Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement searched defendant-appellant Tyrell Braxton’s backpack after arresting him and found a gun. Braxton moved to suppress the gun. The government conceded that the warrantless search was not a valid search incident to arrest, but invoked the inevitable-discovery doctrine to avoid suppression of the illegally obtained evidence. The district court agreed with the government and denied the motion to suppress. The Tenth Circuit determined the government’s stated community-caretaking interest in safeguarding Braxton’s personal property by impounding it was significantly undercut by the presence of an individual who arrived on the scene at Braxton’s request and repeatedly asked to take possession of the backpack throughout the arrest process. "The government’s explanation for why the officers could have properly refused this individual’s requests is not persuasive. Nor is it dispositive, on these facts, that Braxton himself did not ask the officers to turn the backpack over." Thus, the Court ruled the government failed to meet its burden to show that law enforcement would have validly retained the backpack, and the inevitable-discovery doctrine did not apply to excuse application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence discovered during the illegal search. Accordingly, the district court’s order refusing to suppress the gun was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Braxton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Elsa Palacios, personal representative of the estate of the deceased, Bernardo Palacios Carbajal, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants-Appellees Salt Lake City Police Officers Neil Iversen and Kevin Fortuna in their individual capacities, as well as Salt Lake City Corporation. Plaintiff alleged the officers violated Palacios’ Fourth Amendment rights when he was fatally shot during a police pursuit. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in favor of Defendants, finding a lack of a constitutional violation and that Plaintiff failed to show a violation of clearly established law. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that disputes about material and historical facts precluded summary judgment. According to Plaintiff, the district court erred by not making reasonable factual inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, primarily that: (1) Palacios may have been unaware he was being pursued by police because officers did not verbally identify themselves, because he was severely intoxicated, and he did not match the full description of the robbery suspect; (2) once Palacios fell onto his side during the shooting and did not point his gun at officers, he was effectively subdued; and (3) Palacios’ conduct showed he was attempting to avoid confrontation, not evade arrest. Plaintiff also contended that officers exaggerated the seriousness of the offenses that precipitated the pursuit and that officers should have used less intrusive means of apprehension because Palacios did not pose an imminent threat. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's case. View "Palacios v. Fortuna, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Williams pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenged his lengthy sentence as an improper application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). He claimed that his two prior Arkansas drug convictions were not categorically “serious drug offenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) because his state convictions could have applied to hemp, and hemp was no longer a federally controlled substance at the time of his federal sentencing. Since there was a categorical match between Arkansas’ definition of marijuana at the time of Williams’ prior convictions and the federal definition at the time he committed his federal offense, the Tenth Circuit determined the district court properly applied the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Monterial Wesley was convicted by jury of drug trafficking. In a post-conviction motion, Wesley alleged his prosecutor suborned perjury about the drug quantities attributable to him, in turn increasing his sentencing exposure. But, rather than asking the district court to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, he asked for a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute, which permitted a sentencing court to reduce a federal prisoner’s sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Wesley’s motion asserted various grounds for finding extraordinary and compelling reasons in his case, including the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The district court concluded that the claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be interpreted as a challenge to the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence, which can only be brought under § 2255. Because Wesley had previously brought a § 2255 motion attacking the same judgment, and because the Tenth Circuit had not authorized him to file another one, the district court dismissed that portion of Wesley’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. As to the remaining grounds for relief, the district court found they did not justify a sentence reduction. On appeal, Wesley challenged the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal. He did not move for a certificate of appealability (COA), but Tenth Circuit case law required one for this appeal to proceed. “This in turn requires us first to consider whether jurists of reason would find debatable the district court’s decision to construe [Wesley’s compassionate release] motion as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255.” To this, the Tenth Circuit found the question debatable among jurists of reason, so it granted a COA. On the merits, however, the Court agreed with the district court that Wesley’s motion included a successive § 2255 claim because it attacked the validity of his sentence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal. View "United States v. Wesley" on Justia Law

Jose Diaz-Menera challenged the sentence he received for money laundering, arguing that the district court erroneously determined his base offense level under § 2S1.1(a)(1) rather than § 2S1.1(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court applied § 2S1.1(a)(1) based on its finding that Diaz-Menera was a member of the underlying drug conspiracy. Diaz-Menera argued that such finding was insufficient to trigger application of § 2S1.1(a)(1) because he did not personally possess or distribute drugs. However, because the Tenth Circuit concluded that a drug conspiracy can be an underlying offense for purposes of applying § 2S1.1(a)(1), it found no error in the district court’s sentencing decision. But because the government conceded Diaz-Menera’s second argument— agreeing that it breached the plea agreement by failing to move for a one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)—the Court vacated Diaz-Menera’s sentence and remand for resentencing. View "United States v. Diaz-Menera" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Ian Batara-Molina appealed the denial of his motion to suppress methamphetamine found in a car he was driving. The methamphetamine was discovered after Molina was stopped for speeding on his way to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. During this traffic stop, two deputies deployed a drug-sniffing dog around the perimeter of the car and were alerted to the presence of contraband. The car was searched, and methamphetamine was found in the trunk. Molina moved to suppress the methamphetamine on the basis that his traffic stop was delayed for the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After the district court denied this motion, Molina pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Molina maintained his traffic stop was delayed for the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, so it affirmed the district court’s denial of Molina’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Batara-Molina" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Asael Linares was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after an attempted carjacking. He pled guilty, but objected to a sentencing enhancement and the failure to apply a sentencing decrease proposed by the government, arguing that he did not complete an attempted carjacking, nor did he meet the required mental state for the carjacking enhancement. Finding that Linares was about to complete a carjacking while possessing an AK-47, the district court overruled Linares’s objections and sentenced him to 63 months. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the district court did not err in concluding that the facts—the presence of a rifle while confronting a car owner, demanding the keys, approaching the car, threatening the car owner and her family while they were calling 911, and leaving the scene when the victims continued calling 911—met the Sentencing Guideline requirements for carjacking. View "United States v. Linares" on Justia Law

In July 2021 defendant-appellant Anthony Prestel entered into a plea agreement with the government under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) providing that he would plead guilty to sexual abuse in Indian country, and would receive a term of imprisonment of 300 months. The agreement did not specify the term or conditions of Prestel’s supervised release. But under the heading “MAXIMUM POSSIBLE IMPRISONMENT AND/OR FINE,” the agreement stated, “The defendant understands that the maximum possible penalty for Sexual Abuse in Indian Country is imprisonment for a period of Life and/or a fine of $250,000.00, a term of supervised release of at least 5 years up to a lifetime term to be determined by the Court, and a special assessment in the amount of $100.00 and up to $5,100.” Arguing that the district court unlawfully imposed three special conditions of supervised release as part of his sentence Prestel appealed the imposition of those conditions. The Tenth Circuit concluded Prestel waived his right to appeal the three conditions. View "United States v. Prestel" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joseph Chatwin appealed the district court’s denial and dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. In 2013, Chatwin pleaded guilty to two counts: (1) bank fraud and (2) using or carrying (and brandishing) a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). As part of the plea agreement, the government recommended dismissal of seven other charged counts, and Chatwin waived any right to collaterally attack his sentence (though not his convictions). In 2016, Chatwin filed a pro se § 2255 motion challenging his conviction and sentencing as unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2016). As “supporting facts,” Chatwin simply wrote that “police chase not a violent crime.” In 2020, by then represented by counsel, Chatwin moved to amend his motion after the issuance of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Though neither the plea agreement nor the plea colloquy stated whether the court based the § 924(c) conviction on § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause, or both, Chatwin contended that the district court relied solely on the residual clause (a question not yet resolved by the district court). From that, he argued under Davis that the district court needed to vacate his § 924(c) conviction and resentence him. In response, the government repeated its argument that Chatwin’s collateral-attack waiver in the plea agreement defeated any § 2255 claim, including one based on Davis. The district court agreed with the government’s collateral-attack-waiver argument and dismissed Chatwin’s § 2255 motion. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Chatwin showed plain error, and that the error affected his substantial rights. "Absent plainly erring on the waiver’s scope, the district court could not have dismissed on that ground." View "United States v. Chatwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roxanne Torres appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson, agents of the New Mexico State Police Investigations Bureau. The encounter between Torres and Defendants lasted only 14 seconds: Torres was sitting in her vehicle, backed into a spot in front of a suspect’s apartment and cars parked on either side. The vehicle’s engine was running and the doors were locked. Defendants approached Torres’s vehicle and Agent Williamson attempted to open the driver’s door. Defendants shouted commands at Torres to open her door, but they did not announce themselves as police officers. Torres stepped on the gas and headed forward across the parking lot. Both Defendants fired at Torres. Neither Defendant was struck as Torres drove past. Five bullets were fired at the rear of Torres’s vehicle, one of them striking her in the back. Torres ultimately entered a no-contest plea to: (1) aggravated flight from a law- enforcement officer; and (2) assault upon a peace officer. Torres filed a civil-rights suit against Defendants alleging they used excessive force. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that because Torres had successfully fled the scene, she was not seized. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. After remand from the Supreme Court the district court again granted Defendants summary judgment, finding: (1) Torres’s claims were barred because her claims against Defendants were inconsistent with her no-contest pleas to charges of aggravated flight from a law-enforcement officer and assault upon a peace officer; and (2) Torres’s claims were barred on the ground that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding: (1) Torres' pleas were not inconsistent with her claims that the officers used excessive force by firing at her after she had driven past them and no longer posed a threat; and (2) because Defendants did not know Torres would escape when they shot at her, and facts unknown to officers at the moment they use force were not relevant to the qualified-immunity analysis. The Court remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues raised by Defendant's arguments on appeal. View "Torres v. Madrid, et al." on Justia Law