Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Various City of Denver officials, and certain State of Colorado officials, authorized and/or conducted sweeps of homeless encampments throughout Denver, Colorado. The advocacy organization, Denver Homeless Out Loud and several people experiencing homelessness (“DHOL Plaintiffs”), alleged these sweeps violated the rights of persons experiencing homelessness and breached a settlement agreement resolving related litigation. The DHOL Plaintiffs therefore filed this putative class action and corresponding motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the federal district court in Colorado to enjoin all sweeps or, in the alternative, require seven days’ advanced notice for all sweeps. The district court granted the motion in part after concluding the DHOL Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim was likely to succeed on the merits. The district court then issued a preliminary injunction requiring the Denver Defendants to satisfy additional notice and procedural requirements before conducting future sweeps. The Denver Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the injunction. Finding that the district court abused its discretion in ruling the first preliminary injunction factor weighed in the DHOL Plaintiffs' favor (and ultimately granting the preliminary injunction), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order. View "Denver Homeless Out Loud, et al. v. Denver, Colorado, et al." on Justia Law

On June 13, 2014, Beaver County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”) officers responded to reports of a truck running into parked cars. The decedent, Troy Bradshaw, was arrested Bradshaw for driving under the influence and he was transported to Beaver Valley Hospital. A deputy completed the Initial Arrestee Assessment (IAA), which reflected that Bradshaw previously considered suicide; was not thinking about it currently; had a brother who committed or attempted suicide; and was intoxicated. Bradshaw stated that he would kill himself if placed in a cell. After the IAA, the officers placed Bradshaw on suicide watch. Bradshaw beat on the cell door for two to three hours. Officers did not place him in a safety smock or create a suicide watch log, in violation of BCCF’s suicide-prevention policy, but a corporal monitored Bradshaw by sitting in the booking area all night. By June 14, Bradshaw was no longer acting violently, and he was transferred from a suicide-watch cell two to cell three, pertinent here, a cell with bed linens. Just after noon on June 15, Bradshaw was found dead in his cell after he hanged himself with some of the provided bedding. Bradshaw’s mother, plaintiff Kathy George, sued on behalf of her son’s estate, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that prison defendants violated Bradshaw’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and “Utah Code Article I, Section 7.” The district court granted summary judgment to all prison defendants because the law entitled them to qualified immunity, and no Beaver County policy violated Bradshaw’s constitutional rights. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that although Plaintiff proved that certain officers failed to follow Beaver County’s suicide-prevention policy, “failing to follow prison policy is not a constitutional violation in and of itself.” View "George v. Beaver County, et al." on Justia Law

While defendant-appellant Laquan Shakespeare was serving the supervised-release portion of his sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. sections 1153 and 2243(a) (the “2018 conviction”), he sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl. Based on the events underlying that sexual assault, Shakespeare pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. sections 1153 and 2244(a)(5) (the “2020 conviction”). The government then moved to revoke Shakespeare’s supervised release. The district court set a combined (1) sentencing hearing on the 2020 conviction and (2) revocation hearing on Shakespeare’s supervised release. At that hearing, the district court first sentenced Shakespeare to a term of imprisonment of 293 months on the 2020 conviction. The district court then recessed the completed proceedings relating to the 2020 conviction and turned to the question whether Shakespeare’s supervised release on the 2018 conviction should be revoked. Acting pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), the district court concluded it was obligated to revoke Shakespeare’s supervised release and to impose a mandatory-minimum five-year term of imprisonment. For the first time on appeal, Shakespeare argued the district court’s application of § 3583(k) violated: (1) his jury-trial rights, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and (2) his Fifth Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy. Finding no reversible error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law

A confidential informant visited defendant-appellant Gaspar Leal and asked about buying drugs. Leal put the confidential informant in touch with several individuals, and the informant ultimately purchased methamphetamine twice from a third party (Daniel Carmona). These purchases led to Leal’s conviction for conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to a thirty-year prison term. Leal appealed his conviction and sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding: (1) the jury could reasonably find that Leal had known that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of methamphetamine; (2) Leal did not establish that the government’s conduct was clearly and obviously outrageous; and (3) the sentence was not substantively unreasonable: Leal’s crime carried a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, and the district court reasonably considered Leal’s status as a career offender and his mental illnesses. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Holzer was arrested and criminally charged after federal undercover agents determined that Holzer had taken substantial steps towards bombing a synagogue in Pueblo, Colorado. Holzer subsequently pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of intentionally attempting to obstruct persons in the enjoyment of their free exercise of religious beliefs through force, and one count of maliciously attempting to damage and destroy, by means of fire and explosives, a synagogue. The district court sentenced Holzer to a term of imprisonment of 235 months, to be followed by a fifteen-year term of supervised release. The district court also ordered Holzer to comply with eleven special conditions of supervised release, including Special Condition Nine, that prohibited him from acquiring, possessing, or using any material depicting support for or association with antisemitism or white supremacy. Holzer appealed, arguing that the district court erred in imposing Special Condition Nine. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Holzer’s challenge to Special Condition Nine was barred by the appellate waiver provision of his plea agreement. Consequently, his appeal was dismissed. View "United States v. Holzer" on Justia Law

Three out of four defendants in consolidated cases identified as minorities, and two were illegal immigrants. They claimed the district court abused its discretion in failing to ask the potential jurors whether they harbored racist views. One defendant posited that if “America as an institution harbors racial prejudice in the context of immigration law, it stands to reason that some members of that same institution also harbor similar views.” But the Supreme Court had long held that no constitutional presumption of juror bias existed for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups. The Tenth Circuit declined to create such a presumption in these cases, finding that without any substantial indication that racial or ethnic prejudice likely affected the jurors, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ requests to directly examine the jurors about the subject. View "United States v. Murry" on Justia Law

In deciding defendant-appellant Ira Wilkins' sentence for unlawfully possessing a firearm, the district court considered the effect of Wilkins’ prior conviction in Texas for aggravated robbery. The district court characterized this offense as a “crime of violence” under the sentencing guidelines, which increased the base-offense level. Wilkins appealed, arguing for the first time that the district court shouldn’t have considered aggravated robbery as a crime of violence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. View "United States v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

At defendant-appellant Jamaryus Moore’s initial sentencing hearing, the court offered him a choice: (1) an immediate 51-month sentence of imprisonment; or (2) a 48-month sentence of probation, subject to at least 84 months’ imprisonment for any future probation violation. Moore took the second option, and for over a year, upheld his end of the bargain. Moore admitted to some conditions of his probation, and the district court made good on its promise to sentence him to 84 months’ imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court’s sentencing bargain was procedurally unreasonable. After review, the Court held that it was: when revoking probation and resentencing under section 3565(a)(2), the Sentencing Guidelines and United States v. Kelley (359 F.3d 1302) (10th Cir. 2004) required district courts to undertake a two-step analysis. The Court determined nothing in the district court's record suggested either the trial court nor the parties undertook the needed two-step analysis. "We are left to guess as to how the district court arrived at its 84-month sentence." The Court ultimately found Moore showed the district court plainly erred when it sentenced him, making the sentence-in-advance feature procedurally unreasonable. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

This case arose from a jail fight that started when an inmate learned that another inmate “snitched.” Based on the fight, the government charged two inmates, Derrick Segue and Klawaun Sutton, with conspiring to tamper with a witness in a federal proceeding. Defendants moved for acquittal, arguing the evidence was insufficient as to their contemplation of a legal proceeding that was likely to be federal. The motion was denied and they were convicted. The Tenth Circuit reversed, however, finding that Sutton and Segue intended to interfere with a state proceeding. "There was nothing to suggest [they] had contemplated the witness' participation in a possible federal proceeding or a proceeding reasonably likely to become federal." View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant-appellant Tony Burris pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and the district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison, the low end of his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. After Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which addressed sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine, and made those changes retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, Burris moved for a reduced sentence. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Burris’s Guidelines range remained the same because the calculation should have been based on the larger quantity of crack cocaine attributed to Burris in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) rather than the smaller amount charged in the indictment. Recognizing that the parties raised an issue that had not yet been addressed by the Tenth Circuit, the district court declined to resolve it, instead exercising its discretion to deny relief regardless of the correct Guidelines calculation. The Tenth Circuit held the district court was obligated to calculate Burris’s revised Guidelines range before exercising its discretion to deny relief, and that the error was not harmless. Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Burris" on Justia Law