Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two nonprofit organizations dedicated to increasing voter participation, especially among underrepresented groups, sent mail ballot applications to Kansas voters during the 2020 election. These mailings included applications that had been partially prefilled with voter information obtained from public and commercial sources. Due to outdated or inaccurate data, many applications contained errors, leading to voter confusion and administrative burdens for local election officials who had to process erroneous or duplicate applications and respond to concerned voters.Following this experience, the Kansas legislature enacted a law prohibiting private entities from mailing partially prefilled advance ballot applications to registered voters. The nonprofits challenged the law in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that it infringed on their First Amendment rights. The district court initially enjoined enforcement of the law, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to apply intermediate scrutiny unless it found the law was enacted with an improper purpose. On remand, the district court found that the Kansas legislature had acted with an improper purpose, concluded that strict scrutiny should apply, and again enjoined the law.On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding improper legislative intent, as there was no sufficient evidence in the law’s text, justifications, or legislative history to support that conclusion. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit found that the law served significant governmental interests—minimizing voter confusion, facilitating efficient election administration, and fostering confidence in elections—and was narrowly tailored to those interests without substantially burdening protected speech. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action against a biotechnology company, its affiliates, and three principal officers. The company was developing an intravenous drug called RJX, which had not yet received FDA approval. The SEC alleged that the defendants engaged in securities fraud by making misleading statements to investors regarding the principals’ compensation, the existence of audited financial statements and the company’s readiness to go public, and the company’s involvement in litigation. The factual record at the preliminary injunction stage showed discrepancies between reported and actual compensation, false claims about audited statements and IPO readiness, and statements denying ongoing litigation despite a significant lawsuit and settlement.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado initially issued a temporary restraining order and asset freeze at the SEC’s request, then granted a preliminary injunction with an asset freeze after reviewing the parties’ written submissions. The district court allowed the defendants to request modifications to the asset freeze, and later partially lifted it to permit certain business activities, such as third-party payments and licensing of intellectual property. The court denied a motion to fully lift the freeze and declined to appoint a liquidation agent, finding the SEC adequately represented investor interests. The defendants appealed both the initial injunction and the refusal to fully lift the freeze.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The appellate court held that the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing, since the defendants had requested cancellation and never sought to reschedule. It further held that the SEC made a strong showing on all four factors for a preliminary injunction, including likely success on the merits of securities fraud claims. The asset freeze, as modified, was found to be a reasonable means to preserve assets and protect investors. View "USSEC v. Reven Holdings" on Justia Law

A woman named Melissa asked a police officer to accompany her to a residence so she could retrieve her belongings. She told the officer, Chance Avery, that Christopher, who was at the residence, was drunk, mean, had threatened her, and had been drinking. When they arrived, Melissa entered the home and began collecting her things while Avery waited in the hallway. Christopher, holding a baseball bat at his side, entered the house, loudly asking where the police were. Avery immediately drew his gun and ordered Christopher to drop the bat. Christopher said he would comply, but after about 11 seconds and after taking a single step in Avery’s general direction without raising or swinging the bat, Avery shot Christopher three times, killing him.The special administrator of Christopher’s estate, Vision Bank, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, asserting that Avery used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Avery sought summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion. The court found that, based on the facts a reasonable jury could conclude, Avery’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that, under the facts a reasonable jury could find, Avery’s use of force was objectively unreasonable and violated Christopher’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that prior Tenth Circuit precedent made it clear that an officer may not use deadly force against a person holding a bat but making no hostile or aggressive motions. Therefore, Avery was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Vision Bank v. Avery" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who traveled from Miami to Oklahoma City to distribute fentanyl. Acting under the direction of another, he delivered packages of pills, later determined to contain a fentanyl analogue, to a confidential source and another individual in a vehicle. He was observed entering a hotel with an associate who rented a room in his own name, though a note at the front desk bore both their names and a room number. Shortly after, the defendant was seen returning to the hotel lobby with a duffel bag, attempted to flee when approached by law enforcement, and discarded the bag, which was later found to contain fentanyl pills. Upon searching the hotel room, officers found no drugs, drug paraphernalia, or substantial cash. The defendant admitted traveling to Oklahoma City to distribute drugs and stated he needed the associate’s help to rent the room.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, adopting the presentence investigation report, applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a premises for drug distribution and assigned three criminal-history points for a prior conviction stemming from a 1996 offense. The defendant challenged both the application of the enhancement and the criminal-history calculation. The district court overruled the objection to the enhancement but reduced the criminal-history score by one point for unrelated reasons, sentencing the defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the premises-maintenance enhancement because the evidence demonstrated only brief possession of the hotel room with little or no control, and no evidence of drug activity in the room. However, the appellate court found no plain error in assigning three criminal-history points for the prior conviction. The court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Conill-Perez" on Justia Law

A father, motivated by religious beliefs and alleged divine messages received by a companion, took his three-year-old, disabled son from the child’s mother, who was the primary caregiver. Along with several family members and associates, he transported the boy from Georgia to New Mexico, leaving the mother behind and without her consent. The group settled on a remote property, where the father and others performed physically intrusive religious rituals on the child, resulting in the child’s death. The group then adopted apocalyptic beliefs, trained with firearms, and fortified their compound in anticipation of conflict with government agencies. Law enforcement eventually raided the compound, arrested several adults, and discovered the child’s body.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over a joint trial for four defendants. The mother’s siblings and brother-in-law were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and kidnapping resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1201. The father, exempt from kidnapping charges as a parent, was convicted (along with another) of conspiracy to provide material support for and to kill federal officers, after representing himself at trial. The trial court sentenced all four to life imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined several issues, most centrally the definition of “unlawfully” in the context of federal kidnapping. The Tenth Circuit held that the jury instructions incorrectly defined “unlawfully” and that the government had not presented sufficient evidence that the co-defendants’ actions were contrary to law, given that the father had lawful parental rights at the time of the interstate transport. The court reversed the kidnapping convictions for those defendants. The Tenth Circuit also held that the pro se defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights were violated when they were excluded from a jury-note conference of tactical importance, vacating their convictions on material support and conspiracy-to-kill counts and remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wahhaj" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, including the founder of a religious group called Singularism, used psilocybin as part of their religious ceremonies in Utah, where the drug is classified as a controlled substance. Authorities seized a large quantity of psilocybin from them and notified Singularism’s landlord that the drug use constituted a nuisance. Shortly after, the plaintiffs initiated a state lawsuit, which was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The federal court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the return of seized items and, after state authorities filed criminal charges, enjoined state prosecution against the religious leader to prevent a potential First Amendment violation.On appeal, the state authorities argued that the federal district court should have abstained from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine, and that prosecution did not violate the First Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to abstain de novo and found the requirements for abstention were satisfied. The court concluded that the state authorities had not waived the abstention argument through their litigation conduct. The plaintiffs failed to show that the prosecution was brought in bad faith, was harassing, or created a threat of irreparable injury, as required for exceptions to abstention.On the merits, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in finding a likely First Amendment violation. The court found Utah law’s regulatory scheme for secular, supervised medical use of psilocybin was not comparable to the unsupervised religious use, and thus did not treat secular activity more favorably than religious activity. The court vacated the injunction and the denial of the motion to dismiss as to preferential treatment for secular use, remanding the issue of individualized exemptions for further district court proceedings, and dismissed the appeal regarding the Fourth Amendment claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jensen v. Utah County" on Justia Law

A woman and her son, admitted as refugees to the United States in 2005, had their refugee status terminated by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) after an investigation concluded that the woman had participated in the Rwandan genocide. This determination rendered her ineligible for refugee status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically due to the “persecutor bar.” Both were placed in removal proceedings. The woman denied the allegations, asserting they were politically motivated. In removal proceedings, an immigration court found her credible and granted her asylum, but denied asylum to her son, who had aged out of dependent eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded the woman’s asylum grant and affirmed the denial for her son. The government’s appeal and the son’s petition for review were abated pending the outcome of related litigation.The pair then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging USCIS’s termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of actions specified to be in the agency’s discretion. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the termination decision was not discretionary under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that termination of refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) involves a two-step process: a mandatory, nondiscretionary determination whether the individual met the statutory definition of “refugee” at admission, followed by a discretionary decision whether to terminate status. Because the plaintiffs challenged only the nondiscretionary threshold determination, the court concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar judicial review. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mukantagara v. Mullin" on Justia Law

A group of boilermakers, who were participants in a multi-employer pension plan, sought early retirement benefits after leaving their union jobs before reaching age 65. The plan provided for early retirement if the participant “withdrew completely” and refrained from employment in jobs classified under a collective bargaining agreement or supervising workers in those positions. Some boilermakers took other jobs after retiring, prompting the trustees of the pension plan to deny their early retirement benefits, claiming the participants were ineligible because they had not ceased all employment with companies contributing to the plan.In the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the boilermakers on their benefit claims, finding the plan’s language did not require withdrawal from all jobs, only those specified. It also granted partial summary judgment to some boilermakers on fiduciary duty claims, while ruling others were time-barred due to a three-year limitations period. The defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment on the benefits claims, and 66 boilermakers cross-appealed the denial of their fiduciary duty claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to the plan administrator’s decisions. The court held that the plan’s unambiguous language only required withdrawal from certain jobs, not all employment, and that the administrator’s broader interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. It further held that the defendants could not rely on the limitations period for benefit claims due to inadequate notice to participants. For fiduciary duty claims, the court found the limitations period did not begin until actual knowledge of the breach, reversing summary judgment against the 66 boilermakers. The court affirmed the benefit claims and remanded the fiduciary duty claims for further proceedings. View "Phillips v. Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust" on Justia Law

Denver Water, a municipal utility, faced a projected water shortage and vulnerability due to overreliance on its South System. To address these concerns, Denver Water proposed expanding Gross Reservoir by raising the dam, which would increase storage capacity and allow diversion of water from the Fraser and Williams Fork Rivers. Because the project would impact wetlands, Denver Water applied for a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers in 2003. The Corps conducted a fourteen-year review, considering environmental and logistical impacts, and ultimately issued the permit in 2017. Denver Water began and substantially completed the $600 million expansion by 2026, but was unable to fill the reservoir due to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the project after Save the Colorado and other environmental groups challenged the Corps’s permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The plaintiffs alleged the Corps defined the project’s purpose too narrowly, failed to adequately analyze costs, and did not sufficiently consider climate change’s impact on feasibility. The District Court agreed, finding violations of both statutes, vacating the permit and environmental reviews, and issuing a permanent injunction against water diversion and further enlargement activities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined whether the Corps’s review and permitting decisions were arbitrary or capricious. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps appropriately considered multiple related project purposes and reasonably evaluated cost and climate change impacts. The court found that the Corps’s determinations were supported by the record and not arbitrary or capricious. The main holding was that the Corps did not violate the CWA or NEPA, thus the district court’s judgment was reversed, the permanent injunction vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment against the plaintiffs. View "Save The Colorado v. Graham" on Justia Law

Police officers in Colorado observed an SUV parked in a lot adjacent to a closed check-cashing store and inactive bus stop at approximately 1:50 a.m., a location known for drug activity. The vehicle was reverse-parked, and three or four individuals were standing nearby. As officers approached, some individuals dispersed and the defendant, Mr. Jackson, was seen making furtive movements inside the vehicle. Officers requested Mr. Jackson exit the SUV, conducted a pat-down, and found a firearm in his pants. He was subsequently charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).Mr. Jackson moved in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado to suppress evidence of the gun, arguing that the stop and pat-down were made without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, during which both officers testified. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on the location, time, reverse-parking, presence and dispersal of individuals around the SUV, and Mr. Jackson’s furtive movements prior to the stop. The court denied the motion to suppress.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the court reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. It concluded that the district court’s findings regarding the presence of individuals and observations of Mr. Jackson’s furtive movements were not clearly erroneous, even in light of conflicting written statements and body-camera footage. The Tenth Circuit held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld Mr. Jackson’s conviction. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law