Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Ferdinand De Leon appealed a district court’s judgment entered in favor of Defendant Denman Investment Corporation, Inc. Plaintiff represents a class of over 9500 people who brought human rights claims against the former president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos. In 1995, the class obtained a $2 billion judgment in the federal district court of Hawai'i. Several years later, the class registered the judgment in the federal district court in Illinois in an attempt to enforce it. The judgment was revived in 2008 and remains in effect until 2017 under Illinois law. Plaintiff then registered the Illinois revival in federal district court in Colorado. While ancillary lawsuits proceeded, Plaintiff filed a putative class action in 2009, seeking to enforce the Illinois judgment in Colorado against property that Defendant owned nominally for the benefit of the Marcos estate. Defendant moved to dismiss the Colorado suit, contending that, among other things, the Illinois judgement was unenforceable in Colorado. The Colorado court denied Defendant's motion, denied a motion to certify the class, and dismissed the sole claim against the Marcoses. But while that motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed an "advice of settlement" indicating that the parties reached a settlement-in-principle in this suit and the ancillary suit. Later that year, the district court entered its orders. Of import here was the court's finding that the Illinois judgment could not be re-registered in Colorado, and therefore, Plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the judgment. Plaintiff moved to vacate or modify the court's decision in light of the advice of settlement. Defendant responded by filing a notice of its intent not to participate in the appeal, stating that it had settled all claims with the class members. Upon careful consideration of the legal authority and the lengthy court record of this case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that language in the settlement stipulating that once the settlement agreement was executed the parties would dismiss their pending lawsuit controlled in this case. The Court concluded that the district court should have "treated the stipulation as a self-executing dismissal;" Accordingly, the district court's granting of Defendant's motion to dismiss on the merits was void because it was issued after the stipulation was filed and therefore in the absence of jurisdiction." The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to the lower court to dismiss the entire action with prejudice.

Plaintiff Cynthia Anderson appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Cato Corporation on her claim of discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. A month or two after Cato terminated her employment, Plaintiff asked for a letter stating the reasons for her termination so that she could apply for public health benefits. A Cato supervisor wrote that Plaintiff "was terminated due to pregnancy related illnesses. [Plaintiff] needed off three weeks for bed rest required by a doctor. However, according to Cato policy a part time sales associate has to be release[d] if she/he needs off for longer than seven days unless she/he has been employed for 365 days. [Plaintiff] did not apply to the guidelines; therefore she was forced to be terminated." The supervisor's undisputed testimony was that Plaintiff "told me that she needed me to put on [the letter] it was because of her pregnancy." After Plaintiff filed suit, Cato moved for summary judgment. The district court determined that the letter was not direct evidence of discrimination. The court considered it "significant" that Plaintiff asked for the letter and told her supervisors what the letter should state as reasons for her termination. The court concluded that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case for discrimination but that the evidence did not raise a disputed issue of material fact. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the letter was indeed not direct evidence of discrimination, and agreed with the district court's reasoning that Plaintiff could make a prima facie case but that summary judgment was appropriate.

Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) appealed a jury verdict that awarded Plaintiff Keith Jones $2.5 million in actual and punitive damages based on UPS's retaliatory discharge in violation of Kansas common law. Plaintiff alleged, and the jury found, that UPS terminated Jones in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. UPS alleged on appeal that (1) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones's retaliation claim; (2) the district court erred in giving two improper jury instructions; (3) it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones's claim for punitive damages; (4) the district court erred in allowing the jury to decide the amount of punitive damages; and (5) the jury's award of $2 million in punitive damages violated its federal due process rights. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that the evidence presented supported a reasonable inference in support of Plaintiff's retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that UPS was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The Court also concluded that the jury instructions in this case, "although not a model of clarity," were not improper and that UPS, based on the evidence presented, was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The Court ultimately concluded the district court did not err in instructing the jury to determine the proper amount of punitive damages in this case. Finally, the Court concluded that the jury's $2 million punitive damage award was excessive and violated UPS's federal due process rights. The Court reversed and remanded on this limited issue to permit Plaintiff to choose between a new trial solely to determine punitive damages or acceptance of a remittitur to be determined by the district court.

Petitioner Chuwuma Azubuko appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint for lack of venue. Petitioner filed a complaint in the Western District of Oklahoma alleging Latoya Irish and an unknown Boston police detective violated his constitutional rights. He complained that Irish denied his subsidized housing application and that the detective warned him not to contact Irish. Plaintiff sought $21.4 million in damages. According to the complaint, Plaintiff, Irish and the unknown detective all resided in Massachusetts. Further, the apartment at issue is located in Massachusetts. Plaintiff did not allege any facts connecting the dispute to the Western District of Oklahoma. The district court noted that Plaintiff had been placed under filing restrictions in the District of Massachusetts, and that Plaintiff had "a history of attempting to circumvent the Orders enjoining him by filing his lawsuits in other Districts, only to have them transferred to the District of Massachusetts." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that "[Plaintiff] spen[t] the bulk of his appellate brief arguing that the district court possessed jurisdiction over his action. 'Venue, however, is distinct from jurisdiction.'" The Court agreed that venue was improper, and that Plaintiff's action should have been dismissed.

Payne County Jail Administrator Brandon Myers appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for summary judgment that asked for qualified immunity. While held as a pretrial detainee at the Payne County Jail, Plaintiff John David Palmer suffered from an infection of the flesh-eating methicillin-resistent staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The jail's medical transport officer took Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Hill who did not diagnose Plaintiff as having MRSA, but drained the boils Plaintiff had developed, administered an injection of an antibiotic, and prescribed two more antibiotics for oral use at the jail. Dr. Hill advised that Plaintiff should return in two days for a follow-up visit, but warned that if Plaintiff developed a fever, he should be taken to the hospital. Ultimately, Plaintiff developed a fever, his condition worsened, and he alleged in his complaint against prison officials that their inattention or delay in taking him to the hospital caused him tremendous suffering and caused him to accumulate $24,000 in medical bills. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Mr. Myers qualified immunity.

Plaintiff-Appellant Denice Twigg appealed a district court’s order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC) on Plaintiff's claims for (1) retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981; (2) retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and (3) interference under the FMLA. Upon its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that HBC terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about race discrimination or her taking FMLA leave. Therefore, her retaliation claims under Sec.1981 and the FMLA failed as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to HBC on Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim because HBC met its burden of demonstrating that it terminated Plaintiff for a reason unrelated to her FMLA leave, namely, her failure to comply with the company’s notice-of-absence policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Martinez appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. Plaintiff filed suit against Kevin Milyard and Susan Jones, his previous and current wardens, respectively. His complaint included a long list of grievances. Plaintiff alleged that prison employees erroneously billed him for repairs and medical services, confiscated his personal items without following the proper procedures, and failed to separate Plaintiff and another inmate after a physical altercation between them. He further contended that prison facilities lacked adequate amenities and that prison staff failed to provide him with time for fresh air and exercise. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that the Colorado Department of Corrections improperly garnished his deposits. Plaintiff's complaint failed, however, to tie any of these specific allegations to Milyard or to Jones. Because Plaintiff failed to advance "a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal," the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff-Appellant Ed Henry appealed a district court’s final judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees police officers Jacob Storey and Amy Fangio after a jury trial. He contended that the district court erred in (1) granting judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) to these Defendants on two of his claims and (2) rejecting a proposed jury instruction. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a civil-rights complaint against several Defendants arising from a night-time police stop. Plaintiff, an African-American, was pulled over in a rental vehicle. He was ordered out, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a marked police vehicle. After an investigation, officers realized that the rental vehicle driven by Plaintiff had been erroneously reported as stolen. Plaintiff was then released. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was singled out because of his race, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also alleged that the officers used excessive force. Defendants put on no evidence. Plaintiff proposed a jury instruction to the effect that the officers’ compliance with standard operating procedures could not be considered in determining whether they used excessive force. The court did not so instruct the jury. The jury ultimately found that Officer Storey had not engaged in racial profiling and that Officer Fangio had not used excessive force. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Defendants that the submitted jury instructions “comprehensively and correctly” covered the elements of the excessive force claim. The Court affirmed the district court's decision in all other respects.

This appeal arose from a dispute between a city and a rural water district over their rights to serve customers in several annexed areas of Douglas County, Kansas. Rural Water District No. 4 brought this suit against the City of Eudora under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the City violated the District's exclusive right to provide water service to current and prospective customers in violation of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was asked to resolve multiple federal and state legal issues concerning the competitive relationship between the water district and local municipality. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the trial verdict. The Court remanded the matter for further proceedings solely on the issue of whether the District's cooperation to secure a Rural Development guarantee was necessary to carry out the purposes of its organization. All other issues on appeal and cross-appeal were affirmed.

The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act provides that individuals adjudged to be sexually violent predators due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder shall be committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large. Appellant Timothy Burch was a sexually violent predator committed to the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) at Larned State Hospital. He and other Larned residents initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to challenge the adequacy of the SPTP provided at Larned. The other residents voluntarily dismissed their claims, but Appellant filed an amended complaint, insisting the SPTP is inadequate to treat his condition and provide a realistic opportunity for his release. In addition, Appellant alleged that Defendants improperly punished him by, among other things, interfering with his educational endeavors, revoking his work privileges, and reducing his treatment classification level through manipulation of his treatment progress scores. In a fifty-two page opinion, the court analyzed Appellant's allegations, distilled his claims, and concluded he was not entitled to relief. As is relevant to this appeal, the court determined that most of Appellant's claims failed to adequately allege Defendants' personal participation in the claimed misconduct. As for the rest of his claims, the court discussed the unique principles and standards governing the KSVPA and concluded that Appellant failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Regarding the claims of inadequate treatment, the court ruled that Appellant enjoyed no substantive due process right to treatment culminating in his release. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's "thorough and well-reasoned order. The court accurately analyzed Mr. Burch's claims and correctly determined that he was not entitled to relief."