Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two individuals operated a funeral home and nonprofit organization in Colorado, offering low-cost cremation services to families and marketing body donation for medical research. Over several years, they fraudulently obtained, sold, and shipped bodies and body parts without proper consent, often misrepresenting services and forging documents. They targeted particularly vulnerable victims, including those experiencing financial hardship or dealing with terminal illness and hospice care. Many families were misled, charged for services never rendered, and provided false cremains, while the defendants profited from unauthorized sales.After indictment, both defendants pleaded guilty to mail fraud charges involving the shipment of remains; other counts were dismissed pursuant to plea agreements. Their initial Presentence Investigation Reports recommended sentencing enhancements for targeting vulnerable victims and substantial upward variances. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado imposed significant sentences—240 months for one defendant and 180 months for the other—after finding the offenses involved a large number of vulnerable victims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences, holding the district court had not made sufficient particularized findings of vulnerability as required under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(2).On remand, the district court received new evidence and identified twenty-one specific victims whose vulnerabilities were directly exploited by the defendants, including those with financial hardship and families referred by hospice. The court found a sufficient nexus between each victim’s vulnerability and the fraud, applied the two-level enhancement for offenses involving a large number of vulnerable victims, and resentenced the defendants to the same terms as before. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly applied the enhancement, rejected arguments relating to post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts and substantive reasonableness, and upheld both sentences. View "United States v. Hess" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested in Wyoming for possession of and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. When police apprehended him, they found a baseball bat, a police-style baton, and drug paraphernalia in his car. The defendant admitted to having used the bat and baton days earlier to retake his car after it had been stolen with methamphetamine stored inside. Evidence showed that he believed meth might still be in the car when he recovered it by force, though there was no proof that meth was actually present at that time. Five days later, police tracked his movements, observed what appeared to be a drug transaction, and ultimately arrested him after a brief chase, finding methamphetamine and the same bat and baton in his vehicle.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The presentence report recommended a two-level sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines for possession of dangerous weapons. At sentencing, the defendant objected to this enhancement. The district court, after hearing testimony and arguments, found that the totality of the circumstances linked the bat and baton to his drug offense and imposed the enhancement, resulting in a 151-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement for clear error and legal questions de novo. The court held that the enhancement was properly imposed because the defendant failed to demonstrate that a connection between the weapons and his drug activity was “clearly improbable.” The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the facts—including the defendant’s use of the weapons to retake his car associated with drug trafficking—supported the enhancement. View "United States v. Barrera" on Justia Law

In 1999, a warrant was issued for the arrest of a man involved in methamphetamine distribution in eastern Oklahoma after he failed to appear for trial on drug charges. For months, law enforcement sought his capture, eventually locating him at his residence where they executed a no-knock search warrant. During the early morning raid, the defendant opened fire with a rifle, killing one state trooper and wounding another. Following his arrest, authorities found weapons, drug paraphernalia, and cash in the residence and on his person.The defendant was initially tried in Oklahoma state court, where his first trial ended with a hung jury. At a second trial, he was acquitted of murder but convicted of first-degree manslaughter and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, resulting in a 30-year state sentence. Subsequently, federal authorities charged him with three counts, including using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (with the killing of a law enforcement officer as the predicate offense) under federal statutes. He was convicted on all counts, receiving life sentences for the firearm offenses and a death sentence for the killing. His convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, but post-conviction proceedings led to the death sentence being vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma later denied his second or successive motion to vacate his conviction for using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that causing the intentional killing of a law enforcement officer during a drug crime under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. Therefore, any error regarding the use of the now-invalid “residual clause” was harmless. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. View "United States v. Barrett" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Mexico entered the United States without inspection in 1997 and was later placed in removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal but was denied relief by an Immigration Judge, who instead granted her voluntary departure. She appealed the denial, but her subsequent departure from the United States, due to a family emergency, caused her appeal to be automatically withdrawn, making the original decision final. After returning to the United States without inspection in 2013, she was apprehended and a reinstatement order of removal was issued. She remained in the country under stays of removal until she was detained again in 2025, at which point she sought review of the reinstatement order while also pursuing withholding-only proceedings due to fear of persecution in her home country.Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that a removal order did not become final until the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings, following circuit precedent. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), abrogated this approach, holding that an order of removal becomes final upon its issuance or administrative affirmation, regardless of ongoing withholding-only proceedings.In the present case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the petitioner’s arguments that jurisdiction existed to review her reinstatement order and that the deadline for filing her petition should be equitably tolled due to the change in law. The Tenth Circuit held that it retains jurisdiction to review reinstatement orders as final orders of removal, consistent with its precedent and not contradicted by Riley. However, the court found that the petition for review was untimely, as it was not filed within thirty days of the reinstatement order, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. The court therefore dismissed the petition as untimely. View "Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Iran, who was granted asylum in the United States as a child, faced removal proceedings after a drug conviction. In 2002, an immigration judge deferred his removal under the Convention Against Torture, and he was released on supervision, consistently complying with all terms for over 20 years. After relocating from California to Kansas with approval from immigration authorities, he was unexpectedly detained by ICE officers in June 2025, despite no alleged violations of his release terms. He was subsequently notified that his release was revoked due to a supposed new possibility of removal to a third country, yet was not given the required informal interview to contest this revocation.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied his initial habeas petition challenging the legality of his detention, as well as his request for a preliminary injunction to stop his transfer out of Kansas. The court suggested he could file a new habeas petition if detained for more than six months. After over eight months in detention, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition, which the district court granted, leading to his release. The government then moved to dismiss his appeal as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined the appeal was not moot, applying the exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review. On the merits, the court held that the district court misapplied the applicable legal standards. It concluded that the government violated its own regulations by failing to promptly provide the petitioner with an informal interview upon revocation of his release, a due process violation that was per se prejudicial. The court also found error in the district court's application of the six-month presumptive reasonableness standard for detention under Zadvydas v. Davis, ruling it did not reset with each re-detention. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abedi v. Carter" on Justia Law

Oklahoma was authorized by Congress in 2005 to extend its administration of federal environmental programs into Indian country, upon approval by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For many years, Oklahoma did not invoke this provision. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma expanded the definition of Indian country in the state, Oklahoma requested EPA approval to apply its environmental programs to these areas. The EPA initially granted the request in 2020, then withdrew it to allow for further tribal consultation. After extensive engagement with tribal nations, the EPA issued a new approval in January 2025 with added conditions requiring tribal engagement, but subsequently rescinded those conditions in May 2025 and reissued its approval without them.The Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s May 2025 decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Pawnee Nation argued that the EPA's action was unlawful because the congressional provision authorizing Oklahoma's request, § 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA), had expired in 2009, that the EPA erred by refusing to impose conditions on Oklahoma’s approval, and that the EPA failed to make contemporaneous determinations of Oklahoma’s programs’ compliance with federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction and denied Pawnee Nation’s petition for review. The court held that § 10211(a) was unambiguous and remains active, not expired. It determined that EPA’s statutory obligation to approve Oklahoma’s request did not permit the agency to impose additional conditions, and found that EPA acted within the provision’s requirements by relying on its previous determinations that Oklahoma’s programs complied with federal law. The court affirmed EPA’s interpretation and approval. View "Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations dedicated to increasing voter participation, especially among underrepresented groups, sent mail ballot applications to Kansas voters during the 2020 election. These mailings included applications that had been partially prefilled with voter information obtained from public and commercial sources. Due to outdated or inaccurate data, many applications contained errors, leading to voter confusion and administrative burdens for local election officials who had to process erroneous or duplicate applications and respond to concerned voters.Following this experience, the Kansas legislature enacted a law prohibiting private entities from mailing partially prefilled advance ballot applications to registered voters. The nonprofits challenged the law in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that it infringed on their First Amendment rights. The district court initially enjoined enforcement of the law, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to apply intermediate scrutiny unless it found the law was enacted with an improper purpose. On remand, the district court found that the Kansas legislature had acted with an improper purpose, concluded that strict scrutiny should apply, and again enjoined the law.On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding improper legislative intent, as there was no sufficient evidence in the law’s text, justifications, or legislative history to support that conclusion. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit found that the law served significant governmental interests—minimizing voter confusion, facilitating efficient election administration, and fostering confidence in elections—and was narrowly tailored to those interests without substantially burdening protected speech. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. View "VoteAmerica v. Schwab" on Justia Law

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action against a biotechnology company, its affiliates, and three principal officers. The company was developing an intravenous drug called RJX, which had not yet received FDA approval. The SEC alleged that the defendants engaged in securities fraud by making misleading statements to investors regarding the principals’ compensation, the existence of audited financial statements and the company’s readiness to go public, and the company’s involvement in litigation. The factual record at the preliminary injunction stage showed discrepancies between reported and actual compensation, false claims about audited statements and IPO readiness, and statements denying ongoing litigation despite a significant lawsuit and settlement.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado initially issued a temporary restraining order and asset freeze at the SEC’s request, then granted a preliminary injunction with an asset freeze after reviewing the parties’ written submissions. The district court allowed the defendants to request modifications to the asset freeze, and later partially lifted it to permit certain business activities, such as third-party payments and licensing of intellectual property. The court denied a motion to fully lift the freeze and declined to appoint a liquidation agent, finding the SEC adequately represented investor interests. The defendants appealed both the initial injunction and the refusal to fully lift the freeze.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The appellate court held that the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing, since the defendants had requested cancellation and never sought to reschedule. It further held that the SEC made a strong showing on all four factors for a preliminary injunction, including likely success on the merits of securities fraud claims. The asset freeze, as modified, was found to be a reasonable means to preserve assets and protect investors. View "USSEC v. Reven Holdings" on Justia Law

A woman named Melissa asked a police officer to accompany her to a residence so she could retrieve her belongings. She told the officer, Chance Avery, that Christopher, who was at the residence, was drunk, mean, had threatened her, and had been drinking. When they arrived, Melissa entered the home and began collecting her things while Avery waited in the hallway. Christopher, holding a baseball bat at his side, entered the house, loudly asking where the police were. Avery immediately drew his gun and ordered Christopher to drop the bat. Christopher said he would comply, but after about 11 seconds and after taking a single step in Avery’s general direction without raising or swinging the bat, Avery shot Christopher three times, killing him.The special administrator of Christopher’s estate, Vision Bank, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, asserting that Avery used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Avery sought summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion. The court found that, based on the facts a reasonable jury could conclude, Avery’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that, under the facts a reasonable jury could find, Avery’s use of force was objectively unreasonable and violated Christopher’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that prior Tenth Circuit precedent made it clear that an officer may not use deadly force against a person holding a bat but making no hostile or aggressive motions. Therefore, Avery was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Vision Bank v. Avery" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who traveled from Miami to Oklahoma City to distribute fentanyl. Acting under the direction of another, he delivered packages of pills, later determined to contain a fentanyl analogue, to a confidential source and another individual in a vehicle. He was observed entering a hotel with an associate who rented a room in his own name, though a note at the front desk bore both their names and a room number. Shortly after, the defendant was seen returning to the hotel lobby with a duffel bag, attempted to flee when approached by law enforcement, and discarded the bag, which was later found to contain fentanyl pills. Upon searching the hotel room, officers found no drugs, drug paraphernalia, or substantial cash. The defendant admitted traveling to Oklahoma City to distribute drugs and stated he needed the associate’s help to rent the room.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, adopting the presentence investigation report, applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a premises for drug distribution and assigned three criminal-history points for a prior conviction stemming from a 1996 offense. The defendant challenged both the application of the enhancement and the criminal-history calculation. The district court overruled the objection to the enhancement but reduced the criminal-history score by one point for unrelated reasons, sentencing the defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the premises-maintenance enhancement because the evidence demonstrated only brief possession of the hotel room with little or no control, and no evidence of drug activity in the room. However, the appellate court found no plain error in assigning three criminal-history points for the prior conviction. The court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Conill-Perez" on Justia Law