Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at a small Wyoming jail, experienced severe dental pain and underwent three emergency room visits during his two-month incarceration. Medical professionals prescribed pain medication and instructed him to seek dental care within specific timeframes, and also recommended daily oral rinses. The jail, lacking on-site medical staff, required officers to schedule appointments or transport inmates for care. After each emergency visit, discharge instructions were handed to incoming staff, and eventually, a dental appointment was scheduled for August, though the plaintiff was released before it occurred. The plaintiff repeatedly requested timely dental care and rinses, but officers only partially provided the prescribed treatments.In the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the plaintiff sued jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. It found insufficient evidence that the named officers had a duty to schedule dental appointments under jail policy or that they intentionally delayed care. The court also concluded that failure to provide oral rinses did not constitute deliberate indifference, and even if a constitutional violation occurred, the officers did not violate clearly established law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the officers were not responsible for scheduling the dental appointments under jail policy, reasonably believed others were handling scheduling, and responded to the plaintiff’s pain with medication and emergency room visits. The court also found that failure to provide oral rinses did not rise to deliberate indifference, as there was no evidence the officer recognized a substantial risk from their absence. Furthermore, it concluded that no clearly established law required different conduct under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Jarvis v. Liggett" on Justia Law

Deputies from the Pueblo County Sheriff’s Office responded to a 911 call at a local middle school, where they encountered Richard Ward in a car with his mother, Kristy Ward Stamp. During questioning, Mr. Ward placed anti-anxiety medication in his mouth, which led Deputy McWhorter to attempt to remove him from the vehicle. A brief struggle ensued, after which Deputy McWhorter shot Mr. Ward three times, resulting in his death. Following the shooting, Ms. Ward Stamp was ordered to remain in the car, her phone and vehicle were seized, she was detained, patted down, handcuffed, moved between police vehicles, transported to a sheriff’s facility, and held in an interview room for several hours.Mr. Ward’s estate and Ms. Ward Stamp filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the deputies, alleging violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, specifically excessive force against Mr. Ward and unlawful arrest and seizure of Ms. Ward Stamp and her property. The officers moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could determine that Mr. Ward did not resist or pose a threat when force was used, and that there was no probable cause to detain Ms. Ward Stamp or seize her property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the officers’ interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the extent the appeal raised abstract legal questions but dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the officers’ arguments relied on disputed facts rather than accepting the district court’s factual findings. The Tenth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review factual disputes at this stage and that the district court properly applied the qualified immunity framework. View "Estate of Ward v. Lucero" on Justia Law

A young girl, identified as H.M., moved in with her uncle and aunt in Oklahoma in 2014. Both caretakers, the uncle (a member of the Cherokee Nation) and his wife (a non-Indian), became the subject of concern when, in 2019, H.M., then nine years old, fled their home. She was found malnourished, unwashed, and exhibiting signs of physical and emotional abuse, including weight loss and injuries. Subsequent investigation revealed a long period of severe abuse and neglect.A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma indicted both caretakers on charges of child abuse and child neglect under Oklahoma law, with federal jurisdiction arising under statutes applicable to Indian country. The uncle was charged under the Major Crimes Act, while the aunt was charged via the Assimilative Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act. Both were also charged with aiding and abetting each other. After a joint jury trial, both were found guilty of child abuse and child neglect. The aunt unsuccessfully moved post-trial to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for a new trial. At sentencing, the uncle received 180 months and the aunt 240 months in prison, based on sentencing calculations that did not apply a particular federal sentencing guideline.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in calculating the uncle’s advisory sentencing range because it failed to apply the most analogous federal guideline—aggravated assault under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2—to the Oklahoma child abuse conviction. This was deemed procedural error warranting resentencing. The Tenth Circuit vacated the uncle’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed all other convictions and the aunt’s sentence, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions, jurisdictional rulings, or the handling of sentencing evidence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual alleged that he was subjected to excessive force and denied equal protection by officers at a Kansas correctional facility during a medical emergency, and that his internal grievances were not properly addressed. After unsuccessful attempts to resolve his complaints through the prison’s grievance process, he filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against several correctional officers and a nurse-staffing company, raising Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.Following standard procedure, the district court ordered a Martinez report to assess the factual and legal basis of the claims. After screening, the court allowed the case to proceed. Six defendants jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion without prejudice, citing two reasons: the motion exceeded local page limits for Rule 12 motions, and a summary judgment motion was premature before discovery and formalization of claims and defenses. The magistrate judge had also stayed discovery pending resolution of immunity defenses. Rather than resubmitting their motion, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, asking the appellate court to compel the district court to consider their motion immediately.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the collateral-order doctrine did not apply to the district court’s procedural denial. The appellate court found that the district court’s actions did not conclusively deny immunity but only required compliance with non-onerous procedural rules. Since no substantial public interest was threatened and discovery remained stayed, immediate appeal was not warranted. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jefferson v. Moore" on Justia Law

Several non-profit organizations focused on trappers’ rights challenged a New Mexico statute that broadly prohibits the use of traps, snares, or wildlife poison to capture, injure, or kill animals on public land. The statute includes an exception allowing enrolled members of federally recognized Indian nations, tribes, or pueblos to trap for religious or ceremonial purposes under rules that have not yet been promulgated. The plaintiffs did not contest the general prohibition on trapping, but argued that the exception violates constitutional and statutory rights, specifically invoking the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses of both the U.S. and New Mexico Constitutions, as well as the New Mexico Civil Rights Act.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal and state constitutional claims without prejudice, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court found their economic, recreational, aesthetic, and psychological injuries were not redressable because striking the exception would not lift the general ban on trapping. It also determined that their alleged stigmatic injury was not judicially cognizable and, in any event, their claims were not ripe because the rules implementing the exception had not been issued. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state statutory claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing. First, their alleged injuries from not being allowed to trap were not redressable, as invalidating the exception would not affect the underlying prohibition. Second, their claims of psychological and stigmatic injury were not ripe for review, as the exception had not been implemented, and any harm was too abstract and generalized to support standing. The appellate court also found no error in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "New Mexico Trappers Association v. Torrez" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in February 2023 after he and his family experienced multiple detentions and beatings by Salvadoran police, allegedly due to suspicions of collaborating with illicit groups. After his mother and sisters were detained, and later upon learning that his partner had also been detained, the petitioner sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States.An immigration judge denied the requested relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed that decision in July 2024. The petitioner, initially pro se, later retained counsel and, after learning of his partner’s detention, filed a motion to reopen proceedings with the BIA in January 2025. He argued that new evidence warranted reopening and sought equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline for such motions, citing diligence in seeking counsel and resource constraints while detained. The BIA denied the motion as untimely, finding the petitioner did not show the requisite diligence or extraordinary circumstances to justify equitable tolling and that much of the new evidence was not previously unavailable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion, as its decision adequately addressed the petitioner’s arguments and applied the correct legal standard for equitable tolling. The court found that the petitioner did not sufficiently demonstrate either due diligence or extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Bonilla-Espinoza v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Colorado dentist operated his practice using an abusive trust-based tax scheme promoted by a third party. Over seven years, he funneled earnings through a series of sham trusts to disguise income and claim personal expenses as tax deductions. The scheme involved assigning most of his business to a trust, which distributed income through family and charitable trusts, ultimately allowing him to retain control over his earnings without paying taxes. Despite repeated warnings from professionals, the defendant persisted. He continued the scheme even after being notified of a criminal investigation, resulting in over $1.6 million in tax losses to the government.A federal grand jury indicted him for six counts of tax evasion, one for each year from 2017 to 2022. He pleaded guilty to all counts in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At sentencing, the court calculated the total loss—including uncharged conduct from 2016 and 2023—and determined the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court added a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means and considered mitigating factors such as acceptance of responsibility and zero-point offender status. The advisory guidelines range was set at 33–41 months, and the court imposed a sentence at the top end: 41 months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a fine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The court held that including the 2023 tax loss and applying the sophisticated means enhancement were proper under the Guidelines. It also found the sentence substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Ulibarri" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor on a military base. The defendant admitted to sexual activity but claimed he was asleep during the acts, raising a sexsomnia defense. The central dispute at trial concerned the defendant’s state of mind, specifically whether he was awake or asleep. Both sides presented expert witnesses. The defense expert, Dr. Kushida, opined that the victim’s account was consistent with sexsomnia, while the government’s expert, Dr. Bornemann, countered that the described actions were too complex to have occurred during sleep. During trial, Dr. Kushida also offered new opinions about the absence of malingering—suggesting the defendant was not faking symptoms for personal gain—which had not been disclosed before trial.The case was previously tried in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At trial, after Dr. Kushida introduced the new malingering opinions, the government sought to have Dr. Bornemann rebut them. The defense objected to the adequacy and timing of the government’s disclosure regarding Dr. Bornemann’s new rebuttal opinions. The district court overruled the objection, allowed Dr. Bornemann’s testimony, and permitted a brief pre-cross-examination interview. The jury convicted the defendant on the counts related to sexual encounters in the girl’s bedroom.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the government was required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 to provide pretrial notice of the rebuttal opinions offered by Dr. Bornemann. The court held that the government’s duty to disclose rebuttal expert testimony is triggered only when the defense has timely disclosed the opinions being rebutted. Because the defense had not disclosed Dr. Kushida’s malingering opinions prior to trial, the government was not required to provide pretrial notice of Dr. Bornemann’s rebuttal. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Crow" on Justia Law

A man drove his ten-year-old daughter from Oklahoma to Texas so she could participate in a gymnastics competition. While staying in a hotel together, he sexually abused her in the bathtub and later in bed. After the girl disclosed the abuse to her peers, three others—two of her half-sisters and her uncle, all minors at the time of their respective incidents—came forward with their own accounts of sexual abuse or inappropriate conduct by the same man. The evidence included testimony about prior incidents and hidden cameras used by the defendant to record his daughters.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma charged the defendant with three crimes: transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, and 2241(c), and coercion and enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). After a jury trial, he was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for each, to run concurrently. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for transportation of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse, arguing specifically that the government failed to prove that his “dominant purpose” in transporting his daughter was sexual activity and failed to establish his non-Indian status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, under § 2423(a), the government must prove only that the defendant transported the minor “with intent” that she engage in illegal sexual activity, not that this was his dominant purpose, and found the evidence sufficient. The court also held that unchallenged testimonial evidence from family members was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a non-Indian. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

A company was the beneficiary of life insurance policies held in a trust formed by Daniel Carpenter. After the insurer paid proceeds to the trust, the beneficiary sought to recover the full amount and alleged that Carpenter hid assets through hundreds of shell companies. Carpenter was convicted of fraud, and the beneficiary obtained a judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, later registering the judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That court entered judgment against several Carpenter entities, including a limited liability company that owned another company incorporated in Oklahoma. A receiver was authorized to preserve the assets of the debtor company.An entity called Phoenix Charitable Trust, apparently linked to Carpenter, entered the Oklahoma proceedings as an “interested party” through its counsel, who had represented Carpenter and related entities in other courts. Phoenix objected to several orders issued by the district court: an award of attorney fees and costs against Carpenter, an order authorizing the sale of the Oklahoma company’s insurance portfolio, and an order denying Phoenix’s motion to vacate a prior injunction against Carpenter and his entities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether Phoenix had standing to challenge these orders. The court found that Phoenix failed to demonstrate it was injured by the attorney fees order or the sale-of-assets order, as required for Article III standing. Regarding the injunction, the court concluded that Phoenix lacked prudential standing because it was asserting the rights of others rather than its own. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Phoenix’s challenges. View "Universitas Education v. Phoenix Charitable Trust" on Justia Law