Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In this case, law enforcement in Wyoming relied on information from a confidential informant who was cooperating after his own arrest for methamphetamine possession and a firearm offense. The informant reported that he had purchased methamphetamine from Ronald Fox, who sourced the drugs from the defendant. The informant participated in two controlled buys from Fox and provided authorities with the defendant’s address and vehicle information, which officers corroborated through records and GPS tracking. Shortly before the defendant’s arrest, the informant stated that the defendant would borrow his Volkswagen, travel to Colorado to buy methamphetamine, and return to Wyoming. GPS trackers confirmed these movements, including the defendant’s travel patterns and mechanical issues with the vehicle.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming heard the case after the defendant was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from the vehicle stop, arguing that the search lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and later challenged the sufficiency of the search warrant. The district court denied both motions, finding that the search was lawful based on the validity of the warrant, the officers’ good-faith reliance on it, and, independently, the existence of probable cause under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the suppression motions. The appellate court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the corroborated and timely information provided by the informant. The court concluded that the automobile exception justified the warrantless search and affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motions, as well as the defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Schear" on Justia Law

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The defendant was indicted for illegal reentry after previously being deported from the United States. He pleaded guilty to the offense, which stemmed from returning to New Mexico following multiple deportations and engaging in criminal conduct, including threatening a neighbor and attempting to run him over. Prior to his first deportation, the defendant had been convicted in New Mexico for armed robbery with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and bribery of a witness, for which he received consecutive sentences totaling fifteen years. The state court initially credited him with time served in presentence confinement and imposed a term of probation, later revoking probation and crediting additional probation time toward the maximum sentence per New Mexico law.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced the defendant for illegal reentry, applying a ten-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines due to the prior felony conviction’s “sentence imposed” exceeding five years. The probation office recommended this enhancement, and the defendant requested a downward variance at sentencing, arguing that his actual incarceration was less than five years. The district court ultimately imposed a seventy-month sentence.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the probation credit under New Mexico law affected the calculation of “sentence imposed” for guideline purposes. The court held that the relevant calculation is the maximum sentence minus the suspended portion, not the actual time incarcerated. Because the not-suspended portion exceeded five years, the ten-level enhancement was correctly applied. The court affirmed both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the district court’s sentence, concluding there was no error in the guideline calculation or in the consideration of mitigating factors. View "United States v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2022, a wildfire in New Mexico resulted from two controlled burns conducted by the United States Forest Service, ultimately causing substantial property loss and personal harm to local residents. In response, Congress passed the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire Assistance Act to provide compensation to victims. The Act tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with implementing a streamlined process for administering claims for damages under the Act. Plaintiffs who lost property and suffered various injuries—including both economic and noneconomic harm—filed claims with FEMA. FEMA interpreted the Act not to allow recovery for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, and denied those portions of the claims.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico reviewed the plaintiffs’ challenge to FEMA’s interpretation under the Administrative Procedures Act. The district court held that FEMA’s exclusion of noneconomic damages was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. The court set aside FEMA’s rule and ordered FEMA to consider and pay claims for noneconomic damages when warranted. FEMA’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, and FEMA appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the Assistance Act does not contain a clear and unequivocal waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity for noneconomic damages. The court found the relevant statutory language ambiguous and, applying the presumption in favor of sovereign immunity, concluded that noneconomic damages are not recoverable under the Act. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Dolan v. Federal Emergency Management Agency" on Justia Law

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A young woman, an enrolled member of the Choctaw Nation, was raised in a dysfunctional and abusive environment on the Choctaw Nation Reservation. At seventeen-and-a-half years old, she orchestrated a plan for her fifteen-year-old boyfriend and eighteen-year-old friend to murder her parents, purportedly motivated by a fabricated pregnancy and the belief that eliminating her parents was necessary for her future with her boyfriend. The friends carried out the murders as planned, and all three attempted to flee in her parents' car, but were apprehended after crashing nearby.The United States charged her in the Eastern District of Oklahoma with two counts of murder in Indian country, conspiracy to commit murder in Indian country, and carjacking resulting in death. The government successfully moved to transfer her case from juvenile court to adult federal court. She appealed the transfer, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Ultimately, she pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, and the District Court accepted her plea and dismissed the remaining charges. At sentencing, the District Court applied a two-level vulnerable-victim enhancement due to her father’s health conditions and calculated a Guidelines range of life imprisonment. After considering mitigating factors, including her juvenile status and personal history, the District Court imposed a below-guideline sentence of 456 months. Her coconspirators received shorter sentences.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and whether the sentence was reasonable. The Court held that conspiracy to commit murder in Indian country is a generally applicable federal crime, not limited by the Major Crimes Act’s enumeration, and thus falls within the District Court’s jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The Court also concluded that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

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A group of nine tenured professors at a public Kansas university were terminated after the Kansas Board of Regents (KBOR) temporarily amended its policy, citing COVID-19-related financial pressures. The amendment permitted universities to suspend or terminate tenured faculty without the usual protections, including hearings or proof of financial exigency. ESU administrators drafted a framework for implementing these terminations, which KBOR approved. The professors received termination letters referencing general financial concerns, but allegedly lacking specific reasons. The professors claimed ESU was not facing financial exigency, and that their terminations were motivated by their political activities and beliefs. All nine appealed through the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH); six had their terminations reversed and three had them affirmed. Litigation ensued, with the professors asserting constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including due process, liberty, association, and equal protection claims.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss most claims, finding that qualified immunity did not bar them. It ruled the professors had adequately alleged deprivation of a property interest in continued employment without due process and allowed other constitutional claims to proceed. The court dismissed liberty interest claims against KBOR and some administrators where no statements were attributed to them, but denied dismissal for others allegedly involved in drafting termination letters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage, adopting facts as alleged. It held that the professors had a state-created property interest in tenure and that the process used to terminate their employment plausibly violated clearly established procedural due process rights. The court affirmed denial of dismissal for procedural due process and related conspiracy claims, but reversed as to substantive due process claims, finding no clearly established violation. It also reversed denial of dismissal for liberty, association, equal protection, and conspiracy claims against KBOR and certain administrators, instructing the district court to dismiss those claims, while leaving claims against the university president intact. View "Miracle v. Hush" on Justia Law

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A Colorado-based retailer employed a sales associate who, after contracting a severe illness in March 2020 (suspected COVID-19), experienced ongoing and worsening symptoms including gastrointestinal pain, weakness, difficulty breathing, and intermittent inability to speak. She initially received twelve weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which was set to expire in June 2020. Before her leave expired, the employee communicated with the company’s human resources specialist about her persistent symptoms and medical procedures, including a scheduled endoscopy. She requested an extension of leave, explaining she needed more time to recover and receive results from her medical tests. The retailer declined to grant additional leave and terminated her employment shortly after the FMLA leave expired.After the termination, the employee filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which investigated and brought suit against the retailer in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The retailer moved for summary judgment, arguing the EEOC had not established the employee had a qualifying disability, had not provided sufficient notice of her disability and limitations, and had requested an unreasonable, indefinite leave. The district court granted summary judgment for the retailer on all claims, finding the employee had not put the company on notice of her disability and her request for an indefinite leave was not a reasonable accommodation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the employee provided sufficient notice of her disabling condition and that her request for a few weeks of additional leave constituted a plausibly reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. A & A Appliance" on Justia Law

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A group of student-athletes who had completed four seasons of Division I competition at member schools of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) challenged the NCAA’s refusal to retroactively apply a new eligibility rule. The NCAA had previously permitted only four seasons of competition within a five-year period, but in June 2026 adopted a new rule allowing athletes to compete for up to five seasons in five years. The NCAA did not apply the new rule retroactively, excluding athletes who had already exhausted four seasons. Several plaintiffs, most of whom had earned money through name, image, and likeness (NIL) deals, sought to play a fifth season and argued that the NCAA’s decision unlawfully restrained trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case and granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the NCAA to allow plaintiffs a fifth season of eligibility. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ expert’s definition of the relevant labor market as encompassing all NCAA Division I athletics in the United States, finding that this market was plausibly monopsonistic and controlled by the NCAA. The court concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and satisfied the other requirements for preliminary injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ proposed market definition—all Division I athletics in the United States—lacked evidentiary support and was not plausible, as athletes do not view all Division I programs across sports as reasonable substitutes. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court clearly erred in accepting this market definition. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction and vacated the injunction. View "Wisne v. NCAA" on Justia Law

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The defendant was responsible for the care of five minor girls, including his former stepdaughter, and used his access to sexually abuse and surreptitiously record them, often while they were nude. The abuse came to light when one of the victims, a seven-year-old, disclosed inappropriate conduct to her parents, prompting a law enforcement investigation. Officers obtained search warrants and discovered secret videos and images of the minors, some recorded in the defendant’s home bathroom using a hidden camera. A grand jury indicted the defendant on multiple counts for production, attempted production, and possession of child pornography based on these depictions.In the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, the defendant was tried before a jury. The evidence included testimony from law enforcement, parents, and one of the victims, as well as review of the illicit images and videos. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the district judge sentenced him to eighty years in prison. On appeal, the defendant raised several arguments, including challenges to evidentiary sufficiency, jury instructions, the admission of uncharged sexual abuse evidence, multiplicity of counts, and cumulative error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under its precedent, a depiction of a minor can be considered a “lascivious exhibition” based on how the depiction is created by the defendant, regardless of the minor’s awareness or intent. The court found sufficient evidence for all convictions, determined the jury instructions were not erroneous, and upheld the use of the Dost factors as a jury aid. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of evidence, held that the counts were not plainly multiplicitous, and rejected the cumulative error argument. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Scott and Audrey Blum, through Mr. Blum’s interest in a partnership, participated in a tax shelter known as BLIPS, which generated a reported $78.5 million tax loss in 1999. The IRS determined that the BLIPS transactions lacked economic substance and disallowed the loss. The partnership in which Mr. Blum participated challenged the IRS’s determination in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California but was unsuccessful. Subsequently, the IRS issued notices of deficiency (NODs) to the Blums for tax years 1999, 2007, and 2010, assessing significant additional taxes and penalties.After receiving the NODs, the Blums challenged them in the United States Tax Court. They argued, among other things, that the IRS’s partnership-level determination (through the Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment, or FPAA) was untimely because the necessary consents to extend the statute of limitations were invalid. The Tax Court rejected this argument, holding that any challenge to the timeliness of the FPAA had to be raised during the partnership-level proceedings in the Northern District of California, where the Blums were parties but did not raise the issue. The Tax Court further held that the NODs were timely under the relevant statutes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the timeliness of the FPAA is a “partnership item” under TEFRA, and any challenge to it must be raised in the partnership-level proceeding, not in a later partner-level case. Because the Blums failed to raise the timeliness argument at the partnership level, they waived the issue. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s judgment, leaving the Blums liable for the assessed deficiencies and penalties. View "Blum v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Posted in: Tax Law
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A man serving a life sentence for terrorism-related convictions at a federal prison in Colorado, who is severely disabled with both arms amputated above the elbow and vision loss in one eye, filed suit against several federal officials. He alleged violations of his federal constitutional and statutory rights stemming from his conditions of confinement and medical care while incarcerated. His claims included inadequate dental and medical care, denial of a medical diet, lack of proper prosthetics, and insufficient accommodation for his disabilities.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed most claims on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Some claims were dismissed as moot or for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, while others, including his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court also found his Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim challenging his placement at the prison was time-barred. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims with prejudice and then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff could not pursue his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim under the APA because he failed to allege a final agency action and sued individual officers rather than the agency or officials in their official capacities. The court also held that his Bivens claim for deliberate indifference arose in a new context and was foreclosed due to the existence of the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative remedies. The appellate court further found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint and ruled that the plaintiff had waived his challenge to deposition transcript fees by failing to object before the magistrate judge. View "Mostafa v. Blanche" on Justia Law