Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Oklahoma and the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (the “Nation”) entered into a Tribal-State gaming compact; Part 12 of which contained a dispute-resolution procedure that called for arbitration of disagreements “arising under” the Compact’s provisions. The terms of the Compact indicated either party could, “[n]otwithstanding any provision of law,” “bring an action against the other in a federal district court for the de novo review of any arbitration award.” In Hall Street Associates, LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, (2008), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) precluded parties to an arbitration agreement from contracting for de novo review of the legal determinations in an arbitration award. At issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was how to treat the Compact’s de novo review provision given the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates. The Nation argued the appropriate course was to excise from the Compact the de novo review provision, leaving intact the parties’ binding obligation to engage in arbitration, subject only to limited judicial review under 9 U.S.C. sections 9 and 10. Oklahoma argued the de novo review provision was integral to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the Compact and, therefore, the Tenth Circuit should sever the entire arbitration provision from the Compact. The Tenth Circuit found the language of the Compact demonstrated that the de novo review provision was a material aspect of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes arising thereunder. Because Hall Street Associates clearly indicated the Compact’s de novo review provision was legally invalid, and because the obligation to arbitrate was contingent on the availability of de novo review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the obligation to arbitrate set out in Compact Part 12 was unenforceable. Thus, the matter was remanded to the district court to enter an order vacating the arbitration award. View "Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. State of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Spring Creek Coal Company (Spring Creek) petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a decision by the Department of Labor (DOL) awarding survivors’ benefits to Susan McLean under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. sections 901-944. The DOL concluded that Bradford McLean became disabled and died from his exposure to coal dust during the course of his employment at Spring Creek’s surface coal mine. The BLBA adopts several presumptions that apply for purposes of determining whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and whether the death of a miner was due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1)-(5). One of those presumptions, the fifteen-year presumption, is central to the outcome in this case. The ALJ, after concluding that Mr. McLean was entitled to the statutory/regulatory presumption of pneumoconiosis, in turn analyzed the medical evidence to determine whether Spring Creek had rebutted that presumption. The Tenth Circuit determined the ALJ’s findings and decision in this case were case-specific and confined to the specific flaws in the testimony of Spring Creek’s medical experts, thus concluding Spring Creek did not rebut the presumption. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the proffered medical opinions, and that there was no need to remand this case for further proceedings. Spring Creek’s petition for review was denied. View "Spring Creek Coal Company v. McLean" on Justia Law

The first appeal in this case involved claims by the estate of Vera Cummings (the Estate) against Community Health Systems, Inc. (CHSI) under New Mexico state law, against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and against Mountain View Regional Medical Center (Mountain View) under state law. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of the appeal by: (1) entering an order approving the stipulated dismissal with prejudice of the appeal of the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of the claims against CHSI; (2) affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claims under the FTCA for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (3) directing the district court to vacate its judgment in favor of Mountain View and to remand the claims against Mountain View (but not the claims against CHSI) to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On remand to the district court, however, it went beyond the Tenth Circuit’s mandate by vacating its dismissal of the claims against CHSI and remanding those claims to state court. CHSI appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed the order vacating the dismissal of the claims against CHSI and remanded those claims to state court. The Tenth Circuit also rejected the Estate’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Estate of Vera Cummings v. Community Health Systems" on Justia Law

Malik Hasan ordered wine from Premier Cru Fine Wines (Premier Cru) and paid with credit cards issued by Chase Bank USA, N.A. (Chase) and American Express Centurion Bank (AmEx). Premier Cru declared bankruptcy while Hasan was still waiting for delivery of wine that he paid nearly $1 million for. Hasan claimed that under a provision of the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), Chase and AmEx had to refund his accounts the amount he paid for wine that Premier Cru failed to deliver. But because the Tenth Circuit rejected Hasan’s interpretation of that FCBA provision, it affirmed the district court’s orders dismissing his complaints against Chase and AmEx. View "Hasan v. Chase Bank USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Adrian and Angela Lee asked the bankruptcy court to declare that the automatic stay in Adam and Jennifer Peeples’ bankruptcy case applied to a separate lawsuit Adrian Lee filed in state court against defendant Scott McCardle. The Lees also asserted that the automatic stay prevented McCardle from collecting attorney’s fees levied against Adrian Lee in that state-court lawsuit. The Lees sought damages against McCardle for willfully violating the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court found, and the district court agreed, that the automatic stay didn’t apply to the state-court lawsuit, thus granting summary judgment to McCardle. The Lees appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling that the automatic stay didn’t apply. The Tenth Circuit did not reach that question; instead, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment against Angela Lee because she lacked Article III standing to bring this lawsuit, and affirm summary judgment against Adrian Lee because his claims didn’t fall within the Bankruptcy Code’s “zone of interests.” View "Lee v. McCardle" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review centered on how, or even whether, an important-but-subtle and often confusing doctrine limiting federal-court jurisdiction should apply to a unique Colorado procedure for “nonjudicial” foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Mary Mayotte was the debtor on a note held by U.S. Bank, NA. Wells Fargo serviced the loan for U.S. Bank. One allegation was that Plaintiff contacted Wells Fargo to modify her loan, that Wells Fargo told her she needed to miss three payments to secure a modification, and that she eventually took this advice. Rather than granting her a modification, however, Wells Fargo placed her in default. She further alleged the defendants fabricated documents, that their actions rendered her title unmarketable, that they had no ownership interest in her promissory note or property, that they have been unjustly enriched by accepting payments not due them, that they damaged her credit standing, and that they violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The jurisdictional doctrine raised by this appeal was the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which forbade lower federal courts from reviewing state-court civil judgments. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 120 requires creditors pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure to first obtain a ruling by a Colorado trial court that there is a reasonable probability that a default exists. The Tenth Circuit determined it did not need to decide whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred a federal court challenge to a Rule 120 proceeding or ruling: the federal-court suit here was not barred because none of the claims (at least none pursued on appeal) challenged the Rule 120 proceedings or sought to set aside the Rule 120 ruling. The Court left that issue for the district court on remand to consider what effect, if any, the Rule 120 ruling may have had on this case under state-law doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. View "Mayotte v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review centered on how, or even whether, an important-but-subtle and often confusing doctrine limiting federal-court jurisdiction should apply to a unique Colorado procedure for “nonjudicial” foreclosure of mortgages. Plaintiff Mary Mayotte was the debtor on a note held by U.S. Bank, NA. Wells Fargo serviced the loan for U.S. Bank. One allegation was that Plaintiff contacted Wells Fargo to modify her loan, that Wells Fargo told her she needed to miss three payments to secure a modification, and that she eventually took this advice. Rather than granting her a modification, however, Wells Fargo placed her in default. She further alleged the defendants fabricated documents, that their actions rendered her title unmarketable, that they had no ownership interest in her promissory note or property, that they have been unjustly enriched by accepting payments not due them, that they damaged her credit standing, and that they violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The jurisdictional doctrine raised by this appeal was the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which forbade lower federal courts from reviewing state-court civil judgments. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 120 requires creditors pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure to first obtain a ruling by a Colorado trial court that there is a reasonable probability that a default exists. The Tenth Circuit determined it did not need to decide whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred a federal court challenge to a Rule 120 proceeding or ruling: the federal-court suit here was not barred because none of the claims (at least none pursued on appeal) challenged the Rule 120 proceedings or sought to set aside the Rule 120 ruling. The Court left that issue for the district court on remand to consider what effect, if any, the Rule 120 ruling may have had on this case under state-law doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. View "Mayotte v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

This civil rights class action lawsuit was filed thirty years ago to challenge various aspects of the institutionalization of developmentally disabled individuals at two state-supported facilities in New Mexico. After a lengthy trial in 1990, the district court ruled that Defendants (the two institutions and the individuals charged with their operation) were violating class members’ federal constitutional and statutory rights. The district court ordered the parties to develop a plan to cure the violations, and the plan was implemented over the ensuing years through several consent decrees and other court-approved agreements. Although the two institutions closed in the 1990s, the district court has continued to monitor whether Defendants complied with the obligations mandated by the consent decrees. In the years since the court’s initial ruling, the parties have agreed to, and the court has approved, numerous additional decree obligations of varying specificity with which Defendants must comply before the court will discontinue its oversight. As of the district court’s most recent order, Defendants had yet to fulfill over 300 decree obligations. In August 2015, Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) to vacate all consent decrees and to terminate the court’s oversight, arguing that changed factual circumstances warrant the requested relief. The district court denied the motion in June 2016. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit vacated the 2016 Order and remanded the matter for the district court to decide whether Defendants were currently violating class members’ federal constitutional or statutory rights, and to reassess the equity of continuing federal oversight with the benefit of that determination. View "Jackson v. Los Lunas Community Program" on Justia Law

This civil rights class action lawsuit was filed thirty years ago to challenge various aspects of the institutionalization of developmentally disabled individuals at two state-supported facilities in New Mexico. After a lengthy trial in 1990, the district court ruled that Defendants (the two institutions and the individuals charged with their operation) were violating class members’ federal constitutional and statutory rights. The district court ordered the parties to develop a plan to cure the violations, and the plan was implemented over the ensuing years through several consent decrees and other court-approved agreements. Although the two institutions closed in the 1990s, the district court has continued to monitor whether Defendants complied with the obligations mandated by the consent decrees. In the years since the court’s initial ruling, the parties have agreed to, and the court has approved, numerous additional decree obligations of varying specificity with which Defendants must comply before the court will discontinue its oversight. As of the district court’s most recent order, Defendants had yet to fulfill over 300 decree obligations. In August 2015, Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) to vacate all consent decrees and to terminate the court’s oversight, arguing that changed factual circumstances warrant the requested relief. The district court denied the motion in June 2016. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit vacated the 2016 Order and remanded the matter for the district court to decide whether Defendants were currently violating class members’ federal constitutional or statutory rights, and to reassess the equity of continuing federal oversight with the benefit of that determination. View "Jackson v. Los Lunas Community Program" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Dennis Obduskey appealed a district court’s order granting Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo and McCarthy and Holthus, LLP’s motions to dismiss numerous claims, including whether either party was liable as a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). In 2014, Wells Fargo hired McCarthy and Holthus, LLP, a law firm, to pursue a non-judicial foreclosure on Obduskey’s home. Obduskey responded to a letter McCarthy sent him; rather than responding further, McCarthy initiated a foreclosure action. Obduskey then filed this action claiming (1) a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; (2) a violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (3) defamation; (4) extreme and outrageous conduct - emotional distress; and (5) commencement of an unlawful collections action. Wells Fargo and McCarthy filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted on all claims. Regarding the FDCPA claim, the district court held that Wells Fargo was not liable because it began servicing the loan prior to default. It also held that McCarthy was not a “debt collector” because “foreclosure proceedings are not a collection of a debt,” but it noted that “not all courts have agreed” on whether foreclosure proceedings are covered under the FDCPA. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the FDCPA does not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Obduskey’s claims. View "Obduskey v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law