Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellee Charles Chavez was accused of attempting to force two individuals to withdraw their money from a bank automated teller machine (“ATM”) at gunpoint. The district court dismissed these charges, reasoning that, had the accountholders completed the withdrawal as intended, Chavez would have taken the money from them, as opposed to from the bank that operated the ATM. The Tenth Circuit found the district court’s decision aligned with the Fifth Circuit’s approach to this issue, but conflicted with the Seventh Circuit’s. The Tenth Circuit sided with the Seventh Circuit: "Using force to induce a bank customer to withdraw money from an ATM is federal bank robbery, so Chavez cannot show that the government is incapable of proving that his specific conduct amounted to attempted federal bank robbery." Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant John Michael McIntosh pled guilty to five counts of robbery, plus three counts of brandishing a pistol during those five robberies. During the change-in-plea hearing held by the district court, however, McIntosh repeatedly expressed doubts about whether he should plead guilty and suggested that his mental capacity was impaired. After off-the-record discussions with the government, he finally went forward with the plea and the district court completed its plea colloquy. But two months after entering the plea, McIntosh moved to withdraw it, contending that the plea was neither knowing nor voluntary and therefore violated his constitutional due process rights. The district court denied the motion and accepted the plea agreement at sentencing. McIntosh appealed, arguing that the plea was constitutionally invalid, and in the alternative, that the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea was an abuse of discretion. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court failed to ensure the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, so it vacated McIntosh’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Wayne Bowker died at the Carter County Jail on June 30, 2016, while awaiting trial for a drug possession charge. In the days and weeks preceding his death, Bowker did not receive several of his prescribed medications, experienced incontinence and catatonia, and was able to communicate with jail staff only by using strange repetitive phrases. Despite Bowker’s condition, jail officials failed to provide any medical attention in the nineteen days leading up to his death. His mother, Judy Prince, as the administrator of his estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and other claims. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to jail nurse Kimberlee Miller in her individual capacity, and whether it properly granted summary judgment to the Sheriff of Carter County in his official capacity. The Court concluded a reasonable jury could determine Miller violated Bowker’s constitutional right by acting with deliberate indifference toward his psychosis, incontinence, and catatonia. In addition, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Carter County’s failure to medically train jail employees, adequately staff the jail, and provide timely medical attention caused Bowker’s death. The Court reversed district court’s grants of summary judgment. View "Prince v. Sheriff of Carter County, et al." on Justia Law

During a drug trafficking investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents used authorized wiretaps to intercept Jorge Portillo-Uranga’s communications. After he was arrested and charged with drug trafficking crimes, Portillo-Uranga moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the wiretaps. He claimed, among other things, that: (1) the government failed to establish its investigative need for the wiretaps; and (2) the interception of his communications occurred outside the authorizing court’s territorial jurisdiction. After the district court denied his motion, Portillo-Uranga pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for firearms possession because DEA agents found firearms and indicia of drug trafficking throughout Portillo- Uranga’s ranch when they arrested him. To the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Portillo-Uranga contended the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by applying the sentencing enhancement for firearms possession. The Court found the district court did not err in finding the government established a need for the wiretaps, and the interception in Kansas satisfied controlling Tenth Circuit caselaw regarding territorial jurisdiction. The government also established a nexus between the firearms located on Portillo-Uranga’s ranch and the drug trafficking charges. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Portillo-Uranga" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant-appellant Tiahmo Draine of possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred: (1) by admitting testimony from law enforcement officers based on their specialized training and experience without sua sponte qualifying them as experts; (2) by admitting opinion testimony about Draine’s mental state (his intent to distribute heroin); and (3) by admitting a 911 call recording (i) without proper authentication, and (ii) in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Draine's convictions. View "United States v. Draine" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Julieann Logsdon pleaded guilty to making a false statement: the statement concerned her whereabouts and activities on the night of a suspected arson, and were made to a federal agent investigating that arson. At sentencing, the district court applied a cross-reference that increased the Sentencing Guidelines’ advisory range where “the offense involved arson.” Logsdon challenges the application of the cross-reference. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Logsdon" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Twyla Casados, a member of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, was driving under the influence within the boundaries of the Southern Ute reservation in Colorado when she struck and killed another motorist, Charlene Bailey. Casados pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder, and her plea agreement specifically anticipated a restitution order and described Bailey as “the victim” of the offense. At her sentencing hearing, Casados concurred with the Probation Office’s recommendations on restitution. She specifically agreed that she owed restitution to the Victim Compensation Board to cover the costs of Bailey’s cremation services, but she argued she should not be required to cover travel expenses incurred by Bailey’s family members. In response, the government maintained that “the law is very clear that [Bailey’s children] stand in her shoes for the purposes of the restitution statute.” Casados appealed, challenging only the order to pay $7,724.20 in restitution to Rivas for his family’s travel expenses. The Tenth Circuit concluded section 3663A(a)(2) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 1996 did not permit the victim’s representative to substitute his or her own expenses for those of the victim. Thus, the district court here lacked authority to order Casados to pay restitution for transportation expenses that were incurred not by the victim of Casados’s crime but instead by the victim’s representative. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for entry of a corrected restitution order. View "United States v. Casados" on Justia Law

In July 2018, defendant Anthony Cordova was convicted by jury of two felonies associated with the murder of Shane Dix: (1) committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering activity (“VICAR murder”); and (2) in the course of that crime, causing the death of Dix through use or possession of a firearm. Cordova challenged the district court’s pretrial ruling denying his motion to exclude a mostly unintelligible one-minute recorded portion of a conversation with a cooperating witness. In addition, Cordova contended the district court abused its discretion in denying his two motions for a new trial: one alleging insufficiency of evidence and government misconduct, and the other alleging newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "United States v. Cordova" on Justia Law

In defendant-appellant Curtis Anthony’s case, the district court sentenced him to a custodial sentence shortly after trial but did not determine the restitution amount until several months later. When Anthony later filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his conviction, the district court dismissed the motion as untimely. The court concluded Anthony’s one-year limitations period began to run when Anthony’s time to appeal the initial judgment expired even though restitution proceedings were pending on direct appeal. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a judgment of conviction is not final for section 2255 limitations purposes until the defendant’s sentence becomes final upon the conclusion of direct review. Anthony’s judgment of conviction had yet to become final because restitution was a component of his sentence and direct review of the restitution proceedings was still ongoing. Thus, the district court should not have dismissed Anthony’s section 2255 motion as untimely. View "United States v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darrell Black was a suspect in three robberies; two took place in Kansas, and one in Missouri. He was arrested in Missouri and indicted for robbery in both the Western District of Missouri and the District of Kansas. While in custody in Missouri, Black expressed a wish to plead guilty and asked the District of Kansas to transfer the charges to Missouri. Kansas granted Black’s request and transferred the indictment. On April 30, 2018, Black was arraigned in Missouri, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the Kansas charges. Black’s plea of not guilty triggered Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(c), which required the clerk of the transferee court to “return the papers to the court where the prosecution began” and the original court to “restore the proceeding to its docket.” On November 15, 2018, the Clerk for the Missouri court notified the Clerk for the Kansas court that the case was being transferred back for disposition. Black remained in custody in Missouri for sentencing on the Missouri charges. On December 18, 2018, Missouri accepted Black’s guilty plea on the Missouri charges, but sentencing didn’t take place until March 6, 2019. Sixteen days later, Black appeared in the District of Kansas. Black invoked the Speedy Trial Act, moving to dismiss the indictment on the Kansas robberies. The District of Kansas denied the motion, concluding that defendant’s appearance in the transferee district did not start the speedy-trial clock. To this the Tenth Circuit court of Appeals disagreed, finding that more than 70 non-excludable days passed between Black's first appearance in Missouri and his motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the district court to decide whether the charges should be dismissed with or without prejudice, considering the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances leading to dismissal, and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and the administration of justice. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law