Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Brandon Williams pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenged his lengthy sentence as an improper application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). He claimed that his two prior Arkansas drug convictions were not categorically “serious drug offenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) because his state convictions could have applied to hemp, and hemp was no longer a federally controlled substance at the time of his federal sentencing. Since there was a categorical match between Arkansas’ definition of marijuana at the time of Williams’ prior convictions and the federal definition at the time he committed his federal offense, the Tenth Circuit determined the district court properly applied the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Monterial Wesley was convicted by jury of drug trafficking. In a post-conviction motion, Wesley alleged his prosecutor suborned perjury about the drug quantities attributable to him, in turn increasing his sentencing exposure. But, rather than asking the district court to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he asked for a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute, which permitted a sentencing court to reduce a federal prisoner’s sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Wesley’s motion asserted various grounds for finding extraordinary and compelling reasons in his case, including the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The district court concluded that the claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be interpreted as a challenge to the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence, which can only be brought under § 2255. Because Wesley had previously brought a § 2255 motion attacking the same judgment, and because the Tenth Circuit had not authorized him to file another one, the district court dismissed that portion of Wesley’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. As to the remaining grounds for relief, the district court found they did not justify a sentence reduction. On appeal, Wesley challenged the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal. He did not move for a certificate of appealability (COA), but Tenth Circuit case law required one for this appeal to proceed. “This in turn requires us first to consider whether jurists of reason would find debatable the district court’s decision to construe [Wesley’s compassionate release] motion as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255.” To this, the Tenth Circuit found the question debatable among jurists of reason, so it granted a COA. On the merits, however, the Court agreed with the district court that Wesley’s motion included a successive § 2255 claim because it attacked the validity of his sentence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal. View "United States v. Wesley" on Justia Law

Jose Diaz-Menera challenged the sentence he received for money laundering, arguing that the district court erroneously determined his base offense level under § 2S1.1(a)(1) rather than § 2S1.1(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court applied § 2S1.1(a)(1) based on its finding that Diaz-Menera was a member of the underlying drug conspiracy. Diaz-Menera argued that such finding was insufficient to trigger application of § 2S1.1(a)(1) because he did not personally possess or distribute drugs. However, because the Tenth Circuit concluded that a drug conspiracy can be an underlying offense for purposes of applying § 2S1.1(a)(1), it found no error in the district court’s sentencing decision. But because the government conceded Diaz-Menera’s second argument— agreeing that it breached the plea agreement by failing to move for a one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)—the Court vacated Diaz-Menera’s sentence and remand for resentencing. View "United States v. Diaz-Menera" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Ian Batara-Molina appealed the denial of his motion to suppress methamphetamine found in a car he was driving. The methamphetamine was discovered after Molina was stopped for speeding on his way to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. During this traffic stop, two deputies deployed a drug-sniffing dog around the perimeter of the car and were alerted to the presence of contraband. The car was searched, and methamphetamine was found in the trunk. Molina moved to suppress the methamphetamine on the basis that his traffic stop was delayed for the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After the district court denied this motion, Molina pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Molina maintained his traffic stop was delayed for the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, so it affirmed the district court’s denial of Molina’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Batara-Molina" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Asael Linares was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after an attempted carjacking. He pled guilty, but objected to a sentencing enhancement and the failure to apply a sentencing decrease proposed by the government, arguing that he did not complete an attempted carjacking, nor did he meet the required mental state for the carjacking enhancement. Finding that Linares was about to complete a carjacking while possessing an AK-47, the district court overruled Linares’s objections and sentenced him to 63 months. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the district court did not err in concluding that the facts—the presence of a rifle while confronting a car owner, demanding the keys, approaching the car, threatening the car owner and her family while they were calling 911, and leaving the scene when the victims continued calling 911—met the Sentencing Guideline requirements for carjacking. View "United States v. Linares" on Justia Law

In July 2021 defendant-appellant Anthony Prestel entered into a plea agreement with the government under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) providing that he would plead guilty to sexual abuse in Indian country, and would receive a term of imprisonment of 300 months. The agreement did not specify the term or conditions of Prestel’s supervised release. But under the heading “MAXIMUM POSSIBLE IMPRISONMENT AND/OR FINE,” the agreement stated, “The defendant understands that the maximum possible penalty for Sexual Abuse in Indian Country is imprisonment for a period of Life and/or a fine of $250,000.00, a term of supervised release of at least 5 years up to a lifetime term to be determined by the Court, and a special assessment in the amount of $100.00 and up to $5,100.” Arguing that the district court unlawfully imposed three special conditions of supervised release as part of his sentence Prestel appealed the imposition of those conditions. The Tenth Circuit concluded Prestel waived his right to appeal the three conditions. View "United States v. Prestel" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joseph Chatwin appealed the district court’s denial and dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. In 2013, Chatwin pleaded guilty to two counts: (1) bank fraud and (2) using or carrying (and brandishing) a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). As part of the plea agreement, the government recommended dismissal of seven other charged counts, and Chatwin waived any right to collaterally attack his sentence (though not his convictions). In 2016, Chatwin filed a pro se § 2255 motion challenging his conviction and sentencing as unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2016). As “supporting facts,” Chatwin simply wrote that “police chase not a violent crime.” In 2020, by then represented by counsel, Chatwin moved to amend his motion after the issuance of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Though neither the plea agreement nor the plea colloquy stated whether the court based the § 924(c) conviction on § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause, or both, Chatwin contended that the district court relied solely on the residual clause (a question not yet resolved by the district court). From that, he argued under Davis that the district court needed to vacate his § 924(c) conviction and resentence him. In response, the government repeated its argument that Chatwin’s collateral-attack waiver in the plea agreement defeated any § 2255 claim, including one based on Davis. The district court agreed with the government’s collateral-attack-waiver argument and dismissed Chatwin’s § 2255 motion. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Chatwin showed plain error, and that the error affected his substantial rights. "Absent plainly erring on the waiver’s scope, the district court could not have dismissed on that ground." View "United States v. Chatwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roxanne Torres appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson, agents of the New Mexico State Police Investigations Bureau. The encounter between Torres and Defendants lasted only 14 seconds: Torres was sitting in her vehicle, backed into a spot in front of a suspect’s apartment and cars parked on either side. The vehicle’s engine was running and the doors were locked. Defendants approached Torres’s vehicle and Agent Williamson attempted to open the driver’s door. Defendants shouted commands at Torres to open her door, but they did not announce themselves as police officers. Torres stepped on the gas and headed forward across the parking lot. Both Defendants fired at Torres. Neither Defendant was struck as Torres drove past. Five bullets were fired at the rear of Torres’s vehicle, one of them striking her in the back. Torres ultimately entered a no-contest plea to: (1) aggravated flight from a law- enforcement officer; and (2) assault upon a peace officer. Torres filed a civil-rights suit against Defendants alleging they used excessive force. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that because Torres had successfully fled the scene, she was not seized. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. After remand from the Supreme Court the district court again granted Defendants summary judgment, finding: (1) Torres’s claims were barred because her claims against Defendants were inconsistent with her no-contest pleas to charges of aggravated flight from a law-enforcement officer and assault upon a peace officer; and (2) Torres’s claims were barred on the ground that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding: (1) Torres' pleas were not inconsistent with her claims that the officers used excessive force by firing at her after she had driven past them and no longer posed a threat; and (2) because Defendants did not know Torres would escape when they shot at her, and facts unknown to officers at the moment they use force were not relevant to the qualified-immunity analysis. The Court remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues raised by Defendant's arguments on appeal. View "Torres v. Madrid, et al." on Justia Law

After a shoplifting incident at a Colorado Kmart and a shootout two days later, the federal and state governments both indicted Defendant Joshua Garcia. The federal government waited nearly twenty-three months to prosecute Defendant, while the state prosecution ran its course. The district court held the delay violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and dismissed the federal indictment against him. "Violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right compels a severe remedy: dismissing the indictment with prejudice. But a defendant cannot avail himself of that protection when he did not diligently assert that right." The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held the delay in this case did not violate Defendant’s speedy-trial right and the district court improperly dismissed his indictment. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant Ahmad Salti appealed a district court’s determination of how to calculate his restitution obligation when his co-conspirator also paid some of it. Defendant was sentenced to pay the victim $35,000 in restitution, which was a “Joint and Several Amount” also owed by co-conspirator Pattrick Towner. Towner’s sentence required him to pay restitution to the victim of $72,000, owed jointly and severally with Defendant. After Defendant deposited $35,000 with the court clerk as restitution, the clerk informed the government that Defendant should receive a refund for overpayment. The clerk explained that Towner had paid $5,117.92 in restitution and the clerk had apportioned that amount pro rata between the obligation owed by both Defendant and Towner ($35,000) and the amount owed solely by Mr. Towner ($37,000). Because 35/72 of Towner’s payments ($2,487.87) had been credited to the $35,000 in restitution owed jointly and severally by both defendants, Defendant had overpaid by that amount. The government moved the district court to order the clerk not to pay Defendant a refund of $2,487.87. The district court agreed with the government, declaring that Defendant had to continue to make payments toward his $35,000 obligation unless (because of payments by Towner) the victim had already been fully compensated for its $72,000 loss. Defendant appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the decision of the district court maximized compensation to the victim and treated both Defendant and Towner fairly. View "United States v. Salti" on Justia Law