Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Karry Thomas worked for Defendant-Appellee Berry Plastics Corporation from 2003 to 2010. Over the course of Thomas’s seven-year employment, eight different Berry supervisors initiated at least thirteen disciplinary actions against him. These actions ranged in severity from verbal coaching and written warnings to suspensions and final warnings. Thomas initially challenged his termination through Berry’s Termination Review Process, arguing that his termination was not warranted because he was not at fault for the reason given, a print-quality issue. After meeting with Thomas and reviewing his full disciplinary history, the Termination Review Panel (comprised of two independent Berry managers) affirmed the termination decision. Thomas thereafter filed suit for wrongful discharge, alleging, inter alia, that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing race discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Berry moved for summary judgment. Although Thomas initially argued his Printing Manager possessed retaliatory animus that infected his termination decision, Thomas eventually invoked the “cat’s-paw” theory of recovery, arguing that it was an intermediate supervisor who reported to the Printing Manager, who possessed the retaliatory animus that infected the termination decision. The district court ultimately granted Berry’s motion for summary judgment, and Thomas appealed. Finding that Thomas failed to meet his burden of proof, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Berry. View "Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corporation" on Justia Law

Christine B., the mother of student "A.F.," filed suit claiming that the Espanola Public Schools failed to address appropriately her daughter's disabilities in the educational program it formulated for her. Before any hearing could be held, Christine sought to mediate her dispute. In the end, the parties signed a settlement agreement. As a result of the settlement, Christine B. asked the administrative agency to dismiss her Individuals with Disability Education Act (IDEA) claims with prejudice. Despite the satisfactory result she received through mediation, Christine B. filed suit again, though not pursuant to IDEA, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The allegations in her federal court complaint and those in her original IDEA administrative complaint were nearly identical: both alleged that A.F. suffered from the same disabilities and both contended that the school district failed to take her disabilities into account in her educational program. Agreeing with the school district that Christine B. failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her lawsuit. Christine B. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools" on Justia Law

Appellee Jacob Ind had been incarcerated in Colorado state prisons since 1992. At the time he filed this lawsuit on in 2009, he was in administrative segregation at the Colorado State Penitentiary ("CSP") subject to a limit of two personal books imposed by the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"). Appellee filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the book limit was a substantial burden on his sincerely-held religious beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). In 2011, appellee was transferred out of administrative segregation and into the general population, where he was allowed 15 personal books. The CDOC moved to dismiss the case as moot. Although the magistrate judge recommended the motion be granted, the district court concluded appellee would likely be returned to segregation in the future and denied the motion. Following a bench trial, the court held CDOC's two-book policy violated appellee's rights under RLUIPA and directed that, in the event appellee returned to administrative segregation at CSP, CDOC would be enjoined from enforcing the policy against him. CDOC appealed, arguing again that the case was moot. After review, the Tenth Circuit held that appellee's transfer from administrative segregation to the general population indeed mooted his claim, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction. View "Ind v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Charles Jernegan committed suicide at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma (“Jail”). His mother, Plaintiff-Appellee Carolyn Cox, brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Defendant-Appellant Tulsa County Sheriff Stanley Glanz. Sheriff Glanz moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied the Sheriff’s motion (without mentioning qualified immunity) based on the existence of genuinely disputed material facts. In this interlocutory appeal, Sheriff Glanz argued to the Tenth Circuit that extant caselaw at the time of Jernegan’s suicide did not clearly establish that he could be held liable as a supervisor under the circumstances of this case: Jernegan denied having a suicidal intent during booking and no Jail staff members detected a basis for referring him for additional mental-health screening based on their interactions with him. The Sheriff also argued that none of the policies or procedures he had implemented at the Jail could be characterized as the moving force behind any alleged violation of Jernegan’s constitutional rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the facts of this case, the district court erred in denying the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Cox's individual-capacity claim. As for Cox's official-capacity claim, the Court concluded that the district court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment was indisputably not a final decision amenable to interlocutory review: "Our assumption of jurisdiction over the court’s resolution of the official-capacity claim would therefore only be appropriate if we invoked our discretionary power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over this claim. Sheriff Glanz, however, has not relied upon this generally disfavored doctrine; furthermore, we discern no legally cognizable basis for exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case." The Sheriff's appeal of the denial of his motion for summary judgment on Cox's official-capacity claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cox v. Glanz" on Justia Law

Within a month after plaintiff-appellant Raymond Zisumbo complained to his supervisor at Ogden Regional Medical Center (ORMC) about alleged race discrimination in the workplace, ORMC investigated Zisumbo for submitting apparently fraudulent letters to his supervisor months earlier. After confirming that at least one of the letters was falsified, ORMC terminated Zisumbo’s employment. Zisumbo sued ORMC for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law. After years of litigation, procedural wrangling, and a previous appeal to the Tenth Circuit, only Zisumbo’s Title VII claims for unlawful termination remained to be tried to a jury. The jury found in favor of ORMC on Zisumbo’s discrimination claim but in favor of Zisumbo on his retaliation claim. In cross-appeals and a third parallel appeal, the parties raised numerous issues: Zisumbo challenged the district court’s decisions denying his request to amend his complaint, the granting of summary judgment to ORMC on his good faith and fair dealing claim, and denying in part his request for reinstatement, front pay, and back pay, as well as his request for attorneys’ fees. ORMC appealed the denial of its renewed, post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the denial of its request to further reduce Zisumbo’s Title VII remedies. Finding no reversible error as any party alleged, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Zisumbo v. Ogden Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff shot Aaron Palmer dead after entering Palmer's home to serve a bench warrant for Palmer's father, Randall Palmer. The elder Palmer failed to appear and comply with a performance contract with the drug court. The deputy thought he say Randall in Aaron's garage earlier int he day, and arranged for support from other law-enforcement officers to apprehend Randall. When he returned to the area with other officers, the deputy allegedly saw somebody who appeared to be Randall running through the garage into the house. He then sped to the front door of the house with gun drawn, pushed the door open, and fired his gun at Aaron, who was standing a few feet from the door, allegedly with a knife in his hand. Randall was not found on the premises. Aaron's widow Nicole Attocknie filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on behalf of herself, Aaron’s child, and Aaron’s estate claiming that: (1) the deputy violated Aaron’s Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully entering the house and using excessive force; and (2) another deputy (who was not present when Aaron was shot) violated Aaron’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to train or supervise the deputy who shot Aaron. Both deputies claimed qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motions for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denials of qualified immunity to the deputies: "[h]ot pursuit is the sole justification offered by the defendants for Cherry’s entry of Aaron’s home. But Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that Cherry was not in hot pursuit of Randall when he entered the home and that the entry was therefore unlawful. And because the use of force would only have been necessary as a result of the entry, a jury could properly find that the unlawful entry caused Aaron’s death." View "Attocknie v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Kelly Osborne applied to work as a plasma center technician (PCT) at BioLife Plasma Services. After two interviews, Osborne (who is deaf) was conditionally offered the PCT position pending final tests and paperwork. When BioLife’s human resources department received Osborne’s medical information, it determined Osborne could not safely monitor the donor area of the facility because she could not hear the alarms on the plasmapheresis machines, which audibly sound when something goes wrong or requires attention. When Osborne reported to the facility for her first day of work, Joe Elder, the manager, informed her BioLife had rescinded her offer of employment. Osborne filed a lawsuit alleging that BioLife’s revocation of her job offer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court determined Osborne failed to identify accommodations that would allow her to perform essential functions of the PCT position, and granted summary judgment to BioLife and instructed each party to bear its own costs. Both parties appealed: Osborne, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BioLife; BioLife, seeking reversal of the district court’s determination that each party should bear its own costs. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Osborne identified a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her ability to perform essential functions of the PCT position with reasonable accommodation, making summary judgment premature. BioLife’s cross-appeal for costs was deemed moot. View "Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Bennett appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, defendant-appellee Windstream Communications, Inc. Windstream acquired the company that had employed Bennett for twelve years, Paetec Communications, Inc. At the time of the acquisition, Bennett was a Fiber Optic Tech III, responsible for locating fiber optic cable, repairing, splicing, and testing it, and performing routine weekly and monthly maintenance at various sites. After the acquisition, Bennett’s pay and benefits remained the same. A few months after Windstream assumed Paetec’s operations, Todd Moore became Bennett’s supervisor. Moore instituted a policy requiring all technicians, including Bennett, to check in to an assigned manned office each morning at 8 a.m. unless they had tasks to perform at other worksites. Bennett was assigned to check in at the Tulsa office, which was the closest manned office to her home in Gore, Oklahoma. Given the distance between Gore and Tulsa, Bennett was required to commute a total of almost four hours each day. A Human Resources specialist, testified that the check-in policy, though not written, was standard Windstream practice. Bennett understood that she was required to report to the Tulsa office each morning at 8 a.m., yet she often arrived at the Tulsa office more than two hours late. On a number of occasions, she did not report to the Tulsa office at all or left several hours early to drive home, rather than working until 5 p.m. as required. Bennett was disciplined for her tardiness and absences. Concurrently with the discipline, Bennett complained of chest pains and made a workers' compensation claim for "work related stress." Bennett failed to return to work following her medical leave, and she was "separated" from the company. Bennett brought several claims alleging gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), violation of the Oklahoma Antidiscrimination Act (OADA), and constructive discharge in violation of Oklahoma public policy and federal law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Bennett v. Windstream Communications" on Justia Law

Joan McInerney filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Dennis King, a part-time officer with the Colorado School of Mines Police Department, and Deputy Sheriff Brian McLaughlin, alleging that their warrantless entry into her home violated the Fourth Amendment. McInerney appealed the district court’s grant of Officer King’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. In July 2009, King was assigned to investigate a complaint that McInerney had gotten into a physical altercation on the School of Mines campus. King did not knock on the door or announce his presence, and he did not attempt to contact McInerney by phone. As he stated in an affidavit, the condition of McInerney’s home "caused me concern, including over officer safety." He contacted the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office once he determined this situation no longer involved delivery of a summons. Deputy McLaughlin arrived on the scene, and the two officers went to the front porch and knocked and announced their presence several times. McInerney later testified that she was sound asleep in her bedroom with a noisy air conditioner three feet from the head of her bed, and that her car was parked out front. McLaughlin radioed his dispatcher to say he was entering the home to perform a welfare check. Both officers entered with their guns drawn. The day after the incident, McInerney told an internal affairs investigator that she was furious, felt "totally violated" after the incident. McInerney's suit alleged her rights had been violated when the officers entered her residence without a warrant, without her consent, and without any "legally recognizable exigent circumstances" justifying their warrantless entry. In dismissing McInerney's claims, the court ruled that King was not personally responsible for McLaughlin’s warrantless entry into the home because he had no authority to direct McLaughlin’s actions. The court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for King to enter the house behind McLaughlin to provide backup for the deputy’s safety. The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding that King had fair notice that his conduct in entering McInerney’s house without a warrant was unlawful. "[B]ased on the existing case law at the time of Officer King’s warrantless entry – both those cases finding exigent circumstances and those holding such circumstances were not present – it was clearly established that the circumstances he confronted did not constitute exigent circumstances. [. . .] it was clearly established that officers may not create exigent circumstances to justify their actions. Thus, the district court erred in granting Officer King summary judgment based on qualified immunity." View "McInerney v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joyce Rock was terminated from her position as principal of a school in the Central Consolidated School District (the District) after she spoke at a public meeting in opposition to a proposal by the District’s administration to close her school. Rock brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against defendants the District’s Board of Education and Superintendent Don Levinski, alleging that they violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her for her speech. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not violate Rock’s First Amendment rights and that Levinksi was entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rock’s interest in publicly expressing her policy views did not overcome Defendants’ concern that those holding high-ranking policy positions speak publicly with a single voice on policy matters. View "Rock v. Levinski" on Justia Law