Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carl Cushing and Kris Hall were convicted by a jury of a drug conspiracy to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine. On appeal, Cushing and Hall raised a number of challenges to their convictions. The Tenth Circuit held that, among other things, the evidence was sufficient to convict both Cushing and Hall of the drug conspiracy, the district court did not err in admitting res gestae evidence to provide the jury appropriate context to the crime, and the expert testimony presented at trial was properly admitted. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed as to each defendant. View "United States v. Cushing" on Justia Law

During a heated argument at a campsite in Yellowstone National Park, defendant-appellant Jeffery Harris pointed a gun at another camper. Rather than charge Harris under the federal assault statute, the federal prosecutor applied the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. 13, to charge Harris with a Wyoming statute that prohibited “threaten[ing] to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary [for defense.]” Harris was convicted at trial. On appeal, he contended the federal assault statute precluded assimilation of the Wyoming state assault statute in this case. Determining whether the federal assault statute precluded conviction on the Wyoming state assault statute required the Tenth Circuit to apply the analysis set forth in Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155 (1998), an issue of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. The Court agreed with Harris that the Wyoming statute should not have been assimilated, and accordingly reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Kendall Morgan, a former deputy sheriff for LeFlore County, conducted a traffic stop of plaintiff-appellee Chad Osterhout. During the traffic stop, Morgan struck Osterhout in the face and kicked him twice in the ribs. According to Morgan, Osterhout was trying to flee; Osterhout maintained he remained still with his hands raised. Osterhout sued Morgan and the Board of County Commissioners of LeFlore County, Oklahoma. The jury attributed liability to Morgan and the Board, awarding Osterhout $3 million in compensatory damages against both defendants, and $1 million in punitive damages against Morgan. Morgan moved for a new trial or remittitur of damages. The district court remitted the compensatory damages to $2 million, but denied the motion for a new trial. Both defendants appealed. The Board and Mr. Morgan argue that the district court abused its discretion by using a verdict form with a single total for compensatory damages. And the Board argued: (1) the district court erred in denying summary judgment because the notice had been defective and Morgan’s alleged force would have fallen outside the scope of his employment; (2) the jury acted inconsistently by assessing punitive damages and finding that Morgan had acted within the scope of his employment; (3) the verdict against the Board conflicted with the clear weight of the evidence; and (4) the award of compensatory damages was grossly excessive. Morgan argued: (5) the district court should have granted a new trial based on opposing counsel’s misconduct; (6) the compensatory damages were grossly excessive and unsupported by the evidence; and (7) the punitive damages were grossly excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court judgment. View "Osterhout v. Board of County Commissioners, et al." on Justia Law

Alan Williams pleaded guilty to a single count of bank fraud and stipulated to restitution tied to that count and two others that were later dismissed. The government got its conviction, and Williams limited his sentencing exposure and possible future charges. In this appeal, Williams attempted to step back from his bargain, seeking to keep the favorable plea deal, but to contest the restitution he stipulated was owed. Furthermore, he contested the district court’s apportionment of that total restitution between WebBank and Wells Fargo Bank, as recommended by the Presentence Report (PSR). The Tenth Circuit surmised Williams' first hurdle was to overcome the appeal waiver included in his Plea Agreement. To this, the Court concluded the appeal waiver did not bar his total-restitution challenge: the Plea Agreement allowed Williams to appeal the apportionment of the total restitution and the substantive reasonableness of his prison sentence as well. However, addressing the merits of Williams’s challenges, the Court no reason to disturb the order and sentence, and affirmed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

VDARE Foundation, Inc. alleged the City of Colorado Springs improperly spoke through a public statement issued by its Mayor and, in so doing, violated VDARE’s First Amendment rights. The public statement, issued two days after the Charlottesville protests, denounced “hate speech” and relayed that the City wouldn’t be providing municipal resources for VDARE’s upcoming private conference in the City. The day after the Mayor issued the statement, a private resort in the City cancelled its contract to host VDARE’s upcoming conference. VDARE alleged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the City’s statement left the resort with no choice but to cancel the conference and thus: (1) violated VDARE’s rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association; (2) constituted First Amendment retaliation; and (3) tortiously interfered with VDARE’s contract with the resort. The district court dismissed VDARE’s federal claims for failing to state a claim. After that, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state tort claim. VDARE appealed. Finding VDARE did not allege a plausible Fist Amendment claim, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of its case. View "VDARE Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs, et al." on Justia Law

The Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act (the “Act”) criminalized certain actions directed at an animal facility without effective consent of the owner of the facility and with intent to damage the enterprise of such facility. The Act provided that consent was not effective if induced through deception. Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”) wished to perform investigations by planting ALDF investigators as employees of animal facilities to document abuse of animals that ALDF would then publicize. Because investigators would be willing to lie about their association with ALDF, ALDF feared its investigations would run afoul of the Act. ALDF therefore took preemptive action and sued the Governor of Kansas, Laura Kelly, and the Attorney General of Kansas, Derek Schmidt, in their official capacities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the Act violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted both motions in part, determining ALDF had standing to challenge only three subsections of the Act, Title 47, sections 1827(b), (c), and (d) of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. The district court held these provisions were unconstitutional. Thereafter, ALDF moved for a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant subsections of the Act. The district court granted its request. Kansas appealed both the order on the cross-motions for summary judgment and the order granting a permanent injunction, arguing the district court erred in holding the relevant subsections of the Act unconstitutional. After its review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the Act concern speech because they include deception as a possible element and are viewpoint discriminatory because they apply only to persons who intend to damage the enterprise of an animal facility. Because the 'intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility' requirement, is a broad element that does not delineate protected from unprotected speech, Kansas must satisfy strict scrutiny. It has not attempted to do so." View "Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. Kelly, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Steven Henson appealed his convictions and sentence related to his involvement in a drug distribution conspiracy in and around Wichita, Kansas. He argued: (1) his convictions should have been vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the trial court erroneously deprived him of chosen counsel; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury it could find the requisite mental state for his crimes based on a “deliberate ignorance” or “willful blindness” theory of knowledge; (3) the case should be remanded for resentencing based upon the purported procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence to life in prison; and (4) the Tenth Circuit should reconsider a prior precedent and, in doing so, hold that one of the district court’s jury instructions misstated the law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Henson's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Henson" on Justia Law

Wyoming state prisoner Gregory Hawes appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 to challenge his kidnapping conviction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the issue of whether application of the Wyoming kidnapping statute to him was constitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Tenth Circuit found that under the statute, whether a kidnapping ends with a “safe release” of the victim can affect the defendant’s sentence. At trial, the state district court imposed the burden to show safe release on Hawes. The jury found that he had not proved safe release, which subjected him to higher statutory minimum and maximum sentences. A state court denied his post-conviction challenge to the imposition of this burden, relying on Wyoming Supreme Court decisions holding that a kidnapping defendant had to prove safe release rather than the prosecution having to prove lack of safe release. To the Tenth Circuit, Hawes argued the Wyoming court’s application of the statute violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The Tenth Circuit found Hawes made colorable arguments, but he could not not surmount the habeas restrictions that required the Court to (1) give deference to the state court’s application of Supreme Court law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and (2) accept the state court’s interpretation of state law. Accordingly, dismissal of his petition for habeas relief was affirmed. View "Hawes v. Pacheco, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tajuddin Ashaheed arrived at the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) Denver Reception and Diagnostic Center (the “Center”) to serve a short sentence for parole violations. The Center’s policies required inmates to shave their beards at intake but exempted those like Ashaheed who wore beards due to their religion. Ashaheed alleged that he repeatedly invoked this exemption, but Sergeant Thomas Currington, motivated by anti-Muslim animus, forced him to shave his beard. Ashaheed sued Currington under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims for violations of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Currington moved to dismiss both claims based on qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. Finding that Ashaheed alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could infer Currington acted from anti-Muslim animus, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ashaheed v. Currington" on Justia Law

Mark Janny was released from jail on parole in early 2015. His parole officer, John Gamez, directed Janny to establish his residence of record at the Rescue Mission in Fort Collins, Colorado, and to abide by its “house rules.” After arriving at the Mission, Janny learned he had been enrolled in “Steps to Success,” a Christian transitional program involving mandatory prayer, bible study, and church attendance. When Janny objected, citing his atheist beliefs, he alleged both Officer Gamez and Jim Carmack, the Mission’s director, repeatedly told him he could choose between participating in the Christian programming or returning to jail. Less than a week later, Carmack expelled Janny from the Mission for skipping worship services, leading to Janny’s arrest on a parole violation and the revocation of his parole. Janny brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Gamez, Carmack, and the Mission’s assistant director, Tom Konstanty, alleging violations of his First Amendment religious freedom rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The district court granted summary judgment to all three defendants, finding Janny had failed to: (1) adduce evidence of an Establishment Clause violation by Gamez; (2) show Gamez violated any clearly established right under the Free Exercise Clause; or (3) raise a triable issue regarding whether Carmack and Konstanty were state actors, as required to establish their liability under either clause. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order as to Gamez and Carmack, and affirmed as to Konstanty. The Court found the evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. "And because the basic right to be free from state-sponsored religious coercion was clearly established under both clauses at the time of the events, Officer Gamez is not entitled to qualified immunity on either claim." Furthermore, the Court held the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Carmack was a state actor, as required to impose section 1983 liability on private parties. However, because no facts linked Konstanty to Gamez, the evidence was legally insufficient for a jury finding that Konstanty acted under color of state law. View "Janny v. Gamez, et al." on Justia Law