Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-appellant Taberon Honie confessed to murder. About two weeks before trial, following his lawyer’s advice, Honie waived his Utah statutory right to jury sentencing in favor of sentencing by the trial judge. Years later, Honie sought habeas relief, arguing: (1) soon after he waived jury sentencing, a fellow inmate told him that he had made a mistake in doing so; (2) a week before trial, Honie asked his trial counsel to withdraw the waiver; and (3) that counsel told him it was too late. During the defense’s opening statement at the murder trial, Honie’s counsel conceded that Honie was guilty of the aggravated-murder charge, telling the jury that the case would be about punishment. After hearing the evidence, a Utah state jury convicted him of aggravated murder. The trial judge imposed the death sentence. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence. In seeking state postconviction relief, Honie argued under the Sixth Amendment that his trial counsel performed deficiently in two ways: (1) by inadequately explaining his right to jury sentencing, and (2) by not following his direction to retract his waiver. The Utah Supreme Court rejected Honie’s first claim, concluding that Honie’s counsel had performed competently. On the second, the court didn’t rule on the deficient-performance question. For both claims, the court ruled that Honie had suffered no prejudice. Before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Honie argued the Utah Supreme Court's application of the substantive-outcome test for prejudice announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) was unreasonable. Honie argued the holdings of three more-recent Supreme Court cases required the Utah Supreme Court to instead use the process-based test as done in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). If Hill’s standard applied, Honie would have instead needed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have chosen jury sentencing. The Tenth Circuit denied relief, finding: (1) the Supreme Court never applied Strickland’s general prejudice standard in a case involving a waiver of jury sentencing in a capital case; and (2) the Supreme Court has never held that a process-based prejudice test applied to jury-sentencing waivers. View "Honie v. Powell" on Justia Law

Jane Doe and two boys were accused of killing Doe’s parents. Even though Doe was a juvenile at the time of the murders, the government charged her with two counts of first-degree murder. The government successfully moved to transfer her case to adult court, where the punishments for first-degree murder are death or mandatory life imprisonment without parole. These punishments would be unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile. Doe argued she could not be transferred to adult court because, even if guilty, there was no statutory punishment available for her alleged crime. She also argued the district court used an incorrect legal standard for transfer from juvenile to adult court and improperly weighed the relevant factors for transfer. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found her constitutional argument was not ripe, the district court applied the correct legal standard, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the transfer factors. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s transfer of Doe’s case from juvenile to adult court. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Leib challenged the 100-month sentence he received for his conviction for being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The specific sentencing question presented by this appeal was whether the district court clearly erred in calculating Leib’s advisory prison range under the sentencing guidelines by enhancing his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence for the sentencing court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this enhancement applied in Leib’s case. The Court therefore affirmed Leib’s sentence. View "United States v. Leib" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Germaine Coulter, Sr. appealed his convictions for child sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit child sex trafficking. For many years, Coulter was a pimp in the Oklahoma City area. Upon release from a five-year state prison term in 2017, he conscripted an underage girl, “Doe 2,” to recruit a schoolmate, “Doe 1,” to perform sex work for him. After Doe 1 expressed interest, Elizabeth Andrade, one of Coulter’s longtime sex workers, took pictures of Doe 1 in various stages of undress and sent them to Coulter. He forwarded the photos to potential clients with messages suggesting that Doe 1 would perform sex acts for money. Andrade also sent the photos to potential clients and used one of the photos to advertise Doe 1’s services online. A grand jury indicted Coulter and later issued a superseding indictment charging him with (1) conspiring with Andrade to commit child sex trafficking, (2) child sex trafficking with respect to Doe 1, and (3) child sex trafficking with respect to "Doe 3." The grand jury also indicted Andrade for conspiracy to commit child sex trafficking. She pled guilty. Relevant to this appeal, the jury deliberated for about six hours before reporting it had reached a verdict. It filled out verdict forms finding Coulter guilty on Counts 1 and 2 related to Doe 1, but said it was deadlocked on Count 3 related to Doe 3. When the district court polled the jury, one juror said the verdict did not reflect her opinion and expressed that she did not want to return to the deliberations. The he district court recessed for the weekend. On Monday morning, Coulter moved for a mistrial based on these events with the jury. The district court denied the motion. The jury did continue deliberations, but reached the same result. Coulter thereafter moved for a new trial, arguing (1) the evidence against him was insufficient to support the jury verdict and (2) the district court erred in admitting certain testimony. The motion was denied and Coulter was sentenced to 360 months in prison. The Tenth Circuit found the trial court handled its post-trial jury interactions without abusing its discretion. Further, the Court found any admission of testimony was harmless. Accordingly, Coulter's convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Coulter" on Justia Law

Timothy Sumpter was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and aggravated sexual battery, arising from his 2011 sexual assault of J.B. in Wichita, Kansas. The controlling sentence was for aggravated kidnapping, a conviction which added over 15 years to Sumpter’s sentence. Sumpter petitioned for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming that his convictions were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court granted in part Sumpter’s petition for relief, vacating the aggravated kidnapping conviction but denied his remaining claims. Furthermore, the district court denied Sumpter’s request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) with respect to his unsuccessful claims. The State of Kansas appealed the partial grant of habeas relief; Sumpter sought to appeal the partial denial. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief, concluding—under the deference prescribed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)—that the Kansas Court of Appeals (“KCOA”) was reasonable in determining that any ineffective assistance of counsel was not prejudicial because the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Even if the decision was not entitled to deference, the Court concluded under de novo review, the KCOA's decision should have been upheld. The matter was remanded for entry of judgment in Kansas' favor; the Court denied Sumpter's request for a COA and dismissed his cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Sumpter v. Kansas" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Roger Harbin pled guilty to various drug and firearm offenses and was sentenced to a total of 280 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Harbin challenged his sentence, contending the district court plainly erred by enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The Tenth Circuit determined Harbin did not meet his burden of demonstrating that any error in applying the § 4B1.1 enhancement was clear or obvious. Accordingly, the district court's sentencing decision was affirmed. View "United States v. Harbin" on Justia Law

In 2018, Joseph “Tiger King” Maldonado-Passage was indicted and later convicted by jury on several counts, including two murder-for-hire schemes. He was sentenced to a 264-month term of imprisonment. He appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming, inter alia, his murder-for-hire counts should have been grouped for purposes of calculating his total offense level. The Court affirmed Maldonado-Passage’s murder-for-hire convictions, but held his 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) offenses shared a “common criminal objective” and should have been grouped under § 3D1.2(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On remand, Maldonado-Passage moved for reconsideration of the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss one of the two § 1958(a) counts as multiplicitous. He proposed his counts be merged and subject to a single penalty. In its denial of the motion, the district court concluded Maldonado-Passage failed to demonstrate adequate grounds for reconsideration. Furthermore, during resentencing, the district court announced it would not exercise its discretion to expand the scope of sentencing beyond the grouping error identified by the Tenth Circuit prior to the remand, Maldonado-Passage I. The district court revised Maldonado-Passages’ total offense level and advisory Guidelines sentencing range and accordingly imposed a reduced sentence of 252 months’ imprisonment. This sentence included two consecutively run 102-month terms for each murder-for-hire conviction. Maldonado-Passage appealed here claiming the text of § 1958(a) prohibited his conduct from being parsed into two offenses with consecutively run sentences. To this, the Tenth Circuit disagreed: the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting its sentencing scope and refusing to reconsider Maldonado-Passage’s previously denied motion to dismiss for multiplicity. Therefore, no vehicle to challenge the § 1958(a) components of his sentence as multiplicitous remains. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit confirmed § 1958(a)’s “plot centric” unit of prosecution permits separate offenses and consecutive sentences when, as here, two unrelated hitmen are hired to kill the same person. View "United States v. Maldonado-Passage" on Justia Law

Patrol Sergeant Mark Garrett seized a firearm from underneath David Samilton’s passenger seat during a vehicle stop. Based on the firearm, (1) a jury convicted Samilton of being a felon in possession; and (2) the district court revoked his supervised release in an unrelated case. On appeal in both cases, Samilton challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the firearm. Finding no reversible error in the district courts' judgments, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Samilton" on Justia Law

In the fall of 2015, D.T. enrolled as a freshman at Cherokee Trail High School in Aurora, Colorado. During his time at Cherokee Trail, he suffered from depression and a general decline in academic performance. His mother regularly communicated with school officials regarding his well-being and coordinated in-school support. During the first semester of his junior year, D.T. was reported for making a school shooting threat. As a result, he was expelled from Cherokee Trail and the Cherry Creek School District (“the District”) initiated a special education assessment. In December 2017, the District concluded D.T. suffered from a Serious Emotional Disability and approved an individualized education program (“IEP”) to assist his learning. D.T. appealed a district court's judgment finding the District did not deny him access to a free and appropriate public education as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). D.T. asked the Tenth Circuit to conclude the District violated its obligation to identify, or “child find,” students with disabilities who required supplementary academic supports. The Tenth Circuit declined D.T.'s request, finding the District acted reasonably to preserve his access to the benefit of general education. "The District’s duty to assess and provide D.T. with special education services did not begin until his emotional dysfunction manifested in the school environment by way of his shooting threat." View "D.T. v. Cherry Creek School" on Justia Law

In April 2019, police found Defendant Felipe Nevarez in possession of approximately 26 grams of methamphetamine and over $16,000 in cash. The Government sought and obtained an indictment charging Defendant with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Defendant’s case was delayed numerous times, first through a series of pre-trial continuances resulting from motions, counsel withdrawals, and plea negotiations before the onset of the COVID pandemic prompted further delay. When Defendant’s case eventually proceeded to trial in April 2021, Defendant conceded possession of methamphetamine and only put the Government to its burden of proof on the issue of intent to distribute. Unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that the Government’s investigation failed to produce many of the traditional hallmarks of drug dealing, the jury convicted Defendant as charged. Thereafter, the district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, asking the Tenth Circuit to reverse his conviction and dismiss the indictment based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act or, in the alternative, remand his case for resentencing on the grounds that the district court erred by denying him an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Nevarez" on Justia Law