Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
C1.G v. Siegfried, et al.
Plaintiff-Appellant Cl.G., on behalf of his minor son, C.G., appealed a district court’s dismissal of his case against Defendants-Appellees Cherry Creek School District (District or CCSD) and various employees for alleged constitutional violations stemming from C.G.’s suspension and expulsion from Cherry Creek High School (CCHS). In 2019, C.G. was off campus at a thrift store with three friends. He took a picture of his friends wearing wigs and hats, including “one hat that resembled a foreign military hat from the World War II period.” C.G. posted that picture on Snapchat and captioned it, “Me and the boys bout [sic] to exterminate the Jews.” C.G.’s post (the photo and caption) was part of a private “story,” visible only to Snapchat users connected with C.G. on that platform. Posts on a user’s Snapchat story are automatically deleted after 24 hours, but C.G. removed this post after a few hours. He then posted on his Snapchat story, “I’m sorry for that picture it was ment [sic] to be a joke.” One of C.G.’s Snapchat “friend[s]” took a photograph of the post before C.G. deleted it and showed it to her father. The father called the police, who visited C.G.’s house and found no threat. Referencing prior anti-Semitic activity and indicating that the post caused concern for many in the Jewish community, a CCHS parent emailed the school and community leaders about the post, leading to C.G.'s expulsion. Plaintiff filed suit claiming violations of C.G.'s constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the First Amendment limited school authority to regulate off-campus student speech, particularly speech unconnected with a school activity and not directed at the school or its specific members. Defendants maintained that C.G. was lawfully disciplined for what amounts to off-campus hate speech. According to Defendants, although originating off campus, C.G.’s speech still spread to the school community, disrupted the school’s learning environment, and interfered with the rights of other students to be free from harassment and receive an education. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff properly pled that Defendants violated C.G.’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his post; the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s first claim was reversed in part. The Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff’s further facial challenges to CCSD’s policies. Questions of qualified and absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim were remanded for further consideration. View "C1.G v. Siegfried, et al." on Justia Law
United States v. Wells
Defendant-appellant David Wells brutally assaulted his wife, V.W. A grand jury issued an indictment charging Wells with committing: (1) aggravated sexual abuse in “Indian country;” (2) assault with the intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country; (3) assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country; and (4) assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian country. After a petit jury convicted Wells on all four counts, the district court sentenced him to a lengthy term of incarceration. Wells appealed, challenging his convictions and sentence. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined none of Wells’s challenges to his conviction were meritorious. At sentencing, however, the district court erred in adjusting upward Wells’s total offense level on the basis Wells obstructed justice when he violated an order directing that he have no contact with V.W. The Tenth Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for the narrow purpose of vacating Wells’s sentence and conducting any further necessary proceeding with regard to the section 3C1.1 obstruction-of-justice adjustment. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law
Hunt, et al. v. Montano, et al.
Ariza Barreras, T.B., and F.B. (“the children”) were siblings. In May 2017, the children were transferred to the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department's (“CYFD”) custody. At the time, Barreras was four months old, T.B. was two years old, and F.B. was one year old. CYFD employees Michelle Hill and Lora Valdez placed the children with foster parents Vanessa Dominguez and Justin Romero without evaluating whether Barreras and T.B., who were exposed to drugs in utero, “should have been treated and cared for as ‘special needs’ children and placed with foster parents who had received . . . additional training.” Dominguez and Romero had no experience as full-time foster parents for multiple children under the age of three with special needs. Hill and Valdez allegedly made this full-time placement even though Dominguez and Romero were licensed only as respite care providers. This case arose from allegations of abuse of T.B. and F.B., and the death of Ariza. The specific issue was whether the "special relationship" doctrine exposed five CYFD employees from liability when they all asserted qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the children’s representatives’ allegations stated a plausible claim that two of the CYFD employees—Leah Montano and Gwendolyn Griffin—violated the children’s substantive due process rights. However, the district court erred by concluding that the other three employees—Kim Chavez-Buie, Michelle Hill, and Lora Valdez—committed a constitutional violation. The district court also erred by finding that the clearly established prong of qualified immunity had been waived for purposes of this motion. The Court therefore reversed as to Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez on the constitutional violation prong of qualified immunity because the complaint failed to allege liability under the special relationship doctrine. Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Court reversed as to Montano and Griffin on the clearly established prong of qualified immunity because, even though it agreed with the district court that the allegations state a claim under the special relationship doctrine, the Court found the district court incorrectly deemed the clearly established prong waived. The case was remanded for a determination whether Montano and Griffin violated clearly established law. View "Hunt, et al. v. Montano, et al." on Justia Law
Finch, et al. v. Rapp
After Wichita police received a seemingly legitimate call, officers had to make a split-second decision based on fraudulent threats and reports of violence. Unfortunately, that "swatting" call and the subsequent reaction from police resulted in an innocent man’s death. Officers rushed to Andrew Finch's house, where the caller claimed a deranged man who had just killed his father and was holding the rest of his family hostage at gunpoint. Finch had not committed any crime and had no way of knowing why police were surrounding his home. As Finch exited the house, multiple officers yelled different commands. Ten seconds later, one officer thought he saw Finch reaching for a weapon and shot him in the chest. Finch's estate brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and other constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of some of the responding officers and the City of Wichita, but denied summary judgment as to the officer who fired the fatal shots. Finch appealed the grant of summary judgment to one officer and the City; the officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The district court held that a reasonable jury could have found that Finch was unarmed and unthreatening. The Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by those findings for the purposes of this appeal. Thus, the claims against Officer Rapp could go forward. The Court found the claims against the City were properly resolved. In addition, the Court concluded the district court correctly found that Finch did not put forth sufficient evidence to prevail on his municipal liability claim against the City. View "Finch, et al. v. Rapp" on Justia Law
United States v. Armajo
In his trial for assaulting his uncle with a knife, defendant-appellant Shayne Armajo sought to introduce evidence of his uncle’s assaults in order to bolster a self-defense claim. The issue defendant’s appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit’s consideration was whether the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that this was a permissible use under Rule 404(b) but nevertheless excluded most of the proffered evidence under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. Evidence of a victim’s prior violent acts may be admissible in a self-defense case to prove the defendant’s state of mind, but it is subject to Rule 403’s balancing test. As applied here, the Court found the district court reasonably concluded that the probative value of the victim’s alleged assaults was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Consequently, the Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the contested evidence. View "United States v. Armajo" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. Biggs Farley
Defendant-Appellant Connor Biggs Farley appeals the 630-month (52.5-year) sentence he received after pleading guilty to three counts of producing child pornography. In imposing this sentence, the district court rejected the sentence of 20 to 40 years (240 to 480 months) that was stipulated in Farley’s plea agreement with the government, but the court also varied downward from the 1080-month (90-year) sentence recommended by the presentence report, which corresponded to the statutory maximum sentence of 30 years (360 months) on each count, run consecutively. On appeal, Farley argued the district court’s selection of his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court’s method for determining Farley’s sentence involved plain errors of law, rendering the sentence procedurally unreasonable. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded resentencing. View "United States v. Biggs Farley" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. Shamo
Defendant Aaron Shamo was convicted by jury on 12 charges arising from his distribution of controlled substances, including fake oxycodone pills laced with fentanyl. He received a mandatory life sentence on his conviction of being a principal leader of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence of his guilt of the CCE charge because: (1) the government failed to prove that the drug he was distributing was the chemical designated in the criminal statute; and (2) the government failed to prove that he knew he was distributing a controlled substance. He also challenged the admissibility: (a) of screenshots of his illicit online storefront to prove the quantity of drugs distributed; and (b) of testimony by an expert witness who allegedly opined on the meaning of certain language in the CCE statute. He also raised allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in suggesting that he was responsible for uncharged overdose deaths and should be punished because of the social costs of unlawful narcotics. After careful consideration of defendant's arguments, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Shamo" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. Arellanes-Portillo
Defendant-appellant Jesus Arellanes-Portillo pled guilty to a collection of federal drug-trafficking, money-laundering, and immigration crimes. He challenged the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, arguing the district court misapplied a three-level aggravating-role adjustment in calculating his advisory guideline range for his money-laundering offenses. After review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court plainly erred by basing the aggravating-role adjustment on relevant conduct for his drug offenses and not exclusively for his money-laundering offenses, in violation of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2S1.1 Application Note 2(C) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2018). The sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Arellanes-Portillo" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. Starks
Defendant-appellant Devonte Starks appealed his convictions for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possession with intent to distribute heroin. In its closing argument at trial, the government advised the jury that Starts' right to be presumed innocent no longer existed after the presentation of the trial evidence. Starks did not object to this presumption-of-innocence advisement. The Tenth Circuit's review was for plain error, and the court found the district court plainly erred in allowing the advisement to stand uncorrected before the jury, and this error had "some prejudicial effects." Those effects cumulated with the prejudicial effects stemming from two other errors (which the government conceded), Starks' convictions could not stand. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Starks" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. Hartley
Defendants-Appellants Dalton Hartley and Corey Detter, in separate criminal cases, each moved for early termination of probation under 18 U.S.C. 3564(c). The same district judge denied their motions for the exact same reason. Hartley pled guilty to aiding and abetting the acquiring of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. 2. His plea agreement included an appeal waiver. The district court sentenced him to probation for three years, set to expire on August 1, 2022. On January 12, 2022, Hartley moved for early termination of his probation; the district court denied the motion on the day it was filed. Detter pled guilty without a plea agreement to one count of manufacturing counterfeit currency, and to two counts of possessing counterfeit currency. The district court sentenced him to probation for three years, set to end on July 30, 2022. The same district judge who denied Hartley’s motion also denied Detter’s. Hartley and Detter argued the district court abused its discretion by adopting a blanket policy to deny them relief under section 3564(c) and refusing to consider the statutory criteria. The Tenth Circuit found the Government had not and could not meet its burden to show that, absent the district court’s abuse of discretion here, the result would have been the same, especially in light of the court’s finding that each defendant’s conduct on probation was “meritorious. And it has not pointed to anything in the record to suggest that individualized consideration of the section 3553(a) factors and the interest of justice would lead to denial of Mr. Hartley’s and Mr. Detter’s motions for early termination of probation.” The Court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss Hartley’s appeal based on the appeal waiver provision in his plea agreement. Furthermore, the Court reversed the district court’s orders denying Hartley’s and Detter’s motions for early termination of probation under 18 U.S.C. 3564(c) and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hartley" on Justia Law
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law