Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In 2008, a jury found Johnny Warren guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and unlawfully possessing a firearm. The court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 which prospectively ameliorated excessive sentences for crack cocaine offenses. With the passage of the First Step Act in 2018, Congress made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive to the extent it granted judges the discretion to impose reduced sentences for crack cocaine offenders who were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act. In 2019, Warren moved for a reduced sentence; Warren’s original sentence included a downward variance from the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines range. He therefore asked for the same percentage variance from the Guidelines range that would have been generated had the Fair Sentencing Act applied to his original sentencing. The district court denied Warren’s motion. Seven months later, Warren moved for reconsideration. Although the motion was untimely, the Government agreed to waive any procedural or timeliness bars. In his motion, Warren primarily argued he had been improperly designated a career offender by the sentencing court, which resulted in an inappropriately inflated Guidelines range. Warren also presented other arguments, including that the COVID-19 pandemic should be considered as part of the sentencing factors. The district court denied Warren’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Warren challenged only the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider, arguing the district court erred: (1) in applying the legal standard for reconsideration despite the Government’s waiver; (2) in holding he could have raised COVID-19 in his initial motion for sentence reduction; and (3) by failing to make an alternative holding anchored in the proper Guidelines calculation. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law

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Linda Zotigh was murdered, and her trailer, in which her boyfriend Tommy Bullcoming also periodically resided, was set on fire. The day after law enforcement found Zotigh’s body, they arrested Bullcoming pursuant to a warrant for failure to appear in court on an earlier marijuana possession charge. At the time of his arrest, Bullcoming had a black duffel bag in his possession, and he asked law enforcement to bring the bag with them during his transport to the courthouse. Law enforcement searched the bag on three separate occasions and used information from these searches in the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant. Following issuance of a search warrant, law enforcement found a pair of sandals spotted with blood inside the bag. Authorities later matched the blood to Zotigh. Prior to his trial, Bullcoming moved both for an order to access Zotigh’s trailer and to suppress evidence from the duffel bag. The district court denied both motions. A jury ultimately convicted Bullcoming of felony murder, kidnapping, carjacking, and arson. On appeal, Bullcoming challenged the denial of both of his motions. At the time Bullcoming filed his motion for access to the trailer, a third party, not the Government, possessed it. The district court ultimately held it did not have authority “to order entry and inspection of property that is not within the government’s possession, custody, or control.” The Tenth Circuit concurred the district court lacked authority to grant Bullcoming access to the trailer. With regard to the search of the bag, Bullcoming argued the searches were illegal. The Tenth Circuit concluded probable cause supported the search warrant for Bullcoming's bag. The district court's denials of Bullcoming's motions were affirmed. View "United States v. Bullcoming" on Justia Law

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This appeal raised a question of first impression: whether, under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), it was unreasonable for a district court to impose a harsher sentence based on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty without a plea agreement. Defendant-appellant Leroya Cozad was indicted on a single charge of aiding and abetting the making of counterfeit currency. During plea negotiations, she offered to plead guilty in exchange for the government’s recommendation that she be sentenced to 48 months’ probation. The government countered with an offer to recommend a custodial sentence at the low end of the guideline range. She declined and entered an open plea. Following her plea, probation prepared a presentence investigation report that recommended a custodial sentence of between 24 and 30 months based on the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The PSR’s guideline calculation reflected probation’s conclusion that Cozad had “clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for the offense” and was therefore due a reduction of two levels under section 3E1.1(a) of the guidelines. Neither party objected to the PSR, although both submitted sentencing memoranda advocating for their preferred outcome: Cozad advocated for a term of probation; the government recommended the same recommendation it had offered to make during the plea negotiations. The district court rejected both recommendations and sentenced Cozad to a prison term of 27 months, the midpoint of the guideline range. "That Ms. Cozad’s sentence was the result of the district court’s own custom is significant." The Tenth Circuit held that under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), it was procedurally unreasonable for the district court to impose a harsher sentence based on defendant's decision to enter an open plea. Because the district court abused its discretion, Cozad’s sentence was vacated and her case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cozad" on Justia Law

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Defendants’ businesses focused on large diesel trucks and related parts, merchandise, and media. In 2017 Defendants were sued by Plaintiff Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment (UPHE), a nonprofit organization that alleged, among other things, that Defendants were tampering with required emission-control devices and installing so-called “defeat devices” in violation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Utah’s State Implementation Plan. After a bench trial the court entered judgment in favor of UPHE, finding Defendants collectively liable for hundreds of violations of the CAA and Utah’s plan and assessing over $760,000 in civil penalties. On appeal Defendants challenged UPHE’s Article III and statutory standing, the district court’s inclusion of certain kinds of transactions in its tabulation of violations, and the court’s penalty analysis. Although the Tenth Circuit rejected most of Defendants’ arguments, it felt compelled to remand this case back to the district court for additional proceedings because: (1) UPHE lacked Article III standing to complain of conduct by Defendants that had not contributed to air pollution in Utah’s Wasatch Front; and (2) the district court needed to reevaluate the seriousness of Defendants’ violations of the Utah plan’s anti-tampering provision. View "Utah Physic. for Healthy Env't v. Diesel Power Gear, et al." on Justia Law

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Appellant Ramar Palms was convicted by jury in the Northern District of Oklahoma on three crimes related to sex trafficking. On appeal, Palms sought to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial because: (1) the district court should have suppressed the evidence obtained from his cell phone because the warrant and the search of his cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it excluded sexual behavior evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 because the exclusion violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Tenth Circuit held that the warrant to search Palms’s cell phone was sufficiently particular and the search was reasonable. Further, the Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding sexual behavior evidence under Rule 412. Therefore, Palms’s convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Palms" on Justia Law

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Appellant Wilkie Bill Burtrum was found guilty of one count of aggravated sexual abuse and one count of sexual abuse in Indian country. Because Burtrum had previously been convicted of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country, the district court sentenced him to mandatory life imprisonment on the first count pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3559(e). The court sentenced him to 360 months on the second count. And it ordered Burtrum to pay the victim $5,850 in restitution for the equivalent of a year-and-a-half of weekly equine therapy sessions. Appealing, Burtrum argue his aggravated sexual abuse conviction was supported by insufficient evidence, his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional, and a portion of the restitution award was not reasonably certain or supported by sufficient evidence. After review, the Tenth Circuit held: (1) the aggravated sexual abuse conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the mandatory life sentence was constitutional; and (3) the restitution award was a reasonably certain estimate supported by evidence. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Burtrum" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Jesus Francisco Fernandez was convicted by jury of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The methamphetamine was discovered during a search at the Albuquerque Greyhound bus terminal of luggage on a bus on which Fernandez was a passenger. On appeal, Fernandez argued: (1) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence that the luggage was his; (2) the search of the luggage by law-enforcement officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) he was denied due process by Greyhound’s failure to record or preserve terminal surveillance video, allegedly as the agent of law-enforcement officers. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Fernandez's conviction. View "United States v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

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Defendant Angelita Benally was responsible for a head-on car crash that resulted in the death of her front seat passenger and severely injured the other driver. Benally was indicted on one count of involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Benally and the government entered into a written plea agreement, under the terms of which, Benally pleaded guilty to the involuntary manslaughter charge and the government dismissed the assault charge. The agreement also provided that the district court would order restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). The district court sentenced Benally to a term of imprisonment of thirty months, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. In accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the district court ordered Benally to pay restitution pursuant to the MVRA to the deceased passenger’s family and to the other driver. Benally appealed the district court’s restitution order, arguing initially that the district court lacked authority under the MVRA to order her to pay restitution to the other driver because he was not a victim of the involuntary manslaughter offense. After the parties filed their appellate briefs, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). Benally argued that in light of Borden, the district court lacked authority to order restitution “under the MVRA at all,” and instead “may only grant restitution in its discretion under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). The Tenth Circuit found Benally failed to establish her entitlement to plain-error relief, and accordingly affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Benally" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Defendant-appellant Jamshid Muhtorov on three counts of conspiring and providing material support to the Islamic Jihad Union (“IJU”), a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization with ties to al-Qaeda. On appeal, he argued the foreign intelligence surveillance methods the government used to collect his communications were unconstitutional. He also questioned the district court’s refusal to disclose the classified materials the government used to secure approvals for the surveillance, the types of surveillance techniques used, and the evidence derived therefrom. Finally, defendant claimed his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated. After careful consideration, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Muhtorov" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Bakhtiyor Jumaev and his co-defendant Jamshid Muhtorov were convicted, after separate trials, of conspiring to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization (the Islamic Jihad Union, “IJU”), and knowingly providing or attempting to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Both appealed, and, with the parties’ consent, the Tenth Circuit procedurally consolidated the cases. In an opinion issued concurrently with this one, the Court rejected Muhtorov’s claims, including his Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, and affirmed his convictions. In this decision, the Court addressed Jumaev’s claims: (1) his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated; (2) the district court abused its discretion by declining to severely sanction the government for its discovery conduct; and (3) the extraterritorial search warrants for his home, phone, and computer were issued in violation of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded that each of Jumaev’s claims failed, therefore affirming judgment. View "United States v. Jumaev" on Justia Law