Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant John Matthews appealed the district courtâs decision that granted summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP. Plaintiff worked for the Agency under a collective bargaining agreement as a unit supervisor. A female employee under Plaintiffâs supervision told the union steward that Plaintiff allegedly made inappropriate comments to her. The union investigated and recommended that Plaintiff be demoted from his supervisory position. Coincidentally, Plaintiff left work under a doctorâs certification that he could not return to work for medical reasons. Though âcertain statutory employment discrimination claimsâ had previously been arbitrated between the parties, Plaintiff filed suit against the Agency in the district court, alleging his demotion was discriminatory and retaliatory. The Agency pointed to those previously arbitrated claims, and moved to have Plaintiffâs case dismissed. Believing the U.S. Supreme Court had already decided a case similar to Plaintiffâs, the district court used that Supreme Court case as the basis for its decision to dismiss Plaintiffâs case. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court relied on the wrong precedent. The Court held that the prior arbitration should not have precluded the entire case. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff could not establish his case of discrimination. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In the early 1990s, Colorado state prisoners initiated a class action lawsuit alleging that state officials were committing ongoing violations of disabled prisonersâ rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In 2003, the parties entered into a consent decree setting forth the actions the government officials would take to bring the prison system into compliance with these laws. Claimant Larry Gordon filed an individual claim for damages under the plan devised by the inmates and officials. Mr. Gordonâs claim was denied, and he filed an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Because the class action suit covered the issue Mr. Gordon raised in his appeal, his case was remanded to a panel that was working on the logistics of enforcing the plan. The parties could not resolve their disagreements concerning enforcement of the plan, and took their disagreement to the district court. The court ruled that its orders on appeal from the panelâs decisions would be final and not appealable to the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages would eventually be denied by the district court, and he appealed despite the courtâs earlier ruling. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether it could actually review appeals from denied claims of damages that stemmed from the consent decree and plan. The officials wanted the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, Court held that even if the language of the agreement provided that the lower courtâs review would be final, an appeal could be made to the Tenth Circuit since the Courtâs jurisdiction is invoked by statute. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decision to dismiss the officialsâ motion, and Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn McDonald-Cuba sued her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Santa Fe Protective Services, Inc.(SFPS), and sought damages for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17, and New Mexico state law. SFPS counter-sued Plaintiff on breach of contract, interference with their economic advantage and breach of loyalty. SFPS would eventually drop all its claims against Plaintiff. The district court granted SFPS summary judgment on the discrimination claims. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on her claims premised on post-employment retaliation and discrimination. The Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not seek all administrative remedies available to her through before taking her case to court. The Court held that âneither the filing of her EEOC charge nor [Plaintiffâs] filing of this suit can serve as protected activity for purposes of her retaliation . . . because neither of those activities occurred before she filed the EEOC charge mentioned in her complaint.â The Court vacated the district courtâs judgment on Plaintiffâs post-employment retaliation claim, and remanded the case to the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for review.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jessica Cohon sought funding through New Mexicoâs Medicaid program. She qualified for the âMi Via Waiverâ program, and submitted budget requests which were partly granted, partly denied. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, she filed suit, alleging that the administration of the Mi Via Waiver program discriminated against severely disabled persons like herself. The State moved to dismiss Plaintiffâs complaint, arguing that not only was it the wrong entity being sued, but that Plaintiff had no statutory basis to support her suit. The district court dismissed Plaintiffâs claims based on federal law, but remanded her state-law claims to the administrative agency for further proceedings. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her federal law claims to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found Plaintiffâs federal claims âinsufficient in substance,â and affirmed the judgment of the district court that dismissed her claims.

For over a year, Plaintiff-Appellant Miriam Leverington worked as a cardiac nurse for the internal staffing agency of Memorial Health system (Memorial), which is an enterprise of the City of Colorado Springs (City). Plaintiff was fired from her position after she told a Colorado Springs Police Officer during a âless than cordialâ traffic stop, that she hoped she never had him as a patient. The Officer gave her a ticket, and later informed Plaintiffâs supervisors about her statement. Memorial terminated her employment. Plaintiff sued the officer and the City under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated her First Amendment right to free speech. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that Plaintiff had no case against them and proved nothing. The district court granted defendantsâ motion, holding that âthere is no authority to support a claim that such a single statement in that context can be considered protected speech.â Plaintiff appealed. The Tenth Circuit held that âwhile Ms. Leverington certainly has free speech rights even as a public employee, in this case, Memorial did not overstep its bounds in taking action against her for her statement to [the officer].â The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision dismissing Plaintiffâs claim.

Plaintiff-Appellant the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit against Defendant-Appellee C.R. England, Inc. (C.R. England) alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-213. The alleged violations stemmed from Walter Watsonâs employment with C.R. England. Mr. Watson was a driver and trainer for the trucking company. Mr. Watson voluntarily informed C.R. England that he was HIV positive in 1999. By 2003, Mr. Watsonâs workload had significantly decreased and he was unable to make lease payments on his truck. C.R. England terminated his truck lease, and repossessed it. Mr. Watson filed a complaint with the EEOC claiming C.R. Englandâs actions leading up to the repossession was discriminatory and retaliatory for his voluntary disclosure of his illness. The case went to trial in 2008. The EEOC moved for summary judgment, but the trial court denied it, and granted judgment in favor of C.R. England. The EEOC brought multiple issues on appeal, all of which were analyzed by the Tenth Circuit. The Courtâs review of the appeal concluded that the EEOCâs arguments were insufficient to support a discrimination claim under the ADA. The Court affirmed the district courtâs grant of summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on all of the EEOCâs and Mr. Watsonâs claims.

Plaintiff-Appellant Mauerhan and the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee brought suit against Mauerhan's former employer Defendant-Appellee Wagner Corporation alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The lower court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs appealed. Mauerhan had tested positive for drug use and was fired from Defendant's employ, but was told he may return if he was able to complete a rehabilitation program. Mauerhan completed the program, but Defendant's job duties and compensation would be less than what it previously had been. Mauerhan declined Defendant's offer. Later that year, Mauerhan filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and received a discharge of his debts by the end of the year. After filing for bankruptcy, but before the case was closed, Mauerhan learned that he had a viable claim of discrimination against Defendant under the ADA, and filed it with the EEOC. The Bankruptcy Trustee learned of the claim, and moved to amend Mauerhan's bankruptcy petition to include the claim in the bankruptcy estate. The lower court found that Mauerhan had only abstained from drugs for one month, too short to receive protection from the ADA at the time Mauerhan asked to be rehired. On appeal, this Court upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment.

The Court affirmed the lower courtâs grant of summary judgment to Defendant, the Department of the Interior. Plaintiff-Appellant Villalpando sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Colorado state law, alleging the Department passed him over for a promotion based on his race and national origin. Both Plaintiff and Defendant did not dispute the otherâs meeting their respective burdens of proof under Title VII and Colorado case law. In meeting its burden, Plaintiff argued that the real reason behind Defendantâs alleged non-discriminatory reasons for passing him over was pretext for discrimination. However, the Court held that because Plaintiff conceded Defendantâs proffered non-discriminatory reasons, he remained âvulnerable to summary judgment because [his] concession of a lawful motiveâ removed motive as an issue from a juryâs purvey, âand preclude[d] the inference of a discriminatory motive that the jury could otherwise draw from the fact of pretext.â

New Mexico Environmental Division agents conducted an unannounced inspection. The agents' accounts of the visit differ from those of the two facility employees, but an enforcement action followed. The company brought civil rights claims based on the search. The district court denied a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. A jury found violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The company made, but withdrew, a post trial Rule 50(a) motion. After analyzing the jurisdictional issues presented by the filing of an appeal before a ruling on or withdrawal of the post-trial motion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants had waived their claims by withdrawing the motion. The summary judgment rulings were based on remaining issues of fact; because there has been a trial to resolve those issues, the time to appeal those rulings has expired.

The plaintiff made allegations against a Farmington, New Mexico police officer concerning a 2002 arrest and, in 2004, filed civil rights claims in federal district court. In 2005, the officer responded by filing a criminal complaint, claiming libel, harassment, and stalking. A magistrate entered convictions, but the plaintiff was acquitted in the state district court in 2006. In 2005, before his acquittal, the plaintiff signed an agreement settling the federal suit for $75,000. The plaintiff later filed an amended complaint, adding claims relating to the 2005-2006 state criminal case. The district court dismissed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The First Amendment/retaliatory prosecution claim accrued when plaintiff learned of the charges against him, not when he was acquitted, and were time-barred. The officer did not engage in additional retaliatory conduct after filing the charges. The claim was also barred by the settlement agreement, which referred to all claims the plaintiff could "hereafter assert" against the city and all of its employees. Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims failed because the plaintiff was not "seized;" he was never arrested, but only subjected to travel restrictions.