Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Grace Smith, a high school junior, was repeatedly suspended from Laramie High School for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 indoor-mask mandate imposed by the Albany County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees. After her suspensions, she was arrested for trespassing on school grounds. Grace and her parents, Andy and Erin Smith, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming against the Board members, the superintendent, and the principal, alleging violations of Grace’s constitutional rights and state law claims.The district court dismissed the federal claims for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that Grace did not suffer an injury in fact necessary for standing. The court reasoned that her injuries were hypothetical because the mask mandate had expired and she was no longer a student at LHS, and that her injuries were self-inflicted. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Grace had standing to bring her claims because she suffered concrete and particularized injuries from the enforcement of the mask mandate, including suspensions and arrest. The court found that her injuries were directly inflicted by the defendants’ actions and were not self-inflicted. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1" on Justia Law

In March 2019, a group of teenage boys entered a vacant house in a high-crime neighborhood to play with BB guns. A concerned neighbor called 911, reporting several Black men entering the house, one of whom had dreads and was carrying a gun. Officer Kyle Holcomb and his colleague responded to the call. Shortly after arriving, Holcomb shot and injured 14-year-old Lorenzo Clerkley, who was unarmed and had his hands up. Clerkley sued Holcomb under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Holcomb claimed his use of force was reasonable, asserting he saw Clerkley pointing a gun at him.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed the evidence, including body-camera footage and statements from both parties. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Holcomb fired at Clerkley when he could see Clerkley did not have a gun or anything in his hand. The court held that Holcomb’s use of force violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law and denied his motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Holcomb’s use of deadly force was unconstitutional because Clerkley was unarmed and posed no threat. The court also held that the law prohibiting the use of deadly force against an unarmed, nonthreatening person was clearly established at the time of the incident. Therefore, Holcomb was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Clerkley v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Mica Martinez was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Martinez sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim about his trial counsel’s inadequate investigation and presentation of testimony from his grandfather, mother, and uncle. He also claimed that his sentencing was fundamentally unfair due to witness testimony about his use of a racial slur and argued for reversible cumulative error.The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Martinez’s conviction and sentence, finding sufficient evidence of malice aforethought and holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently. The OCCA also rejected Martinez’s claim that the introduction of a racial slur during sentencing denied him a fair proceeding, concluding that any error was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the comment. The OCCA denied Martinez’s applications for postconviction relief, including his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of trial counsel’s investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The court held that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law or rely on an unreasonable factual finding in rejecting Martinez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court also found that Martinez failed to point to any clearly established federal law regarding the introduction of inflammatory evidence, and the OCCA did not base its decision on an unreasonable factual finding. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of relief on the cumulative error claim as well. View "Martinez v. Quick" on Justia Law

A federal inmate, Dustin Rowland, developed a hernia after a pretrial detention fight. A physician deemed the hernia "reducible and stable," recommending non-surgical treatments. Rowland, desiring surgery, utilized the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Administrative Remedial Program, which involves a four-step grievance process. His initial requests were denied, but a later appeal led to approval for a surgical consultation. However, Rowland's final appeal was denied for procedural reasons, and he did not correct the deficiency. He eventually received surgery but filed a lawsuit claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, seeking damages under Bivens, injunctive relief for post-operative care, and a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Rowland's Bivens claim, granted summary judgment against his injunctive relief claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Rowland's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens claim, noting that Rowland's case presented a new context not covered by previous Bivens cases and that the BOP's Administrative Remedial Program provided an adequate alternative remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the injunctive relief claim, as Rowland failed to exhaust administrative remedies specifically for post-operative care. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FTCA claim, emphasizing the jurisdictional requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Rowland's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. View "Rowland v. Matevousian" on Justia Law

Ngozi Iweha, a Black woman born and educated in Nigeria, was hired as a staff pharmacist at Larned State Hospital (LSH) in Kansas. She alleged that she faced a hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Incidents included exclusion from projects, insensitive comments about Nigeria, and a confrontation with a coworker involving "slave trade beads." She was eventually placed on administrative leave and terminated following an investigation into her workplace conduct.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the incidents described by Iweha did not amount to a hostile work environment as they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive. The court also determined that Iweha failed to show that her termination was pretextual. The court noted that the employer's progressive discipline policy was discretionary and that the investigation into Iweha's conduct was independent and thorough. Additionally, the court found that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, as her complaints did not specifically allege discrimination based on race or national origin.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the incidents described by Iweha were not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. The court also found that Iweha failed to demonstrate that the reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court noted that the investigation into her conduct was independent and that the decision to terminate her was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The court also upheld the finding that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Iweha v. State of Kansas" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a transgender woman, was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and prescribed hormone replacement therapy (HRT) while detained at the Oklahoma County jail. After being transferred to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC), she continued her HRT regimen. However, upon her transfer to the Dick Conner Correctional Center, a staff psychologist evaluated her and concluded she did not have gender dysphoria. Based on this evaluation, the prison physician at the Davis Correctional Facility, where she was subsequently transferred, decided to taper and discontinue her HRT.The plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against the prison physician and the health services administrator. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference because the discontinuation of HRT was in compliance with correctional policy, which required a confirmed diagnosis of gender dysphoria for HRT to continue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference by discontinuing the plaintiff’s HRT based on the psychologist’s evaluation and the correctional policy. The court found no evidence that the defendants knew or strongly suspected that the psychologist’s diagnosis was incorrect. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s disagreement with the diagnosis and the course of treatment did not constitute a constitutional violation. The court also rejected the argument that the defendants were required to arrange for a second evaluation, as there was no indication that they suspected the initial diagnosis was wrong. View "Johnson v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The case involves the Estate of Charles Anthony Hurtado, which brought an action against Dr. Jerry A. Smith, alleging that Dr. Smith acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Hurtado’s serious medical needs. Mr. Hurtado, an inmate, was treated for a perineal abscess at a medical center where Dr. Smith performed a diagnostic needle aspiration but did not find an abscess cavity. Dr. Smith prescribed oral antibiotics and pain medication, and Mr. Hurtado was discharged. Later that evening, Mr. Hurtado returned to the emergency room with intense pain, was diagnosed with sepsis, and underwent surgery. He was later transferred to another hospital where he died from complications related to the abscess and other health issues.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Dr. Smith knew of and disregarded a significant risk to Mr. Hurtado’s health. The court concluded that even if Dr. Smith’s diagnosis and treatment were incorrect, they did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference but were, at most, medical negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that Dr. Smith consciously disregarded a substantial risk to Mr. Hurtado’s health. The court noted that Dr. Smith’s treatment was not patently unreasonable and that the expert testimony provided by the plaintiff did not establish deliberate indifference but rather suggested medical negligence. The court emphasized that deliberate indifference requires more than a misdiagnosis or negligence; it requires a showing that the medical professional knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s health. View "Estate of Hurtado v. Smith" on Justia Law

Corey McNellis, a former Athletic Director and Assistant Principal at Ponderosa High School in the Douglas County School District (DCSD), was placed on administrative leave and subsequently terminated after expressing reservations about a school play, "The Laramie Project," in a staff email chain. McNellis offered to add a "Christian perspective" to the production, which led to his investigation and termination.McNellis sued DCSD in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and religious discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Colorado law. The district court dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that McNellis failed to state a plausible claim for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of McNellis's First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding that his speech was made pursuant to his official duties and not as a private citizen. The court also affirmed the dismissal of his retaliation claims under Title VII and CADA, finding that McNellis failed to plausibly allege a causal connection between his complaints about the investigation and his termination.However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal of McNellis's discrimination claims under Title VII and CADA. The court found that McNellis had plausibly alleged that his termination was linked to his religious comments, which could give rise to an inference of discrimination. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "McNellis v. Douglas County School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued multiple officers from the Mesa County Sheriff's Office and Grand Junction Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. The officers executed a search warrant for a stolen Sno-Cat at Plaintiff's property, which included a garage and an attached residence. Believing the Sno-Cat was in the garage, officers obtained a search warrant and returned with SWAT units. Without knocking or announcing their presence, they fired chemical munitions into the residence, causing significant property damage. The search revealed no humans, only a dog, and Plaintiff claimed over $50,000 in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, granting qualified immunity to the defendants. The court relied on documents outside the complaint, including a search warrant, supporting affidavit, and an after-action report (AAR), despite Plaintiff's objections. Plaintiff then filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), which the district court also dismissed, again granting qualified immunity and considering the same external documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the district court erred by considering the AAR without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and allowing for discovery. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff plausibly alleged individual actions by each defendant and that the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant by entering the residence, which could not house the Sno-Cat. The court also found that the officers violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by failing to knock and announce their presence and using excessive force without exigent circumstances. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cuervo v. Sorenson" on Justia Law

In May 2018, Brian Estrada, a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC), attempted to escape from a courthouse while shackled. He was shot three times by Jacob Smart, a CDOC officer. Estrada filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Smart, concluding that Estrada had failed to exhaust all available CDOC administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado found that Estrada did not follow CDOC’s three-step grievance process regarding the shooting incident. Estrada argued that the courthouse was not a CDOC prison, and thus, the PLRA did not apply to his case. The district court disagreed, ruling that the PLRA and CDOC’s grievance procedures applied to the shooting of a CDOC inmate by a CDOC officer, regardless of the location.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies broadly to all inmate suits about prison life, including incidents occurring outside the prison walls, such as the courthouse shooting. The court also determined that CDOC’s grievance procedures were applicable to the incident, as they cover actions by employees and incidents affecting inmates, even outside the facility. The court concluded that Estrada’s failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies barred his § 1983 claim. View "Estrada v. Smart" on Justia Law