Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In July 2018, defendant Anthony Cordova was convicted by jury of two felonies associated with the murder of Shane Dix: (1) committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering activity (“VICAR murder”); and (2) in the course of that crime, causing the death of Dix through use or possession of a firearm. Cordova challenged the district court’s pretrial ruling denying his motion to exclude a mostly unintelligible one-minute recorded portion of a conversation with a cooperating witness. In addition, Cordova contended the district court abused its discretion in denying his two motions for a new trial: one alleging insufficiency of evidence and government misconduct, and the other alleging newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "United States v. Cordova" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ahmad Ajaj, a practicing Muslim, was a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate serving a 114-year sentence for terrorist acts connected with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ajaj sued to obtain injunctive relief against BOP and damages from BOP officials on several grounds, including violations of his rights to free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed his claims, and Ajaj appealed, contending the district court erred by holding: (1) his claim against the BOP for denial of his right to group prayer was moot; and (2) that RFRA did not provide a claim for damages against government officials in their individual capacities. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ajaj and reversed the challenged rulings. The Court found the mootness ruling was based on a misconception of the evidence of Ajaj’s prison conditions. And the Supreme Court ruled in Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020), that damages claims were permissible under RFRA. The Court rejected Ajaj’s contention that the doctrine of qualified immunity was inapplicable to RFRA claims, but declined to resolve whether the individual defendants in this case showed entitlement to qualified immunity, leaving that matter to the district court in the first instance. View "Ajaj v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al." on Justia Law

In defendant-appellant Curtis Anthony’s case, the district court sentenced him to a custodial sentence shortly after trial but did not determine the restitution amount until several months later. When Anthony later filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his conviction, the district court dismissed the motion as untimely. The court concluded Anthony’s one-year limitations period began to run when Anthony’s time to appeal the initial judgment expired even though restitution proceedings were pending on direct appeal. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a judgment of conviction is not final for section 2255 limitations purposes until the defendant’s sentence becomes final upon the conclusion of direct review. Anthony’s judgment of conviction had yet to become final because restitution was a component of his sentence and direct review of the restitution proceedings was still ongoing. Thus, the district court should not have dismissed Anthony’s section 2255 motion as untimely. View "United States v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Darrell Black was a suspect in three robberies; two took place in Kansas, and one in Missouri. He was arrested in Missouri and indicted for robbery in both the Western District of Missouri and the District of Kansas. While in custody in Missouri, Black expressed a wish to plead guilty and asked the District of Kansas to transfer the charges to Missouri. Kansas granted Black’s request and transferred the indictment. On April 30, 2018, Black was arraigned in Missouri, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the Kansas charges. Black’s plea of not guilty triggered Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(c), which required the clerk of the transferee court to “return the papers to the court where the prosecution began” and the original court to “restore the proceeding to its docket.” On November 15, 2018, the Clerk for the Missouri court notified the Clerk for the Kansas court that the case was being transferred back for disposition. Black remained in custody in Missouri for sentencing on the Missouri charges. On December 18, 2018, Missouri accepted Black’s guilty plea on the Missouri charges, but sentencing didn’t take place until March 6, 2019. Sixteen days later, Black appeared in the District of Kansas. Black invoked the Speedy Trial Act, moving to dismiss the indictment on the Kansas robberies. The District of Kansas denied the motion, concluding that defendant’s appearance in the transferee district did not start the speedy-trial clock. To this the Tenth Circuit court of Appeals disagreed, finding that more than 70 non-excludable days passed between Black's first appearance in Missouri and his motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the district court to decide whether the charges should be dismissed with or without prejudice, considering the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances leading to dismissal, and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and the administration of justice. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

The United States Supreme Court remanded these cases back to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioners Sitamipa Toki, Eric Kamahele, and Daniel Maumau filed motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences stemming from a series of armed robberies. They made several arguments in their motions, including that their convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence were invalid because their predicate convictions were not “crime[s] of violence” as defined by the statute. The district court denied the section 2255 motions, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of its intervening decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021), which held that a crime that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) “elements” or “force” clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The parties agreed that, after Borden, offenses that could be committed recklessly were not “crime[s] of violence” under section 924(c)’s nearly identical elements clause, 924(c)(3)(A). As a result, the petitioners’ predicate assault convictions under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (“VICAR”) could not support their separate convictions under section 924(c). The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed in part the district court’s order denying petitioners’ section 2255 motions and remanded with instructions to vacate their section 924(c) convictions based on violations of VICAR. View "United States v. Toki" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Marvin Ellis was convicted by jury of, among other things, conspiring to manufacture, distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. Ellis was sentenced to a term of 303 months' imprisonment, to be followed by 13 years of supervised release. Ellis appealed the sentence, arguing: (1) district court misapplied the United States Sentencing Guidelines by failing to make particularized findings regarding the scope of his jointly undertaken criminal activity with his coconspirator Ataven Tatum; and (2) the evidence did not support a judicial finding that he agreed to participate in jointly undertaken criminal activity with Tatum, therefore the drug quantities associated with Tatum’s purchases of cocaine should not have been attributed to him for sentencing purposes. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Ellis' sentence. View "United States v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Monty Englehart pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) and was sentenced to time served and five years of supervised release. The conditions of his supervised release prohibited him from viewing sexually explicit materials. Englehart violated the conditions of his supervised release on three occasions by viewing legal, adult pornography. After a hearing, the district court amended the sexual material restriction and added additional conditions to Englehart’s supervised release, including: (1) psychosexual evaluation and treatment; and (2) mental health treatment. Englehart appealed, arguing the district court failed to make particularized findings of compelling circumstances to justify the revised Sexual Material Prohibition and failed to give even a generalized statement of reasons to justify the Mental Health Condition. The Tenth Circuit agreed, vacated those conditions, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed affirm the Psychosexual Evaluation and Treatment Condition because the district court provided an adequate generalized statement of reasons and did not improperly delegate sentencing authority to Englehart’s probation officer. View "United States v. Englehart" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Curtis Anthony was convicted of child-sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit child-sex trafficking. He was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay restitution to R.W. and M.M. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal recognized that Anthony’s conduct was reprehensible, but vacated the restitution order as to R.W. because the district court failed to apply but-for causation to determine restitution as required by 18 U.S.C. 1593. In doing so, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that the statute permitted restitution based on a sufficient-causation theory. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to recalculate restitution based on actual losses resulting directly from Anthony’s offenses. On remand, the Government sought restitution under the sufficient-causation theory previously rejected. The district court denied the Government’s request for Anthony to pay $1,143,000 in restitution to R.W., finding that the Government’s expert report failed to determine which losses compensable by restitution she would not have suffered but for Anthony’s conduct. The Government appealed. Although the parties agreed that R.W. suffered trauma from Anthony and was thus potentially entitled to restitution from him, under the prior decision, Anthony I, the Government had to show he was the but-for cause of the loss that a restitution award would compensate. "And although this showing should be attainable in many instances and likely could have been made here, the Government failed to make it on remand." Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Defendant Victor Sanchez entered a blind plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court varied downward from Defendant’s advisory guideline range of 110 to 120 months and sentenced him to 96 months in prison. Defendant challenged the district court’s calculation of his base offense level for the purpose of determining his advisory guideline range, particularly the court’s decision to increase his base offense level by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018). On appeal, Defendant renewed his objection to the district court’s four-level increase. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that "All § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires under our precedents is that Defendant’s possession of the firearm had the potential to facilitate his possession of the stolen vehicle. The district court was well within its authority to find it did." View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury found Johnny Warren guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and unlawfully possessing a firearm. The court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 which prospectively ameliorated excessive sentences for crack cocaine offenses. With the passage of the First Step Act in 2018, Congress made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive to the extent it granted judges the discretion to impose reduced sentences for crack cocaine offenders who were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act. In 2019, Warren moved for a reduced sentence; Warren’s original sentence included a downward variance from the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines range. He therefore asked for the same percentage variance from the Guidelines range that would have been generated had the Fair Sentencing Act applied to his original sentencing. The district court denied Warren’s motion. Seven months later, Warren moved for reconsideration. Although the motion was untimely, the Government agreed to waive any procedural or timeliness bars. In his motion, Warren primarily argued he had been improperly designated a career offender by the sentencing court, which resulted in an inappropriately inflated Guidelines range. Warren also presented other arguments, including that the COVID-19 pandemic should be considered as part of the sentencing factors. The district court denied Warren’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Warren challenged only the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider, arguing the district court erred: (1) in applying the legal standard for reconsideration despite the Government’s waiver; (2) in holding he could have raised COVID-19 in his initial motion for sentence reduction; and (3) by failing to make an alternative holding anchored in the proper Guidelines calculation. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law