Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several plaintiffs, including the founder of a religious group called Singularism, used psilocybin as part of their religious ceremonies in Utah, where the drug is classified as a controlled substance. Authorities seized a large quantity of psilocybin from them and notified Singularism’s landlord that the drug use constituted a nuisance. Shortly after, the plaintiffs initiated a state lawsuit, which was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The federal court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the return of seized items and, after state authorities filed criminal charges, enjoined state prosecution against the religious leader to prevent a potential First Amendment violation.On appeal, the state authorities argued that the federal district court should have abstained from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine, and that prosecution did not violate the First Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to abstain de novo and found the requirements for abstention were satisfied. The court concluded that the state authorities had not waived the abstention argument through their litigation conduct. The plaintiffs failed to show that the prosecution was brought in bad faith, was harassing, or created a threat of irreparable injury, as required for exceptions to abstention.On the merits, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in finding a likely First Amendment violation. The court found Utah law’s regulatory scheme for secular, supervised medical use of psilocybin was not comparable to the unsupervised religious use, and thus did not treat secular activity more favorably than religious activity. The court vacated the injunction and the denial of the motion to dismiss as to preferential treatment for secular use, remanding the issue of individualized exemptions for further district court proceedings, and dismissed the appeal regarding the Fourth Amendment claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jensen v. Utah County" on Justia Law

A woman and her son, admitted as refugees to the United States in 2005, had their refugee status terminated by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) after an investigation concluded that the woman had participated in the Rwandan genocide. This determination rendered her ineligible for refugee status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically due to the “persecutor bar.” Both were placed in removal proceedings. The woman denied the allegations, asserting they were politically motivated. In removal proceedings, an immigration court found her credible and granted her asylum, but denied asylum to her son, who had aged out of dependent eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded the woman’s asylum grant and affirmed the denial for her son. The government’s appeal and the son’s petition for review were abated pending the outcome of related litigation.The pair then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging USCIS’s termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of actions specified to be in the agency’s discretion. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the termination decision was not discretionary under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that termination of refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) involves a two-step process: a mandatory, nondiscretionary determination whether the individual met the statutory definition of “refugee” at admission, followed by a discretionary decision whether to terminate status. Because the plaintiffs challenged only the nondiscretionary threshold determination, the court concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar judicial review. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mukantagara v. Mullin" on Justia Law

A group of boilermakers, who were participants in a multi-employer pension plan, sought early retirement benefits after leaving their union jobs before reaching age 65. The plan provided for early retirement if the participant “withdrew completely” and refrained from employment in jobs classified under a collective bargaining agreement or supervising workers in those positions. Some boilermakers took other jobs after retiring, prompting the trustees of the pension plan to deny their early retirement benefits, claiming the participants were ineligible because they had not ceased all employment with companies contributing to the plan.In the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the boilermakers on their benefit claims, finding the plan’s language did not require withdrawal from all jobs, only those specified. It also granted partial summary judgment to some boilermakers on fiduciary duty claims, while ruling others were time-barred due to a three-year limitations period. The defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment on the benefits claims, and 66 boilermakers cross-appealed the denial of their fiduciary duty claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to the plan administrator’s decisions. The court held that the plan’s unambiguous language only required withdrawal from certain jobs, not all employment, and that the administrator’s broader interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. It further held that the defendants could not rely on the limitations period for benefit claims due to inadequate notice to participants. For fiduciary duty claims, the court found the limitations period did not begin until actual knowledge of the breach, reversing summary judgment against the 66 boilermakers. The court affirmed the benefit claims and remanded the fiduciary duty claims for further proceedings. View "Phillips v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust" on Justia Law

Denver Water, a municipal utility, faced a projected water shortage and vulnerability due to overreliance on its South System. To address these concerns, Denver Water proposed expanding Gross Reservoir by raising the dam, which would increase storage capacity and allow diversion of water from the Fraser and Williams Fork Rivers. Because the project would impact wetlands, Denver Water applied for a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers in 2003. The Corps conducted a fourteen-year review, considering environmental and logistical impacts, and ultimately issued the permit in 2017. Denver Water began and substantially completed the $600 million expansion by 2026, but was unable to fill the reservoir due to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the project after Save the Colorado and other environmental groups challenged the Corps’s permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The plaintiffs alleged the Corps defined the project’s purpose too narrowly, failed to adequately analyze costs, and did not sufficiently consider climate change’s impact on feasibility. The District Court agreed, finding violations of both statutes, vacating the permit and environmental reviews, and issuing a permanent injunction against water diversion and further enlargement activities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined whether the Corps’s review and permitting decisions were arbitrary or capricious. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps appropriately considered multiple related project purposes and reasonably evaluated cost and climate change impacts. The court found that the Corps’s determinations were supported by the record and not arbitrary or capricious. The main holding was that the Corps did not violate the CWA or NEPA, thus the district court’s judgment was reversed, the permanent injunction vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment against the plaintiffs. View "Save The Colorado v. Graham" on Justia Law

Police officers in Colorado observed an SUV parked in a lot adjacent to a closed check-cashing store and inactive bus stop at approximately 1:50 a.m., a location known for drug activity. The vehicle was reverse-parked, and three or four individuals were standing nearby. As officers approached, some individuals dispersed and the defendant, Mr. Jackson, was seen making furtive movements inside the vehicle. Officers requested Mr. Jackson exit the SUV, conducted a pat-down, and found a firearm in his pants. He was subsequently charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).Mr. Jackson moved in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado to suppress evidence of the gun, arguing that the stop and pat-down were made without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, during which both officers testified. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on the location, time, reverse-parking, presence and dispersal of individuals around the SUV, and Mr. Jackson’s furtive movements prior to the stop. The court denied the motion to suppress.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the court reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. It concluded that the district court’s findings regarding the presence of individuals and observations of Mr. Jackson’s furtive movements were not clearly erroneous, even in light of conflicting written statements and body-camera footage. The Tenth Circuit held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld Mr. Jackson’s conviction. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Several teachers, students, parents, and their organizations challenged Oklahoma’s H.B. 1775, specifically subsection B, which restricts public school employees from making certain “discriminatory concepts” a required part of courses. These concepts include assertions about inherent superiority, moral character, responsibility, and psychological distress based on race or sex, among others. If violated, educators could face suspension or revocation of their teaching credentials. Plaintiffs argued that subsection B was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated students’ First Amendment right to receive information.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed the case. It granted judgment on the pleadings against the plaintiffs on their First Amendment claims, finding no protected right in curricular speech and no plausible right-to-receive-information claim. The court partially granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the use of “require” and two of the prohibited concepts (those using “treatment” and “treat”) were likely unconstitutionally vague, and enjoined enforcement of those parts. The court denied injunctive relief for the remaining language, and both parties appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court later declined to answer certified questions regarding the statute’s interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the injunction. The court held that the District Court abused its discretion in finding vagueness in subsection B. It interpreted the statute as prohibiting teaching or requiring teaching of the listed discriminatory concepts as correct principles, not banning abstract discussion or instruction about related history or figures. The court determined that the statute’s language was sufficiently clear and not likely vague. It vacated the preliminary injunction, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court declined to address the First Amendment right-to-receive-information claims due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Black Emergency Response Team v. Drummond" on Justia Law

In November 2022, Anderson Aldrich entered Club Q, an LGBTQIA+ nightclub in Colorado Springs, and shot patrons, killing five people and injuring twenty-five others. Survivors and families of victims sued multiple defendants: the El Paso County Board of County Commissioners, the Sheriff, and Club Q’s owners and associated entities. Against the County Defendants, plaintiffs raised federal substantive due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging county policies prevented law enforcement from seeking emergency protection orders (ERPOs), thereby increasing vulnerability to private violence. Against Club Q Defendants, plaintiffs brought claims under the Colorado Premises Liability Act (CPLA), as well as negligence and wrongful-death claims, alleging inadequate security and safety measures.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss all federal claims, finding plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged affirmative danger-creating conduct required under the state-created-danger theory. The court also dismissed the CPLA claims against Club Q Defendants due to lack of causation, but denied dismissal of negligence and wrongful-death claims, reasoning the exclusivity of the CPLA was a fact-intensive issue not suitable for resolution at the pleading stage. Once federal claims were dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims and entered judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims, holding plaintiffs failed to allege that county conduct placed them at immediate risk, thus not satisfying the affirmative-conduct requirement. The court also affirmed dismissal of the CPLA claims, concluding Aldrich’s actions were the predominant cause of injury under Colorado law. However, it reversed the district court’s denial of dismissal for negligence and wrongful-death claims, holding the CPLA provides the exclusive remedy for injuries arising from Club Q’s conditions and precludes those common-law claims. View "Vance v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

A man became the primary caregiver for his two-month-old daughter after his partner returned to work. Within a few days, the child was found to have severe and unexplained injuries, including multiple broken bones, bruises, and scratches. The child’s mother noticed initial injuries but delayed seeking medical attention until a scheduled check-up, at which point a pediatrician directed them to the hospital and notified authorities. Medical examination suggested the injuries were caused by forceful, non-accidental actions over a period of days. The accused gave varying explanations for the injuries, none of which were found consistent with the medical evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma conducted a two-day jury trial. The prosecution presented expert and lay witnesses, including a specialist in child abuse who diagnosed the child as having suffered abuse and neglect. The defense challenged the admissibility and scope of the expert’s testimony, as well as certain statements by lay witnesses, arguing they improperly commented on the defendant’s credibility and offered expert opinions. The jury found the defendant guilty on both charges of child abuse and child neglect. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial and imposed a ten-year sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the expert’s medical diagnoses, as these did not address the defendant’s mental state—a necessary element for conviction—leaving that determination to the jury. The court also found that any improper lay witness testimony was harmless given its similarity to uncontested expert testimony. Arguments regarding prosecutorial misconduct and cumulative error were rejected. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop on Highway I-80 in Wyoming, George Ostertag was pulled over by law enforcement for failing to signal a turn. A K-9 officer deployed a narcotics-detection dog named Becky to sniff the exterior of Ostertag’s vehicle while a record check was being performed. Becky subsequently made physical contact with the vehicle, alerting to the presence of contraband, which prompted officers to search the vehicle. They discovered a 9mm pistol with an obliterated serial number between the driver’s seat and center console. Ostertag, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held a five-day suppression hearing. It found Becky to be sufficiently reliable and determined she exhibited a positive alert behavior before making physical contact with the vehicle. The district court concluded that while Becky’s contact with the vehicle constituted a search, the alert prior to contact provided probable cause to justify the search. The court also rejected Ostertag’s argument that Becky’s open-air sniff amounted to a search. Ostertag’s motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss the indictment—on both facial and as-applied Second Amendment grounds—were denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal, and the charge for possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number was dismissed. Ostertag was convicted on the remaining count and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that Becky’s open-air sniff did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and even if Becky’s physical contact with the vehicle was a search, probable cause existed. The court further held that binding precedent foreclosed both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ostertag" on Justia Law

Nancy Martin embezzled millions of dollars from her employers over several years. After discovery of her actions, her employers obtained an $11 million default judgment against her in Kansas state court when she failed to appear, apparently following the advice of her attorney. Subsequently, Martin was federally indicted for bank fraud and for assisting in the filing of false tax documents, related to her failure to report the embezzled funds. On the advice of counsel, she pled guilty to one count of bank fraud and one count of tax fraud. The federal district court sentenced her to concurrent prison terms and ordered $3.9 million in restitution.Martin initially appealed her conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but her appeal was dismissed due to the appeal waiver in her plea agreement. She then filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. She claimed her attorney failed to inform her of potential defenses related to the bank fraud charge and the necessity of willfulness for the tax charge. The district court denied her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding her legal theories insufficient and concluding she had not demonstrated prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo and held that Martin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether her counsel’s failure to advise her of a potential defense to bank fraud constituted deficient performance, and whether she suffered prejudice as a result. Additionally, the court found that the district court erred in its legal analysis regarding willfulness for the tax charge and remanded for further proceedings to properly assess prejudice. The district court’s denial was therefore reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law