United States v. Driscoll

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In 2004, Chance Wade Driscoll (“Driscoll”) pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At Driscoll’s sentencing in January 2005, the sentencing court accepted the Presentence Investigation Report’s (“PSR”) determination that Driscoll was an armed career criminal based upon one previous drug conviction and two previous burglary convictions. The sentencing court did not state whether the two burglary convictions counted as violent felonies under the ACCA’s enumerated offenses clause or the residual clause. Over ten years later, Driscoll filed this 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing it was possible the sentencing court relied on the now-unconstitutional residual clause of the ACCA to enhance his sentence. The district court denied his section 2255 motion as untimely. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the predicate Nebraska crime that served as his sentence enhancer did not categorically fit under the generic offense of burglary. As a result, Driscoll's 1988 Nebraska burglary conviction was not a violent felony as defined by the enumerated offenses clause of the ACCA. This meant Driscoll did not qualify as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, not eligible for 18 U.S.C. 924(e)'s fifteen-year minimum sentence, and instead was subject to section 924(a)(2)'s ten-year maximum. The Tenth Circuit found the sentencing court's error was not harmless. View "United States v. Driscoll" on Justia Law