Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prisoner-Petitioner Mark Tuckel filed a "1983" lawsuit against two prison officials. In his suit, Petitioner averred that he was beaten in retaliation for submitting a complaint through the prison grievance system. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, finding that Petitioner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that a petitioner with an objectively reasonable fear of retaliation from prison officials may show that administrative remedies were unavailable to him and thereby be excused from exhausting such remedies. Because there were disputed issues of fact about the availability of administrative remedies to Petitioner, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendants Daniel Montoya and Joe Williams appealed the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss Plaintiff Ray Brown's "1983" lawsuit against them. Plaintiff pled guilty to two counts of false imprisonment in New Mexico state court. When he was released from custody, his probation officer, Daniel Montoya, directed him to register as a sex offender and placed him in the sex offender probation unit. Officer Montoya alleged that he acted on information that the victim in Plaintiff's false imprisonment case was a minor and, under Officer Montoya’s understanding of the law, Plaintiff was properly classified as a sex offender. Plaintiff sought and won in state court an order removing his name from the sex offender registry and removing him from the sex offender probation unit. Plaintiff then filed suit, alleging violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection rights. The Defendants argued, among other things, that their qualified immunity from suit required dismissal. The Tenth Circuit's review of the case was limited to the qualified immunity issue. As to Plaintiff's claims against Secretary Williams in his individual capacity, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of the motion. As to Plaintiff's procedural due process claim against Officer Montoya, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss on the substantive due process and equal protection claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Dennis Carter began working as a directional driller at Pathfinder Energy Services, Inc., in December 2004. Two years later, declining health had caused a reduction in Plaintiff's workload. Pathfinder fired Plaintiff for "gross misconduct" based primarily on an altercation that he had had with a coworker and his language and attitude during a conversation with his supervisor. Plaintiff sued Pathfinder in federal district court, alleging that Pathfinder had violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). He also alleged that Pathfinder had breached his implied-in-fact employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pathfinder on all three claims. Upon careful review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claim, but affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the remaining claims. Specifically, the Tenth Court held that "[a] reasonable jury could conclude that [Plaintiff] has made out a prima facie case of discrimination and has established that Pathfinder’s asserted justification for his firing was pretextual. At this stage of the case, that is enough." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings on the ADA claim.

Beginning in 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Vicki Koch and her parents assumed control over the property and care of an elderly woman, Gladys Lance. Ms. Lance’s niece became concerned about her aunt’s welfare, and in 2005, when she could no longer locate Ms. Lance, she obtained an order from an Oklahoma state court appointing her as Ms. Lance’s special guardian. Several days later, Defendant-Appellant John Beech, an officer of the Del City Police Department, was told by his supervisor that a "pickup" order had been issued for Ms. Lance, and that he should go to Ms. Koch’s residence to check on Ms. Lance. When he did, he encountered Ms. Koch on her front doorstep. He asked Ms. Koch where Ms. Lance was located, but Ms. Koch refused to tell him, instead telling him to leave her property and talk to her attorney. When Ms. Koch persisted in her non-responsiveness and turned to leave, Officer Beech arrested her for obstruction. During the arrest, a scuffle ensued, which concluded when Officer Beech brought Ms. Koch to the ground and handcuffed her. Ms. Koch sued Officer Beech and Del City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, concluding that Officer Beech was entitled to qualified immunity. Ms. Koch appealed that decision. The Appellees, in turn, challenged the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction to hear Ms. Koch’s appeal. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's decision.

State prisoner Plaintiff Michael Milligan appealed a district court's sua sponte dismissal of his Section 1983 complaint against various Colorado prison officials who were allegedly involved in decisions affecting Plaintiff's prison employment. Plaintiff alleged he worked for the prison's maintenance department plumbing crew for months without incident. In the fall of 2010 however, Plaintiff's "gate pass" was pulled, preventing him from accessing areas in which the maintenance department was located. Plaintiff was allegedly told that inmates assigned to work in these areas were reevaluated for their potential escape risk following the escape of another inmate. After he filed a grievance regarding his designation as a potential escape risk, the facility job board allegedly took his job away and placed him in vocational janitorial school. In his complaint, Plaintiff raised an equal protection claim based on the pulling of his gate pass as well as a retaliation claim based on the loss of his job in the maintenance department. The district court found that Plaintiff could not state an arguable claim that his civil rights were violated. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's complaint: "We are not persuaded, however, that amendment would necessarily be futile or that this claim was based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." The Court reversed the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Ferdinand De Leon appealed a district court’s judgment entered in favor of Defendant Denman Investment Corporation, Inc. Plaintiff represents a class of over 9500 people who brought human rights claims against the former president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos. In 1995, the class obtained a $2 billion judgment in the federal district court of Hawai'i. Several years later, the class registered the judgment in the federal district court in Illinois in an attempt to enforce it. The judgment was revived in 2008 and remains in effect until 2017 under Illinois law. Plaintiff then registered the Illinois revival in federal district court in Colorado. While ancillary lawsuits proceeded, Plaintiff filed a putative class action in 2009, seeking to enforce the Illinois judgment in Colorado against property that Defendant owned nominally for the benefit of the Marcos estate. Defendant moved to dismiss the Colorado suit, contending that, among other things, the Illinois judgement was unenforceable in Colorado. The Colorado court denied Defendant's motion, denied a motion to certify the class, and dismissed the sole claim against the Marcoses. But while that motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed an "advice of settlement" indicating that the parties reached a settlement-in-principle in this suit and the ancillary suit. Later that year, the district court entered its orders. Of import here was the court's finding that the Illinois judgment could not be re-registered in Colorado, and therefore, Plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the judgment. Plaintiff moved to vacate or modify the court's decision in light of the advice of settlement. Defendant responded by filing a notice of its intent not to participate in the appeal, stating that it had settled all claims with the class members. Upon careful consideration of the legal authority and the lengthy court record of this case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that language in the settlement stipulating that once the settlement agreement was executed the parties would dismiss their pending lawsuit controlled in this case. The Court concluded that the district court should have "treated the stipulation as a self-executing dismissal;" Accordingly, the district court's granting of Defendant's motion to dismiss on the merits was void because it was issued after the stipulation was filed and therefore in the absence of jurisdiction." The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to the lower court to dismiss the entire action with prejudice.

Plaintiff Cynthia Anderson appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Cato Corporation on her claim of discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. A month or two after Cato terminated her employment, Plaintiff asked for a letter stating the reasons for her termination so that she could apply for public health benefits. A Cato supervisor wrote that Plaintiff "was terminated due to pregnancy related illnesses. [Plaintiff] needed off three weeks for bed rest required by a doctor. However, according to Cato policy a part time sales associate has to be release[d] if she/he needs off for longer than seven days unless she/he has been employed for 365 days. [Plaintiff] did not apply to the guidelines; therefore she was forced to be terminated." The supervisor's undisputed testimony was that Plaintiff "told me that she needed me to put on [the letter] it was because of her pregnancy." After Plaintiff filed suit, Cato moved for summary judgment. The district court determined that the letter was not direct evidence of discrimination. The court considered it "significant" that Plaintiff asked for the letter and told her supervisors what the letter should state as reasons for her termination. The court concluded that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case for discrimination but that the evidence did not raise a disputed issue of material fact. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the letter was indeed not direct evidence of discrimination, and agreed with the district court's reasoning that Plaintiff could make a prima facie case but that summary judgment was appropriate.

Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) appealed a jury verdict that awarded Plaintiff Keith Jones $2.5 million in actual and punitive damages based on UPS's retaliatory discharge in violation of Kansas common law. Plaintiff alleged, and the jury found, that UPS terminated Jones in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. UPS alleged on appeal that (1) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones's retaliation claim; (2) the district court erred in giving two improper jury instructions; (3) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones's claim for punitive damages; (4) the district court erred in allowing the jury to decide the amount of punitive damages; and (5) the jury's award of $2 million in punitive damages violated its federal due process rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that the evidence presented supported a reasonable inference in support of Plaintiff's retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that UPS was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The Court also concluded that the jury instructions in this case, "although not a model of clarity," were not improper and that UPS, based on the evidence presented, was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The Court ultimately concluded the district court did not err in instructing the jury to determine the proper amount of punitive damages in this case. Finally, the Court concluded that the jury's $2 million punitive damage award was excessive and violated UPS's federal due process rights. The Court reversed and remanded on this limited issue to permit Plaintiff to choose between a new trial solely to determine punitive damages or acceptance of a remittitur to be determined by the district court.

Petitioner Chuwuma Azubuko appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint for lack of venue. Petitioner filed a complaint in the Western District of Oklahoma alleging Latoya Irish and an unknown Boston police detective violated his constitutional rights. He complained that Irish denied his subsidized housing application and that the detective warned him not to contact Irish. Plaintiff sought $21.4 million in damages. According to the complaint, Plaintiff, Irish and the unknown detective all resided in Massachusetts. Further, the apartment at issue is located in Massachusetts. Plaintiff did not allege any facts connecting the dispute to the Western District of Oklahoma. The district court noted that Plaintiff had been placed under filing restrictions in the District of Massachusetts, and that Plaintiff had "a history of attempting to circumvent the Orders enjoining him by filing his lawsuits in other Districts, only to have them transferred to the District of Massachusetts." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that "[Plaintiff] spen[t] the bulk of his appellate brief arguing that the district court possessed jurisdiction over his action. 'Venue, however, is distinct from jurisdiction.'" The Court agreed that venue was improper, and that Plaintiff's action should have been dismissed.

Payne County Jail Administrator Brandon Myers appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for summary judgment that asked for qualified immunity. While held as a pretrial detainee at the Payne County Jail, Plaintiff John David Palmer suffered from an infection of the flesh-eating methicillin-resistent staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The jail's medical transport officer took Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Hill who did not diagnose Plaintiff as having MRSA, but drained the boils Plaintiff had developed, administered an injection of an antibiotic, and prescribed two more antibiotics for oral use at the jail. Dr. Hill advised that Plaintiff should return in two days for a follow-up visit, but warned that if Plaintiff developed a fever, he should be taken to the hospital. Ultimately, Plaintiff developed a fever, his condition worsened, and he alleged in his complaint against prison officials that their inattention or delay in taking him to the hospital caused him tremendous suffering and caused him to accumulate $24,000 in medical bills. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Mr. Myers qualified immunity.