Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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Lockheed Martin Corp. sought to set aside a decision of the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor (the "ARB" or the "Board") that concluded Lockheed violated Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Board affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who concluded Lockheed violated the Act by constructively discharging employee Andrea Brown after she had engaged in protected activity. Brown worked as Communications Director for Lockheed from June 2000 to February 2008. In 2003, she became the Director of Communications in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In May 2006, Brown began having difficulty getting responses from one of her supervisors on work-related matters. She discussed the problem with Tina Colditz, a coworker and personal friend. Colditz ran a pen pals program for the company, through which Lockheed employees could correspond with members of the U.S. military deployed in Iraq. Colditz told Brown that the supervisor had developed sexual relationships with several of the soldiers in the program, had purchased a laptop computer for one soldier, sent inappropriate emails and sex toys to soldiers stationed in Iraq, and traveled to welcome-home ceremonies for soldiers on the pretext of business while actually taking soldiers to expensive hotels in limousines for intimate relations. Colditz told Brown she was concerned the supervisor was using company funds for these activities. Brown thus became concerned Owen’s actions were fraudulent and illegal and that there could be media exposure which could lead to government audits and affect the company’s future contracts and stock price. Brown brought her concerns to Jan Moncallo, Lockheed’s Vice President of Human Resources. Moncallo told Brown she would submit an anonymous ethics complaint on Brown’s behalf, and that she would be protected from retaliation because no one would know her identity. Moncallo sent an Prior to 2006, Brown received a "high contributor" or "exceptional contributor" rating in her performance evaluations. In late 2006, and thereafter, however, Brown received a lower rating of "successful contributor." In 2007, Lockheed announced to all employees it was undergoing a corporate-structure reorganization. Brown began reporting to a new supervisor, who according to Brown, had a negative attitude toward her from the beginning of their professional relationship. Shortly thereafter, Brown received a phone call from the former supervisor telling her that Brown’s job had been posted on the internet and that she should get her resume together. Brown would suffer from an emotional breakdown, fall into a deep depression, and take medical leave over the changes. Brown brought a complaint alleging violations of Sarbanes-Oxley. In his Recommended Decision and Order, the ALJ found that Brown had engaged in protected activity; she suffered materially adverse employment actions, including constructive discharge; and her engagement in protected activity was a contributing factor in the constructive discharge. The ALJ awarded reinstatement, back pay, medical expenses, and non-economic compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000. Lockheed timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor, which affirmed. Finding no error in the Board's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Lockheed Martin v. DOL" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 ("Lloyds") appealed the district court's denial of its summary judgment motion and subsequent grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. ("BYA") in an action arising out of a professional liability insurance contract. The district court concluded Lloyds failed to pay sufficient indemnity to BYA for claims brought against BYA in an arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers. The underlying suit alleged BYA agents mismanaged and unlawfully "churned" the investment accounts of its clients. The court concluded the claims brought in the arbitration did not relate back to earlier claims brought outside the policy period and, therefore, rejected Lloyds' argument coverage was precluded altogether. Additionally, the court rejected BYA's argument that Lloyds was equitably estopped from denying coverage due to its course of conduct in receiving and defending the claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of the law of the case, and therefore abused its discretion in making its judgments in this case. Accordingly, the district court's decisions were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v. Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003" on Justia Law

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After a bench trial, the federal district court found that Appellant Maggie Chapman violated the "assisting and facilitating" provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310.3(b). A consumer protection action was brought by the Federal Trade Commission and four states against several individual and corporate defendants who marketed and sold to consumers grant-related goods and services with false representations that the consumers were guaranteed or likely to receive grants. After the claims against the other defendants were settled or adjudicated by entry of summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial on the remaining claim against Ms. Chapman. Following the trial, the court found that Ms. Chapman violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule by providing substantial assistance to telemarketing defendants while knowing or consciously avoiding knowing of their deceptive telemarketing practices. The court accordingly ordered a permanent injunction and $1,682,950 in monetary damages against Ms. Chapman. The court also denied Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment or, alternatively, for remittitur. Ms. Chapman appealed both the finding she violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule and the denial of her post-judgment motion. Not persuaded that the district court's underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous, and concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Chapman" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (ILM) appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial following a $2.2 million jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Ryan Development Company, L.C., d/b/a Agriboard Industries (Agriboard). This case arose from a fire that destroyed a Texas manufacturing facility in April 2009. Agriboard, manufactured building panels made of compressed straw. At the time of the fire, Agriboard was insured under a fire and related losses insurance policy issued by ILM with various coverages including lost income. By May 2009, ILM had paid $450,000; Agriboard filed suit and thereafter ILM paid $1.8 million. Agriboard continued to seek recovery under the policy, but ILM refused to pay the amount requested and Agriboard re-filed suit, seeking $2.4 million in unpaid coverages. The trial court denied ILM's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial. ILM timely appealed that denial to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying ILM's motion and affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Ryan Development Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Klein-Becker USA and Klein-Becker IP Holdings sued Patrick Englert and Mr. Finest, Inc., for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act; false advertising under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act; unfair competition under the Utah Unfair Practices Act; fraud; civil conspiracy; and intentional interference with existing and prospective business relations. The action arose from Englert's unauthorized selling of "StriVectin" skin care products: he posed as a General Nutrition Center (GNC) store to purchase the products at below wholesale rates. Englert then sold the products through eBay and other commercial web platforms, including his own, "mrfinest.com." Englert was sanctioned several times for failing to comply with court orders and discovery schedules. The third and final sanction resulted in the entry of default judgment for Klein-Becker on all remaining claims. Englert appealed the district court's entry of default judgment against him, determination of his personal liability and the amount of damages owed, grant of a permanent injunction, denial of a jury trial, and refusal to allow him to call a certain witness. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no fault in the district court's analysis or judgment and affirmed. View "Klein-Becker USA v. Englert" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Eric Rajala, Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Generation Resources Holding Company, LLC (GRHC), appealed a district court order which granted motions by Defendants-Appellees FreeStream Capital, LLC (FreeStream) and Lookout Windpower Holding Co., LLC (LWHC) to distribute approximately $9 million held in escrow. The amount represented part of the purchase price of a wind power project allegedly developed by GRHC. The Trustee claimed that GRHC had been left with $5 million in debt while the individual Defendants-Appellees and their affiliated entities received some $13 million in proceeds from the sale of several wind power projects, unburdened by the debt. The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was what constituted property of the bankruptcy estate and whether allegedly fraudulently transferred property was subject to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay before a trustee recovers the property through an avoidance action. The district court held that allegedly fraudulently transferred property was not part of the bankruptcy estate until recovered and therefore was beyond the reach of the automatic stay. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[i]n the end, we need not pass upon the constitutionality of such a broad reading. . . . This interpretation gives Congress's chosen language its ordinary meaning, and abides by the rule against surplusage. Further, our reading does not undermine the Bankruptcy Code's goal of equitable distribution, as there exist[s] alternative means of protecting estate assets." View "Rajala v. Garnder" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Allstate Sweeping, LLC (Allstate) is owned and operated by two white women: Martha Krueger and Barbara Hollis. In January 2006 it began performing pressure-washing services at Denver International Airport (DIA) under a contract with the City and County of Denver (Denver). Although the contract term was through July 2008, it was terminated by Denver July, 2007. Defendant Calvin Black, a contract-compliance technician at DIA, was assigned to monitor Allstate’s contract. Black is an African-American male. Allstate claimed that it was subjected to gender- and race-based discrimination and to retaliation for its complaints of discrimination. It filed suit in the federal district court in Colorado against Denver and four DIA employees, including Black, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (Title VI), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except Black, holding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether Black was motivated by racial and gender bias and whether Black created a hostile work environment in such a way as to make plaintiff’s contract "unprofitable and its owners miserable." It did not address Allstate’s retaliation claim. Black appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, contending that he was entitled to qualified immunity and that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s determinations because such sufficiency determinations are not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court did, however, have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of the claim that Black made Allstate’s owners "miserable" and to review the sufficiency of the evidence of the retaliation claim (which the district court did not consider). The Court reversed the denial of summary judgment on those claims. View "Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Ronica Tabor and Dacia Gray worked as inside salespeople for Hilti, Inc and Hilti of North America, Inc. After being denied promotions to Account Managers (outside sales), they each filed individual claims for gender discrimination under Title VII and moved to certify a class of all female inside salespersons at Hilti who were denied similar promotions. The district court refused to certify the class and granted summary judgment in favor of Hilti on all claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Tabor's claim for retaliation, and Gray's claim for failure to promote. The Court also affirmed the refusal to certify a class. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Tabor's individual claims for failure to promote and disparate impact, and remanded Gray's individual disparate impact claim because the district court did not address that claim in its opinion. View "Tabor, et al v. Hilti, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case was one of first impression: whether the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy code exempted Chapter 11 debtors from the absolute priority rule. The bankruptcy court answered this question affirmatively, and therefore confirmed the Debtors' proposed plan of reorganization over certain creditors' objections that the plan violated the absolute priority rule. On appeal, the bankruptcy appellate panel certified the case for direct appeal. The Tenth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's order confirming the plan: "here, the statutory language and legislative history lack any clear indication that Congress intended to erode a pillar of creditor bankruptcy protection." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dill Oil Company, LLC, et al v. Stephens, et al" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Campus Village Apartments, LLC appealed denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff-Appellee Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC. Regency's complaint alleged that Campus Village conspired with the University of Colorado at Denver to monopolize student housing in and around the university's campus. Regency moved to dismiss, averring that the Tenth Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the district court's denial of Campus Village's motion to dismiss was not a final order. In response, Campus Village argued that the Tenth Circuit indeed had jurisdiction over this case under the "collateral order doctrine." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not err in denying Campus Village's motion to dismiss; the court's order was not an appealable final order. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Campus Village's appeal. View "Auraria Student Housing v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law