Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-Appellant John Chatman, Jr. was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (Count One), obstruction of justice by attempting to kill a witness (Count Two), and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (Count 3). He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count Two arguing that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence in accordance with Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011). Under Fowler, “the [g]overnment must prove (1) a killing or attempted killing, (2) committed with a particular intent, namely, an intent (a) to ‘prevent’ a ‘communication’ (b) about ‘the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense’ (c) to a federal ‘law enforcement officer or judge.’” Under the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit determined the statute (quoted in Fowler) did not fit the crime. The Court remanded this case to the district court to vacate and dismiss Chatman’s convictions under both Counts Two and Three and resentence him under Count One alone. View "United States v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Doe asserted that the disciplinary proceeding brought against him by Defendants, the University of Denver (“DU”) along with several University employees, violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and under Title IX. The court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the Fourteenth Amendment claim because Plaintiff had failed to show that DU, a private school, was a state actor. The court also granted Defendants summary judgment on the Title IX claim, concluding that Plaintiff had adduced insufficient evidence of gender bias. Plaintiff enrolled as a freshman at DU in 2014. In October 2014, Plaintiff had a sexual encounter with Jane Doe, a female freshman, in his dorm room. Six months later, Jane’s boyfriend reported the encounter as an alleged sexual assault to a DU resident director. The resident director then spoke with Jane, who repeated the allegations and later filed with DU’s Office of Equal Opportunity a complaint of non-consensual sexual contact. Under DU’s policies, a student’s non-consensual sexual contact with another was a policy violation. Prohibited sexual contact includes contact by “coercion,” which the policy defined as “unreasonable and persistent pressure to compel another individual to initiate or continue sexual activity against an individual’s will,” such as “continued pressure” after “someone makes clear that they do not want to engage in sexual contact.” Two of the named defendants investigated the claims; the outcome of the investigation ultimately led to Plaintiff’s expulsion. The district court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute that gender was a motivating factor in DU’s decision to expel him. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Doe v. University of Denver" on Justia Law

Jose Lira-Ramirez was indicted on a charge of illegally reentering the United States, an element of which was the existence of a prior removal order. Though Lira-Ramirez had been removed in earlier proceedings, he moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction over the earlier proceedings because the notice to appear was defective under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). The district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, and Lira-Ramirez appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that precedents foreclosed Lira-Ramirez’s jurisdictional challenge: “[T]wo precedential opinions that [the time and date] omission does not create a jurisdictional defect.” The Court thus affirmed denial of Lira-Ramirez’s motion. View "United States v. Lira-Ramirez" on Justia Law

In 2015, the FBI deployed a Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”) to identify the Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses of computers accessing “Playpen,” a child pornography website. One of those IP addresses belonged to Defendant-Appellant Wesley Wagner. Agents executed a warrant for his Kansas residence, where they interviewed him and found evidence of child pornography on a laptop computer. He would be indicted for receipt and possession of child pornography. Wagner moved to suppress the NIT's identification of his IP address, the pornography evidence in his home, and statements he made to agents. he district court denied his motions. Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted him of both counts. On appeal, Wagner argued the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress and motion to dismiss the indictment. He also contended an erroneous evidentiary ruling required a new trial and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Wagner's convictions. View "United States v. Wagner" on Justia Law

On March 3, 2018, a man called 911 to report that he witnessed two men in a Honda shoot at another car. The caller followed the Honda and dialed 911 within “two to three minutes” of observing the gunfire. During the approximately thirteen-minute 911 call, the caller discussed the shooting, his continuing observations of the Honda and its occupants, and his safety, often in response to the 911 operator’s questions. Shortly thereafter, responding police officer Levi Braun (“Officer Braun”) located a Honda matching the caller’s description. With Officer Braun in pursuit, the Honda slowed down and Defendant Daniel Lovato jumped out of the passenger’s side of the moving car. Officer Braun stopped to detain Defendant, who volunteered that he had a gun on him. Officer Braun then retrieved a .22 caliber pistol from Defendant’s waistband, along with thirty-two rounds of .22 caliber ammunition from Defendant’s left front pants pocket. At the time of this incident, Defendant had prior felony convictions. The government ultimately charged Defendant with three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition: one each for possessing the .22 caliber pistol, thirty-two rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, and canister full of additional ammunition. At trial, Defendant objected to the admission of the 911 call on hearsay grounds. The district court overruled the objection and admitted the 911 call into evidence under the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the district court sentenced Defendant to 100 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant alleged the district court abused its discretion in admitting the 911 call. Finding no reversible error as to Defendant's conviction, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Court vacated a special condition and remanded on that issue for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lovato" on Justia Law

After committing crimes when he was seventeen years old, defendant Atorrus Rainer was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of aggravated robbery. For these crimes, the district court sentenced Mr. Rainer to 224 years in prison. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. But the Colorado Court of Appeals ordered modification of the sentences, concluding that the prison terms for attempted first-degree murder and first-degree assault should have run concurrently, rather than consecutively, because the crimes could have been based on identical evidence. The Colorado Court of Appeals thus modified Mr. Rainer’s sentences to run for 112 years. After the direct appeal, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that the Eighth Amendment prohibited life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes. Under Graham, these juveniles were entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Defendant sought habeas relief, claiming the State of Colorado deprived him of this opportunity by imposing the 112-year sentence for the crimes he committed as a juvenile. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the State provided defendant with the required opportunity through the combination of the Juveniles convicted as Adults Program, and the general parole program. View "Rainer v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Michael Bacon appealed a district court’s decision to keep the supplement to his plea agreement filed under seal. In 2015, Bacon pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery and one count of robbing a credit union, pursuant to a written plea agreement. At his combined plea and sentencing hearing, the district court asked Bacon if he had signed the documents relating to his plea agreement. After responding that he had not, Bacon’s counsel explained that Bacon was “concerned about the [plea] supplement” and asked “for permission to file the plea agreement without the [plea] supplement. The district court responded that under Utah local rules, supplements were sealed in every case, “and we do that to protect the rare person who does cooperate.” Plea supplements describe the nature of the defendant’s cooperation with the government or lack thereof. Bacon ultimately refused to sign his plea supplement, explaining to the court that “[w]hen you go off to prison and you’ve got something sealed inside your paperwork and the yard gets the paperwork and they see you’ve got a sealed document, they think you cooperated, and they want to hurt you.” His counsel signed it on his behalf. At Bacon’s resentencing, the parties did not dispute that Bacon’s supervised release term should have been reduced to 36 months, however, a dispute emerged over the sealed plea supplement. Bacon addressed the court himself, regarding the sealed plea supplement, stating, “If I don’t wan’t [sic] to place my life in jeopardy, I don’t see how the federal government can force me to do that.” Bacon contended the district court erred by failing to consider the common law right of access to court documents and by failing to make case-specific findings regarding sealing on the record. The Tenth Circuit determined defendant was challenging the district court’s decision to keep a specific document under seal, not its authority to enact a local rule. “A presumption of openness must be overcome for a judicial record to remain under seal. The record demonstrates that the district court did not consider this presumption of access to judicial records.” Because the Court determined the district court failed to articulate a case-specific reason for its sealing decision, its decision was vacated and the matter remanded. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Bradley appealed a federal district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on qualified immunity. Plaintiff Susan Ullery alleged Defendant violated, among other things, her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force against her in the form of sexual assault and abuse. Plaintiff was a former inmate at the Denver Women’s Correctional Center, which was a prison in the Colorado state prison system. Between early 2014 and April 2016, Plaintiff worked in the canteen services at the prison under the direction of Defendant, a corrections officer and supervisor of inmates who worked in the department. During this time, Defendant sexually harassed, abused, and assaulted Plaintiff. On appeal, Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that he violated a constitutional right. Rather, Defendant argued he was entitled to qualified immunity even if he violated the Constitution because Plaintiff’s asserted Eighth Amendment right to be free from sexual abuse was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. After review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the district court erred to the extent it held the contours of the asserted constitutional right were clearly established before August 11, 2015. But the Court further concluded any reasonable corrections officer in Defendant’s position since August 11, 2015, would have known the alleged conduct violated the Eighth Amendment based upon the clearly established weight of persuasive authority. “Because any actionable constitutional violations in this case would necessarily have occurred after this date, the law was clearly established for all relevant purposes; the district court therefore correctly denied Defendant qualified immunity.” View "Ullery v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Blackbird attempted to sexually abuse his fifteen-year-old granddaughter. He pleaded guilty to the offense, and the district court sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court applied a sentence enhancement, which increased his base offense level because “the minor was in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant” at the time of the attempted sexual abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing the government presented no evidence he had custody, care, or supervisory control of his granddaughter at the time of the attempted abuse. The Tenth Circuit concurred with this reasoning, finding that because the government failed to show that Defendant exercised “custody, care, or supervisory control” over the victim, it vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Blackbird" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodolfo Gonzalez-Fierro, a Mexican citizen, challenged his conviction for unlawfully re-entering the United States after a prior removal. That conviction was based in part on Gonzalez-Fierro’s prior expedited removal from the United States in 2009. Due process required that, before the United States can use a defendant’s prior removal to prove a 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) charge, “there must be some meaningful review” of the prior administrative removal proceeding. In light of that, Congress provided a mechanism in section 1326(d), for a defendant charged with a section 1326(a) offense to challenge the fundamental fairness of his prior unreviewed removal. But, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(D), the section 1326(d) mechanism applied only to prior formal removal orders, and not to prior expedited removal orders like Gonzalez-Fierro’s. "Expedited removals apply to undocumented aliens apprehended at or near the border soon after unlawfully entering the United States. Different from formal removals, expedited removals are streamlined - generally there is no hearing, no administrative appeal, and no judicial review before an expedited removal order is executed." Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Tenth Circuit concluded section 1225(b)(1)(D) was unconstitutional because it deprives a defendant like Gonzalez-Fierro of due process. Without section 1225(b)(1)(D), the Court reviewed Gonzalez-Fierro's 2009 expedited removal order, and concluded he failed to establish that removal was fundamentally unfair. On that basis, the Court affirmed Gonzalez-Fierro's section 1326(a) conviction. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Fierro" on Justia Law