Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Willie Barlow, Jr., appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, C.R. England, Inc., on his claims for race discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of Colorado public policy, and failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). England employed Plaintiff as a security guard and also paid him to perform janitorial work through a company Plaintiff formed. Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation benefits after he sustained an injury at work in June 2007. In November, England terminated its janitorial services contract with Plaintiff's company. A few months later, England fired Plaintiff from his security guard position after he failed to notice and report a theft of several trailer doors from England’s premises. The district court concluded that: (1) there was no evidence England fired Plaintiff for race-based reasons, or in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim; (2) Plaintiff performed his janitorial work as an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus could not assert a claim for wrongful discharge from that position; and (3) Plaintiff's status as an independent contractor precluded an FLSA claim for overtime. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed with regard to Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and violation of the FLSA. The Court reversed, however, Plaintiff's state-law claim for wrongful discharge. View "Barlow, Jr. v. C.R. England Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was the scope of the special relationship doctrine and whether it would apply to the facts alleged to expose two human services employees to potential individual liability for the death of a seven-year-old child in foster care. After their son Chandler died while in the care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler's biological parents, Christina Grafner and Joshua Norris, and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two county human services departments and two employees alleging, among other things, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for violation of Chandler's substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, appealed denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, showed Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler's substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Schwartz, et al v. Booker, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Sturgeon Stewart appealed a district court's judgment in favor of defendants on his claims under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. Appellant was an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) and confined at the El Dorado Correctional Facility (El Dorado). In accordance with his Rastafarian religious beliefs, he does not cut or comb his hair, which he keeps in dreadlocks. In December 2006, Stewart learned that his mother had been diagnosed with cancer. To be closer to her, Stewart requested a voluntary transfer to the Lansing Correctional Facility (Lansing). His request was granted. On the day of the transfer, one of the defendants, Officer Agnes Beach, refused to allow Stewart to board the transport vehicle because he could not comb out his dreadlocks, as was required by the KDOC policy then in effect. Beach consulted with her supervisor who gave Appellant a choice: either cut his hair or forego the transfer. Appellant told defendants of his religious beliefs; in lieu of cutting his hair, Appellant offered that the officers pat down his hair and use a metal detector to search for contraband. Wilson cancelled the transfer and sent Appellant to administrative segregation. Appellant filed multiple unsuccessful grievances. Appellant eventually cut his hair and was transferred to Lansing the next day. In 2008, acting pro se, Appellant filed this action asserting that defendants essentially forced him to choose between adhering to his religious beliefs and transferring closer to his ailing mother, and that this violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. Claims against defendants were dismissed. Upon review of the applicable legal authority implied by this case, the Tenth Circuit largely agreed with the district court's decision and affirmed. View "Stewart v. Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, eight operators and a supervisor at the City of Albuquerque's 311 Citizen Contact Center (CCC), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees City of Albuquerque, Ed Adams, and Esther Tenenbaum, on claims arising from their termination. The City's Merit System governed Plaintiffs' employment; section 3-1-6 of the Merit System Ordinance (MSO) divides employees into classified and unclassified service, and defines unclassified employees as "employees at will." When the City created the 311 CCC, it designated all positions as unclassified. Upon joining the 311 CCC, each Plaintiff signed a form that listed their Employment or Position Status as "Unclassified." Between 2005 and 2009, Plaintiffs were terminated from the 311 CCC. Some Plaintiffs were subject to Progressive Disciplinary Action, while others faced Immediate Termination. In April 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court for (1) breach of employment contract, (2) denial of due process and equal protection, (3) wrongful termination, (4) violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and (5) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In a lengthy opinion, the district court found that summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs, as unclassified employees, were employed at will, and (1) had no protected property interest in continued employment; (2) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they had an implied employment contract; and (3) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they were terminated in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. With respect to the FMLA claim, the court found that whether treated as a claim for retaliation or interference, Plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the City's reason for termination was pretextual or that the City had interfered with Plaintiffs' right to FMLA leave. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because the court weighed the evidence and failed to construe the facts in Plaintiffs' favor when determining that they were at will employees and thus rightly terminated. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs' arguments lacked merit and affirmed the district court decision. View "Gonzales v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Regina Daniels, a former United Parcel Service (UPS) dispatcher who worked in UPS's Kansas City, Kansas facility, brought suit against the company alleging discrimination based on her sex and age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS, and Plaintiff appealed. Upon review of the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in finding: (1) most of Plaintiff's discrimination claims were untimely; and (2) the claims of discrimination and retaliation that remained failed as a matter of law. View "Daniels v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Frank Brown filed this action against his former employer Defendant-Appellee ScriptPro, LLC, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on his termination in November 2008. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ScriptPro, and Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court found that Mr. Brown did not produce sufficient evidence proving a genuine issue of fact existed to survive summary judgment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed the trial and appellate courts' decisions. View "Brown v. ScriptPro, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Ann and Greg Elwell were in the process of adopting T.S., a young boy who had been in their care almost his entire life. But approximately one month after a complaint of emotional abuse of another child in the Elwells' care, state officials withdrew the license allowing the Elwells to care for T.S. and removed him from their home without any advance notice. Despite a state court's finding that the agency acted wrongfully in removing the boy, he was never returned to them. The Elwells brought suit against several state officials involved in the removal under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that qualified immunity did not shield the state officials from liability. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the defendants violated the Elwells' Due Process rights when they removed T.S. without notice. However, despite the Court's sympathy for the Elwells' plight, the Court concluded that this violation was not clearly established in the case law at the time of T.S.'s removal. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment. View "Elwell, et al v. Byers, et al" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case filed interlocutory appeals from a district order that granted a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff, an association of individual members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and beneficiaries of a charitable religious trust (FLDS Association). The FLDS Association alleged six claims for relief: (1) a claim for declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging deprivation of the FLDS Association's rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) a claim for declaratory relief under Article 1, Sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution; (3) a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; (4) a claim that Utah Code Ann. 76-7-101, which prohibits plural marriage, was unconstitutional as applied under the federal and state constitutions; (5) a claim that Utah Code Ann. sections 75-7-1001, -412(1), and -413(1)(c) were unconstitutional as applied; and (6) a claim for injunctive relief against the defendants' continuing administration of the UEP Trust. The FLDS Association also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the probate court's ongoing administration of the UEP Trust. The federal suit was stayed pending the parties' settlement negotiations. After granting the defendants' motion for an emergency stay pending resolution of these appeals, the Tenth Circuit certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court regarding the preclusive effect of laches under Utah law of dismissal, of a petition for extraordinary writ. The Court received its answer from the Utah court and vacated the district court's preliminary injunction, remanding the case to dismiss the FLDS Association's claims as barred by res judicata. View "Fundamentalist Church of Jesus v. Wisan (Horne Appeal), et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Rural Water District No. 2 Creek County, Oklahoma, a rural water provider covered by 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), and Defendant Glenpool Utility Services Authority, a public trust created to provide water service, and its beneficiary, Defendant City of Glenpool, entered into a Settlement Agreement under which Plaintiff agreed not to file a civil action pursuant to section 1926(b) during the term of the agreement unless Defendants defaulted on their contractual obligations. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the civil action underlying this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging Defendants violated section 1926(b). The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit centered on whether Plaintiff’s agreement not to file a civil action against Defendants, absent default, deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where a state court had not yet determined whether Defendants defaulted. Upon review, the Court held that such agreement did not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, and it reversed and remanded. View "Rural Wtr Dist No 2 Creek Cnty v. City of Glenpool, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Kaufman brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the Defendants, all Colorado police officers, had violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause. In 2009, a vehicle driven by an unnamed female driver hit an unoccupied car in a jewelry store parking lot. Someone witnessed the incident, took down the car's license plate number and reported it to the Colorado State Patrol. Officers investigating the report learned that Plaintiff owned the car and had made a purchase at the store moments before the accident. Plaintiff cited "privilege" in refusing to tell the officers the name of the female driver. Frustrated, the officers advised Plaintiff that refusing to tell them the name of the driver could end in an arrest for obstruction of justice. Plaintiff refused and he was arrested. The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. As to a Fourth Amendment claim, the court concluded that there was no false arrest because the troopers had probable cause to believe Plaintiff's silence, accompanied by assertion of privilege, constituted a violation of the obstruction statute. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. The Defendants never contended that their encounter with Plaintiff was other than consensual; the law was well established that a citizen has no obligation to answer an officer's questions during a consensual encounter; and the Colorado Supreme Court had made it clear that the Colorado obstruction statute is not violated by mere verbal opposition to an officer's questioning. "It follows that the Defendants could not have reasonably thought that they were justified in arresting Plaintiff and their motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity should have been denied." View "Kaufman v. Higgs, et al" on Justia Law