Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant Maurice Edwards of a single count of Possession of Controlled Substances with Intent to Distribute. On appeal, he argued: (1) the admission of an anonymous 911 call that mentioned him by name violated the Confrontation Clause; (2) the trial evidence and jury instructions that allowed him to be convicted as a principal constructively amended his indictment; and (3) the jury instruction on aiding and abetting omitted an essential element. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury convicted defendant-appellant Jesus Figueroa-Labrada of conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, the district court attributed to Figueroa 746.19 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine (the total amount of methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy) and sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal, a panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed his sentence and remanded for resentencing based on the district court's failure to make particularized findings to support attributing the total quantity to Figueroa. In doing so, the panel noted that it was "reasonably probable" that only 56.7 grams of the methamphetamine mixture could be attributed to Figueroa based on his participation in the conspiracy. Figueroa appealed he district court's denial of his request for a reduced sentence under the "safety-valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). The district court held section 3553(f) did not apply because Figueroa failed to make the disclosures necessary to support a reduced sentence before his initial sentencing hearing. After review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of section 3553(f), concluding that when a defendant provides information to the government for the first time on remand, but before the resentencing hearing, the plain text of the statute required the district court to consider that information in determining whether the defendant has satisfied 3553(f). Because the district court here failed to do so, its judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the district court to determine Figueroa's eligibility for a safety-valve sentence. View "United States v. Figueroa-Labrada" on Justia Law

Charges were ultimately dropped against plaintiff-appellant Aaron Puller following his 2009 arrest for his suspected involvement in a racially motivated attack of another. The charges were dismissed without hearing because the state district court concluded the affidavit of defendant-appellee Detective Paul Baca, the officer who applied for and obtained the arrest warrant, had omitted material information and supplied false information, and the warrant therefore lacked probable cause. Puller sued Baca under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The federal district court concluded that Baca was entitled to qualified immunity, and entered summary judgment in Baca's favor. Puller appealed, but the Tenth Circuit agreed with the federal district court, and affirmed that court's decision. View "Puller v. Baca" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs John Quinn and Lavern Gonzalez were arrested in connection with an Albuquerque Police Department (APD) larceny sting. They subsequently filed a civil-rights lawsuit against the arresting officers, William Young and Benjamin Melendrez, alleging: (1) a warrantless arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) entrapment; (3) substantive due process; and (4) malicious prosecution. The Officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motion. The district court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found that the Officers arrested Quinn and Gonzalez without probable cause. Additionally, the court determined that a reasonable law-enforcement official in the Officers’ position would have known it was unlawful to make the challenged arrests without probable cause that Quinn and Gonzalez possessed the requisite mens rea for the crime of larceny. In an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, the Officers argued the district court erred because they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs and, alternatively, because the law did not clearly establish that their actions during the sting violated the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Officers that the extant clearly established law would not have put a reasonable, similarly situated officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's decision on their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity grounds. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ entrapment claim. Lastly, the Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to explicitly set forth its reasoning as to whether the Officers could avail themselves of qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ malicious-prosecution and substantive due process claims and to rule on those claims anew. View "Quinn v. Young" on Justia Law

The District Court (Colorado) granted Defendant Naif Al-Yousif's application for a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant, a native of Saudi Arabia, moved to the United States in 1996 to study English. Defendant's conviction was for the 2001 murder of Abdulaziz Al-Kohaji. Although the application was untimely filed, the district court granted equitable tolling and proceeded to the merits. It ruled that the state-court decision was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and "Moran v. Burbine," (475 U.S. 412 (1986)). The State of Colorado appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred in its analysis and application of the cited cases, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Al-Yousif v. Trani" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Hicks entered a conditional guilty plea and was later convicted of: one count of possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine; one count of possession of a firearm or ammunition by a felon; and one count of possession of body armor by a felon previously convicted of a crime of violence. The district court sentenced Hicks to 240 months’ imprisonment. Hicks raises two arguments on appeal to the Tenth Circuit:(1) that the district court erred in denying his two motions to dismiss based on alleged violations of his speedy trial rights under the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment; and (2) that the district court violated the prohibition against judicial participation in plea negotiations. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court concluded that Hicks’s Speedy Trial Act rights were violated, but his Sixth Amendment rights were not. Because the case was remanded for the district court to determine whether the charges against Hicks should have been dismissed with or without prejudice, the Court did not reach his challenge to the plea negotiations. View "United States v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Defendant Billy Engles appealed the revocation of his federal supervised release based on a criminal conviction in state court. Defendant was a registered sex offender in Oklahoma. In 2013, he was on federal supervised release for an unrelated federal offense. A condition of Defendant’s supervised release stated that he “shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.” Defendant accompanied his then live-in girlfriend to her sixteen-year-old daughter’s high school to update the daughter’s emergency contact form. Defendant and his girlfriend spent approximately 10 minutes on campus completing this task. One of the school employees recognized Defendant as a sex offender, and reported his visit. Based on this 10-minute visit to the school, Oklahoma charged Defendant with violating Oklahoma’s Zone of Safety Around Schools statute. Defendant argued in state court that he was not “loitering” because he went to the school very briefly to perform a specific task. The state judge and jury rejected Defendant’s argument, convicted him, and imposed a sentence of time served plus a $2,500 fine. At the time of Defendant’s appeal before the Tenth Circuit, his appeal of that conviction was pending in Oklahoma state court. Because his direct appeal asserted on View "United States v. Engles" on Justia Law

It was undetermined when petitioner Carlos Jovany Medina-Rosales entered the United States, but he received an adjusted status as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in late 2001. In 2013, while residing in Oklahoma, he was convicted of grand larceny in Oklahoma state court. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings. The Notice to Appear ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge (IJ) in Dallas, Texas, even though the issuing officer was in Tulsa, Oklahoma. About two months later Medina-Rosales was issued a Notice of Hearing stating that a master hearing would be held before an IJ in Tulsa. The Dallas-based IJ held video conference hearings with Medina-Rosales and his counsel, who were in Tulsa. The IJ issued an oral decision, ordering Medina-Rosales’ removal and pretermitting and denying his applications for waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status. The IJ rejected his argument that Fifth Circuit law applied, deciding, instead, that Tenth Circuit law applied because the case arose in Tulsa, even though the IJ was located in Dallas and proceedings were conducted by video conference. Next, the IJ determined that Medina-Rosales was ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility, and, by extension, adjustment of status, because he had been convicted of the aggravated felony of grand larceny after acquiring LPR status. The BIA dismissed Medina-Rosales’ appeal, and he appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Based on the clear and unambiguous language of 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), the Tenth Circuit concluded that Medina-Rosales was eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for review and remanded this case back to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ for further proceedings. View "Medina-Rosales v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Ferdman and three co-conspirators concocted a scheme to fraudulently obtain cellular phones from Sprint stores in three states and resell them. Defendant obtained account information for a number of Spring corporate customers. With this information, defendant went to retain stores, purchased the phones, charging the price of the phones to the corporate accounts. Some of the phone were sold to one of his co-conspirators for resale online. Defendant ultimately pled guilty on conspiracy charges, for which he was sentenced to fifteen months in prison. As part of his sentence, the court ordered Defendant to pay Sprint $48,715.59 in restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). The court calculated this amount based on what Sprint referred to as the “retail unsubsidized price” of 86 cell phones Defendant fraudulently procured, plus Sprint’s shipping and investigative costs. Defendant appealed the district court’s restitution order, arguing the Government’s proof of loss was insufficient to support the award. Finding that the district court erred in its application of the MVRA in calculating defendant's restitution amount, the Tenth Circuit vacated the order of restitution for lack of an adequate evidentiary basis, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ferdman" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Dunn was convicted of possessing child pornography, receiving child pornography and distribution of child pornography. Defendant received a 144-month sentence for these convictions, followed by a 25-year term of supervised release. The district court imposed certain special conditions of the release (including restrictions on defendant's ability to access computers and the internet), and ordered payment of restitution. Defendant raised several arguments on appeal: (1) the court erred in instructing the jury, relieving the government of its burden to prove he "distributed" pornography; (2) his convictions for receipt and possession were multiplicitous and violated Double Jeopardy; (3) the special conditions of his supervised release limiting his access to computers and the Internet were not supported by necessary findings of fact; and (4) the district court applied an incorrect legal standard with regard to restitution (affecting the total amount owed). After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the special conditions imposed on release were not supported by necessary findings of fact. The Court also agreed that an incorrect legal standard was used in calculating restitution. On those grounds the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings; the Court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "United States v. Dunn" on Justia Law