Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Wayne Tomlinson, Alice Ballesteros and Gary Muckelroy appealed the dismissal of their claims against El Paso Corporation and the El Paso Pension Plan (collectively "El Paso") brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Plaintiffs' claims concern "wear-away" periods that occurred during El Paso's transition to a new pension plan. They contended that the wear-away periods violated the ADEA's prohibition on age discrimination and the anti-backloading and notice provisions of ERISA. The trial court found that El Paso's transition favored, rather than discriminated against, older employees; and the plan was frontloaded rather than backloaded. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's review concluded that ERISA did not require notification of wear-away periods so long as employees were informed and forewarned of plan changes. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision dismissing Petitioners' claims.

Pro se prisoner Petitioner Steve Standifer challenged a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation that denied him eligibility to participate in its Residential Drug Abuse Program by filing for the writ of habeas corpus. He was deemed ineligible because his last-reported date of drug use was more than three years before his arrest on federal charges. Petitioner contended the BOP's policy requiring that it consider only his substance-abuse history for the 12 months preceding his arrest was based on an unreasonable interpretation of the authorizing statutes. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Court concluded that the BOP's eligibility requirement is based on reasonable interpretation of the applicable governing provisions. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Petitioner's assertion that the BOP was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs was "unavailing". The Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition and dismissed his appeal.

Plaintiff Edward Simmons sued the Postmaster General of the United States claiming that the USPS discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment as a result of his disability. Plaintiff worked as a customer services supervisor at a Colorado facility. In this action, Plaintiff alleged that he was disabled by reason of a brain tumor and post-traumatic stress disorder. The USPS moved for summary judgment. Among its many reasons, the USPS argued that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC 791, 794). The district court granted the USPS' motion, and Plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that none of the arguments Plaintiff raised on appeal involved the district court's determination of his meeting the elements of his prima facie case. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgement.

This case arose from "an unfortunate situation" of child-on-child abuse within the foster care system. Plaintiffs J.W. and M.R.W. are a foster couple, and their now-adopted foster children were injured after an abusive foster child was placed in their home in 2002. Plaintiffs raised several state and federal claims against Utah and the state employees involved in placing the abusive child in their home. The district court dismissed several of Plaintiffs' negligence claims based on Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. As for Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court held that the caseworker and her supervisor were entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs had not shown a failure to exercise professional judgment on the part of the caseworker, nor had they shown any basis for holding the supervisor liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs challenged these decisions on appeal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the undisputed evidence in the record reflected that there was an impermissible deviation from professional judgment on the part of the state employees. Furthermore, the Court found Plaintiffs did not set forth a valid basis for holding the employees liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions.

Plaintiff Billy Merrifield brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against his former employer Defendant Board of Commissioners for Santa Fe. In his suit, he alleged he had been denied procedural due process with respect to the County's pre termination hearing process when he was fired from his position as a Youth Services Administrator. His complaint also alleged that he was fired in retaliation for retaining an attorney. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, and set aside a state administrative decision to award him back pay. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to show that the County's pre termination process was constitutionally inadequate and that his association with an attorney lead to his termination.

Plaintiff Michelle Christian appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant AHS Tulsa Regional Medical Center (Hospital), on her Title VII sex discrimination claims. Plaintiff described four situations where her immediate supervisor made sexually charged comments, and two situations where he leaned against her while she was at a computer or copy machine. Plaintiff brought this action against the Hospital, raising claims of hostile work environment, retaliation, negligent supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Hospital successfully moved for summary judgment on each of the claims. The district court made two rulings relevant to this appeal: (1) Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because no rational jury could conclude that the conduct "however obnoxious" was pervasive enough to have altered the work environment; and (2) the Hospital asserted an affirmative defense that its investigation into the situations was reasonable. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Plaintiff was unable to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to the Hospital's affirmative defense. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff Curtis McCarty brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Joyce Gilchrist, former forensic chemist for the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD), the OCPD Chief of Police and Oklahoma City, alleging multiple constitutional violations and damages under theories of malicious prosecution, municipal liability for failure to train or supervise, and supervisor liability for failure to train or supervise. In 1986, Plaintiff was charged in Oklahoma state court with first-degree murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction, finding that the State deprived Plaintiff of a "fair and adequate opportunity to have evidence examined by an independent forensic expert" and of an accurate forensic report necessary for intelligent cross-examination. Plaintiff was retried in 1989 and convicted again of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction but reversed the death sentence. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for post-conviction relief. In 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation launched an investigation into Ms. Gilchrist's forensic work. The Tenth Circuit found that Ms. Gilchrist had fabricated evidence in another case and was fired. Plaintiff filed another application for post-conviction relief. At the conclusion of a rehearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that Plaintiff did not receive a fair trial in 1989, but refused to dismiss the charges against him. At the close of a 2007 hearing, the court found that Ms. Gilchrist had intentionally destroyed the potentially exculpatory evidence recovered from the victim in Plaintiff's case. Plaintiff was released from prison after spending almost 19 years on death row. Subsequently, he brought this civil rights case. The federal district court dismissed his complaint, ruling that Plaintiff was barred by a two-year statute of limitations that began to run when his conviction was first reversed. Plaintiff appeals that dismissal. Upon careful consideration of the lower courts' records and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff indeed filed his action well beyond the two-year statute of limitations period for all theories listed in his complaint. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing his case.

Pro se Appellant Janos Toevs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil-rights suit. Appellant's lawsuit pertained to the Colorado prison system's "Quality of Life Level Program" (QLLP). The QLLP program was described as a "stratified quality of life program based on increased levels of privileges for demonstrated appropriate offender behavior." Level 1 is the most restrictive, and each successive level offers an inmate more privileges. Appellant was placed in the QLLP in 2002 after attempting to escape. By September 2005, he had reached the least restrictive Level 6, but due to poor health was regressed back to Level 1. By 2009, Appellant had achieved Level 6 again and rejoined the general prison population. Appellant complained that during his placement in the QLLP from 2005 to 2009, his case managers' periodic reviews were "perfunctory, meaningless, and all said the same thing." He sued his case workers and the warden in their individual capacities. In affirming the district court's dismissal of Appellant's case, the Tenth Circuit found that the standards for meaningful periodic review for inmates in the QLLP were not previously clearly established in the Circuit. As such, the Court found that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Appellant's suit.

Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Simmons appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Sykes Enterprises, Incorporated. Ms. Simmons claimed Sykes terminated her on the basis of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court concluded that Ms. Simmons failed to establish that Sykes' reason for terminating her was pretextual, and dismissed her case. In early 2007, Ms. Simmons claimed that the workplace environment got decidedly hostile towards her. Later that year, an aggrieved employee complained to Sykes management that someone within the company had improperly disclosed the employee's confidential medical information. Ms. Simmons was implicated as the source of the confidential information. After her termination, Ms. Simmons filed a complaint with the EEOC, which in turn, resulted in a formal complaint before the district court. The Tenth Circuit found that the undisputed facts in this case permitted only one inference: "absent the alleged discriminatory bias, Sykes would still have fired Ms. Simmons because from Sykes' perspective, she violated company policy and could not be trusted with confidential information." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Sykes Enterprises.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Whittington filed a civil rights lawsuit, alleging that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to choose between spending funds in his inmate bank account on court costs, or on dental hygiene items. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was unable to pay for basic hygiene supplies because all of his inmate salary and the funds in his account were levied for mandatory deductions imposed by the Department of Corrections, or for the necessary costs of protected litigation. Refusing to give him the hygiene supplies for free, Plaintiff argued, was "cruel and unusual punishment." Ultimately the district court dismissed all Plaintiffs' claims based on various grounds. Plaintiff only challenged the dismissals based on "qualified immunity." The Tenth Circuit found that the deprivation of hygiene items for extended periods can implicate the Eighth Amendment, but the law was not established on this point at the time Plaintiff brought his complaint. The Court noted that the facts of Plaintiff's complaint do not allege that the Department of Corrections denied him the items per se. Rather, Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the Department forced him to choose between two constitutionally protected activities. The Court held that the district court properly granted qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claims against the Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's claims.