Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Albuquerque, New Mexico (“Albuquerque” or “the City”) enacted a city-wide ordinance that, in pertinent part, prohibited pedestrians from: (1) congregating within six feet of a highway entrance or exit ramp; (2) occupying any median deemed unsuitable for pedestrian use; and (3) engaging in any kind of exchange with occupants of a vehicle in a travel lane. Plaintiffs-Appellees, residents of Albuquerque who engaged in a variety of expressive activities (like panhandling, protesting, or passing out items to the needy), sued the City in federal court, alleging that the Ordinance impermissibly burdened the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The City argued the Ordinance was necessary to address persistent and troubling pedestrian safety concerns stemming from high rates of vehicular accidents throughout Albuquerque, and, in relation to this pressing interest, the Ordinance was narrowly tailored and did not burden substantially more speech than necessary. The district court disagreed, finding that those provisions of the Ordinance violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights because they were not narrowly tailored to the City’s interest in increasing pedestrian safety and, more specifically, reducing pedestrian-vehicle collisions. On appeal, the City argued the district court erred in concluding the Ordinance did not pass First Amendment muster, and it specifically focused on the question of narrow tailoring, arguing that the City did, indeed, appropriately tailor the Ordinance. After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected the City’s position, holding that the Ordinance was not narrowly tailored and, therefore, violated the First Amendment. View "Martin, et al. v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In early 2019, a group of individuals called the United Constitutional Patriots (UCP) began camping along a 52-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border along the eastern edge of New Mexico, near El Paso, Texas. Defendant-Appellant James Benvie met this group and subsequently began posting videos on Facebook of the group’s attempts to capture aliens they contended were illegally crossing the border. While filming, Benvie was usually accompanied by members of the UCP who were often dressed in camouflage fatigues and carried firearms. In June 2019, Benvie was indicted based on two encounters with aliens that were captured on video, specifically, impersonating a government employee, for which he was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment and a year of supervised release. On appeal, Benvie argued the district court erred by: (1) instructing the jury that “U.S. Border Patrol” and “Border Patrol” were synonymous; (2) imposing five special conditions of supervised release without adequate explanation; and (3) imposing a mandatory condition of supervised release (drug testing) in the judgment and commitment order. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for reconsideration of the conditions of supervised release and removal of the mandatory condition of drug testing. View "United States v. Benvie" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Dave Wilson pled guilty to selling 1.54 grams of methamphetamine to a police confidential informant. Along the way, however, he confessed to purchasing 113 grams of methamphetamine. Deeming that entire quantity “relevant conduct,” the district court sentenced defendant based on the 113 grams he admitted to possessing, rather than the 1.54 grams he was caught selling. Defendant appealed his sentence, claiming he personally consumed most of the 113 grams, and only sold some of it to support his habit. Defendant argued any personal-use quantity was not relevant for sentencing, and that the government failed to prove how much of the 113 grams defendant personally consumed versus how much he sold. The Tenth Circuit agreed the personal-use quantity should be excludable in this context, but defendant had the burden of coming forward with evidence to establish a personal-use quantity. No such evidence was entered into the trial court record. Nevertheless, because defendant’s burden to come forward with evidence of personal use was unclear before this opinion, the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded so that Wilson could have the opportunity to put on evidence of personal use pertaining to the quantities of meth charged. Defendant’s sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Mark Lantis set off on a day hike in Yellowstone National Park to search for buried treasure. He would get lost in the wilderness and was rescued by helicopter late the next day. Based on these events, a magistrate judge found Lantis guilty of a misdemeanor: reckless disorderly conduct under 36 C.F.R. 2.34(a)(4). Lantis appealed, arguing that the magistrate judge applied an objective standard for reckless conduct, without also assuring that the subjective component of recklessness was met. To this, the Tenth Circuit disagreed: "the magistrate judge did not apply only an objective standard; he simply relied on circumstantial evidence of Lantis’s state of mind and the obviousness of the risk to conclude that Lantis behaved recklessly by consciously disregarding a risk that he was aware of. Accordingly, we affirm." View "United States v. Lantis" on Justia Law

The estate of a mentally ill and intellectually disabled prisoner who committed suicide while in Utah Department of Corrections (“UDC”) custody appealed the dismissal of its lawsuit against the UDC. Brock Tucker was seventeen when he was imprisoned at the Central Utah Correctional Facility (“CUCF”). At CUCF, Tucker endured long periods of punitive isolation. CUCF officials rarely let him out of his cell, and he was often denied recreation, exercise equipment, media, commissary, visitation, and library privileges. Tucker hanged himself approximately two years after his arrival at CUCF. Plaintiff-appellant Janet Crane was Tucker’s grandmother and the administrator of his estate. She sued on his estate’s behalf: (1) making Eighth Amendment claims against four prison officials (the “CUCF Defendants”); (2) making statutory claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act against UDC; and (3) making a claim under the Unnecessary Rigor Clause of the Utah Constitution against both the CUCF Defendants and UDC. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, holding the CUCF Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal constitutional claims and the federal statutory claims did not survive Tucker’s death. As a result, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Crane v. Utah Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick LaJuan Jones, Jr. contended the Sentencing Commission did not intend to include state convictions based on a controlled substance not identified in the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) to serve as predicate offenses when determining a defendant’s base-offense level under U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a)(4). Notwithstanding Application Note 1 of section 2K2.1(a)(4) directing to section 4B1.2(b), where the Guidelines defined “controlled substance offense,” Defendant claimed the Sentencing Commission intended to only include those controlled substances identified in the CSA. Based on a plain reading of section 4B1.2(b), the district court determined that the Sentencing Commission did not limit “controlled substance” to mean only substances identified in the CSA. Finding no error in that interpretation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Malachi Bruley appealed the district court’s order revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to 48 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. In 2014, Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which carried a statutory maximum sentence of 60 months and a lifetime of supervised release. He also pleaded guilty to one count of being a drug user in possession of a firearm, which was punishable by up to 120 months' imprisonment and three years of supervise release. The district court sentenced Defendant to 42 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. In addition, the district court imposed three years of supervised release on each count, to run concurrently. Since his release from prison, Defendant’s supervised release has been revoked twice. On the first revocation, the district court sentenced Defendant to 10 months’ imprisonment on both counts, to run concurrently. The district court also imposed 18 months of supervised release on both counts, to run concurrently. On the second revocation, the one at issue on appeal here, the district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months’ imprisonment: 24 months on each count, to run consecutively. The district court also imposed two years of supervised release but did not specify to which count it applied. Prior to the revocation proceedings, the U.S. Probation Office proposed a set of special conditions for the court to impose as part of Defendant’s supervised release. These included a search condition and substance abuse treatment condition - both of which were imposed during Defendant’s two previous terms of supervised release. At the hearing, the district court announced two of the four special conditions recommended by the Probation Office, but did not announce the search condition or substance abuse treatment condition. Following the hearing, the district court issued a written judgment which imposed the unannounced search condition and substance abuse treatment condition. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "United States v. Bruley" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Adam Hemmelgarn moved for compassionate release, based on an outbreak of COVID-19 at FCI Lompoc. The district court denied his motion, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding Hemmelgarn had not established extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of a sentence reduction because of his health conditions or the risk of exposure to COVID-19. View "United States v. Hemmelgarn" on Justia Law

Appellants, seventy-six Chapter 11 debtors associated with John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts (Debtors), argued they incurred more than $2.5 million of quarterly Chapter 11 disbursement fees from January 2018 through December 2020. Debtors faulted the bankruptcy court’s statutory interpretation, arguing that it applied the quarterly fees retroactively to pending cases against Congress’s intent. Alternatively, Debtors faulted Congress, arguing that charging different Chapter 11 disbursement fees depending on the location of the bankruptcy filing violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art I, sec. 8, cl. 4. The Tenth Circuit concluded the presumption against retroactivity did not apply here, because Congress increased the quarterly bankruptcy fees prospectively. On Debtors' second point, the Court concluded that Debtors had to prevail: the 2017 Amendment’s fee disparities failed under the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. The Amendment imposed higher quarterly fees on large debtors in Trustee districts. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a determination of Debtors' quarterly Chapter 11 fees and a refund of overpayment. View "In re: John Q. Hammons Fall, et al." on Justia Law

In 1984, petitioner-appellant Bruce Wimberly pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault. The Colorado trial court accepted his plea and considered the sentencing options: (1) determinate prison term up to 24 years; or (2) an indeterminate term of confinement lasting anywhere from one day to life. The court chose the second option, made additional findings required by the Colorado Sex Offenders Act of 1968, and imposed an indeterminate term of confinement ranging from one day to life imprisonment. More than 24 years passed. Now Wimberly argued the Constitution required his release because he didn’t receive a new hearing at the end of the 24-year determinate term (that the trial court chose not to impose). Without a new hearing, Wimberly claimed his continued confinement violated his rights to equal protection and due process. The federal district court rejected Wimberly’s arguments, and so did the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. “The state trial court provided adequate procedural safeguards when imposing the indeterminate term of confinement, and that term could last anywhere from a single day to the rest of Mr. Wimberly’s lifetime. The State thus had no constitutional duty to provide a new round of procedural safeguards 24 years into Mr. Wimberly’s indeterminate term.” View "Wimberly v. Williams" on Justia Law