Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Banking
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Plaintiff-Appellant Jean Rosenfield appealed a district court's order that granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee HSBC Bank, USA (HSBC). Plaintiff brought claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages against HSBC for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), contending her lender failed to make required disclosures in a residential loan refinancing agreement executed by the parties, and that because of this, she was entitled to a rescission of her loan agreement. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her claims and by holding that she failed to timely exercise her right of rescission within the applicable three-year time bar specified by TILA. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and affirmed its judgment. View "Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA" on Justia Law

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After Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) brought a foreclosure action against the home owned by Appellants Mark and Jamileh Miller and obtained an Order Authorizing Sale (OAS) from a Colorado court, the Millers filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Upon the filing of their petition, an automatic stay entered, halting the foreclosure proceedings. Deutsche Bank obtained an order from the bankruptcy court relieving it from the stay to permit the foreclosure to continue. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order granting Deutsche Bank relief from the automatic stay. The Millers appealed the BAP’s order affirming relief from stay. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether Deutsche Bank established that it was a "party in interest" entitled to seek and obtain relief from the stay. Because the Court concluded that Deutsche Bank did not meet its burden of proof on this issue, the Court reversed the BAP’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller, et al v. Deutshce Bank National Trust" on Justia Law

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Azhar Said on behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant Abbasid, Inc. sued the Los Alamos National Bank and First National Bank of Santa Fe for negligence in paying and accepting checks intended for the business but that his now ex-wife Bina Shahani had deposited in her cousin's account for personal use. The case was removed from Texas state to federal court, then removed to the U.S. District Court for the district of New Mexico. The district court dismissed the negligence claim on the grounds that the Bank owed no duty of care to Abbasid and that the claim and was preempted by statute which imposed strict liability. After trial, the jury returned a special verdict that the Bank did not convert any of Abbasid's checks. Abbasid timely filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. Among the issues Abbasid raised on appeal: (1) the district court improperly denied its motion for new trial claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (2) the court improperly excluded evidence of the Bank’s check-handling policies. Finding that most of Abbasid's claims of error were not properly preserved or that any error was mooted by the verdict, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in the case. View "Abbasid, Inc. v. First Natl. Bank of Santa Fe" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant International Bancshares Corporation (IBC) appealed the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee MCC Management of Naples (Colliers). The Colliers sued for breach of contract and fraud in a dispute over tax benefits. The dispute arose over the parties' disagreement over the entitlement to $16 million in benefits that accrued over a period of years in Local bank. Brothers and investors Miles and Barron Collier owned Local at the time the tax benefits arose. IBC now owns the bank. Local bought troubled loan assets. An agency (now the FDIC) guaranteed the value of the assets. In return, Local had to "share" some of its profits. When Congress repealed the deductions Local claimed on the losses from the assets, Local stopped paying its share from those assets and sued in federal court. The FDIC counterclaimed for non-payment. The Townsend Group had purchased Local Bank from the Colliers while the lawsuit was pending. Townsend required the Colliers promise to indemnify Townsend/Local in the event the FDIC won the lawsuit for more than the potential liability in the suit. Local eventually settled the suit for approximately $25-27 million. Townsend/Local and the Colliers signed a Resolution and Modification Agreement from which the Colliers claimed entitlement to the aforementioned tax benefits. Furthermore, through the "excess basis deduction," Local claimed a deduction on principal payments made to the FDIC and for attorney's fees. In addition to the dispute over the tax benefits, Local's former "tax director" quit over what she believed was the bonus owed to her for discovering the excess basis deduction. She began consulting for the Colliers and notified them of the millions in deductions that Local claimed. IBC counterclaimed against the Colliers, and added third-party claims against the former tax director for breaching confidentiality and tortious interference with contract. The Colliers and tax director prevailed after a jury trial. IBC appealed, arguing it was entitled a judgment as a matter of law. But after review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's findings at trial. View "MCC Mgmt of Naples v. International Bancshare " on Justia Law

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Trinity Mortgage Companies, Inc. (Trinity) appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of David Dryer and Dryer and Associates, P.C. (Dryer). Trinity, formerly a mortgage brokerage company owned by Shawn Cremeen, entered into a franchise agreement with 1st Class Lending, Inc., which was owned by Dennis Junker and Richard Gheisar. In April 2007, Junker sued Gheisar and Trinity in Oklahoma state court for breach of contract, fraud, defamation, and conversion, all concerning his alleged wrongful termination. Between May 2007 and April 2008, Dryer represented Trinity, without a written contract. In October 2007, while the lawsuit was pending, Trinity entered into an agreement to sell most of its assets and to stop originating loans. Meanwhile, after Trinity failed to file an answer in the pending lawsuit, Junker moved for a default judgment against Trinity. Because Dryer failed to object to entry of default judgment against Trinity, the state court granted the motion against Trinity in January 2008. The another firm replaced Dryer as Trinity’s counsel, who unsuccessfully sought to vacate the default judgment against Trinity. Cremeen and Junker eventually entered into a settlement agreement concerning the lawsuit. Trinity confessed a final judgment in favor of Junker but the only recovery of this amount would be through his ownership interest in Trinity, which was the action against Dryer. Trinity moved for partial summary judgment on its malpractice and breach of contract claims. Dryer moved for summary judgment, contending that all claims were barred as a matter of law because Trinity unlawfully assigned them to Junker. In response, Trinity argued that there had not been an assignment of tort causes of action; there was never any collusion between Trinity and Junker; and that the malpractice case was not contingent upon disproving the merits of the underlying suit against Trinity. The district court granted Dryer’s motion for summary judgment and denied Trinity’s motion for partial summary judgment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dryer.

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Defendant-Appellant Alan Tukes appealed his federal conviction for bank robbery, arguing that the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) at the time of the crime. At trial, a prosecutor asked the bank’s branch manager: “Now, the Compass Bank, is that a bank that is federally insured by the [FDIC]?” She responded: “Yes, it is.” When asked whether the bank “has” any documentation proving its insured status, she replied: “Yes. We have a certificate.” When asked whether the certificate “hangs” in the branch, the manager replied in the affirmative. The district court admitted the certificate, dated November 8, 1993, into evidence. The government offered no additional evidence of the bank’s insured status. At summation, Defendant argued that the government had not proven that the bank was FDIC insured at the time of the robbery. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Tenth Circuit concluded "it is clear that a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was insured at the time of the robbery." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

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Plaintiffs Aviva Life & Annuity Company and American Investors Life Insurance Company (collectively, "Aviva") contended the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in rendering insurance determinations concerning certain of Plaintiffs’ bank deposit accounts. They appealed a district court’s order upholding the FDIC’s determinations. In 2008, the Kansas Bank Commissioner closed Columbian Bank & Trust Company and appointed the FDIC as receiver. At that time, Plaintiffs maintained twelve deposit accounts at Columbian. The bulk of those funds were held in two accounts (the “Challenged Accounts”). The remaining accounts bore a variety of titles. Shortly after its appointment as receiver, the FDIC determined that each Plaintiffs’ respective accounts identified as “operating” accounts, which included the Challenged Accounts, would be aggregated as corporate accounts. The FDIC further determined that the accounts designated as “benefits” accounts would be separately insured as annuity contract accounts. Upon review of the FDIC's determination and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that the FDIC ultimately concluded the deposit account records clearly and unambiguously indicated the Challenged Accounts were owned in the manner of “corporate accounts.” Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence was not, therefore, “relevant data” for purposes of the FDIC’s final insurance determination: "[t]he absence of any discussion pertaining to this evidence in the FDIC’s final determination is therefore unsurprising, and in no way arbitrary or capricious." The Court affirmed the FDIC's determination.

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BancInsure, Inc. appealed a declaratory judgment in favor of Columbian Financial Corporation and a former director, Carl McCaffree (collectively the Insureds). The insurance policy at issue here was a "claims-made" policy covered any claim made to BancInsure against any Columbian officer or director for a "Wrongful Act" as defined by the policy. A disputed provision of the policy pertained to the scope of coverage if Columbian was placed in receivership or otherwise ceased to engage in active banking business. The parties interpreted the provision differently. The Insureds contended that if Columbian went into receivership, the policy covered all claims made through the end of the original policy period, although only for Wrongful Acts committed before the receivership. BancInsure contended that the policy covered only claims made before the receivership. The operation of the disputed provision became relevant in August 2008 when the Kansas State Bank Commissioner declared Columbian insolvent and appointed the FDIC as its receiver. Soon thereafter, Columbian’s management sent BancInsure a letter to notify it of potential claims by the FDIC and others. The parties disputed many of the claims against Columbian which led to Columbian filing suit to the district court to determine which claims were covered under the policy. The sole issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court had jurisdiction. Though no party disputed jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no actual controversy between the parties when the district court below rendered its judgment. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded to case with instructions to the court to vacate its judgment.