Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In November 2004, Dr. Ashard Yousuf sued Dr. George Cohlmia and Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists Corporation (CVSS) in Oklahoma state court for defamation, tortious interference with business relations/contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage, negligence, and breach of contract. Dr. Yousuf alleged that Dr. Cohlmia made a series of false statements to local media disparaging Dr. Yousuf's professional reputation. Dr. Cohlmia denied that the statements he made were false. CVSS held a professional liability policy with Physicians Liability Insurance Company (PLICO) and two identical general commercial liability policies with American National Property and Casualty Company (ANPAC, one for each business location), each of which covered Dr. Cohlmia as an additional insured. Dr. Cohlmia demanded that both insurers provide for his defense, pursuant to their respective policies. PLICO agreed to defend the lawsuit under a reservation of rights and requested ANPAC to share in the defense. ANPAC refused, contending its policy did not cover the alleged wrongdoing and that it owed no duty to defend. ANPAC further claimed that even if it erred in refusing to defend Dr. Cohlmia, PLICO had no right to indemnification or contribution for the defense costs it incurred. ANPAC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PLICO in a dispute regarding ANPAC's breach of its duty to defend a co-insured. PLICO cross-appealed the district court's denial of its motion for prejudgment interest. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Yousuf v. Cohlmia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Anil Vazirani was an independent insurance agent who owned and managed Vazirani & Associates Financial, LLC and Secured Financial Solutions, LLC. Vazirani contracted with Aviva Life and Annuity Company. After Defendants Mark Heitz and Jordan Canfield, executives at Aviva, cancelled the contract, Vazirani sued them in federal district court, alleging that they tortuously interfered with the contract. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, holding that an officer of a company could be liable for tortious interference with a company contract only if he was motivated by solely personal interests. The court concluded Vazirani failed to produce evidence that defendants were motivated by solely personal interests in terminating the contract. Finding no error with that decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Vazirani v. Heitz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bjorn Myklatun and his company, Plaintiff Oil Innovation, brought claims of tortious interference, fraud, and civil conspiracy against Chemical Equipment and Specialties, Inc. (CESI); its parent company, Flotek Industries; Flotek president Todd Sanner; and former Flotek CEO Jerry Dumas. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the claim of tortious interference and one of Plaintiffs’ two theories of fraud. A jury entered a verdict in favor of all Defendants on the civil conspiracy claim. The jury also found in favor of Sanner and Dumas on the narrowed claim of fraud, but it found for Plaintiffs on the fraud claim against CESI and Flotek. Plaintiffs appealed, also raising various evidentiary and other challenges relating to their damages on the fraud claim, and they contended the jury’s verdict on the civil conspiracy and fraud claims was facially inconsistent and required a new trial. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court did not address those other arguments. View "Myklatun, et al v. Halliburton Energy Services, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Court in this matter concerned interpretation of an errors-and-omissions policy. The policy excluded coverage for claims "arising out of" bankruptcy or insolvency. The dispute grew from a stop-loss policy issued by United Re to a company that had hired Plaintiff-Appellee C.L. Frates as a broker. After the policy was issued, United filed for bankruptcy protection. When Frates learned of the bankruptcy, it learned that United had been sued in Ohio, and filed for bankruptcy to stall the litigation. Ultimately, Frates recommended to its client that it move the stop-loss insurance to another insurer. The client agreed. However, Frates had to reimburse the client for what it lost through higher deductibles. Frates then sued Westchester Fire Insurance Company under its errors-and-omissions policy. In cross-motions for summary judgment, Westchester contended that Frates's claim "arose out of" United's bankruptcy or insolvency. Frates contended that the claim "arose out of" United's deception. The district court agreed with Frates and granted its motion for summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court. It held that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that Frates's claim arose out of United's bankruptcy or insolvency. Accordingly the Court reversed the award of summary judgment to Frates. View "CL Frates v. Westchester Fire" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized a new tort called "malicious abuse of process," which subsumed causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Nanodetex Corporation and two of its principals (the Insureds) were successfully sued for malicious abuse of process. They then sought indemnification from Carolina CasualtyInsurance Company, which covered the Insureds under a management liability policy (the Carolina Policy). Carolina denied the claim, relying on an exclusion in the policy for losses arising from claims for "malicious prosecution." It sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the damages arising from the malicious-abuse-of-process judgment. On Carolina's motion for summary judgment, the district court agreed with Carolina and also rejected the Insureds' counterclaims. The Insureds appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that the term "malicious prosecution" in the exclusion does not encompass all claims of malicious abuse of process, but only claims whose elements are essentially those of the common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution. Because the judgment against the Insureds in the tort case was affirmed on appeal on a claim that was not substantially the same as common-law malicious prosecution, the exclusion in the Carolina Policy did not apply. View "Carolina Casualty Insurance v. Nanodetex Corporation, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on a written consumer contract for the sale of goods and whether it incorporated by reference a separate document entitled "Terms of Sale" which was available on the seller's website, but that the contract stated that it was "subject to" the seller's "Terms of Sale" but does not specifically reference the website? Finding no controlling precedent, the Tenth Circuit decided to certify the question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. View "Walker, et al v. BuildDirect.com Technologie" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Elm Ridge Exploration Company, LLC, an operator of oil and gas leases in New Mexico, and Fred Engle, who owned a majority of those leases. Elm Ridge sought to recover drilling expenses by foreclosing on Engle's lease interests. Engle counterclaimed, arguing that Elm Ridge had no authority to operate, and broadly that Elm Ridge breached its contractual and fiduciary duties. Engle also filed a third-party complaint against the previous operators, Central Resources, Inc. and Giant Exploration & Production Company. The district court dismissed two counts on Engle's counterclaim against Elm Ridge and the third-party complaint on statute of limitations grounds. After a trial on Engle's remaining counterclaim count (breach of contractual and fiduciary duties), a jury found that Elm Ridge breached the Operating Agreement and could not recover drilling expenses. The jury found that Engle still owed Elm Ridge for other drilling costs. The district court calculated Engle's share of the costs not attributable to the breach, and held Elm Ridge was entitled to a foreclosure order. Both parties appealed. Finding no error in the district court's calculation or ultimate disposition of the case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Engle v. Elm Ridge Exploration Co." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant XTO Energy, Inc. appealed a district court's certification of a class of Kansas royalty owners who sought recovery for its alleged underpayment of royalties. Specifically, the class claimed XTO violated Kansas law by improperly deducting costs for placing gas into a "marketable condition." After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the class did not meet Rule 23(a)'s commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements or Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Furthermore, the Court found the class' argument in favor of certification through collateral or judicial estoppel unavailing. The class certification order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Trust v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma City car dealer, Automax Hyundai South, sued its insurance company for refusing to defend it when the dealership was sued by customers. Two aggrieved customers brought claims against Automax relating to car purchases they made. The customers won their cases at the state court. The district court ruled that the insurance company had no duty to defend or indemnify Automax in the underlying lawsuits. Upon review of the district court record and the policy at issue, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Automax and concluded the insurance company had a duty to defend. View "Automax v. Zurich, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant George Lopez conducted mediations in a program created and managed by the Administrative Office of Courts of the State of Utah. In 2006, he was removed from the panel of mediators that mediated certain domestic matters. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that his removal from that list of mediators violated his right to due process and his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. He also alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Upon review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Tenth Circuit found that because Plaintiff's primary argument was based on his alleged contractual rights as a public employee, and because the Court found that there was no implied contract (because evidence in the record revealed Plaintiff was not a public employee), Plaintiff's arguments necessarily failed. View "Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court" on Justia Law