Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vanity Johnson pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement in which she "knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] any right to appeal . . . any matter in connection with this prosecution, the defendant's conviction, or the components of the sentence to be imposed herein including the length and conditions of supervised release." Despite her appeal waiver, Johnson filed a notice of appeal and indicated her intent to challenge her sentence. The government moved to enforce Johnson's appeal waiver. On appeal, Johnson argued that her waiver was subject to an exception because the district court relied on an impermissible factor in its sentencing decision. However, Johnson did not challenge that impermissible factor at the district court. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit's review was for plain error only. Finding none, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A series of appeals came before the Tenth Circuit brought by Maria Vianey Medina-Copete and Rafael Goxcon-Chagal following their convictions on drug trafficking charges. The issue these cases presented to the Court were one of first impression. At trial, the district court allowed a purported expert on certain religious iconography to testify that veneration of a figure known as "Santa Muerte" was so connected with drug trafficking as to constitute evidence that the occupants of the vehicle were aware of the presence of drugs in a secret compartment. In addition to qualifying a law enforcement official as an expert on Santa Muerte, the court allowed the witness to wander far afield and render theological opinions about the "legitima[cy]" of Santa Muerte in relation to other venerated figures. Upon review of these cases, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the law enforcement officer was improperly vetted under Fed. R. Evid. 702, "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals," (509 U.S. 579 (1993)), and "Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael," (526 U.S. 137 (1999)), and that the testimony proffered was both impermissible and prejudicial. The Court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.View "United States v. Medina-Copete" on Justia Law

Michael Salas was pulled over for erratic driving and consented to a search of his car, which yielded over 20 pounds of methamphetamine. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute. On appeal, he challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the drug evidence, arguing the court erred in finding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop his car based on a violation of an Oklahoma fog line statute that requires driving "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." He also appealed the district court's sentence based on the court's refusal to decrease his offense level by one point under 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) for acceptance of responsibility and the court's refusal to issue a downward departure for minor or minimal participation in criminal activity under 3B1.2. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. View "United States v. Salas" on Justia Law

Anthony and Melissa Stonecipher became targets of an investigation because of their purchases and sales of firearms and explosives. During the investigation, federal officers discovered that Mr. Stonecipher had pled guilty in 2007 to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in Missouri. One of the officers, Carlos Valles, concluded Mr. Stonecipher had violated federal law, which made it illegal for anyone convicted of even a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. Acting on this knowledge, Valles obtained a search warrant for the Stoneciphers' home, ending with Mr. Stonecipher's arrest. It turned out that Mr. Stonecipher had not been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of federal law. Prosecutors soon learned that the conviction did not count because the sentence had been suspended and, under Missouri law, a suspended sentence in these circumstances did not amount to a conviction. The government dismissed the criminal complaint. The Stoneciphers filed a "Biven"s action against Valles and other law enforcement officers involved in the investigation, alleging violations of their Fourth and First Amendment rights in connection with the search of their home and Mr. Stonecipher's arrest and prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity. The Stoneciphers appealed the grant of summary judgment on their claims for unreasonable search and seizure, unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution, and violation of their First Amendment rights. For purposes of qualified immunity, Valles had enough information to: (1) conclude he had probable cause to search the Stoneciphers' home; and (2) arrest and file charges based on Mr. Stonecipher's possession of firearms and explosives. Further, there was no evidence that Mr. Stonecipher's arrest and prosecution were in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Stonecipher, et al v. Valles, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Smith robbed two stores and shot the managers in both. He was convicted on two counts of robbery, and two counts of using a gun "during and in relation to" those "crime[s] of violence." "Normally, [. . .] a district court enjoys considerable discretion when it comes to picking a prison term within the applicable statutory range. But at the government's urging in this case the district court decided there was one set of facts it had to disregard - Mr. Smith’s [section] 924(c) gun convictions and the lengthy sentence it just issued for them." The Tenth Circuit phrased the issue before it on appeal as whether "a sentencing court must studiously ignore one of the most conspicuous facts about a defendant when deciding how long he should spend in prison." The Court was "convinced the law doesn't require so much from sentencing courts. [. . .] Viewed with a cold eye, the relevant statutes permit a sentencing court to consider a defendant's 924(c) conviction and sentence just as they permit a sentencing court to consider most any other salient fact about a defendant. To say this much isn't to suggest a sentencing court must reduce a defendant's related crime of violence sentence in light of his mandatory gun enhancement sentence under 924(c). Only that the court is not required to feign the sort of ignorance the government demands." The Court affirmed defendant's conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

A Utah state trooper stopped Sherida Felders for speeding while on a trip from California to Colorado. Based on her answers to a few questions, Trooper Brian Bairett asked to search Felders’s car for drugs. After Felders refused, Bairett called for assistance from K-9 Unit officer Jeff Malcom to conduct a dog sniff. The ensuing two-hour search yielded no drugs. Felders and her passengers filed suit against Bairett and Malcom under 28 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other claims, that both Bairett and Malcom unlawfully searched Felders’s car in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Malcom moved for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim based on qualified immunity. The district court denied Malcom’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found as a matter of law that Malcom could not establish probable cause to search the car prior to conducting the dog sniff and that material facts were in dispute regarding (1) whether Malcom’s canine alerted prior to jumping into the vehicle; and (2) whether Malcom facilitated the dog's entry into the vehicle prior to establishing probable cause. Malcom filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. He argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment because he had probable cause to search the car prior to conducting the dog sniff and, alternatively, that the law did not clearly establish that his actions during the sniff violated the Fourth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Malcom did not have probable cause to search the vehicle prior to conducting the sniff. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Malcom's motion for summary judgment. View "Felders, et al v. Malcom, et al" on Justia Law

In 2012, Cheston Foster was arrested for violating the terms of his supervised release, including traveling to Massachusetts without permission. Following a revocation hearing where Foster admitted the violations enumerated, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Foster to time served and 30 months of supervised release. The court imposed a special condition that he reside in a halfway house residential re-entry center. Foster’s attorney sought an alternative arrangement by providing the probation office with the address of Foster’s mother, but the probation officer opposed this suggestion. The district court stated, “[w]hat we will do is we will start with a residential re-entry center, and if through his assigned probation officer there is an alternative that is reasonable, we will go at it that way, but we will start there.” On December 27, 2012, Foster left the residential reentry center without permission and did not return. A few months later, a grand jury issued an indictment charging Foster with a single count of escape from custody. Foster’s attorney moved to dismiss the indictment because the residence requirement “was not part of any detention or a sanction for his supervised release violation,” and therefore Foster was not in custody for purposes of the escape statute. The district court dismissed the indictment after concluding that Foster was not in custody. The government appealed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Five members of Petitioner Steven Bonney's extended family, four girls and one boy, accused him of sexually assaulting them on various occasions when they were between the ages of six and eight and Petitioner was a teenager. The assaults allegedly occurred around 2000 or 2001. The State of Wyoming charged Petitioner in 2008 with four counts of second degree sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault. The issue before the Tenth Circuit, as framed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, was whether the Wyoming state court's denial of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on collateral review of a guilty plea "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established" Supreme Court precedent. The federal district court thought so, but upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed.View "Bonney v. Wilson, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner Enrique Garcia-Mendoza petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision upholding an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his request for cancellation of removal. The agency determined that he was ineligible for such relief because he could not establish that he "ha[d] been a person of good moral character" due to his confinement in a penal institution for more than 180 days. In 2010, he was arrested and charged with driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. He could not afford bond and remained confined during his pretrial criminal proceedings. He was released after he had been confined for a total of 197 days when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took him into custody and initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded that he was removable for remaining in the United States beyond his authorized period of stay and applied for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied his request because petitioner had been confined for more than 180 days for his 2010 conviction and therefore he could not establish the requisite good moral character. While petitioner’s appeal of that decision was pending with the BIA, he filed a motion with the state trial court seeking to amend his sentence. In the motion, he alleged that his counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his sentence before he entered his guilty plea. He asked the court to resentence him to 166 days with no credit for time served. The state court granted the motion and issued a modified mittimus nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date. Petitioner then filed a motion for remand with the BIA based on the new evidence that his sentence was modified to 166 days. The BIA granted the motion and remanded to the IJ. On remand, the IJ again denied cancellation of removal, noting that the nunc pro tunc order modifying the sentence did not change the fact that petitioner had already been confined for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision. Petitioner then petitioned the Tenth Circuit. Seeing no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied review. View "Garcia-Mendoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2009, a Kansas state court convicted Defendant of possessing cocaine with intent to sell and sentenced him to 40 months in jail. Around the same time, Defendant was convicted in a Kansas state court of eluding a police officer. For this latter crime, Defendant’s presumptive Kansas guideline range allowed for a maximum of seven months of jail time. The prosecutor did not seek an upward departure. In the end, the court imposed a six month sentence. In 2012, Defendant pled guilty in the federal District of Kansas to possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base, and to using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office concluded in its Presentence Report (PSR) that Defendant was a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a) because, among other requirements not at issue in this case, he had "at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." Defendant objected to his career offender classification, arguing that eluding a police officer, while indeed a crime of violence, was not a federal felony in this instance because it was not "punishable by . . . imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit was whether defendant committed enough prior qualifying felonies to be considered a "career offender" under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court said yes, relying on "United States v. Hill," (539 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2008)). On appeal, defendant admitted "Hill" mandated this classification, but he argued that "Hill" was abrogated by the Supreme Court in "Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder," (560 U.S. 563 (2010)). The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law