Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Seneca Insurance Company paid $1 million to settle a lawsuit in which its insured alleged Seneca had mishandled insurance claims for hail damage to the insured’s property. Seeking to recoup the costs of defending and settling the lawsuit, Seneca brought this action for implied equitable indemnity and negligence against its insurance adjuster, Western Claims, Inc., and Western Claims’ agent Lou Barbaro. The district court allowed Western Claims to discover and admit as evidence at trial correspondence containing advice from Seneca’s lawyers regarding the underlying hail damage claim and litigation. It concluded Seneca put the advice at issue in this lawsuit, thereby waiving any attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. The jury ultimately found in Western Claims’ favor. On appeal, Seneca sought a new trial, arguing the district court erred in concluding Seneca put the legal advice at issue. Western Claims cross appealed, arguing that even if the district court erred, Western Claims was nevertheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both of Seneca’s claims. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that because Seneca cited “advice of counsel” to justify settling with its insured in the underlying action, Seneca could not shield that advice from Western Claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision that Seneca waived any attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. The Court did not reach Western Claims’ cross appeal. View "Seneca Insurance Co. v. Western Claims" on Justia Law

Current and former employees of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (County) brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging they were paid overtime at a lower rate than required by the statute during 2010, 2011, and 2012. The district court dismissed the Employees' Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court held the Employees had failed to allege their "regular rates" of pay were the Promised Rates and therefore, they had not stated a claim for unpaid overtime. The district court also concluded the Employees' argument, that "regular rates" for the purposes of the FLSA could be established by mutual agreement) failed because by continuing to work for years at the lower Actual Rates, the Employees had modified any alleged agreement concerning the Promised Rates. The Employees appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sivetts v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Aviva Life & Annuity challenged identical orders of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sitting in its capacity as a bankruptcy appellate court. The district court entered the orders in two directly related cases brought by Aviva in the nature of interpleader pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22. Aviva argued the court erred by limiting the scope of the interpleader relief granted. This case stemmed from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of the Millennium Multiple Employer Welfare Benefit Plan. Prior to seeking the protection of the bankruptcy court, the Millennium Plan was an employee welfare benefit plan providing medical, disability, long term care, severance, and death benefits. Participants made contributions to the Millennium Plan, which then purchased life insurance policies (Policies) on the lives of the participants from Aviva and other insurance companies. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Aviva Life & Annuity v. Millennium Multiple Employer" on Justia Law

Ernest McKenzie’s Canadian birth certificate listed the wrong birth date. Because he used that birth certificate to become a naturalized United States citizen, his United States Certificate of Naturalization also listed the wrong birth date. After he was naturalized, he got his birth certificate corrected; he tried to amend his naturalization certificate so that his paperwork listed the correct date. Relying on 8 C.F.R. 334.16(b) (2011) to establish the district court’s jurisdiction, he filed suit requesting that the district court order United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to issue a naturalization certificate with his correct date of birth. "The request seems fair and simple enough," but the Tenth Circuit could not help: "With limited exceptions not applicable here, Congress has withdrawn jurisdiction over naturalizations from the district courts. In addition, the district court lacked jurisdiction because Dr. McKenzie’s invocation of 334.16(b) is not a colorable claim." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).View "McKenzie v. US Citizenship & Immigration" on Justia Law

Amber Shaw coached Plaintiff Tori Varnell in several sports while she was a student in the Dora Consolidated School District. According to Plaintiff, Shaw sexually abused her for more than a year, ending while she was in the ninth grade, (sometime in late 2006 or early 2007). When Plaintiff was 20, she sued Shaw, Dora Schools, and Dora Schools Superintendent Steve Barron under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. On Defendants' motion, the district court granted summary judgment on the federal claims as untimely, denied a proposed amendment to the complaint as futile, and dismissed the state tort claims without prejudice. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Varnell v. Dora, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant JetAway Aviation, LLC sued Defendants-Appellees Board of County Commissioners of the County of Montrose, Colorado and the Montrose County Building Authority, and nongovernmental defendants Jet Center Partners, LLC, Black Canyon Jet Center, LLC, Kevin Egan, and James Rumble, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Sherman Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on JetAway’s antitrust claims on multiple bases, including that JetAway did not have antitrust standing to bring its claims. JetAway appealed that decision, and the Governmental Defendants cross-appealed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on state-action immunity grounds. Acting as a quorum, Judges Tymkovich and Holmes joined this opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, specifically, because JetAway failed to establish an antitrust injury and, consequently, lacked antitrust standing to bring this action. However, the judges employed different reasoning in reaching this conclusion. Because the Tenth Circuit fully denied JetAway relief at the threshold on the basis of its failure to establish an antitrust injury, it did not reach the Governmental Defendants' cross-appeal regarding state-action immunity and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. In addition, the Court addressed two pending procedural matters: a motion to seal and a motion to strike. JetAway filed an unopposed motion to seal numerous documents that were under seal in the district court. The Tenth Circuit's clerk's office provisionally granted that request pending the merits panel's final determination. The Court then denied the motion, finding that JetAway did not provide any basis for sealing the documents; instead, it merely stated that the documents were filed under seal. "[A] generalized allusion to confidential information is woefully inadequate to meet JetAway's 'heavy burden.'" View "JetAway v. Board of County Commissioners, et al" on Justia Law

A Kansas jury convicted David Fuller of willfully failing to pay more than $50,000 of past-due child support. Both after the government's case-in-chief and at the close of all evidence, Fuller moved for acquittal. The district court reserved ruling on the motions and then, several weeks after the verdict, issued a single order denying both. On appeal, argued the district court erred in denying his first motion: (1) that the court erred by relying on an unconstitutional statutory presumption of his "ability to pay" child support, and (2) that without the presumption the government's evidence was insufficient to prove that he “willfully” failed to pay. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did not rely on the presumption and that the government presented sufficient evidence that Fuller had willfully failed to pay his child-support obligation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)-1, LLC (a Utah company), received a loan application. In considering the request, Rockwood required the borrower to obtain an opinion letter from its New Hampshire law firm, Devine, Millimet & Branch. Devine provided the letter, which was picked up by someone and forwarded to Rockwood’s owner in Utah. Rockwood concluded that the opinion letter contained falsehoods and sued Devine in Utah federal court. The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Rockwood appealed. The issue before the Tenth Circuit centered on whether Devine had sufficient contacts with Utah to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Court concluded that Devine’s contacts with Utah were insufficient, and thus affirmed the district court's decision. View "Rockwood Select Asset Fund v. Devine, Millimet & Branch" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Clean Air Act, which requires states to adopt programs that will reduce emission of air pollutants that affect visibility. The State of Utah submitted a revised plan to the Environmental Protection Agency. The agency partially rejected the plan, and the State and one of the affected companies (PacifiCorp) filed petitions for review. Though all parties agree that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction over this case, the Court disagreed and dismissed their petitions. View "Utah v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. The Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court's jurisdiction. The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town's sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent. The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts' exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the Tribal Town presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But the Court agreed the Tribal Town should have exhausted its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action was abated. View "Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, et al" on Justia Law