Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The federal government sought to encourage delinquent taxpayers to pay up: by threatening to withhold or revoke their passports until their tax delinquency was resolved. No nexus between international travel and the tax delinquency needed to be shown; the passport revocation served only to incentivize repayment of the tax debt. A challenge to the constitutionality of this approach was a matter of first impression; appellant Jeffrey Maehr was one such taxpayer whose passport was revoked for non-payment of taxes. He argued the revocation violated substantive due process, ran afoul of principles announced in the Privileges and Immunities clauses, and contradicted caselaw concerning the common law principle of ne exeat republica. The district court rejected these challenges. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on each of these arguments. View "Maehr v. U.S. Department of State" on Justia Law

Joseph Maldonado-Passage a/k/a Joe Exotic, the self-proclaimed "Tiger King," was indicted on 21 counts: most for wildlife crimes, and two for using interstate facilities in the commission of his murder-for-hire plots against Carole Baskin. A jury convicted Maldonado-Passage on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 264 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Maldonado-Passage challenged his murder-for-hire convictions, arguing that the district court erred by allowing Baskin, a listed government witness, to attend the entire trial proceedings. He also disputed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not grouping his two murder-for-hire convictions in calculating his advisory Guidelines range. On this second point, he contended that the Guidelines required the district court to group the two counts because they involved the same victim and two or more acts or transactions that were connected by a common criminal objective: murdering Baskin. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal determined the district court acted within its discretion by allowing Baskin to attend the full trial proceedings despite her being listed as a government witness, but that it erred by not grouping the two murder-for-hire convictions at sentencing. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed, but the sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Maldonado-Passage" on Justia Law

Between August 2010 and January 2011, Defendant Armando Cervantes prepared for trial on two charges: (1) conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine; and (2) possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On the eve of trial, defense counsel filed a last-minute motion to continue premised on a breakdown of communication. The district court denied the motion and commenced with jury selection. After jury selection but before opening statements, Defendant absconded. The district court proceeded with trial in Defendant’s absence, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. Nine years later, Defendant was apprehended and sentenced. This appeal followed. Defendant argued the district court abused its discretion by: (1) denying his motion to continue; and (2) trying him in absentia. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joshua Mjoness challenged his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The question on appeal was whether 18 U.S.C. 875(c) constituted a crime of violence such that it could serve as a predicate for the 18 U.S.C. 924(c) charge. The Tenth Circuit found that section 875(c) provided separate elements in the form of threats to kidnap or, alternatively, threats to injure, so the Court concluded Mjoness’s offense of transmitting threats to injure in interstate commerce met the definition of a "crime of violence." The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order, but on alternate grounds. View "United States v. Mjoness" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellee Karl Fontenot was twice tried and found guilty of the 1984 kidnapping, robbery, and murder of Donna Haraway in Ada, Oklahoma. Almost no evidence connected him to the crime other than his own videotaped confession, a confession that "rang false in almost every particular." Nearly thirty years after his second conviction, Fontenot brought a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court, arguing the actual innocence gateway allowed for his constitutional claims to be heard on the merits. The district court agreed, and granted relief on all of Fontenot’s claims, including his assertion that the prosecution suppressed material evidence prior to his trial. The district court ordered the State of Oklahoma to release Fontenot or grant him a new trial. The State appealed, but the Tenth Circuit found its arguments for reversing that order lacked merit. "Mr. Fontenot has brought forth new evidence that is sufficient to unlock the actual innocence gateway and to allow his substantive claims to be heard on the merits. And Mr. Fontenot has also established that evidence suppressed by the State prior to his new trial in 1988 led to a violation of his constitutional right to due process." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of Fontenot’s petition for habeas relief. View "Fontenot v. Crow" on Justia Law

Defendant Nickie Nathanial Rico asserted he was acting in self-defense when he fired several shots in the late hours of the night across a busy downtown Denver street. As a result of his actions, the government charged Defendant with one count of possessing a firearm as a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and he pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) applied a cross-reference for attempted murder. Over Defendant’s objection, the district court concluded the PSR appropriately applied the cross-reference and sentenced Defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Tenth Circuit held that for a defendant to invoke self-defense, one must face imminent danger that he did not cause. Defendant contended the district court incorrectly found that he did not act in self-defense, and therefore erred in applying the Guideline enhancement for attempted murder. Defendant also contended that Colorado, and not federal, self- defense law applied. The Court found defendant failed to support his assertions with record evidence: "In fact, the record supports the district court’s factual finding that the evening’s events did not trigger a reasonable belief that Defendant needed to use deadly force in self-defense." Judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Rico" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma jury convicted Alonzo Johnson of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. After unsuccessfully challenging his convictions in state court, Johnson petitioned for federal habeas relief. Relevant here, he asserted that the prosecution exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner to exclude minorities from the jury, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Johnson also asserted, in relevant part, that gruesome evidence, juror misconduct, and cumulative error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The district court denied relief. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on Johnson’s gruesome-evidence, juror-misconduct, and cumulative-error claims. But because the Court concluded that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) relied on an unreasonable factual determination and unreasonably applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) to reject Johnson’s claim, and further determined that Johnson raised a prima facie case of discrimination under the first step of Batson. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief on Johnson’s Batson claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Martin" on Justia Law

Attorney Mark Schell asked a federal district court to invalidate Oklahoma’s requirement that practicing attorneys join the Oklahoma Bar Association (“OBA”) and pay mandatory dues. In addition, Schell alleged that the OBA did not utilize adequate safeguards to protect against the impermissible use of funds. Initially, the district court dismissed Schell’s challenges to membership and dues but permitted his challenge to the OBA’s spending procedures to proceed. Then, the OBA adopted new safeguards consistent with Schell’s demands. The parties agreed the revised safeguards mooted Schell’s remaining claim and asked that the district court dismiss the Amended Complaint. The district court obliged, and this appeal, limited to the membership and dues requirements, followed. On appeal, Schell, primarily citing Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), disputed whether Supreme Court precedents upholding bar membership and mandatory dues remained good law. He contended "Janus" transformed prior Supreme Court decisions upholding mandatory bar dues and membership such that what was once permitted by Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), and Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), was now precluded. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that mandatory bar dues did not violate Schell’s First Amendment rights. As for Schell’s First Amendment claim based on mandatory bar membership, the Court held the majority of the allegations supporting this claim occurred prior to the controlling statute-of-limitations period. However, some of the allegations falling within the statute-of-limitations period alleged conduct by the OBA not necessarily germane to the purposes of a state bar as recognized in Lathrop and Keller. Accordingly, the district court erred by relying upon Lathrop and Keller to dismiss Schell’s freedom of association claim based on mandatory bar membership. The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s dismissal of Schell’s freedom of association claim based on mandatory bar membership, and remanded the case so that Schell could conduct discovery on that claim. View "Schell v. OK Supreme Court Justices" on Justia Law

Daniel Lowell and his girlfriend went on a "Bonnie and Clyde-esque crime spree that turned deadly." While on their way to cash in a stolen car and credit cards, the pair were pulled over outside Las Cruces, New Mexico. A high-speed chase ensued. They carjacked a Toyota 4Runner and eventually law enforcement lost track of them for two and a half hours in Las Cruces, during which time they did drugs and shoplifted items from Walmart that they could use to steal another car. After an officer spotted the 4Runner, another chase ensued, but this time it ended tragically when their car crashed into a motorcyclist, killing him. Lowell pleaded guilty to numerous crimes, including carjacking resulting in death, and was sentenced to 449 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Lowell challenged the validity of his guilty plea, as well as the district court’s application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Lowell argued his conviction for carjacking resulting in death was invalid because he lacked the specific intent to cause the motorcyclist’s death while in the act of carjacking. According to Lowell, section 2119(3) required "but-for" causation, not specific intent to cause the death. Lowell thus argued the district court erred by applying the first-degree murder cross reference in USSG 2B3.1(c). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Lowell’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Lowell" on Justia Law

Prior to the First Step Act, defendants convicted of crimes involving crack cocaine faced much higher penalties than defendants convicted of powder cocaine offenses. Section 404 of the First Step Act "opened the courtroom doors" to these defendants to move for discretionary sentence reductions based on the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the remedial purpose of section 404 was clear, its language had not been interpreted uniformly. Because application of section 404(b) "should not vary from defendant to defendant," the Court concluded that before a district court exercises its discretion, "it should look to the drug quantity and Sentencing Guidelines associated with an eligible defendant’s offense of conviction, rather than his underlying conduct, to 'impose a reduced sentence as if . . . the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.'” The district court did not do so here, so denial of defendant-appellant Jason Broadway's petition for sentence reduction was reversed. View "United States v. Broadway" on Justia Law