws, improperly communicating with a state-employed attorney, and destroying public records relevant to ongoing litigation. After repeatedly warning the Board internally without effect, Timmins disclosed her concerns to reporters and private citizens, alleging that the Board members were acting against the interests of the District and its residents. She was subsequently terminated from her position.Timmins filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the District and three Board members, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. The district court dismissed her claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that her speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was made pursuant to her official duties as a public employee. The court reasoned that her statements to the press and private citizens were essentially identical to those made in her official capacity and stemmed from her work responsibilities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that Timmins’s speech to reporters and private citizens was not made pursuant to her official duties, as her job did not ordinarily require her to make such disclosures outside the chain of command. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Timmins’s amended complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, declining to address alternative grounds for affirmance at this stage. View "Timmins v. Plotkin" on Justia Law