Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether police had a reasonable suspicion to believe defendant Ajohntae Hammond was armed and dangerous to justify frisking him for weapons following a traffic stop. The pat-down revealed a gun in Hammond’s pocket; Hammond was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on information the officers gleaned from the department’s Police Information Management System (“PIMS”) prior to the pat-down that connected Hammond and the car to gang activity and weapons possession, along with the officers’ observation that Hammond was wearing gang colors, the Tenth Circuit held the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to justify the pat-down search, and affirmed the district court denying his motion to suppress the firearm. View "United States v. Hammond" on Justia Law

M.A.K. Investment Group, LLC owned several parcels of property in Glendale, Colorado. The City adopted a resolution declaring several of M.A.K.’s parcels “blighted” under state law. Glendale never notified M.A.K. of its resolution or the legal consequences flowing from it. The blight resolution began a seven-year window in which the City could begin condemnation proceedings against M.A.K.’s property. It also started the clock on a thirty-day window in which M.A.K. had a right to seek judicial review of the blight resolution under state law. Receiving no notice, M.A.K. did not timely seek review. M.A.K. argued Colorado’s Urban Renewal statute, both on its face and as-applied to M.A.K., violated due process because it did not require municipalities to notify property owners about a blight determination, or the thirty days owners had to seek review. The Tenth Circuit concluded the statute was unconstitutional as applied to M.A.K. because M.A.K. did not receive notice that Glendale found its property blighted. Because of this, the Court did not decide whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face. As for M.A.K.’s second argument, the Court held due process did not require Glendale to inform M.A.K. about the thirty-day review window. View "M.A.K. Investment Group v. City of Glendale" on Justia Law

M.A.K. Investment Group, LLC owned several parcels of property in Glendale, Colorado. The City adopted a resolution declaring several of M.A.K.’s parcels “blighted” under state law. Glendale never notified M.A.K. of its resolution or the legal consequences flowing from it. The blight resolution began a seven-year window in which the City could begin condemnation proceedings against M.A.K.’s property. It also started the clock on a thirty-day window in which M.A.K. had a right to seek judicial review of the blight resolution under state law. Receiving no notice, M.A.K. did not timely seek review. M.A.K. argued Colorado’s Urban Renewal statute, both on its face and as-applied to M.A.K., violated due process because it did not require municipalities to notify property owners about a blight determination, or the thirty days owners had to seek review. The Tenth Circuit concluded the statute was unconstitutional as applied to M.A.K. because M.A.K. did not receive notice that Glendale found its property blighted. Because of this, the Court did not decide whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face. As for M.A.K.’s second argument, the Court held due process did not require Glendale to inform M.A.K. about the thirty-day review window. View "M.A.K. Investment Group v. City of Glendale" on Justia Law

This case centered on an agreement between the City of Rawlins, Wyoming, and Dirty Boyz Sanitation Services (Dirty Boyz) for local garbage collection and disposal. About two years after the parties executed the agreement, the State of Wyoming required Rawlins to close its landfill. Soon after, Rawlins opened a transfer station to process garbage for transport to a landfill elsewhere. Later, Rawlins adopted a flow-control ordinance requiring that all locally licensed garbage haulers take collected garbage to Rawlins’ transfer station. Dirty Boyz argued the ordinance violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, and was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration and Authorization Act (FAAAA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rawlins. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Rawlins' favor. View "Dirty Boyz Sanitation Service v. City of Rawlins" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury returned a six-count indictment against defendant-appellant Samuel Silva, charging him with: (1) attempted carjacking; (2) knowingly using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of the attempted carjacking; (3) carjacking; (4) knowingly using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a carjacking, (5) knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition; and (6) possessing firearms as a convicted felon. Silva appealed his ultimate convictions, arguing: (1) the district court erred by allowing the prosecution to present evidence of a previous felony conviction to support the charge of his being a felon in possession of a firearm; (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm; and (3) The district court plainly erred by admitting testimony from a DNA expert who had made typographical errors in the course of performing her DNA analysis. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Silva’s convictions. View "United States v. Silva" on Justia Law

In 2014, nine of Jerry and Deidre Matthews’ adopted children were placed in the emergency custody of the State. In June 2016, Jerry Matthews pleaded no contest to reduced charges of child neglect. He received a suspended life sentence in exchange for his promise to testify truthfully against his now former wife, Deidre Matthews. In October 2017, Deidre Matthews pleaded no contest in the same state court to twelve counts of child abuse, child neglect, and child endangerment. The state court sentenced Deidre Matthews to life in prison with all but four years suspended. The children claimed among other things, that eighteen Oklahoma Department of Human Services (ODHS) caseworkers violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights in connection with the horrific events recounted in the complaint. They generally alleged that between January 2004 and March 2014, various individuals, all with good cause, reported to ODHS that the children living in the Matthews’ home were being mentally and physically abused. At least seventeen reports of abuse and neglect were made to ODHS during this time period. “To say the ODHS caseworkers left the children with the Matthews to suffer continued abuse and neglect under deplorable conditions in a dangerous home environment is perhaps an understatement.” The caseworkers appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the constitutional claims against them on the basis of qualified immunity. At issue before the Tenth Circuit was: (1) whether the facts alleged in the complaint gave rise to constitutional claims against each of the ODHS caseworkers; and if so, (2) whether those claims were clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violations. Because the caseworkers asserted the defense of qualified immunity, the burden was on Plaintiffs to establish their right to proceed. The Tenth Circuit found plaintiffs did not meet that burden as to some, but not all, of the caseworkers, and affirmed in part and reversed in part. “The people of the State of Oklahoma ‘may well prefer a system of liability which would place upon the State and its officials the responsibility for failure to act in situations such as the present one.’ The people may create such a system if they have not already done so. But ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief [under the Constitution], this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” View "Matthews v. Bergdorf" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Clifford Raymond Salas was found guilty of various arson-related offenses, after he used a Molotov cocktail to firebomb a tattoo parlor. For his offenses, Salas was sentenced to a total of 35 years’ imprisonment: 5 years for counts 1, 2, and 4 and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)’s mandatory minimum sentence, 30 years for count 3. He was also sentenced to 3 years’ supervised release. He appealed the sentence, arguing that section 924(c)(3)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. The Tenth Circuit agreed, remanding this case to the district court with instructions to vacate Salas’s 924(c)(1) conviction and resentence him because 924(c)(3)(B), the provision defining a “crime of violence” for the purposes of his conviction, was unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Salas" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from Raymond Hamilton’s sentencing for possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. Hamilton was sentenced to 190 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based in part on three Oklahoma convictions for second-degree burglary. Hamilton moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that the district court had improperly applied a mandatory minimum based on the ACCA’s unconstitutional Residual Clause. The district court granted the motion and resentenced Hamilton to time served. The government appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Edward McCranie pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery. The presentence report (PSR) treated that conviction as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) Manual section 4B1.2(a)(1), as it also did for McCranie’s earlier convictions for federal bank robbery. With these predicate convictions, McCranie qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review was whether a conviction for federal bank robbery categorically qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause of the career-offender sentencing guideline. The Tenth Circuit concluded that it did. View "United States v. McCranie" on Justia Law

One of the conditions of supervised release for Defendant Isiah Adams was that he comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911–20932. The district court found that Defendant, who was homeless at the time, had violated that condition by failing to update his SORNA registration within three days of changing his residence to Tulsa. He challenged the court’s finding, arguing on appeal that the government offered no evidence that he had established his residence in Tulsa for SORNA purposes by residing there for 30 days or more. After review, the Tenth Circuit held there was sufficient evidence and affirmed. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law