Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Supreme Court remanded these cases back to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioners Sitamipa Toki, Eric Kamahele, and Daniel Maumau filed motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences stemming from a series of armed robberies. They made several arguments in their motions, including that their convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence were invalid because their predicate convictions were not “crime[s] of violence” as defined by the statute. The district court denied the section 2255 motions, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of its intervening decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021), which held that a crime that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) “elements” or “force” clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The parties agreed that, after Borden, offenses that could be committed recklessly were not “crime[s] of violence” under section 924(c)’s nearly identical elements clause, 924(c)(3)(A). As a result, the petitioners’ predicate assault convictions under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (“VICAR”) could not support their separate convictions under section 924(c). The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed in part the district court’s order denying petitioners’ section 2255 motions and remanded with instructions to vacate their section 924(c) convictions based on violations of VICAR. View "United States v. Toki" on Justia Law

Metropolitan State University of Denver (MSU) student Rowan Thompson had a classroom dispute with her chemistry professor that ultimately prompted Thompson to drop the professor’s class. But when Thompson emailed her former classmates to express her displeasure with the professor and to suggest that her classmates leave “honest” end-of-term evaluations. Thomas Ragland, MSU’s Associate Director for Student Conduct, allegedly prohibited Thompson from further contacting the professor or even discussing the professor with any students taking any of the professor’s classes. Thompson sued Ragland under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that he violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Ragland had not violated clearly established law and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. "Because one can infer from the allegations in the complaint that there was no proper justification for Ragland’s actions, the complaint states a violation of clearly established law governing the regulation of student speech." View "Thompson v. Ragland" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Marvin Ellis was convicted by jury of, among other things, conspiring to manufacture, distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. Ellis was sentenced to a term of 303 months' imprisonment, to be followed by 13 years of supervised release. Ellis appealed the sentence, arguing: (1) district court misapplied the United States Sentencing Guidelines by failing to make particularized findings regarding the scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity with his coconspirator Ataven Tatum; and (2) the evidence did not support a judicial finding that he agreed to participate in jointly undertaken criminal activity with Tatum, therefore the drug quantities associated with Tatum’s purchases of cocaine should not have been attributed to him for sentencing purposes. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Ellis' sentence. View "United States v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Monty Englehart pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) and was sentenced to time served and five years of supervised release. The conditions of his supervised release prohibited him from viewing sexually explicit materials. Englehart violated the conditions of his supervised release on three occasions by viewing legal, adult pornography. After a hearing, the district court amended the sexual material restriction and added additional conditions to Englehart’s supervised release, including: (1) psychosexual evaluation and treatment; and (2) mental health treatment. Englehart appealed, arguing the district court failed to make particularized findings of compelling circumstances to justify the revised Sexual Material Prohibition and failed to give even a generalized statement of reasons to justify the Mental Health Condition. The Tenth Circuit agreed, vacated those conditions, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed affirm the Psychosexual Evaluation and Treatment Condition because the district court provided an adequate generalized statement of reasons and did not improperly delegate sentencing authority to Englehart’s probation officer. View "United States v. Englehart" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Curtis Anthony was convicted of child-sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit child-sex trafficking. He was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay restitution to R.W. and M.M. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal recognized that Anthony’s conduct was reprehensible, but vacated the restitution order as to R.W. because the district court failed to apply but-for causation to determine restitution as required by 18 U.S.C. 1593. In doing so, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that the statute permitted restitution based on a sufficient-causation theory. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to recalculate restitution based on actual losses resulting directly from Anthony’s offenses. On remand, the Government sought restitution under the sufficient-causation theory previously rejected. The district court denied the Government’s request for Anthony to pay $1,143,000 in restitution to R.W., finding that the Government’s expert report failed to determine which losses compensable by restitution she would not have suffered but for Anthony’s conduct. The Government appealed. Although the parties agreed that R.W. suffered trauma from Anthony and was thus potentially entitled to restitution from him, under the prior decision, Anthony I, the Government had to show he was the but-for cause of the loss that a restitution award would compensate. "And although this showing should be attainable in many instances and likely could have been made here, the Government failed to make it on remand." Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Municipal authorities in Oklahoma fined Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company for violating its Blocked Crossing Statute—setting up a preemption challenge between the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) and the Blocked Crossing Statute. Defendants argued the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), not the ICCTA, applied to Oklahoma’s statute and did not preempt it. The district court held that the ICCTA preempted Oklahoma’s Blocked Crossing Statute because it regulated railroad operations. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the federal district court and affirmed its decision. View "BNSF Railway v. City of Edmond, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Victor Sanchez entered a blind plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court varied downward from Defendant’s advisory guideline range of 110 to 120 months and sentenced him to 96 months in prison. Defendant challenged the district court’s calculation of his base offense level for the purpose of determining his advisory guideline range, particularly the court’s decision to increase his base offense level by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018). On appeal, Defendant renewed his objection to the district court’s four-level increase. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that "All § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires under our precedents is that Defendant’s possession of the firearm had the potential to facilitate his possession of the stolen vehicle. The district court was well within its authority to find it did." View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury found Johnny Warren guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and unlawfully possessing a firearm. The court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 which prospectively ameliorated excessive sentences for crack cocaine offenses. With the passage of the First Step Act in 2018, Congress made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive to the extent it granted judges the discretion to impose reduced sentences for crack cocaine offenders who were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act. In 2019, Warren moved for a reduced sentence; Warren’s original sentence included a downward variance from the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines range. He therefore asked for the same percentage variance from the Guidelines range that would have been generated had the Fair Sentencing Act applied to his original sentencing. The district court denied Warren’s motion. Seven months later, Warren moved for reconsideration. Although the motion was untimely, the Government agreed to waive any procedural or timeliness bars. In his motion, Warren primarily argued he had been improperly designated a career offender by the sentencing court, which resulted in an inappropriately inflated Guidelines range. Warren also presented other arguments, including that the COVID-19 pandemic should be considered as part of the sentencing factors. The district court denied Warren’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Warren challenged only the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider, arguing the district court erred: (1) in applying the legal standard for reconsideration despite the Government’s waiver; (2) in holding he could have raised COVID-19 in his initial motion for sentence reduction; and (3) by failing to make an alternative holding anchored in the proper Guidelines calculation. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law

Linda Zotigh was murdered, and her trailer, in which her boyfriend Tommy Bullcoming also periodically resided, was set on fire. The day after law enforcement found Zotigh’s body, they arrested Bullcoming pursuant to a warrant for failure to appear in court on an earlier marijuana possession charge. At the time of his arrest, Bullcoming had a black duffel bag in his possession, and he asked law enforcement to bring the bag with them during his transport to the courthouse. Law enforcement searched the bag on three separate occasions and used information from these searches in the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant. Following issuance of a search warrant, law enforcement found a pair of sandals spotted with blood inside the bag. Authorities later matched the blood to Zotigh. Prior to his trial, Bullcoming moved both for an order to access Zotigh’s trailer and to suppress evidence from the duffel bag. The district court denied both motions. A jury ultimately convicted Bullcoming of felony murder, kidnapping, carjacking, and arson. On appeal, Bullcoming challenged the denial of both of his motions. At the time Bullcoming filed his motion for access to the trailer, a third party, not the Government, possessed it. The district court ultimately held it did not have authority “to order entry and inspection of property that is not within the government’s possession, custody, or control.” The Tenth Circuit concurred the district court lacked authority to grant Bullcoming access to the trailer. With regard to the search of the bag, Bullcoming argued the searches were illegal. The Tenth Circuit concluded probable cause supported the search warrant for Bullcoming's bag. The district court's denials of Bullcoming's motions were affirmed. View "United States v. Bullcoming" on Justia Law

This appeal raised a question of first impression: whether, under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), it was unreasonable for a district court to impose a harsher sentence based on a defendant’s decision to plead guilty without a plea agreement. Defendant-appellant Leroya Cozad was indicted on a single charge of aiding and abetting the making of counterfeit currency. During plea negotiations, she offered to plead guilty in exchange for the government’s recommendation that she be sentenced to 48 months’ probation. The government countered with an offer to recommend a custodial sentence at the low end of the guideline range. She declined and entered an open plea. Following her plea, probation prepared a presentence investigation report that recommended a custodial sentence of between 24 and 30 months based on the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The PSR’s guideline calculation reflected probation’s conclusion that Cozad had “clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for the offense” and was therefore due a reduction of two levels under section 3E1.1(a) of the guidelines. Neither party objected to the PSR, although both submitted sentencing memoranda advocating for their preferred outcome: Cozad advocated for a term of probation; the government recommended the same recommendation it had offered to make during the plea negotiations. The district court rejected both recommendations and sentenced Cozad to a prison term of 27 months, the midpoint of the guideline range. "That Ms. Cozad’s sentence was the result of the district court’s own custom is significant." The Tenth Circuit held that under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), it was procedurally unreasonable for the district court to impose a harsher sentence based on defendant's decision to enter an open plea. Because the district court abused its discretion, Cozad’s sentence was vacated and her case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cozad" on Justia Law