Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States unlawfully several decades ago. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging that he was inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act due to his illegal entry. The petitioner admitted the allegations and sought cancellation of removal, arguing that he met the statutory requirements, including continuous residence and good moral character for the preceding ten years. He also requested voluntary departure as an alternative form of relief.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the application for cancellation of removal, finding that the petitioner had not demonstrated good moral character for the required ten-year period. The IJ acknowledged positive evidence regarding the petitioner’s family and work history but emphasized his history of alcohol abuse and criminal conduct, specifically noting a 2017 DUI conviction that was his fourth such offense, with the previous three occurring in 1995 and 1996. The IJ concluded that the 2017 conviction was not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of recidivist behavior. The IJ granted voluntary departure. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that the 2017 DUI conviction reflected recidivism and outweighed positive equities. The BIA also rejected the petitioner’s due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo, focusing on whether the BIA improperly considered DUI convictions outside the ten-year statutory period for good moral character. The court held that the BIA properly considered the recidivist nature of the petitioner’s 2017 DUI conviction, even though the earlier convictions occurred outside the statutory period, because recidivism aggravates the seriousness of the most recent offense. The court denied the petition for review. View "Luna-Corona v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Bartlesville, Oklahoma police officers responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Willis Gay Jr., who reported his son Thomas Gay was behaving erratically and possibly under the influence of drugs. Willis informed the officers that Thomas was unarmed but had made furtive movements toward his back pocket. Upon entering the home, the officers observed Thomas holding an innocuous object and appearing disoriented. Officer Lewis immediately pointed his Taser at Thomas and, after a single command, tased him. Officer Pitts drew her firearm. Thomas retreated into a bedroom, where Officer Lewis tased him again, but the Taser failed to incapacitate him. A brief struggle ensued, and as Thomas moved toward the bedroom door, making a motion toward his back pocket, Officer Pitts shot him twice, resulting in his death within minutes of the officers’ arrival.The Estate of Thomas Gay sued the officers in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the motion, finding that disputed facts could allow a reasonable jury to conclude the officers violated Thomas’s clearly established constitutional rights. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Thomas was unarmed and not holding any object when shot, and that the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the district court’s factual determinations, as the record did not blatantly contradict those findings and no legal error was committed. The court further held that, under clearly established law, the officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable, precluding qualified immunity. View "Burke v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Late one night in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Jason Roybal led police officers on a low-speed chase in a stolen car. After stopping, Roybal leaned out of his vehicle and fired a BB gun at the officers. The officers responded by firing their guns. Roybal then exited his car, dropped the BB gun, and fled on foot toward a civilian-occupied vehicle. The officers shot and killed Roybal as he was running away. The personal representative of Roybal’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, specifically claiming that Roybal was unarmed and fleeing when he was shot.The case was initially filed in New Mexico state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity and arguing that the complaint omitted key facts, such as Roybal firing a BB gun and running toward an occupied car. They also asked the district court to consider dash- and body-camera footage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that it could not consider the videos at this stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly refused to consider the video evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a violation of Roybal’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the officers’ conduct was not justified by the circumstances described, and the right at issue was clearly established by precedent. View "Fuqua v. Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Mary Timmins worked as general counsel and litigation counsel for the Green Mountain Water and Sanitation District in Colorado. During her employment, she discovered that certain members of the District’s Board were engaging in conduct she believed to be corrupt and potentially unlawful, including violating open meetings laws, improperly communicating with a state-employed attorney, and destroying public records relevant to ongoing litigation. After repeatedly warning the Board internally without effect, Timmins disclosed her concerns to reporters and private citizens, alleging that the Board members were acting against the interests of the District and its residents. She was subsequently terminated from her position.Timmins filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the District and three Board members, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. The district court dismissed her claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that her speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was made pursuant to her official duties as a public employee. The court reasoned that her statements to the press and private citizens were essentially identical to those made in her official capacity and stemmed from her work responsibilities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that Timmins’s speech to reporters and private citizens was not made pursuant to her official duties, as her job did not ordinarily require her to make such disclosures outside the chain of command. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Timmins’s amended complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, declining to address alternative grounds for affirmance at this stage. View "Timmins v. Plotkin" on Justia Law

In this case, police in Denver were investigating a shooting that occurred early in the morning. They identified a suspect described as a light-skinned Black male with a bald head, thick beard, and muscular build, and circulated a photo of him. Later that day, officers surveilled a vehicle believed to be connected to the suspect. When a group, including a Black male with some similar clothing but not matching the suspect’s physical description, arrived in a different car and then left in a third vehicle, officers decided to stop that vehicle at a gas station. During the stop, officers detained Noah Huerta, a passenger, and conducted a patdown, finding a firearm magazine on him. A subsequent search of the vehicle, after obtaining the driver’s consent, revealed a handgun near Huerta’s seat.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Huerta’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and dangerous, and also ruled that the firearm would have been inevitably discovered. The court also denied Huerta’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which challenged the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute under recent Supreme Court precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo. The court held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Huerta was armed and dangerous, as the connection between the group and the shooting suspect was tenuous and based on a mere hunch, and the conduct of the vehicle’s occupants was innocuous. The court also found that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment, as binding circuit precedent foreclosed Huerta’s constitutional challenge. The court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Huerta" on Justia Law

In 2009, the defendant and two co-defendants abducted a family at gunpoint, including two young daughters, and robbed them of $30,000. A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado convicted the defendant of four counts of kidnapping, one count of conspiracy to kidnap, and one count of possessing and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The convictions for kidnapping the children were central to the sentencing dispute.Following the initial sentencing, which totaled 600 months, the defendant challenged his convictions and sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously remanded the case for resentencing after the government conceded that the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be vacated, in light of Johnson v. United States, which found the residual clause of “violent felony” unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the district court conducted a de novo resentencing. The government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2) required mandatory minimum twenty-five-year sentences for each kidnapping conviction involving a child. The district court agreed and imposed concurrent 300-month sentences for each remaining count.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2). The appellate court held that kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is not categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Therefore, § 3559(f)(2) did not mandate a twenty-five-year minimum sentence for each conviction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing consistent with its decision. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was stopped by police officers in Aurora, Colorado, for speeding. During the stop, the officers observed the defendant make a dramatic movement toward the passenger side of his vehicle, to the extent that he was no longer visible to them. The officers recognized the defendant as a member of a local violent gang and learned from him that he was on parole for robbery. After asking the defendant to exit the vehicle and conducting a pat-down that revealed no weapons, the officers searched the passenger seat area and found a firearm. The defendant was subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm evidence, which argued that the warrantless vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, based on his furtive movement, gang affiliation, and parole status for a violent crime. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, considering the totality of the circumstances. The court held that the combination of the defendant’s dramatic movement, his recognized gang membership, and his parole for robbery provided reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, justifying the protective vehicle search under the officer safety exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court also rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), finding it foreclosed by circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. McGregor" on Justia Law

The defendant, an enrolled member of a Native American tribe, was charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse against his minor stepdaughter, D.P., occurring over several years in Indian Country. The alleged abuse began when D.P. was about six years old and continued until she was over twelve, with a brief pause when her mother was more frequently present. D.P. disclosed the abuse following a suicide attempt at age twelve, and her mother and medical professionals testified about her outcry. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on D.P.’s credibility, as there was no physical evidence corroborating her allegations. The defense sought to challenge D.P.’s credibility, highlighting her mental health history, medication use, and possible suggestibility, and attempted to introduce four sexually suggestive, fictionalized YouTube videos created by D.P. at age eleven.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted the government’s motion in limine under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, excluding any mention or introduction of the YouTube videos at trial. The court found the videos constituted evidence of “other sexual behavior” or “sexual predisposition” and did not fall within any of Rule 412’s exceptions. The defense argued the videos were relevant to impeach D.P.’s credibility, not to prove sexual behavior or predisposition, and that exclusion violated the defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and due process.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary ruling and constitutional claims. The Tenth Circuit held that Rule 412’s bar applies to evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition, even if the purpose is impeachment, and that no exception for general impeachment exists. The court further held that exclusion of the videos did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, as the Constitution does not mandate admission of general impeachment evidence absent a showing of bias or motive to lie. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

Several businesses involved in the cultivation, distribution, and sale of hemp products in Wyoming and elsewhere challenged a Wyoming statute, Senate Enrolled Act 24 (SEA 24), which significantly altered the state’s regulation of hemp. SEA 24 narrowed the definition of hemp to exclude synthetic substances and expanded the definition of THC to include both delta-9 and delta-8 THC, requiring that the combined concentration not exceed 0.3%. The law also added both naturally occurring and synthetic delta-8 THC to Wyoming’s Schedule I controlled substances, making it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess hemp products exceeding the new THC limits or containing synthetic substances, even if such products are legal under federal law.After SEA 24 was enacted, the plaintiffs filed a preenforcement action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that SEA 24 was preempted by the federal 2018 Farm Bill, violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and was void for vagueness. The plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect. The district court denied the motion for preliminary relief and subsequently dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that most defendants were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the remaining claims lacked legal merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a substantial federal right to support their preemption claim, failed to demonstrate a Dormant Commerce Clause violation, did not establish a regulatory taking of their commercial personal property, and did not show that SEA 24 was unconstitutionally vague. The court also dismissed the appeal of the denial of preliminary relief as moot due to the dismissal of the complaint. View "Green Room v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Several healthcare employees in Colorado, including those at the University of Colorado Hospital Authority and South Denver Cardiology Associates, were terminated after refusing to comply with their employers’ COVID-19 vaccination mandates. These mandates, implemented in 2021, required employees to either be vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. The plaintiffs declined vaccination and did not seek exemptions, resulting in their dismissal.Following their terminations, the plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, asserting nearly identical claims. They alleged violations of statutory, constitutional, and contractual rights, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state-law breach of contract and tort claims, and an implied private right of action under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds such as sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. The district courts dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled any viable legal theory. The courts also denied the plaintiffs’ requests to amend their complaints after judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that none of the statutes cited by the plaintiffs—including the Emergency Use Authorization statute, the PREP Act, and 10 U.S.C. § 980—unambiguously conferred individual rights enforceable under § 1983. The court also found that the constitutional claims, including those based on due process and equal protection, were not adequately pled and that the breach of contract claim was waived for lack of argument. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted and that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Timken v. South Denver Cardiology Associates" on Justia Law