Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An individual pleaded guilty to twelve felony counts, including threatening members of Congress and their families and transmitting those threats via interstate communication. The sentencing guidelines recommended a prison term of 33 to 41 months based on the offense level and criminal history. Although the guidelines did not permit probation, the court imposed a five-year probation term, as urged by all parties, with special conditions, including monitored communications and a prohibition on making further threats. Within days, the defendant violated probation by sending another threatening message to a former federal official, prompting the probation office to seek revocation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held a revocation hearing, revoked probation, and resentenced the defendant. The court referenced both Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines, ultimately imposing a 36-month prison sentence based on the Chapter 5 range. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred by not starting with Chapter 7’s recommended range for probation violations. Initially, the appellate panel affirmed the sentence, interpreting prior circuit precedent, United States v. Moore (Moore I), as not requiring the district court to identify an alternative sentence at the original sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed whether Moore I’s two-step sentencing process—first considering the underlying offense under Chapter 5 and then the probation violation under Chapter 7—was correct. The court held that after revoking probation, the sentencing court must take Chapter 7’s recommended range as its starting point, and only consider Chapter 5’s range when deciding whether to vary from Chapter 7’s recommendation. Because the district court did not follow this process, the Tenth Circuit reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Seals" on Justia Law

A family group brought claims in Oklahoma state court against an energy company, alleging underpayment of oil and gas royalties over several decades. These claims overlapped with those in a separate class action brought by another party against the company and its related entities, also concerning underpayment of royalties. The class action was removed to federal court, where a settlement was reached and approved by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The settlement covered claims for a defined period, and included a permanent injunction barring class members from pursuing similar claims. The family did not opt out of the settlement and received compensation under its terms.Later, the energy company sought summary judgment in the family’s original state case, arguing that the federal settlement released the company from liability for claims during the covered period. When summary judgment was denied, the company returned to the federal district court, seeking enforcement of the settlement’s injunction against further pursuit of those claims by the family in state court. The federal court declined to issue a new injunction but found that the family’s ongoing litigation of released claims violated the original injunction. The court ordered the family to either show cause for their violation or agree to abide by the injunction and dismiss the released claims. The family appealed this order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.The Tenth Circuit determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order. The court held that a post-judgment civil contempt or enforcement order is not final and appealable unless the district court both finds contempt and imposes a specific, unavoidable sanction. Because the district court’s order did neither, and because no alternative grounds for appellate jurisdiction applied, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "Fischer v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law

A woman was arrested and searched by Colorado Springs police officers in the parking lot of a motel where she lived, following her involvement in assisting an overdose victim and recording the police response. The officers claimed she was disruptive and failed to comply with commands to leave the scene, while she maintained she was cooperative and was wrongfully arrested. After her acquittal of the municipal charge, she brought a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for unlawful arrest and search, seeking damages including for emotional distress.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado addressed extensive disputes during discovery. The plaintiff had deleted social media videos of her later police encounters, as well as records and messages related to the arrest. The court sanctioned her and her attorneys with a monetary penalty and gave adverse-inference jury instructions, directing the jury to presume that she regularly disrupted police business and profited from posting such videos. At trial, over her objection, the court admitted more than twenty clips from her unrelated copwatching videos, which portrayed her berating officers and threatening lawsuits. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the unrelated videos and by issuing an adverse-inference instruction that invited improper propensity reasoning, thereby unfairly prejudicing the plaintiff before the jury and depriving her of a fair trial. The Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment for the officers and remanded the case for a new trial. However, it affirmed the monetary sanction against the plaintiff and her attorneys for discovery violations. View "Cronick v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was observed in a high-crime area of Albuquerque, New Mexico, acting suspiciously by loitering near a house, retrieving a duffel bag he had left overnight, and peering into the window of a car for sale. After the homeowner reported his behavior to the police, deputies responding to the call found the defendant matching the caller’s description. During their interaction, the defendant acted nervously, repeatedly reached into his duffel bag, and did not comply with officers’ commands. The deputies conducted a pat-down, discovering a pistol, a magazine, and cash on his person. After running his information, they learned of outstanding felony warrants, arrested him, and searched the duffel bag, uncovering methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence from his person and the duffel bag, arguing the stop, frisk, and search were unlawful. Initially, the district court indicated the stop and frisk were lawful but suppressed the contents of the duffel bag, finding no valid inventory search or basis for inevitable discovery. After the government submitted additional evidence regarding inventory procedures, the district court reconsidered and denied the motion to suppress, holding that the items would have been inevitably discovered during a lawful inventory search prior to booking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court concluded that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion given the defendant's suspicious behavior in a high-crime area. The court further held that, even if the frisk or bag search had been unlawful, the items would have been inevitably discovered either during a search incident to arrest or a proper inventory search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, upholding the convictions. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal shooting that occurred after an altercation in a bar, where the defendant, after being physically attacked and ejected by several patrons, retrieved a firearm from his vehicle and fired into the bar, killing a patron. There was evidence presented that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and possibly a traumatic brain injury as a result of the fight, which could have affected his mental state and perception of danger at the time of the shooting.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the original trial, where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in Indian Country and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense but did not inform them that the government bore the burden to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also instructed on diminished capacity, stating it was not a defense to second-degree murder or manslaughter. The defendant raised several challenges on appeal, including errors in jury instructions and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. The district court also addressed multiplicitous charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j), dismissing the greater-included offense.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt as to first-degree murder. This error affected the defendant's substantial rights and seriously impacted the fairness of the proceedings, necessitating reversal of the first-degree murder conviction. The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s other challenges, including those related to diminished capacity instructions and prosecutorial statements. The court affirmed the district court’s choice to dismiss the greater-included firearm offense and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted for murder and related firearm offenses arising from the death of an individual in Indian Country. A key witness, William Lozer, had previously testified at a state preliminary hearing that the defendant confessed to and described details of the crime. Prior to the defendant's federal trial, the government was unable to locate Lozer, who was known to be transient and had not been seen or contacted by his family or attorney for months. The government sought to introduce Lozer's prior testimony, which had been given under oath and subject to cross-examination by defense counsel.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma considered whether the government had made sufficient efforts to locate Lozer and ultimately found that, despite reasonable and good-faith efforts, Lozer was unavailable as a witness. As a result, the court permitted the prior testimony to be read to the jury. At trial, additional evidence against the defendant was introduced, including incriminating statements to other individuals and physical evidence. The defendant was convicted on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s argument that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of Lozer’s prior testimony. Applying a de novo standard of review, the Tenth Circuit held that the government’s efforts to locate Lozer were reasonable and made in good faith under the circumstances. Thus, Lozer was properly deemed unavailable, and the admission of his prior, cross-examined testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "United States v. Barker" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted of first-degree murder after he entered a home with several gang members and shot the victim, Michael Rhodes, multiple times as Rhodes sat on a couch next to his young daughter. The events stemmed from a gang dispute involving other individuals, but Rhodes was not the intended target and was caught in the crossfire. After the incident, the defendant and his accomplices fled the scene.The trial took place in an Oklahoma state court, where the defendant requested an instruction for the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, arguing that the evidence could support a conviction for that crime rather than for first-degree murder. The trial court denied this request, concluding there was insufficient evidence to support the lesser charge. The defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty; this was denied because one of his IQ scores was above the statutory cutoff. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder and found aggravating circumstances, resulting in a death sentence. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed both the conviction and the sentence, finding no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the lesser-included instruction or to conduct an intellectual disability hearing. The defendant’s requests for post-conviction relief and for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case after the federal district court denied habeas relief. The Tenth Circuit held that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent regarding either the necessity of a lesser-included offense instruction under Beck v. Alabama or the requirement for an intellectual disability hearing under Atkins v. Virginia and its progeny. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Fuston v. Quick" on Justia Law

A licensed physician operated pain clinics in Arizona and Wyoming, where he, with assistance from family members, employees, and certain patients, prescribed large quantities of oxycodone and other controlled substances. Many prescriptions were issued without adequate medical examinations and were routinely exchanged for cash or goods. Several individuals helped manage clinic operations, refer new patients, and facilitate prescription transactions, often receiving or providing payment for these activities. One patient, Jessica Burch, died after overdosing on oxycodone obtained through these prescriptions.The physician was initially convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming on multiple counts, including unlawful dispensing of controlled substances, conspiracy resulting in death, and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On his first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court, in light of *Ruan v. United States*, vacated his convictions due to a jury instruction error regarding the required mens rea for the offenses. The Tenth Circuit then remanded the case for a new trial. At retrial, the physician was convicted on seventeen of twenty-one counts. He moved for acquittal or a new trial, but the district court denied these motions and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the physician challenged the admission of expert testimony about the law governing prescriptions, the sufficiency of the evidence for the continuing criminal enterprise and death-resulting convictions, and the use of a regulation to define the scope of authorized prescriptions. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, found sufficient evidence supported the challenged convictions, and reaffirmed that a DEA-registered physician can be prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 if acting outside the usual course of professional practice. The court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Kahn" on Justia Law

Wilford Deweese, a 67-year-old man from Florida, was traveling through Manitou Springs, Colorado, when he became involved in an altercation at a bar. After being refused service at two establishments, Deweese returned to the first bar to retrieve his belongings, leading to an argument with the bartender and a patron. During this confrontation, Deweese attempted to show a gun, prompting someone to call 911. Police located him in a nearby courtyard. Over roughly twenty minutes, officers repeatedly ordered Deweese to surrender, but he did not comply. After warning him, officers released a police canine to subdue him. As Deweese drew his firearm to shoot the dog, officers responded with gunfire, resulting in his death.Following these events, Deweese’s estate filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the officers, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment for excessive force and related claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers invoked qualified immunity, arguing that their conduct did not violate clearly established law. The district court agreed, granting their motion to dismiss the federal claims on the grounds that any constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time. The court declined jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff failed to identify Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent, or a consensus of authority from other circuits, that would have clearly established the unconstitutionality of the officers’ conduct under the particular circumstances present. The court further found that the situation did not rise to an obvious or egregious constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the officers. View "Estate of Deweese v. Hancock" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Upon sentencing, he received thirty-seven months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release, the district court ordered that, to the extent he was financially able, he must contribute toward the costs of court-ordered medical and substance abuse treatment.After the United States District Court for the District of Kansas imposed these conditions, the defendant objected to the requirement that he pay for treatment, arguing the court did not have statutory authority to impose such a payment condition as part of supervised release. The district court overruled his objection, relying on prior circuit precedent and the statutory scheme, and found the payment conditions appropriate and tailored to the defendant’s circumstances. The defendant then timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the challenge, first determining the issue was prudentially ripe for review because it presented a purely legal question of statutory interpretation. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) grants sentencing courts broad discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release, including those requiring defendants to pay for treatment to the extent they are financially able, so long as these conditions are not expressly prohibited by statute and meet the statutory requirements of being reasonably related to sentencing factors and not imposing greater deprivation of liberty than necessary. The court rejected arguments that specific or omitted statutory language precluded such payment conditions. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law