Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Ronald Benton was convicted by jury of one count of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The district court imposed a sentence based on the penalty found in 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2). Benton challenges his conviction on multiple grounds. The Tenth Circuit found that each of those grounds was predicated on accepting his proposed interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Specifically, Benton argued that, under Rehaif, the government was required to prove not only that he knew he was a domestic violence misdemeanant, but also that he knew that status prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Benton contended his conviction had to be vacated because the jury was not instructed it must find he knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, and because the government presented insufficient evidence concerning his knowledge that he was so prohibited. To this, the Tenth Circuit rejected Benton’s interpretation of Rehaif, holding that in a prosecution under sections 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the government need not prove a defendant knew his status under section 922(g) prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Instead, the only knowledge required for conviction was that the defendant knew: (1) he possessed a firearm; and (2) had the relevant status under section 922(g) at the time of his possession. Because the Court rejected Benton’s proposed interpretation of Rehaif, the Court further rejected his challenges to the jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

Prior to her arrest in May 2017, Defendant-Appellant Gladys Nkome participated in an international “advance-fee” conspiracy managed by individuals located in the Republic of Cameroon. The Cameroon-based organizers created websites that purportedly sold legal and illegal goods. They convinced prospective online buyers to wire purchase money to fictitious U.S.-based sellers. A U.S.-based individual posing as a seller (a so-called “money mule”) would retrieve the wired money, take a percentage, and send the remainder overseas to the conspiracy’s organizers. The buyers would never receive the items that they sought to purchase. For approximately thirteen months, Ms. Nkome used at least thirty-five (35) fraudulent identities to collect $357,078.74 in wire transfers connected to the conspiracy. Nkome challenged the district court’s denial of a mitigating-role adjustment under United States Sentencing Guideline section 3B1.2. After careful consideration of Ms. Nkome’s arguments, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err. View "United States v. Nkome" on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant Shaun Salazar pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1), by way of 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), carried a statutory maximum of 120 months in prison. In 2011, district court sentenced Salazar to 115 months in prison and three years of supervised release. Salazar completed his prison term and began serving his term of supervised release in May 2019. Soon after, a probation officer filed a petition to revoke Salazar’s supervised release, alleging that Salazar violated two conditions of his supervised release by committing battery against his brother and associating with a felon, his girlfriend. Salazar appealed the district court’s order revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to ten months’ imprisonment, arguing his ten-month prison sentence was illegal because, when combined with his prior 115-month prison term, it exceeded the 120-month statutory maximum for his crime of conviction. The Tenth Circuit previously rejected this argument in United States v. Robinson, holding “that [18 U.S.C. section] 3583 authorizes the revocation of supervised release even where the resulting incarceration, when combined with the period of time the defendant has already served for his [or her] substantive offense, will exceed the maximum incarceration permissible under the substantive statute.” Because it remained bound by Robinson, the Court affirmed. View "United States v. Salazar" on Justia Law

In a pat-down search of Ronald Torres following a traffic stop, police officers found a handgun, which lead to his arrest for possessing a firearm after a felony conviction. Torres moved to suppress evidence of the gun, arguing police did not have a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. Though the district court erroneously viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Tenth Circuit determined this error was ultimately harmless, because undisputed evidence had justified the traffic stop and pat-down search. The traffic stop was permissible because the police had probable cause from observing a parking violation. When the police approached the vehicle, the smell of burnt marijuana created reasonable suspicion for further questioning. That questioning led to reasonable suspicion that Torres was armed and dangerous, justifying the pat-down search. Given the reasonableness of the suspicion for the pat-down search, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in denying Torres’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Patrick Stein, Curtis Allen, and Gavin Wright appealed their convictions for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction against people and property within the United States, and knowingly and willfully conspiring to violate civil rights. Wright also appealed his false statements conviction. In October 2016, defendants were arrested in connection with a scheme to bomb an apartment complex and mosque in Garden City, Kansas. The arrests were the result of an extended FBI investigation involving an undercover information to joined defendants' militia, Kansas Security Force (KSF), to monitor what the FBI considered a threat to public safety. In June 2016, defendants began planning their attack on local Muslims in response to a nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida. The cases were tried before a jury. The government called 15 witnesses, including the undercover informant, and introduced more than 500 exhibits. Defendants called 10 witnesses, and introduced nearly 40 exhibits, but did not testify themselves. The district court found defendants failed to establish an evidentiary basis for entrapment, and declined to instruct the jury on that defense, at defendants' request. All three defendants challenged their convictions and sentences on three grounds: (1) the method of petit jury selection violated the Jury Act, (2) the district court improperly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment, and (3) the district court erred in applying the terrorism enhancement at sentencing. Wright raised several additional challenges in which his co-defendants do not join. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

Before the warrantless seizure of a firearm from a car, the driver, defendant Manuel Chavez, had driven the car at least a couple hundred feet up a private,d irt roadway and parked it outside his isolated trailer home. The district court approved just one of the government’s asserted justifications for the seizure of the firearm (a .38 special caliber Amadeo Rossi S.A.), ruling that the deputy’s seizure of the firearm was reasonable as part of an inventory of the car’s contents in preparation for impounding it. But during the inventory, a woman emerged from the trailer and satisfied the deputy that she owned the car. So the deputy left the car with her where it was parked, mere feet from her and defendant’s trailer, but the deputy kept the firearm. In denying an ensuing motion to suppress, the district court held that the deputy could lawfully seize and keep the firearm, even without admissible evidence that anyone had illegally possessed or used it. The court did not evaluate whether it mattered that the deputy never in fact impounded the car. The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court’s denying the motion to suppress on inventory-impoundment grounds. Further, the Court rejected all the government’s other asserted bases to validate the deputy’s seizing and keeping the firearm. The district court erred by denying the motion to suppress, so the Tenth Circuit reversed. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Kenneth Eugene Barrett moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his death sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. Barrett’s death sentence was based on his intentionally killing a state trooper when drug task force officers attempted to execute a warrant at his home. The evidence at trial and at the sentencing hearing depicted him as having planned a lethal attack on police officers. In mitigation, defense counsel introduced testimony that he was a loved family member and good person who was sorry for his crime. But his counsel did not introduce evidence that he experienced abuse as a child; suffered from brain-damage, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); and struggled to exercise judgment in pressured situations. The jury recommended, and the court imposed, the death penalty. The district court denied Barrett's request to vacate his sentence. The matter was remanded for reconsideration of counsel's performance at sentencing; the district court found deficient performance but no prejudice, and again denied relief. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In reversing, the Court concluded that, viewing the totality of the evidence at trial, sentencing, and the postconviction hearing, there was a reasonable probability at least one juror would have recommended a life sentence. As noted, “[a] reasonable probability is less than a preponderance of the evidence” and need only “undermine confidence in the outcome.” Because Barrett’s postconviction evidence shifted the balance in favor of mitigation, the Tenth Circuit was not “confiden[t]” all twelve jurors would have recommended a death sentence had defense counsel introduced this evidence. View "United States v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Dustin Lance was denied medical treatment for priapsm at a detention center in McAlester, Oklahoma. He ultimately sued the sheriff and four jail guards; summary judgment was entered in favor of all defendants. After review of his appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part. Like the district court, the Court concluded that one of the jail guards, Edward Morgan, had qualified immunity because he didn’t violate Lance’s constitutional right to medical care. But the Court concluded that qualified immunity was unavailable to the three other jail guards: Mike Smead, Dakota Morgan, and Daniel Harper. And the sheriff, Chris Morris, was not entitled to summary judgment in his official capacity because the factfinder could reasonably determine that the county’s policies had violated Lance’s constitutional right to medical care. View "Lance v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Defendant Riordan Maynard, the former chief executive officer of two related companies, was convicted by a jury of twenty-six criminal counts arising out of his gross mismanagement of those companies. The district court sentenced Maynard to 78 months’ imprisonment. The district court also ordered Maynard to pay restitution to the Internal Revenue Service and to the employee-victims. On appeal, Maynard argued: argues that: (1) the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines in calculating his offense level for Counts 1 and 2 (failure to pay corporate payroll taxes); (2) his convictions on Counts 14 through 26 were not supported by sufficient evidence (theft or embezzlement of employee health care contributions); (3) the district court erred in calculating the restitution award for Counts 4 through 13 (theft or embezzlement of employee benefit plan contributions); and (4) the district court plainly erred in calculating the restitution award for Counts 14 through 26. Rejecting these arguments, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Maynard's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Maynard" on Justia Law

Late one night, Fabian Sanchez was approached by two police officers who suspected him or attempting to break into a vehicle sitting the back area of a hotel parking lot. He was wearing a trench coat with a loaded gun in the pocket. After routine questioning, he was caught in a lie and fled. During the chase, his trench coat ended up on the ground after one of the officers unsuccessfully tased Sanchez, but he kept running. He eventually ran back toward his trench coat but was tackled by the officers before he could get there. Sanchez was arrested, and the loaded gun was discovered in his trench coat. Charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Sanchez moved to suppress the gun. The district court denied the motion and granted the government's motion in limine to admit an incriminating statement Sanchez made after his arrest. Sanchez pleaded guilty on the condition that he could appeal these rulings. He was then sentenced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). On appeal, Sanchez argued: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him and lacked probable cause to arrest him, violating his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the officers searched his trench coat without a warrant even though he did not voluntarily abandon it, violating his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) his incriminating statement was the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, violating his Fifth Amendment rights. Sanchez also contended his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntarily made, and that the district court erred in arriving at his sentence under the ACCA. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law