Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of individuals and organizations challenged rules of decorum established by certain Colorado state legislators during public hearings on legislation concerning transgender rights. The rules prohibited misgendering and deadnaming—referring to transgender individuals in ways inconsistent with their gender identity or using names they no longer use. The plaintiffs asserted that these rules violated their First Amendment rights by restricting their speech during legislative hearings and by removing certain comments from the official legislative record.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case after the legislators, sued in both their official and individual capacities, moved to dismiss. The legislators argued that they were protected by legislative immunity, that the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits, and that the requests for relief were moot. The district court granted the legislators’ motion to dismiss, holding that the rules and their enforcement were within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and thus subject to absolute legislative immunity. The court also found the matter moot regarding prospective relief, concluding it was speculative whether the plaintiffs would face the same situation again.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs continued to seek relief and the legislators confirmed that the challenged rules would remain in effect. However, the Tenth Circuit found that legislative immunity applied, protecting legislators from suit for actions taken in their legislative capacity, regardless of whether the relief sought was prospective or retrospective, or whether the suit was brought against them in their individual or official capacities. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims due to the application of legislative immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Gays Against Groomers v. Garcia" on Justia Law

After a road-rage incident in which a firearm was allegedly discharged, law enforcement investigated and tied the suspect to a residence using law enforcement databases, vehicle registration information, and visual surveillance. The police observed a vehicle matching the description from the incident parked at a house on West Iliff Lane, saw the suspect washing the car in the driveway, and watched him enter and exit the house. These observations occurred several weeks after the incident. Officers obtained a search warrant for the house and vehicle based on an affidavit summarizing the investigation and linking the suspect to the location. Execution of the warrant resulted in the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances, leading to charges for drug offenses and possession of a firearm by a felon.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The defendant pleaded guilty but preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that the affidavit supporting the warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged offense and the residence and challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, as law enforcement’s observations and the suspect’s connection to the residence justified the search. The court also held that the Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by binding Tenth Circuit precedent. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Becker" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, while guarding a cache of drugs and money, opened fire on law enforcement officers, wounding one but not fatally due to protective gear. He was indicted by a federal grand jury on several charges, including attempted murder of federal officers and using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Under a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder, one § 924(c) count (with attempted murder as the predicate crime of violence), and a firearm possession charge, waiving most rights to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction. In exchange, the government dropped other charges and agreed not to prosecute his son.After his conviction, the defendant pursued multiple post-conviction relief motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, all unsuccessful. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the “residual clause” of § 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” as unconstitutionally vague, he sought authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted authorization, and the District of Utah considered the merits. The district court denied relief, concluding the plea waiver barred relief and, alternatively, that the defendant failed to show the sentencing court relied on the residual clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the § 2255 motion. The court held that the defendant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court relied on the now-invalid residual clause when applying § 924(c). The court further affirmed that attempted murder qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the still-valid “elements clause” of § 924(c). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of post-conviction relief. View "United States v. Sandoval-Flores" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in a Colorado state prison, the plaintiff, a practicing member of the Sac & Fox faith, brought suit seeking monetary and injunctive relief. He alleged that certain prison regulations and practices violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. His claims focused on being denied possession of sacred items, spiritual cleansing of his cell, use of donated firewood for religious ceremonies, and access to faith grounds during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff named numerous officials and employees, including the Governor of Colorado, in both their official and individual capacities.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the Governor’s motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, rejecting his assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Governor argued he lacked the required connection to the challenged regulations to qualify for the Ex Parte Young exception. During the appeal, the plaintiff was transferred to another facility within the Colorado Department of Corrections. The Governor raised the issue of mootness due to this transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the claims for injunctive relief against the Governor were moot because of the transfer and whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applied. The court held that the claims were neither constitutionally nor prudentially moot, as the plaintiff’s affidavit showed ongoing exposure to substantially similar conditions at the new facility. The court further held that, under Colorado law and the facts alleged, the Governor had sufficient authority and demonstrated involvement in the challenged practices to satisfy the Ex Parte Young exception. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Eaves v. Polis" on Justia Law

A fifth-grade student, J.S., attended a local Oklahoma elementary school where, in August 2022, the administration implemented a policy segregating fifth-grade students into all-boys and all-girls homerooms. J.S. was placed in the boys’ class, taught by Mr. McClain. During the initial weeks, Mr. McClain allegedly targeted J.S. with severe discipline, derogatory language, and inappropriate sexual comments. After J.S. and his parents complained about this treatment and the sex-segregated policy, J.S. was removed from his classroom and placed on a modified schedule, then ultimately withdrawn from the school by his parents, who cited ongoing retaliation and lack of safety. The parents also filed a Title IX complaint, but alleged that the school’s investigation was inadequate and retaliatory actions followed, including public shaming and further mistreatment of J.S.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted in part and denied in part various defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding some claims barred by qualified immunity but allowing others to proceed. The court found that school district officials and Mr. McClain could not claim qualified immunity on certain equal protection and retaliation claims, but dismissed some due process and conspiracy claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that school officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim but not on the equal protection claim related to sex-based class segregation. Principal Anderson and Mr. Blair were properly denied qualified immunity on retaliation claims, while others were dismissed. Mr. McClain was granted qualified immunity on the substantive due process claim but not on the equal protection claim for alleged sexual harassment. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stepp v. Lockhart" on Justia Law

A group of activists and the Chinook Center, a nonprofit organization, participated in a housing-rights march in Colorado Springs. After the march, the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) launched an investigation targeting some participants. CSPD obtained three search warrants: two related to Jacqueline Armendariz, a protester accused of obstructing an officer by dropping her bike, and one targeting the Chinook Center’s Facebook account. The first Armendariz warrant authorized a search of her home and seizure of her electronic devices. The second allowed a search of data on those devices, including a broad keyword search. The third warrant authorized obtaining all posts, messages, and events from the Chinook Center’s Facebook account for a seven-day period.Armendariz and the Chinook Center filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the City, individual CSPD officers, the FBI, and others, alleging that the warrants were overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. They also brought state-law claims, and the Chinook Center alleged a violation of the Stored Communications Act. The district court granted motions to dismiss all claims, concluding that the officers were protected by qualified immunity, the plaintiffs failed to allege plausible constitutional violations, and that municipal liability was unsupported.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s ruling that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity regarding the warrant to seize Armendariz’s electronic devices. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to the officers for the second warrant (searching data on Armendariz’s devices) and the Facebook warrant, holding that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged these warrants were overbroad in violation of their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court also reversed the dismissal of related claims against the City and remanded for further proceedings. The dismissals of Armendariz's claims against the FBI and the United States were affirmed. View "Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

A group of individuals traveling through Kansas were stopped by Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) troopers while driving on interstate highways, primarily I-70. In each instance, the drivers and passengers were from out of state, often driving to or from Colorado, and were stopped for alleged traffic violations. After the initial traffic stop was concluded, troopers used a tactic known as the “Kansas Two-Step”—they would briefly disengage, then reinitiate conversation in an attempt to gain consent for further questioning or searches. These stops often led to extended detentions and searches, but no contraband was discovered. The troopers testified that they considered the drivers’ out-of-state status, travel to or from Colorado, and other factors in developing reasonable suspicion.The individuals sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and their constitutional right to travel. Some plaintiffs also brought damages claims, resulting in jury verdicts in their favor. For their claims for injunctive relief, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that KHP had a pattern and practice of targeting out-of-state drivers and using the Two-Step in a manner violating the Fourth Amendment. The court granted a permanent injunction, requiring changes in KHP’s training, documentation, consent procedures, and supervision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing for injunctive relief and whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because there was a substantial risk they would be stopped again and that KHP had a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. However, the Tenth Circuit found that the injunction was overly broad regarding the use of a driver’s state of origin and the Two-Step tactic. The court affirmed the injunction in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shaw v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2002, an individual disappeared from her home in Ada, Oklahoma, and her ex-boyfriend quickly became a suspect. Evidence implicating him included his presence at her home, strange phone calls to her family, and physical injuries. Law enforcement discovered blood in his car and house, and, after consulting with his attorney, he led officers to the woman’s body, which was buried and showed signs of gunshot wounds. He subsequently pleaded guilty to murder in Oklahoma state court and was sentenced to life without parole.Many years later, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which clarified that certain areas in Oklahoma are Indian country and subject to federal—not state—jurisdiction for major crimes involving Native Americans, the state court vacated his conviction. As a member of a federally recognized tribe and with the crime occurring within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation, only the federal government could prosecute him. A federal grand jury indicted him for murder in Indian country and for causing death while violating federal firearm statutes. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed one firearm count as time-barred, and a jury convicted him on the remaining counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered three main arguments: (1) alleged failures in the jury selection process under the Jury Selection and Service Act, (2) denial of a motion to suppress statements about the location of the victim’s body, and (3) denial of a motion to compel disclosure of communications between the government and former defense counsel. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to comply with the procedural requirements for challenging jury selection, that Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to his statements to law enforcement, and that any error in denying document disclosure was harmless. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Early in the morning, a security guard at a hotel in Oklahoma City called 911 to report an unauthorized individual, Dawawn McCoy, refusing to leave a guest’s room and appearing unable to walk. Sergeant Cassidy of the Oklahoma City Police Department responded, found McCoy noncompliant and apparently under the influence, and requested medical evaluation. After medical personnel determined McCoy did not need immediate attention and he refused care, police were instructed to arrest him for trespassing. Cassidy called for additional officers, and together the officers attempted to handcuff McCoy, who resisted physically by pulling his hands in and kicking. The officers used pepper spray and a taser to subdue him. Once handcuffed, McCoy was rolled onto his stomach and restrained further. For approximately ninety seconds, according to the district court’s findings, McCoy had stopped resisting but officers continued to apply force by holding a knee on his back and pressing his legs upward. McCoy stopped responding verbally and showed signs of medical distress. Officers later attempted resuscitation and administered Narcan, but McCoy died six days later in the hospital.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, LaQuita Bruner, as administrator of McCoy’s estate, brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference claim but denied it as to the excessive force claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude excessive force was used after McCoy was subdued.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court held that, based on the facts found by the district court, the officers’ continued use of force after McCoy was subdued was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bruner v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

During a shopping trip at Walmart, William Montgomery was stopped by a store employee and subsequently by Officer Armando Cruz, who suspected shoplifting after Montgomery declined to show a receipt. Officer Cruz directed Montgomery to raise his hands, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search his pockets. Without conducting a pat-down, Officer Cruz reached into Montgomery’s pockets, removing a prescription bottle and a wallet, and looked for Montgomery’s driver’s license. Montgomery was detained briefly, but Walmart employees determined he had paid for the items and he was released.Montgomery filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that Officer Cruz violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets and wallet without proper justification. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his actions did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that factual disputes existed regarding whether Officer Cruz had patted Montgomery down before reaching into his pockets and whether Montgomery had consented to the search of his wallet.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, accepting the district court’s factual conclusions, Officer Cruz’s search of Montgomery’s pockets without a pat-down or arrest constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the subsequent search of Montgomery’s wallet was not justified by consent, as any statement made by Montgomery after the illegal search could not retroactively legitimize the search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Cruz. View "Montgomery v. Cruz" on Justia Law