Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prior to the First Step Act, defendants convicted of crimes involving crack cocaine faced much higher penalties than defendants convicted of powder cocaine offenses. Section 404 of the First Step Act "opened the courtroom doors" to these defendants to move for discretionary sentence reductions based on the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the remedial purpose of section 404 was clear, its language had not been interpreted uniformly. Because application of section 404(b) "should not vary from defendant to defendant," the Court concluded that before a district court exercises its discretion, "it should look to the drug quantity and Sentencing Guidelines associated with an eligible defendant’s offense of conviction, rather than his underlying conduct, to 'impose a reduced sentence as if . . . the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.'” The district court did not do so here, so denial of defendant-appellant Jason Broadway's petition for sentence reduction was reversed. View "United States v. Broadway" on Justia Law

Guy Jean-Pierre, a corporate and securities attorney, aided an illegal stock trading operation. Through a series of self-dealing transactions, Jean-Pierre and his co-conspirators artificially inflated stock prices of a company they controlled. Jean- Pierre sent letters on the company’s behalf to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that contained false and misleading information and omitted material information from disclosures to potential investors. Jean-Pierre appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud as to four of the twenty-eight counts of conviction, arguing the district court erred in admitting evidence that he had previously used his niece’s signature without her permission to submit attorney letters to a stock trading website. Jean- Pierre also argued that three of the four convictions should have been reversed because the district court declined to give a requested instruction reiterating the government’s burden as to a specific factual theory. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jean-Pierre" on Justia Law

Defendant Veng Xiong was convicted by jury on one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, and on weapons possession charges. On appeal, Defendant challenged his two firearm-related convictions based on what the Government admitted was an erroneous constructive possession charge tendered to the jury. The Tenth Circuit concluded Defendant did not meet his burden to show that there was a “reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Xiong" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Matthew Maley appealed a district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Maley was convicted in New Mexico of various conspiracy and drug offenses as well as possession of a firearm by a felon, for which he was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment on the drug-related counts and 120 months’ imprisonment on the felon-in-possession count to run concurrently. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on direct appeal, rejecting the argument that he was denied his choice of counsel when the district court denied his fourth motion for a continuance and required his then-counsel to proceed to trial. Maley also faced charges in Arizona based upon evidence found in the travel trailer. In that case, however, Arizona counsel filed a motion to suppress which was granted and ultimately the charges were dismissed. In his section 2255 motion, Maley argued that had his New Mexico counsel filed a motion to suppress, it likely would have been granted and he would not have been convicted on the felon in possession of a firearm count. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on: (1) whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that Maley would be found within the travel trailer he was using as his residence when they entered it on November 17, 2013, with a valid warrant for his arrest; and (2) if probable cause was lacking, whether the failure of New Mexico trial counsel to seek suppression of the evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Finding no reversible error in the district court judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Maley" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant John William Childers, then-incarcerated in Oklahoma, appealed a district court’s denial of his pro se 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Childers was convicted of violating two provisions of Oklahoma’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) for living within 2,000 feet of a school and for failing to update his address. He was serving two consecutive life sentences for these convictions. After seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Childers sought federal habeas relief, arguing, among other things, that his life sentences were the result of an impermissible retroactive application of SORA’s provisions in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Oklahoma Constitution. The district court determined that Childers’s section 2254 petition was time-barred and denied relief. The Tenth Circuit, however, granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA), concluding that “[r]easonable jurists could debate whether . . . Childers has advanced a colorable claim of actual innocence” to overcome the time-bar. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court’s procedural ruling was correct and that Childers did not raise a claim of actual innocence before the district court or in his application for a COA. Accordingly, the Court disagreed that a COA should have been granted. Even were this not the case, Childers’s ex post facto arguments on appeal changed substantially from those he presented in his COA application. The Court therefore declined to consider Childers’s new arguments because they exceeded the scope of the COA. View "Childers v. Crow" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Eric Martinez appealed a district court’s imposition of a 27-month sentence for his burglary conviction under the Indian Major Crimes Act. In February 2016, Martinez and two accomplices burglarized a residence within the boundaries of the Navajo Nation in McKinley County, New Mexico. During the burglary, Martinez used a hammer to break a hole in the front door near the doorknob to gain entry to the residence. He and his accomplices took valuable items from the residence, including electronics, jewelry, and ceremonial shawls and robes. Martinez ultimately pled guilty to an “assimilated” New Mexico burglary offense under N.M. Stat. Ann. 30-16-3. At sentencing, Martinez argued that federal law permitted the district court to impose a conditional discharge, which would allow a term of probation without entry of a judgment of conviction -- a sentence possible had his case been adjudicated in New Mexico state court. He also objected to a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B2.1(b)(4) for possessing a dangerous weapon on the basis that he did not use the hammer as a weapon during the burglary. The district court rejected these arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Martinez’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Christopher Dominguez appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This case arose from Defendant’s involvement in a series of robberies in New Mexico and Wyoming. In 2016, Defendant was arrested along with two other suspects, for the armed robbery of the Medicine Shoppe Pharmacy in Raton, New Mexico. Prior to the robbery, the robbers had stolen a vehicle, which they used during the robbery and abandoned thereafter. During the robbery, the robbers wore face coverings, displayed firearms, and ordered the pharmacy employees to load certain drugs into black trash bags that the robbers supplied. The robbers identified the requested drugs by name, namely Oxycontin and Oxycodone. After seeing the Raton Police Department Facebook information, a Medicap pharmacist in Wyoming alerted law enforcement, which began investigating whether the suspects in the New Mexico robbery had also committed a prior Wyoming robbery, under similar circumstances. Defendant would ultimately strike a plea agreement for the charges arising out of the two robberies. On the day of his change-of-plea hearing, the law changed: on December 21, 2018, the President signed into law the First Step Act, a wide-ranging package of criminal justice reform measures that had passed both houses of Congress only days prior. Pertinent here, the First Step Act altered the “stacking” provision of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), which had “significant implications” for Defendant’s potential sentencing exposure. On appeal of his ultimate conviction, Defendant contended his plea was invalid for two reasons: (1) he did not knowingly and intelligently plead guilty; and (2) he did not receive the requisite “close assistance” of counsel in making his plea. Despite his arguments to the contrary, the Tenth Circuit concluded Defendant was unconvincing unknowingly and unintelligently pleaded guilty or that he did not receive “close assistance” of counsel. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a road rage incident at the corner of a crosswalk in Colorado Springs: a pedestrian wanted to cross the street, the driver of a vehicle wanted to turn right. Words were exchanged, the driver pulled out a gun and took a shot at the pedestrian. The bullet didn’t strike anyone. The vehicle sped off, and the pedestrian called 911. Law enforcement focused their investigation on Defendant Perry Suggs. Warrants were issued, Defendant’s home was searched, and incriminating evidence was discovered. A federal grand jury charged Defendant with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during sequential searches of his home and an SUV parked under his carport, arguing that the warrant to search his home violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and that officers would not have found the evidence used against him but for the invalid warrant. The district court disagreed and denied the motion. Defendant appealed that decision. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. “Because the residential search warrant failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and cannot be saved by the severability doctrine, we vacate the order denying Defendant’s suppression motion.” Yet the question remained whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule saved the incriminating evidence from suppression. The case was remanded for the district court to resolve underlying factual disputes and consider that remedial question in light of the Tenth Circuit’s holding. View "United States v. Suggs" on Justia Law

Two decades ago, Wallace Crooks was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. He was convicted at a bench trial in which the district court found the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Crooks personally possessed with intent to distribute and did distribute 567 grams of crack cocaine. At the time of Crooks’ crime and sentencing, the quantity of crack cocaine he was convicted of conspiring to distribute (50 grams or more) triggered 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). This enhanced penalty provision subjected Crooks to a mandatory statutory penalty of 10 years to life imprisonment. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated an offense level of 38 based on the quantity of drugs involved in the entire conspiracy, between 1,701 and 2,126 grams, and a criminal history category of VI. The PSR also concluded Crooks qualified as a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, treating the instant charge for conspiracy as a controlled substance offense. Crooks did not object to the PSR which recommended a sentence of 360 months. Crooks filed a motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act in 2019, requesting a reduction of his 360-month sentence to time-served, which at the time was about 260 months. In support, Crooks argued he was eligible for First Step Act relief because his offense of conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841 was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. He then asked the district court to correctly calculate his guidelines range without the career offender enhancement because a federal drug conspiracy was not a “controlled substance offense” under the career offender guideline. The district court denied relief; the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding Crooks was eligible to have his designation as a career offender re-reviewed. View "United States v. Crooks" on Justia Law

A trial judge excused several hard-of-hearing potential jurors from the venire of defendant Kenneth Meadows’ trial for sex offenses. Trial was to be held in a small, rural Colorado district court that lacked sufficient amplification equipment. Meadows’s trial lawyer objected to the excusals, but chose not to seek a continuance of jury selection to obtain equipment from a different location. Meadows was convicted. On direct appeal to state court, Meadows raised the juror dismissal issue, but that argument was rejected by the Colorado Court of Appeals. The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review, and Meadows was unsuccessful in state post-conviction collateral proceedings. Meadows then challenged his conviction by filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief, arguing his attorney’s performance at the state trial amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to the excusal of, or seek accommodations for, hard- of-hearing jurors. The district court denied Meadows’s petition. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding: (1) Meadows’s trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective; and (2) Meadows failed to show any actual prejudice resulting from his trial counsel’s performance because he provided no reason to believe the excusal of the jurors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. View "Meadows v. Lind" on Justia Law