Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Antoine Frazier appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a roadside search of his vehicle in 2019. A Utah state trooper pulled defendant over for speeding. The trooper did not begin the standard procedures necessary to issue a citation. Instead, he immediately began trying to contact a canine handler with the local sheriff’s office, so he could come to the scene and perform a dog sniff of the vehicle. At first, the trooper tried contacting the deputy via the instant-messaging system on his vehicle’s computer. When the deputy failed to respond to several messages, the trooper tried callling him on the radio. When the deputy again failed to respond, the trooper asked dispatch to locate him and send him to the scene. Approximately thirty minutes from the initial stop did the canine search defendant's vehicle, alerting to potential contraband. In this time, a records check from dispatch revealed defendant had pled guilty in 2006 to manslaughter; a pat-down search revealed defendant had a .22 caliber pistol in his pants pocket. Defendant was ultimately arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and for possession of fentanyl and cocaine with the intent to distribute. Defendant argued the evidence obtained from that search was inadmissible because the trooper improperly prolonged the traffic stop to facilitate a dog sniff and thereby obtain probable cause to search his vehicle. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the trooper departed from the traffic-based mission of the stop by arranging the dog sniff, "an investigative detour that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion and that added time to the stop. ...The trooper’s consultation of the DEA database, a second investigative detour, only aggravated that ongoing violation. Accordingly, the evidence discovered because of that seizure is tainted by its unlawfulness and is inadmissible." View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

At defendant-appellant Jamaryus Moore’s initial sentencing hearing, the court offered him a choice: (1) an immediate 51-month sentence of imprisonment; or (2) a 48-month sentence of probation, subject to at least 84 months’ imprisonment for any future probation violation. Moore took the second option, and for over a year, upheld his end of the bargain. Moore admitted to some conditions of his probation, and the district court made good on its promise to sentence him to 84 months’ imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court’s sentencing bargain was procedurally unreasonable. After review, the Court held that it was: when revoking probation and resentencing under section 3565(a)(2), the Sentencing Guidelines and United States v. Kelley (359 F.3d 1302) (10th Cir. 2004) required district courts to undertake a two-step analysis. The Court determined nothing in the district court's record suggested either the trial court nor the parties undertook the needed two-step analysis. "We are left to guess as to how the district court arrived at its 84-month sentence." The Court ultimately found Moore showed the district court plainly erred when it sentenced him, making the sentence-in-advance feature procedurally unreasonable. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

This case arose from a jail fight that started when an inmate learned that another inmate “snitched.” Based on the fight, the government charged two inmates, Derrick Segue and Klawaun Sutton, with conspiring to tamper with a witness in a federal proceeding. Defendants moved for acquittal, arguing the evidence was insufficient as to their contemplation of a legal proceeding that was likely to be federal. The motion was denied and they were convicted. The Tenth Circuit reversed, however, finding that Sutton and Segue intended to interfere with a state proceeding. "There was nothing to suggest [they] had contemplated the witness' participation in a possible federal proceeding or a proceeding reasonably likely to become federal." View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant-appellant Tony Burris pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and the district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison, the low end of his sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. After Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which addressed sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine, and made those changes retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, Burris moved for a reduced sentence. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Burris’s Guidelines range remained the same because the calculation should have been based on the larger quantity of crack cocaine attributed to Burris in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) rather than the smaller amount charged in the indictment. Recognizing that the parties raised an issue that had not yet been addressed by the Tenth Circuit, the district court declined to resolve it, instead exercising its discretion to deny relief regardless of the correct Guidelines calculation. The Tenth Circuit held the district court was obligated to calculate Burris’s revised Guidelines range before exercising its discretion to deny relief, and that the error was not harmless. Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Burris" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Charles Chavez was accused of attempting to force two individuals to withdraw their money from a bank automated teller machine (“ATM”) at gunpoint. The district court dismissed these charges, reasoning that, had the accountholders completed the withdrawal as intended, Chavez would have taken the money from them, as opposed to from the bank that operated the ATM. The Tenth Circuit found the district court’s decision aligned with the Fifth Circuit’s approach to this issue, but conflicted with the Seventh Circuit’s. The Tenth Circuit sided with the Seventh Circuit: "Using force to induce a bank customer to withdraw money from an ATM is federal bank robbery, so Chavez cannot show that the government is incapable of proving that his specific conduct amounted to attempted federal bank robbery." Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant John Michael McIntosh pled guilty to five counts of robbery, plus three counts of brandishing a pistol during those five robberies. During the change-in-plea hearing held by the district court, however, McIntosh repeatedly expressed doubts about whether he should plead guilty and suggested that his mental capacity was impaired. After off-the-record discussions with the government, he finally went forward with the plea and the district court completed its plea colloquy. But two months after entering the plea, McIntosh moved to withdraw it, contending that the plea was neither knowing nor voluntary and therefore violated his constitutional due process rights. The district court denied the motion and accepted the plea agreement at sentencing. McIntosh appealed, arguing that the plea was constitutionally invalid, and in the alternative, that the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea was an abuse of discretion. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court failed to ensure the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, so it vacated McIntosh’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

During a drug trafficking investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents used authorized wiretaps to intercept Jorge Portillo-Uranga’s communications. After he was arrested and charged with drug trafficking crimes, Portillo-Uranga moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the wiretaps. He claimed, among other things, that: (1) the government failed to establish its investigative need for the wiretaps; and (2) the interception of his communications occurred outside the authorizing court’s territorial jurisdiction. After the district court denied his motion, Portillo-Uranga pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for firearms possession because DEA agents found firearms and indicia of drug trafficking throughout Portillo- Uranga’s ranch when they arrested him. To the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Portillo-Uranga contended the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by applying the sentencing enhancement for firearms possession. The Court found the district court did not err in finding the government established a need for the wiretaps, and the interception in Kansas satisfied controlling Tenth Circuit caselaw regarding territorial jurisdiction. The government also established a nexus between the firearms located on Portillo-Uranga’s ranch and the drug trafficking charges. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Portillo-Uranga" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant-appellant Tiahmo Draine of possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred: (1) by admitting testimony from law enforcement officers based on their specialized training and experience without sua sponte qualifying them as experts; (2) by admitting opinion testimony about Draine’s mental state (his intent to distribute heroin); and (3) by admitting a 911 call recording (i) without proper authentication, and (ii) in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Draine's convictions. View "United States v. Draine" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Julieann Logsdon pleaded guilty to making a false statement: the statement concerned her whereabouts and activities on the night of a suspected arson, and were made to a federal agent investigating that arson. At sentencing, the district court applied a cross-reference that increased the Sentencing Guidelines’ advisory range where “the offense involved arson.” Logsdon challenges the application of the cross-reference. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Logsdon" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Twyla Casados, a member of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, was driving under the influence within the boundaries of the Southern Ute reservation in Colorado when she struck and killed another motorist, Charlene Bailey. Casados pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder, and her plea agreement specifically anticipated a restitution order and described Bailey as “the victim” of the offense. At her sentencing hearing, Casados concurred with the Probation Office’s recommendations on restitution. She specifically agreed that she owed restitution to the Victim Compensation Board to cover the costs of Bailey’s cremation services, but she argued she should not be required to cover travel expenses incurred by Bailey’s family members. In response, the government maintained that “the law is very clear that [Bailey’s children] stand in her shoes for the purposes of the restitution statute.” Casados appealed, challenging only the order to pay $7,724.20 in restitution to Rivas for his family’s travel expenses. The Tenth Circuit concluded section 3663A(a)(2) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 1996 did not permit the victim’s representative to substitute his or her own expenses for those of the victim. Thus, the district court here lacked authority to order Casados to pay restitution for transportation expenses that were incurred not by the victim of Casados’s crime but instead by the victim’s representative. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for entry of a corrected restitution order. View "United States v. Casados" on Justia Law