Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Board of Education of Gallup-McKinley County Schools (Gallup) successfully obtained summary judgment on certain Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claims made by Mavis Yazzie in the administrative action below. Subsequently, Gallup sought attorneys’ fees from Yazzie and her counsel, the Native American Disability Law Center (NADLC). The question presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether the controlling provision of the New Mexico Administrative Code (NMAC) permitted Gallup to pursue attorneys’ fees within 30 days of the final decision relating to any party in the administrative action, or did the NMAC limit Gallup to seeking fees within 30 days of obtaining summary judgment, which Gallup failed to do. The Tenth Circuit concluded the plain meaning of the regulatory language permitted petitions for attorneys’ fees made within 30 days of the final decision in the administrative action regardless of whether that decision related to the party seeking fees. Accordingly, Gallup’s petition was timely. The Court therefore reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Board of Education of Gallup v. Native American Disability Law" on Justia Law

An Immigration Judge with the Board of Immigration Appeals moved sua sponte to reopen Juvenal Reyes-Vargas' removal proceedings. The Board ruled that under 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1) the Board ruled that this regulation removed the IJ’s jurisdiction to reopen an alien’s removal proceedings after the alien has departed the United States (the regulation’s “post-departure bar”). The Tenth Circuit reviewed the Board's interpretation of its regulation using the framework announced in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), which clarified when and how courts defer to an agency interpreting its own regulations. Under that case, the Tenth Circuit determined it could defer to the Board’s interpretation only if the Court concluded, after rigorously applying all interpretative tools, that the regulation presented a genuine ambiguity and that the agency’s reading was reasonable and entitled to controlling weight. Applying this framework here, the Tenth Circuit concluded the regulation was not genuinely ambiguous on the issue in dispute: whether the post-departure bar eliminated the IJ’s jurisdiction to move sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings. In fact, the regulation’s plain language conclusively answered the question: the post-departure bar applies to a party’s “motion to reopen,” not to the IJ’s own sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings. So the Court did not defer, and granted Reyes-Vargas’s petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Board had to review the IJ’s conclusory decision that Reyes-Vargas had not shown “exceptional circumstances” as required before an IJ can move sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings. View "Reyes-Vargas v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2014, Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston rejected the claim for long-term disability benefits by plaintiff-appellee Michael Ellis. As part of its employee-benefit plan, Comcast Corporation, for whom Ellis worked in Colorado from 1994 until 2012, had obtained from Liberty in 2005 a Group Disability Income Policy (the Policy). Ellis sought review of Liberty’s denial of benefits in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court, reviewing the denial de novo, ruled that Liberty’s denial was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Liberty appealed, contending the court should have reviewed its decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard but that it should prevail even under a de novo standard. Ellis defended the district court’s choice of a de novo standard but argued he should prevail under either standard of review. The Tenth Circuit determined a plan administrator’s denial of benefits was ordinarily reviewed by the court de novo; but if the policy gave the administrator discretion to interpret the plan and award benefits, judicial review was for abuse of discretion. The Policy at issue provided that it was governed by the law of Pennsylvania, which was where Comcast was incorporated and has its principal place of business. Among its terms was one that gave Liberty discretion in resolving claims for benefits. A Colorado statute enacted in 2008, however, forbade such grants of discretion in insurance policies. The parties disputed whether the statute applied to the Policy under Colorado law, and whether Colorado law governed. The Tenth Circuit held that in this dispute the law of Pennsylvania was controlling. Liberty’s denial of benefits was therefore properly reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under that standard the denial had to be upheld. View "Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Dana Zzyym did not identify as either male or female, rather intersex. The United States State Department refused Zzyym's application for a passport. Zzyym sued, alleging that the State Department's reliance on a binary sex policy: (1) exceeded its statutory authority; (2) was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) violated the federal Constitution. The district court concluded that as a matter of law, the State Department violated the APA on Zzyym's first two grounds; the court did not reach the constitutional claims. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the State Department acted within its authority. but exercised this authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The State Department gave five reasons for denying Zzyym’s request for a passport. Two of the reasons were supported by the administrative record, but three others weren’t. "Given the State Department’s partial reliance on three unsupported reasons, we don’t know whether the State Department would have denied Zzyym’s request if limited to the two supported reasons. The district court thus should have remanded to the State Department to reconsider the policy based only on the two reasons supported by the record." View "Zzyym v. Pompeo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant W. Clark Aposhian filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded plaintiff did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of his challenge to a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) rule classifying bump stocks as machine guns under the National Firearms Act (NFA). Aposhian purchased a Slide Fire bump stock before the Final Rule was promulgated. He filed suit against various governmental officers and agencies challenging the Final Rule as unconstitutional and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the Final Rule contradicted an unambiguous statute, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b), and mistakenly extended its statutory definition of “machinegun” to cover bump stocks. The government argued the statute was unambiguous but that the Final Rule was merely interpretive and, as so, reflected the best interpretation of the statutory text. For its part, the district court did not specifically opine on whether the statute was ambiguous or not. The Tenth Circuit concurred plaintiff failed to demonstrate the threatened injury to him outweighed the harm that the preliminary injunction might cause to the government, or that the injunction would not adversely affect the public interest. Accordingly, denial of the injunction was affirmed. View "Aposhian v. Barr" on Justia Law

A federal district court used a Colorado statute governing costs to award more than $230,000 in costs that would not have been allowable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Disappointed with the outcome of a merger, minority-shareholder Plaintiffs brought a class action against Defendants for breach of contract and fiduciary duties. The parties litigated their dispute for over ten years across proceedings in arbitration and federal court. In the end the district court granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor, which was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. Moving for costs under Rule 54(d), the district court awarded the costs under review in this appeal. Because Rule 54(d) fell well within the statutory authorization of the Rules Enabling Act and its displacement of Colorado state law would not impair any state substantive right, the Tenth Circuit held that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction has no power to award costs. View "Stender v. Archstone-Smith" on Justia Law

Progressive Northwestern Insurance filed suit to obtain a declaratory judgment that it had not violated any duty to its insureds in the defense of a wrongful-death suit. The underlying suit had been brought in 2013 by Gabriel Gant against Justin Birk; his parents, Edward and Linda; and the Birks’ family company, Birk Oil. The suit alleged that Justin had negligently killed Kathyrn Gant (Gabriel’s wife) in a car accident; that his parents were liable because they had negligently entrusted the vehicle to him; and that Birk Oil was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because Justin was driving the vehicle incidental to his employment by the company. Gant’s attorneys estimated damages of many million dollars, which far exceeded defendants’ insurance coverage. Defendants had assets from which Gant could have collected additional money on a judgment against them, but his attorneys apparently thought that a better way to collect a large judgment would be if defendants had a claim against Progressive for not representing them properly and exposing them to a judgment far exceeding their insurance coverage. Accordingly, shortly before trial Gant entered into an agreement with the Birks in which Gant promised not to execute any judgment against the Birks, and in exchange the Birks assigned to Gant their rights to the policy limits under the Progressive and corporate insurance policies, and any claims the Birks had against Progressive for breach of contract, negligence, or bad faith. After a bench trial, Gant was awarded $6.7 million in damages. Progressive then brought this declaratory-judgment action and Gant counterclaimed, arguing that Progressive: (1) breached its duty to discover and disclose the corporate insurance policy; (2) was negligent in hiring attorney Kevin McMaster to defend the suit; and (3) was vicariously liable for McMaster’s conduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive on its claim and the counterclaims. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Progressive Northwestern Ins v. Gant" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants (collectively, the “Estate”), brought this action against Defendant-Appellee, Betty Diamond (“Diamond”), the former wife of Gregory Diamond (the “Decedent”). The complaint alleged the Decedent was a federal employee who had a Thrift Savings Plan account (the “TSP Account”) administered by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (“FRTIB”). During Diamond’s marriage to the Decedent, she was the named beneficiary of Decedent’s TSP Account. When Diamond and the Decedent divorced in 2013, they entered into a divorce decree containing the following provision relevant to the Decedent’s TSP Account: “The parties have acquired an interest in retirement accounts during the course of the marriage. [Diamond] waive[s] her interest in [Decedent’s] retirement accounts. Therefore, [Decedent] is awarded any and all interest in his retirement accounts, free and clear of any claim of [Diamond].” When the Decedent died in 2017, however, Diamond was still designated as the beneficiary of the TSP Account. The Estate requested that Diamond waive all her interest in any distribution she received from the TSP Account. After Diamond refused and indicated her intent to retain any monies distributed to her, the Estate filed a declaratory judgment action against her in Utah’s Third Judicial District Court. Diamond removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss the Estate’s complaint. The district court granted the motion, concluding the Estate’s breach of contract claims against Diamond are preempted by federal law governing the administration of TSP accounts. Finding that the district court correctly concluded the relevant provisions of the Federal Employee Retirement Systems Act (“FERSA”) preempted any conflicting Utah state property rights, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Evans v. Diamond" on Justia Law

The residential community of Cordillera in Eagle County, Colorado, featured a private lodge and spa (the “Lodge”) and a village center (the “Village”). For many years, the Lodge offered its dues-paying members certain amenities, including a golf course and spa. The Village offered “open space: tennis courts and hiking paths, which all residents and their guests could use. In 2013, after years of monetary losses, the owner of both parcels listed them for sale. In 2016, CSMN Investments, LLC (CSMN) emerged to purchase both properties. CSMN's plan for the properties would have closed the properties to other uses. Before closing on the sale, CSMN sought confirmation from Eagle County’s Planning Director that its planned use, operating an inpatient addiction-treatment center, was an allowed use under the “Cordillera Subdivision Eleventh Amended and Restated Planned Unit Development Control Document” (PUD). The Director issued a written interpretation of the PUD, concluding CSMN could operate a clinic including inpatient, non-critical care, for treatment of a variety of conditions. In response to the Director’s interpretation, community members unhappy with the change to the Lodge and Village, formed the Cordillera Property Owners Association (CPOA) and Cordillera Metropolitan District (CMD), to jointly appeal the Director's PUD interpretation to the Board of county Commissioners. The Board affirmed the Director on all but one point, concluding the PUD permitted outpatient-only clinical uses. Still aggrieved, the CMD and CPOA took their case to Colorado state court; the district court affirmed the Board's decision. CPOA appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which likewise affirmed the Board's decision. With the state-court appeals pending, CSMN filed a civil-rights action in Colorado federal district court against CPOA, CMD, and various associated people (the CMD board members, the CMD district manager, and the Legal Committee members). In response, Appellees moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims, arguing that the right to petition immunized their conduct. CSMN countered that Appellees’ claim of immunity was unfounded because the petitioning had sought an unlawful outcome, and that even if the immunity somehow did apply, the petitioning fell within an exception to that immunity, that is, the petitioning was a “sham.” The district court sided with Appellees, dismissing all but one of the claims on the ground that their conduct was protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity. CSMN appealed. But the Tenth Circuit concurred with the finding that Appellees engaged in objectively reasonable litigation, thus immunity applied to their conduct. View "CSMN Investments v. Cordillera Metropolitan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellants were eleven rural hospitals (the “Hospitals”) who challenged the methodology the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) used to calculate their Medicare reimbursements. After the publication of the FY 2010 Final Rule, the Hospitals took issue with the Secretary’s methodology for calculating the hospital-specific rate for new base years. And dissatisfied with their reimbursements under that methodology, the Hospitals filed administrative appeals with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, an independent panel authorized to hear appeals from the Secretary’s final determinations. The Hospitals then sued the Secretary in the district court, arguing: (1) the Secretary applied the same cumulative budget-neutrality adjustment twice—once by using inflated normalized diagnosis-related group weights as a divisor in step two and then again in step four; (2) the Secretary’s methodology yielded different payments than “would have been made had [he] . . . applied the budget-neutrality adjustments to the DRG weights themselves;" and (3) the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not calculating the hospital-specific rate for new base years “based on 100 percent” of a hospital’s base-year “target amount." The district court held it would “not second-guess the Secretary’s policy” just because there may have been “other ways of calculating payments.” And so the court denied the Hospitals’ summary-judgment motion, granted the Secretary’s cross-motion, and entered final judgment.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing the Hospitals’ arguments, found that their arguments rested on "flawed assumptions. And the Secretary has long understood his methodology and explained it to the public." The Court concurred with the district court and affirmed its judgment. View "Hays Medical Center et al. v. Azar" on Justia Law