Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alan Williams pleaded guilty to a single count of bank fraud and stipulated to restitution tied to that count and two others that were later dismissed. The government got its conviction, and Williams limited his sentencing exposure and possible future charges. In this appeal, Williams attempted to step back from his bargain, seeking to keep the favorable plea deal, but to contest the restitution he stipulated was owed. Furthermore, he contested the district court’s apportionment of that total restitution between WebBank and Wells Fargo Bank, as recommended by the Presentence Report (PSR). The Tenth Circuit surmised Williams' first hurdle was to overcome the appeal waiver included in his Plea Agreement. To this, the Court concluded the appeal waiver did not bar his total-restitution challenge: the Plea Agreement allowed Williams to appeal the apportionment of the total restitution and the substantive reasonableness of his prison sentence as well. However, addressing the merits of Williams’s challenges, the Court no reason to disturb the order and sentence, and affirmed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Steven Henson appealed his convictions and sentence related to his involvement in a drug distribution conspiracy in and around Wichita, Kansas. He argued: (1) his convictions should have been vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the trial court erroneously deprived him of chosen counsel; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury it could find the requisite mental state for his crimes based on a “deliberate ignorance” or “willful blindness” theory of knowledge; (3) the case should be remanded for resentencing based upon the purported procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence to life in prison; and (4) the Tenth Circuit should reconsider a prior precedent and, in doing so, hold that one of the district court’s jury instructions misstated the law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Henson's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Henson" on Justia Law

Wyoming state prisoner Gregory Hawes appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 to challenge his kidnapping conviction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the issue of whether application of the Wyoming kidnapping statute to him was constitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Tenth Circuit found that under the statute, whether a kidnapping ends with a “safe release” of the victim can affect the defendant’s sentence. At trial, the state district court imposed the burden to show safe release on Hawes. The jury found that he had not proved safe release, which subjected him to higher statutory minimum and maximum sentences. A state court denied his post-conviction challenge to the imposition of this burden, relying on Wyoming Supreme Court decisions holding that a kidnapping defendant had to prove safe release rather than the prosecution having to prove lack of safe release. To the Tenth Circuit, Hawes argued the Wyoming court’s application of the statute violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The Tenth Circuit found Hawes made colorable arguments, but he could not not surmount the habeas restrictions that required the Court to (1) give deference to the state court’s application of Supreme Court law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and (2) accept the state court’s interpretation of state law. Accordingly, dismissal of his petition for habeas relief was affirmed. View "Hawes v. Pacheco, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants James Hald, Monterial Wesley, and Walter Sands appealed the denials of their district-court motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). They were among many prisoners who sought to be released from prison confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Each claimed that his underlying health conditions and mounting infections at his correctional facility satisfied the statute’s “extraordinary and compelling reasons” requirement for early release. Before granting a sentence reduction, the district court had to consider whether the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) supported the reduction. The Tenth Circuit found each of the Defendants was denied relief by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas based on the court’s discretionary analysis of the section 3553(a) factors. The principal issue for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether, as argued by Hald and Sands, a district court was permitted to deny relief based on its assessment of the 3553(a) factors without first making a determination on the existence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” To this, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, holding that district courts were free to deny relief on the basis of any one of section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirements without considering the others. The Court also rejected the other arguments raised by Sands and Wesley. Accordingly, the denial of all three motions for compassionate release was affirmed. View "United States v. Hald, et al." on Justia Law

Von Lester Taylor and an accomplice, Edward Deli, murdered two unarmed women who tragically encountered them burglarizing a mountain cabin in December 1990. Taylor confessed to shooting the women; he never denied he fired the first shot in the brutal attack that lead to their deaths. Taylor pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to death by a Utah jury. He challenged his convictions through a petition for federal habeas corpus, contending missteps by his trial counsel lead to a defective guilty plea. The Tenth Circuit determined Taylor failed to raise his ineffective-counsel claim in Utah state court, and this would have been a procedural bar to federal habeas relief. This notwithstanding, Taylor argued that despite re-affirming time and again he participated in the murders, he was “actually innocent” of them. Thus, he contended, the Tenth Circuit should consider his underlying claims. At the district court, Taylor presented new ballistics evidence that he alleged called into question whether he fired the fatal shots in the two murders. The court credited Taylor’s claim, set aside the convictions, and considered the merits of Taylor’s claims for habeas relief. In its review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s assessment of Taylor’s actual innocence claim. “To answer the question of whether he can be actually innocent of the crime: He cannot. Mr. Taylor ‘is not innocent, in any sense of the word.’” The district court’s grant of habeas relief was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Powell" on Justia Law

A Utah state court dismissed Petitioner Jeffery Finlayson’s habeas corpus proceeding for failure to prosecute. After appealing that decision, Petitioner brought a petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 2254. But the district court found the state court’s dismissal procedurally barred federal relief. So the district court dismissed the petition and granted judgment for Respondent State of Utah, denying a certificate of appealability. Petitioner appealed, and a Tenth Circuit judge issued a certificate of appealability on two issues: whether dismissal for want of prosecution under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is an independent and adequate state ground for denial of habeas relief; and (2) whether Petitioner could establish cause to excuse the procedural bar under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and its progeny. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that under Utah’s rule, the state court could look to the meritoriousness of the federal claim to gauge the injustice that might result from dismissal. "But the ultimate decision does not rest on the application of federal law or the answer to a question of federal law. For these reasons, we conclude that a dismissal for failure to prosecute under Utah Rule 41(b) is independent." And, the Court concluded, dismissal for failure to prosecute under that rule was an adequate sate procedural default. Further, the Court concluded Petitioner could not demonstrate cause for the default. Accordingly, dismissal was affirmed. View "Finlayson v. Utah" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Raymond Moya was convicted for distributing heroin that resulted in the death of a then-eighteen-year-old Cameron Weiss. The precise question underlying this conviction is whether the heroin was the but-for cause of Cameron’s death. Moya argued that the district court misinstructed the jury about the “death results” element of the heroin-distribution crime and that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict on that element. According to Moya (and his expert witness), the heroin that Cameron injected couldn’t have caused his death hours later. Having reviewed the trial record, most notably the competing expert-witness testimony, the Tenth Circuit concluded a rational jury could have found Moya guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court affirmed. View "United States v. Moya" on Justia Law

Utah police officers discovered Defendant Tevita Tafuna sitting in a parked car with a gun he admitted to possessing. Because Defendant had a prior felony conviction, the Government charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the firearm and his confession, arguing that he was detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that his detention led to the incriminating evidence used against him. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant appealed. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether officers unconstitutionally seize Defendant before they found the firearm or obtained his confession? The Court concluded no, so it affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Tafuna" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit in this case involved a pretextual search, in which police impounded a car simply as an excuse to look inside for evidence of a crime. The search at issue stemmed from a call complaining to police about defendant-appellant Evan Woodard. The caller said that Woodard was fighting a huge drug case, may have smoked PCP, had three previous gun cases, and violated a protective order. After talking to the caller, police discovered Woodard had an outstanding warrant for misdemeanor public intoxication. With this information, the police looked for Woodard, planning to serve him with the protective order and execute the warrant. Police officers found Woodard in Tulsa, Oklahoma and initiated a traffic stop. Woodard pulled into a parking lot at a QuikTrip convenience store and stopped there. Police told Woodard to get out of the car, arrested him based on the warrant, and took his cellphone. Woodard then asked if he could call someone to pick up the car. One of the police officers responded “I don’t think so,” and the police decided to impound the car. Two officers then opened the front doors and began to search the car. One officer commented that he was looking for verification of car insurance, expressing doubt that Woodard had insured the car. After seeing no verification in the center console, he eventually found proof of an old insurance policy in the glove compartment. By then, however, another officer had found marijuana, cocaine, a digital scale, and a gun. With that evidence, the police obtained a warrant allowing access to text messages on Mr. Woodard’s cellphone. Those text messages provided evidence of drug dealing. Woodard moved to suppress the evidence found during that stop, arguing the officers ordered impoundment as pretext to investigate suspected crimes. The district court denied the motion, and Woodard was ultimately tried and convicted on all charges. The Tenth Circuit concluded the search was indeed pretextual, and reversed the district court's denial of Woodard's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Joseph Maldonado-Passage a/k/a Joe Exotic, the self-proclaimed "Tiger King," was indicted on 21 counts: most for wildlife crimes, and two for using interstate facilities in the commission of his murder-for-hire plots against Carole Baskin. A jury convicted Maldonado-Passage on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 264 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Maldonado-Passage challenged his murder-for-hire convictions, arguing that the district court erred by allowing Baskin, a listed government witness, to attend the entire trial proceedings. He also disputed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not grouping his two murder-for-hire convictions in calculating his advisory Guidelines range. On this second point, he contended that the Guidelines required the district court to group the two counts because they involved the same victim and two or more acts or transactions that were connected by a common criminal objective: murdering Baskin. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal determined the district court acted within its discretion by allowing Baskin to attend the full trial proceedings despite her being listed as a government witness, but that it erred by not grouping the two murder-for-hire convictions at sentencing. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed, but the sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Maldonado-Passage" on Justia Law