Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal grew out of a suit brought on behalf of an 11-year-old girl (“J.P”), who was a student in a class for children with special needs. One day, deputy sheriff J.M. Sharkey, who was working as a school resource officer, saw J.P. kick a teacher. Because the kick constituted a crime, Deputy Sharkey arrested J.P., handcuffed her, and transported her to a juvenile detention center. These actions led J.P.’s mother (identified as “J.H.”) to sue Deputy Sharkey and Bernalillo County claiming violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court dismissed the due process claims and granted summary judgment to Deputy Sharkey and the county on the claims involving the Fourth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. J.H. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "J.H. v. Bernalillo County" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose from a sting operation designed to determine if police officers in the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department’s (KCKPD) “SCORE” Unit were stealing from residences while executing search warrants. As a result of the sting operation, three officers were indicted and pled guilty to federal crimes. The remaining officers brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of their Fourth Amendment rights for arrests without probable cause. The individual Defendants-Appellants appealed the district court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The entity Defendant-Appellant (Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City) also appealed, arguing that should the Tenth Circuit determine a constitutional violation did not occur, it should reverse and render judgment in its favor. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the basis that the law was not clearly established at the time of the arrests in question. The Court dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Callahan v. Unified Govt of Wyandotte" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of allegations that AKC, a child with autism, suffered abuse at school by her special-education teacher, Vickie Cantrell. AKC’s parents, Ted and Bella Carroll, filed suit in federal district court against Cantrell, the school district, and others, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and a variety of state-law theories. The district court dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, concluding the Carrolls had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the IDEA). The district court then dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The Carrolls appealed. The single issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court erred in determining the Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Because the Court concluded the Carrolls’ complaint alleged educational injuries that could have been redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative remedies, it agreed with the district court that exhaustion of those remedies was required before the Carrolls could file suit. View "Carroll v. Lawton Independent School" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Stephen Maresca, Heather Martin-Maresca, and their three children were driving back from a family hike when they were arrested in a “felony stop” carried out by Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Deputies J. Fuentes, G. Grundhoffer, and four other officers. Deputy Fuentes initiated the stop because she mistakenly believed that the Marescas were driving a stolen vehicle. The Marescas sued, alleging that the officers violated the Marescas’ Fourth Amendment rights both by unlawfully arresting them and by using excessive force in doing so. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had not violated clearly established Fourth Amendment standards. After review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the Marescas were entitled to summary judgment against Deputy Fuentes on their unlawful arrest claim because they were arrested without probable cause as the result of Deputy Fuentes’ unreasonable conduct; (2) Deputy Grundhoffer was entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim against him because he was entitled to rely on information conveyed to him by Deputy Fuentes; and (3) disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for Fuentes, Grundhoffer, or the Marescas on the excessive force claim. The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maresca v. County of Bernalillo" on Justia Law

Albuquerque Police Officer Brian Pitzer shot Russell Tenorio when responding to an emergency call. Tenorio sued Pitzer under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Pitzer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. The district court denied Pitzer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was evidence that Pitzer violated clearly established law under two theories: (1) when Pitzer shot Tenorio he “did not have probable cause to believe that [Tenorio] presented a threat of serious physical harm to [Pitzer] or another person'” and (2) Pitzer and his fellow officers recklessly created the situation that resulted in the use of deadly force. Pitzer appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence would support a violation of clearly established law under the first theory. The Court therefore did not address the second theory, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tenorio v. Pitzer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Karry Thomas worked for Defendant-Appellee Berry Plastics Corporation from 2003 to 2010. Over the course of Thomas’s seven-year employment, eight different Berry supervisors initiated at least thirteen disciplinary actions against him. These actions ranged in severity from verbal coaching and written warnings to suspensions and final warnings. Thomas initially challenged his termination through Berry’s Termination Review Process, arguing that his termination was not warranted because he was not at fault for the reason given, a print-quality issue. After meeting with Thomas and reviewing his full disciplinary history, the Termination Review Panel (comprised of two independent Berry managers) affirmed the termination decision. Thomas thereafter filed suit for wrongful discharge, alleging, inter alia, that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing race discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Berry moved for summary judgment. Although Thomas initially argued his Printing Manager possessed retaliatory animus that infected his termination decision, Thomas eventually invoked the “cat’s-paw” theory of recovery, arguing that it was an intermediate supervisor who reported to the Printing Manager, who possessed the retaliatory animus that infected the termination decision. The district court ultimately granted Berry’s motion for summary judgment, and Thomas appealed. Finding that Thomas failed to meet his burden of proof, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Berry. View "Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corporation" on Justia Law

Christine B., the mother of student "A.F.," filed suit claiming that the Espanola Public Schools failed to address appropriately her daughter's disabilities in the educational program it formulated for her. Before any hearing could be held, Christine sought to mediate her dispute. In the end, the parties signed a settlement agreement. As a result of the settlement, Christine B. asked the administrative agency to dismiss her Individuals with Disability Education Act (IDEA) claims with prejudice. Despite the satisfactory result she received through mediation, Christine B. filed suit again, though not pursuant to IDEA, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The allegations in her federal court complaint and those in her original IDEA administrative complaint were nearly identical: both alleged that A.F. suffered from the same disabilities and both contended that the school district failed to take her disabilities into account in her educational program. Agreeing with the school district that Christine B. failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her lawsuit. Christine B. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools" on Justia Law

Appellee Jacob Ind had been incarcerated in Colorado state prisons since 1992. At the time he filed this lawsuit on in 2009, he was in administrative segregation at the Colorado State Penitentiary ("CSP") subject to a limit of two personal books imposed by the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"). Appellee filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the book limit was a substantial burden on his sincerely-held religious beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). In 2011, appellee was transferred out of administrative segregation and into the general population, where he was allowed 15 personal books. The CDOC moved to dismiss the case as moot. Although the magistrate judge recommended the motion be granted, the district court concluded appellee would likely be returned to segregation in the future and denied the motion. Following a bench trial, the court held CDOC's two-book policy violated appellee's rights under RLUIPA and directed that, in the event appellee returned to administrative segregation at CSP, CDOC would be enjoined from enforcing the policy against him. CDOC appealed, arguing again that the case was moot. After review, the Tenth Circuit held that appellee's transfer from administrative segregation to the general population indeed mooted his claim, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction. View "Ind v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Charles Jernegan committed suicide at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma (“Jail”). His mother, Plaintiff-Appellee Carolyn Cox, brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendant-Appellant Tulsa County Sheriff Stanley Glanz. Sheriff Glanz moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied the Sheriff’s motion (without mentioning qualified immunity) based on the existence of genuinely disputed material facts. In this interlocutory appeal, Sheriff Glanz argued to the Tenth Circuit that extant caselaw at the time of Jernegan’s suicide did not clearly establish that he could be held liable as a supervisor under the circumstances of this case: Jernegan denied having a suicidal intent during booking and no Jail staff members detected a basis for referring him for additional mental-health screening based on their interactions with him. The Sheriff also argued that none of the policies or procedures he had implemented at the Jail could be characterized as the moving force behind any alleged violation of Jernegan’s constitutional rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the facts of this case, the district court erred in denying the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Cox's individual-capacity claim. As for Cox's official-capacity claim, the Court concluded that the district court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment was indisputably not a final decision amenable to interlocutory review: "Our assumption of jurisdiction over the court’s resolution of the official-capacity claim would therefore only be appropriate if we invoked our discretionary power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over this claim. Sheriff Glanz, however, has not relied upon this generally disfavored doctrine; furthermore, we discern no legally cognizable basis for exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case." The Sheriff's appeal of the denial of his motion for summary judgment on Cox's official-capacity claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cox v. Glanz" on Justia Law

Within a month after plaintiff-appellant Raymond Zisumbo complained to his supervisor at Ogden Regional Medical Center (ORMC) about alleged race discrimination in the workplace, ORMC investigated Zisumbo for submitting apparently fraudulent letters to his supervisor months earlier. After confirming that at least one of the letters was falsified, ORMC terminated Zisumbo’s employment. Zisumbo sued ORMC for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law. After years of litigation, procedural wrangling, and a previous appeal to the Tenth Circuit, only Zisumbo’s Title VII claims for unlawful termination remained to be tried to a jury. The jury found in favor of ORMC on Zisumbo’s discrimination claim but in favor of Zisumbo on his retaliation claim. In cross-appeals and a third parallel appeal, the parties raised numerous issues: Zisumbo challenged the district court’s decisions denying his request to amend his complaint, the granting of summary judgment to ORMC on his good faith and fair dealing claim, and denying in part his request for reinstatement, front pay, and back pay, as well as his request for attorneys’ fees. ORMC appealed the denial of its renewed, post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the denial of its request to further reduce Zisumbo’s Title VII remedies. Finding no reversible error as any party alleged, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Zisumbo v. Ogden Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law