Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A deputy sheriff shot Aaron Palmer dead after entering Palmer's home to serve a bench warrant for Palmer's father, Randall Palmer. The elder Palmer failed to appear and comply with a performance contract with the drug court. The deputy thought he say Randall in Aaron's garage earlier int he day, and arranged for support from other law-enforcement officers to apprehend Randall. When he returned to the area with other officers, the deputy allegedly saw somebody who appeared to be Randall running through the garage into the house. He then sped to the front door of the house with gun drawn, pushed the door open, and fired his gun at Aaron, who was standing a few feet from the door, allegedly with a knife in his hand. Randall was not found on the premises. Aaron's widow Nicole Attocknie filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on behalf of herself, Aaron’s child, and Aaron’s estate claiming that: (1) the deputy violated Aaron’s Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully entering the house and using excessive force; and (2) another deputy (who was not present when Aaron was shot) violated Aaron’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to train or supervise the deputy who shot Aaron. Both deputies claimed qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motions for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denials of qualified immunity to the deputies: "[h]ot pursuit is the sole justification offered by the defendants for Cherry’s entry of Aaron’s home. But Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that Cherry was not in hot pursuit of Randall when he entered the home and that the entry was therefore unlawful. And because the use of force would only have been necessary as a result of the entry, a jury could properly find that the unlawful entry caused Aaron’s death." View "Attocknie v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Kelly Osborne applied to work as a plasma center technician (PCT) at BioLife Plasma Services. After two interviews, Osborne (who is deaf) was conditionally offered the PCT position pending final tests and paperwork. When BioLife’s human resources department received Osborne’s medical information, it determined Osborne could not safely monitor the donor area of the facility because she could not hear the alarms on the plasmapheresis machines, which audibly sound when something goes wrong or requires attention. When Osborne reported to the facility for her first day of work, Joe Elder, the manager, informed her BioLife had rescinded her offer of employment. Osborne filed a lawsuit alleging that BioLife’s revocation of her job offer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court determined Osborne failed to identify accommodations that would allow her to perform essential functions of the PCT position, and granted summary judgment to BioLife and instructed each party to bear its own costs. Both parties appealed: Osborne, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BioLife; BioLife, seeking reversal of the district court’s determination that each party should bear its own costs. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Osborne identified a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her ability to perform essential functions of the PCT position with reasonable accommodation, making summary judgment premature. BioLife’s cross-appeal for costs was deemed moot. View "Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Bennett appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, defendant-appellee Windstream Communications, Inc. Windstream acquired the company that had employed Bennett for twelve years, Paetec Communications, Inc. At the time of the acquisition, Bennett was a Fiber Optic Tech III, responsible for locating fiber optic cable, repairing, splicing, and testing it, and performing routine weekly and monthly maintenance at various sites. After the acquisition, Bennett’s pay and benefits remained the same. A few months after Windstream assumed Paetec’s operations, Todd Moore became Bennett’s supervisor. Moore instituted a policy requiring all technicians, including Bennett, to check in to an assigned manned office each morning at 8 a.m. unless they had tasks to perform at other worksites. Bennett was assigned to check in at the Tulsa office, which was the closest manned office to her home in Gore, Oklahoma. Given the distance between Gore and Tulsa, Bennett was required to commute a total of almost four hours each day. A Human Resources specialist, testified that the check-in policy, though not written, was standard Windstream practice. Bennett understood that she was required to report to the Tulsa office each morning at 8 a.m., yet she often arrived at the Tulsa office more than two hours late. On a number of occasions, she did not report to the Tulsa office at all or left several hours early to drive home, rather than working until 5 p.m. as required. Bennett was disciplined for her tardiness and absences. Concurrently with the discipline, Bennett complained of chest pains and made a workers' compensation claim for "work related stress." Bennett failed to return to work following her medical leave, and she was "separated" from the company. Bennett brought several claims alleging gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), violation of the Oklahoma Antidiscrimination Act (OADA), and constructive discharge in violation of Oklahoma public policy and federal law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Bennett v. Windstream Communications" on Justia Law

Joan McInerney filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Dennis King, a part-time officer with the Colorado School of Mines Police Department, and Deputy Sheriff Brian McLaughlin, alleging that their warrantless entry into her home violated the Fourth Amendment. McInerney appealed the district court’s grant of Officer King’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In July 2009, King was assigned to investigate a complaint that McInerney had gotten into a physical altercation on the School of Mines campus. King did not knock on the door or announce his presence, and he did not attempt to contact McInerney by phone. As he stated in an affidavit, the condition of McInerney’s home "caused me concern, including over officer safety." He contacted the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office once he determined this situation no longer involved delivery of a summons. Deputy McLaughlin arrived on the scene, and the two officers went to the front porch and knocked and announced their presence several times. McInerney later testified that she was sound asleep in her bedroom with a noisy air conditioner three feet from the head of her bed, and that her car was parked out front. McLaughlin radioed his dispatcher to say he was entering the home to perform a welfare check. Both officers entered with their guns drawn. The day after the incident, McInerney told an internal affairs investigator that she was furious, felt "totally violated" after the incident. McInerney's suit alleged her rights had been violated when the officers entered her residence without a warrant, without her consent, and without any "legally recognizable exigent circumstances" justifying their warrantless entry. In dismissing McInerney's claims, the court ruled that King was not personally responsible for McLaughlin’s warrantless entry into the home because he had no authority to direct McLaughlin’s actions. The court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for King to enter the house behind McLaughlin to provide backup for the deputy’s safety. The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding that King had fair notice that his conduct in entering McInerney’s house without a warrant was unlawful. "[B]ased on the existing case law at the time of Officer King’s warrantless entry – both those cases finding exigent circumstances and those holding such circumstances were not present – it was clearly established that the circumstances he confronted did not constitute exigent circumstances. [. . .] it was clearly established that officers may not create exigent circumstances to justify their actions. Thus, the district court erred in granting Officer King summary judgment based on qualified immunity." View "McInerney v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joyce Rock was terminated from her position as principal of a school in the Central Consolidated School District (the District) after she spoke at a public meeting in opposition to a proposal by the District’s administration to close her school. Rock brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against defendants the District’s Board of Education and Superintendent Don Levinski, alleging that they violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her for her speech. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not violate Rock’s First Amendment rights and that Levinksi was entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rock’s interest in publicly expressing her policy views did not overcome Defendants’ concern that those holding high-ranking policy positions speak publicly with a single voice on policy matters. View "Rock v. Levinski" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five women who were formerly incarcerated at the Hillside Community Corrections Center in Oklahoma City. They filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against multiple defendants, alleging they were sexually abused and harassed in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs’ complaint named fifteen defendants, including Defendant-Appellant Charlotte Day and Defendant-Appellant Mary Pavliska, both of whom were guards at Hillside during the relevant period. Plaintiffs alleged Day and Pavliska were aware of the abuse and did nothing to prevent it. The claims against several defendants were dismissed without prejudice. The remaining defendants (except the alleged perpetrator Anthony Bobelu) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to all movants except Day and Pavliska. The district ruled a jury could conclude from the evidence presented that Day and Pavliska were deliberately indifferent to a known substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs. In an interlocutory appeal, Day and Pavliska argued to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the district court erred by ruling they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Day’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Pavliska. View "Castillo v. Day" on Justia Law

Albuquerque police sergeant Adam Casaus had ended his shift when he drove home in his squad car, lights flashing and going at a high rate of speed. He ran a red light, hitting Ashley Browder's car. Browder died, and her sister Lindsay suffered serious injuries. Casaus was ultimately charged with reckless vehicular homicide in state court. Lindsay and her parents filed a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages. Casaus moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied relief, and Casaus appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Browder v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Charges were ultimately dropped against plaintiff-appellant Aaron Puller following his 2009 arrest for his suspected involvement in a racially motivated attack of another. The charges were dismissed without hearing because the state district court concluded the affidavit of defendant-appellee Detective Paul Baca, the officer who applied for and obtained the arrest warrant, had omitted material information and supplied false information, and the warrant therefore lacked probable cause. Puller sued Baca under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The federal district court concluded that Baca was entitled to qualified immunity, and entered summary judgment in Baca's favor. Puller appealed, but the Tenth Circuit agreed with the federal district court, and affirmed that court's decision. View "Puller v. Baca" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Max Seifert sued defendants Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (the Unified Government), Wyandotte County Sheriff Donald Ash, and Wyandotte County Undersheriff Larry Roland under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, and brought and state-law retaliation claims against defendants too. Plaintiff, a former reserve deputy for the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department (WCSD), alleged that defendants removed him from investigations and revoked his reserve commission because of his testimony supporting allegations by a former criminal defendant of mistreatment by federal law-enforcement officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was not legally protected speech, that defendants' actions were not unconstitutionally motivated, and that defendants would have taken the same actions regardless of his testimony. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law claims because federal law provided an adequate alternative remedy; and the Court affirmed the qualified-immunity dismissal of the 1983 claims against Sheriff Ash and Undersheriff Roland because at the time of the alleged retaliatory actions the law was not clearly established that the First Amendment protected Plaintiff's testimony. In all other respects the Court reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was constitutionally protected and a jury could have reasonably found that the explanations defendants gave for their actions were pretextual. View "Seifert v. Unified Government" on Justia Law

David Hawkins filed claims against his former employer, Schwan's Home Service, Inc. ("SHS"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Oklahoma law. Hawkins has described his chief responsibilities as "ordering products to be delivered by [SHS's] delivery drivers, scheduling, and loading trucks with products." According to a Mr. Hillaker, who supervised truck operations as part of his leadership duties, fleet management often included driving company trucks to service appointments or otherwise "[s]huttling trucks to salespeople" to ensure product delivery. Hillaker's observation that the facility-supervisor position involved driving was bolstered by the "Qualifications" section of SHS's facility-supervisor job description, which indicates that an "excellent driving record" was required. The job description further specified that "meet[ing] the Federal Department of Transportation eligibility requirements, including appropriate driver's license and corresponding medical certification," was a "condition of employment for this position" Hawkins suffered from several health conditions that came to a head in 2010: he was "in and out of the hospital . . . with heart problems and fainting spells and very high blood pressure." Hawkins experienced a minor stroke in June of 2010, but he resumed working soon afterward. On June 14, 2010, Hawkins emailed a human-resources manager that Hillaker wanted him "to drive trucks back and [forth] to" Enid and Woodward. Hawkins explained that these requests had taken place in May and June of 2010 just as his health issues were escalating, and that Hillaker was "telling everyone in Enid" that Hawkins was "a liability." He further suggested Hillaker had begun asking him to drive the trucks to Enid and Woodward in order to "force[ ] [him] to quit." Another co-worker offered similar testimony, maintaining that Hillaker expressed that Hillaker was "very upset about [Hawkins] being in the hospital . . . [and] wanted him gone." On June 21, 2010, Hawkins failed a routine DOT medical evaluation. The next day, SHS gave Hawkins a letter notifying him that he had been placed on a 30 day company requested unpaid leave, and that he had thirty days to obtain certification or "to find a non-DOT position." Hawkins testified that he perused job listings on SHS's public website. However, he "did not apply for any jobs." On June 23, 2010, Hawkins signed a termination form. Despite the language on the form indicating that his resignation was voluntary, Hawkins wrote on the form that the reason for his action was: "Force[d] to quit for medical reason." Before his separation from SHS, Mr. Hawkins began the process of seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The SSA denied Hawkins's claim after reconsideration. An administrative law judge determined at a 2011 hearing that Hawkins was not disabled. Hawkins filed his ADA and Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act ("OADA") claims. The district court ruled in SHS's favor on May 28, 2013, and Hawkins appealed. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's "principled analysis" of the district court record, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of SHS. View "Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law