Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several teachers, students, parents, and their organizations challenged Oklahoma’s H.B. 1775, specifically subsection B, which restricts public school employees from making certain “discriminatory concepts” a required part of courses. These concepts include assertions about inherent superiority, moral character, responsibility, and psychological distress based on race or sex, among others. If violated, educators could face suspension or revocation of their teaching credentials. Plaintiffs argued that subsection B was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated students’ First Amendment right to receive information.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed the case. It granted judgment on the pleadings against the plaintiffs on their First Amendment claims, finding no protected right in curricular speech and no plausible right-to-receive-information claim. The court partially granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the use of “require” and two of the prohibited concepts (those using “treatment” and “treat”) were likely unconstitutionally vague, and enjoined enforcement of those parts. The court denied injunctive relief for the remaining language, and both parties appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court later declined to answer certified questions regarding the statute’s interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the injunction. The court held that the District Court abused its discretion in finding vagueness in subsection B. It interpreted the statute as prohibiting teaching or requiring teaching of the listed discriminatory concepts as correct principles, not banning abstract discussion or instruction about related history or figures. The court determined that the statute’s language was sufficiently clear and not likely vague. It vacated the preliminary injunction, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court declined to address the First Amendment right-to-receive-information claims due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Black Emergency Response Team v. Drummond" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop on Highway I-80 in Wyoming, George Ostertag was pulled over by law enforcement for failing to signal a turn. A K-9 officer deployed a narcotics-detection dog named Becky to sniff the exterior of Ostertag’s vehicle while a record check was being performed. Becky subsequently made physical contact with the vehicle, alerting to the presence of contraband, which prompted officers to search the vehicle. They discovered a 9mm pistol with an obliterated serial number between the driver’s seat and center console. Ostertag, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held a five-day suppression hearing. It found Becky to be sufficiently reliable and determined she exhibited a positive alert behavior before making physical contact with the vehicle. The district court concluded that while Becky’s contact with the vehicle constituted a search, the alert prior to contact provided probable cause to justify the search. The court also rejected Ostertag’s argument that Becky’s open-air sniff amounted to a search. Ostertag’s motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss the indictment—on both facial and as-applied Second Amendment grounds—were denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal, and the charge for possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number was dismissed. Ostertag was convicted on the remaining count and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that Becky’s open-air sniff did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and even if Becky’s physical contact with the vehicle was a search, probable cause existed. The court further held that binding precedent foreclosed both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ostertag" on Justia Law

An attorney licensed in Utah challenged the state’s requirement that lawyers join the Utah State Bar and pay annual dues as a condition of practicing law. She argued that the Bar engaged in activities—such as lobbying, publishing a journal, and posting on social media—that were not sufficiently related to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. She also objected to the procedures used by the Bar for handling members’ mandatory dues, claiming they were inadequate to protect her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Utah first dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that mandatory dues violated her rights, relying on precedent from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Schell v. Chief Justice & Justices of Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court then reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining claims. It ruled for the defendants, finding that most challenged Bar activities were germane under the standard set in Keller v. State Bar of California, and that the Bar’s procedures for handling objections to expenditures and providing refunds were constitutionally sufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that, under existing Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, mandatory bar dues are constitutional when used for activities germane to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. The court also held that the correct legal standard for evaluating the Bar’s activities is the “germaneness” test from Keller, not a heightened “exacting scrutiny” standard. Because the plaintiff did not adequately challenge the district court’s germaneness findings or show that the Bar’s procedures were constitutionally deficient, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal and summary judgment rulings. View "Pomeroy v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

Businesses selling flavored e-cigarettes in Utah challenged a state law passed in March 2024 that banned the sale of any e-cigarette flavors other than tobacco or menthol. The plaintiffs, representing Retail Tobacco Specialty Businesses (RTSBs), argued that this “Flavor Ban” would severely affect their operations, as the majority of their sales involved flavored products. They asserted that the ban was preempted by the Federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and also contended that the law’s enforcement mechanism, which authorized warrantless searches by local health departments, violated the Fourth Amendment.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking preliminary injunctions against both the Flavor Ban and the enforcement mechanism. The district court denied the preliminary injunction regarding the Flavor Ban, concluding that federal law did not preempt the state’s action, but granted an injunction against the enforcement provision, finding the warrantless search mechanism unconstitutional. The court determined that the enforcement provision was severable from the rest of the Act, so it left the remainder of the law, including the Flavor Ban, intact. Both sides appealed the rulings adverse to them.After the Utah legislature amended the enforcement provision, both parties agreed that the Fourth Amendment issue was moot. The only remaining issue on appeal was whether the federal law preempted the state’s Flavor Ban. However, the plaintiffs failed to properly identify the relevant district court order denying the preliminary injunction against the Flavor Ban in their notice of appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal did not specify the order they sought to challenge, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the preemption issue. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Utah Vapor Business Association v. State of Utah" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was observed in a high-crime area of Albuquerque, New Mexico, acting suspiciously by loitering near a house, retrieving a duffel bag he had left overnight, and peering into the window of a car for sale. After the homeowner reported his behavior to the police, deputies responding to the call found the defendant matching the caller’s description. During their interaction, the defendant acted nervously, repeatedly reached into his duffel bag, and did not comply with officers’ commands. The deputies conducted a pat-down, discovering a pistol, a magazine, and cash on his person. After running his information, they learned of outstanding felony warrants, arrested him, and searched the duffel bag, uncovering methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence from his person and the duffel bag, arguing the stop, frisk, and search were unlawful. Initially, the district court indicated the stop and frisk were lawful but suppressed the contents of the duffel bag, finding no valid inventory search or basis for inevitable discovery. After the government submitted additional evidence regarding inventory procedures, the district court reconsidered and denied the motion to suppress, holding that the items would have been inevitably discovered during a lawful inventory search prior to booking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court concluded that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion given the defendant's suspicious behavior in a high-crime area. The court further held that, even if the frisk or bag search had been unlawful, the items would have been inevitably discovered either during a search incident to arrest or a proper inventory search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, upholding the convictions. View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal shooting that occurred after an altercation in a bar, where the defendant, after being physically attacked and ejected by several patrons, retrieved a firearm from his vehicle and fired into the bar, killing a patron. There was evidence presented that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and possibly a traumatic brain injury as a result of the fight, which could have affected his mental state and perception of danger at the time of the shooting.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the original trial, where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in Indian Country and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The district court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense but did not inform them that the government bore the burden to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also instructed on diminished capacity, stating it was not a defense to second-degree murder or manslaughter. The defendant raised several challenges on appeal, including errors in jury instructions and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. The district court also addressed multiplicitous charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j), dismissing the greater-included offense.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the district court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the government must disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt as to first-degree murder. This error affected the defendant's substantial rights and seriously impacted the fairness of the proceedings, necessitating reversal of the first-degree murder conviction. The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s other challenges, including those related to diminished capacity instructions and prosecutorial statements. The court affirmed the district court’s choice to dismiss the greater-included firearm offense and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted for murder and related firearm offenses arising from the death of an individual in Indian Country. A key witness, William Lozer, had previously testified at a state preliminary hearing that the defendant confessed to and described details of the crime. Prior to the defendant's federal trial, the government was unable to locate Lozer, who was known to be transient and had not been seen or contacted by his family or attorney for months. The government sought to introduce Lozer's prior testimony, which had been given under oath and subject to cross-examination by defense counsel.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma considered whether the government had made sufficient efforts to locate Lozer and ultimately found that, despite reasonable and good-faith efforts, Lozer was unavailable as a witness. As a result, the court permitted the prior testimony to be read to the jury. At trial, additional evidence against the defendant was introduced, including incriminating statements to other individuals and physical evidence. The defendant was convicted on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the defendant’s argument that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of Lozer’s prior testimony. Applying a de novo standard of review, the Tenth Circuit held that the government’s efforts to locate Lozer were reasonable and made in good faith under the circumstances. Thus, Lozer was properly deemed unavailable, and the admission of his prior, cross-examined testimony did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "United States v. Barker" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former New Mexico state senator, used leftover campaign funds to make charitable donations, including a $200 contribution to assist a high school student with attending a pre-law program. These donations were made to individuals and organizations that did not qualify as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. New Mexico’s Campaign Reporting Act (CRA) prohibits most campaign expenditures, but lists certain permitted uses, including donations to 501(c)(3) organizations. After the Secretary of State discovered the $200 donation during a random audit, she determined it violated the CRA and requested the plaintiff to reimburse his campaign fund. The plaintiff refused, arguing that enforcing the CRA in this way violated his First Amendment rights, and the matter was referred to the State Ethics Commission and Attorney General.In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the restriction was facially unconstitutional, and injunctive relief. The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the CRA for such donations, viewing the plaintiff’s claim as a facial overbreadth challenge and finding it likely to succeed. However, after further proceedings and in light of an affidavit from the Secretary of State, the district court concluded the CRA did not prohibit protected speech, granted summary judgment for the defendant, and denied a permanent injunction. The district court allowed the plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to proceed separately; the plaintiff appealed only the denial of his facial challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the CRA’s prohibition on donations to non-501(c)(3) organizations and individuals facially regulates activity protected by the First Amendment. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, directing the lower court to determine the appropriate constitutional test and apply it to the CRA’s challenged prohibitions. View "Ortiz y Pino v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

The case centers on a juvenile, John Doe, who was charged by the government with two counts of violating the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act by possessing a handgun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) on two separate occasions. Section 922(x)(2) prohibits juveniles from knowingly possessing a handgun or handgun ammunition, with certain exceptions outlined in the statute. Doe challenged the charges, asserting that the statute exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause and violated the Second Amendment, though he ultimately appealed only the Commerce Clause issue.The United States District Court denied Doe’s motion to dismiss the information, finding that Congress had the power to enact § 922(x)(2) under the Commerce Clause. Doe admitted delinquency to one count, was sentenced to juvenile probation until his 21st birthday, and subsequently appealed the district court’s Commerce Clause ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(x)(2) de novo. The court held that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that regulating juvenile handgun possession was an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at the interstate handgun market. The court determined that Congress could rationally conclude that the regulatory scheme would be substantially undercut if § 922(x)(2) were removed, and that such regulation directly and substantially affects interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Congress’s authority to enact § 922(x)(2) under the Commerce Clause. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law