Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Jose Pena, was accused of inducing his minor daughter to engage in sexual activity and recording it. Using a Facebook alias, "Jaime Peres," Pena initiated an online relationship with his daughter, Jane Doe, and later coerced her into recording sexual acts with him by threatening her with fabricated cartel violence. Jane reported the incidents to her school, leading to Pena's arrest and confession during a police interview.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Pena's motion to suppress his confession, finding it voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that law enforcement did not overbear Pena's will despite using various interrogation tactics. A jury subsequently convicted Pena of inducing a minor to engage in sexual activity and producing child pornography.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, agreeing that the confession was voluntary. The court found that law enforcement's conduct, while at times troubling, did not critically impair Pena's capacity for self-determination. The court also determined that any potential error in admitting the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of Pena's guilt, including DNA evidence, video recordings, and digital forensic evidence linking him to the alias "Jaime Peres."The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Pena's confession was voluntary and that the evidence against him was sufficient to uphold the conviction. View "United States v. Pena" on Justia Law

Two boys from Grand Junction, Colorado, were sexually abused by Michael Tracy McFadden over several years. McFadden, who was distantly related to one boy (J.W.) and a close family friend to the other (K.W.), provided necessities and luxuries to the boys, ingratiating himself with their families. The boys frequently stayed at McFadden’s house, where he assaulted them during the night. McFadden also took the boys on interstate trucking trips, during which he continued the abuse.McFadden was initially convicted in Colorado state court on nineteen counts of child-sex abuse, but the Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed the charges due to a violation of his speedy-trial rights. Subsequently, a federal grand jury charged McFadden with five counts related to his sexual abuse of J.W. and K.W. across state lines. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado admitted a video recording of K.W.’s 2013 forensic interview under Rule 807, despite McFadden’s objections. The jury convicted McFadden on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent life sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed McFadden’s appeal, which argued that evidentiary errors and a mistake in his Guidelines calculation warranted a new trial and resentencing. The court found that the district court erred in admitting the 2013 forensic-interview video under Rule 807 but deemed the error harmless. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of an audio recording of K.W.’s 2018 interview and rejected McFadden’s claims of improper vouching by witnesses. Finally, the court affirmed the application of a two-level undue-influence enhancement to McFadden’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). The Tenth Circuit affirmed McFadden’s conviction and sentence. View "U.S. v. McFadden" on Justia Law

Omar Godinez, a minor at the time of his conviction, is serving a 32-years-to-life sentence in Colorado state prison for kidnapping and sexually assaulting two victims. After exhausting state appeals, he sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Graham v. Florida, which prohibits life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide offenses committed by minors without a meaningful opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation.The state trial court rejected Godinez's interpretation of Graham, concluding that the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) allows the parole board to consider maturity and rehabilitation, even if not explicitly mandated. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence on different grounds, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. Godinez then filed a habeas petition in the District of Colorado, which was denied. The district court agreed with the state trial court that the parole board could consider the Graham factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. They had previously certified a question to the Colorado Supreme Court, which clarified that SOLSA permits consideration of maturity and requires consideration of rehabilitation. The Tenth Circuit denied Godinez's habeas petition, holding that he could not show that the Colorado courts unreasonably applied federal law. The court concluded that the parole board's ability to consider maturity and rehabilitation when Godinez becomes eligible for parole in 2034 meets the requirements set forth in Graham. The court also noted that any future failure by the parole board to adhere to constitutional requirements could be challenged at that time. View "Godinez v. Williams" on Justia Law

Arthur Aragon was indicted for unlawfully possessing an incendiary device, specifically a Molotov cocktail, which he threw onto his neighbor's property. This act was part of a series of harassments against his neighbors, including threats and property damage. Despite the Molotov cocktail causing a fireball, it did not result in significant damage or meet the threshold for felony arson under New Mexico law.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico applied a four-level sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The court reasoned that Aragon's use of the Molotov cocktail had the potential to facilitate a felony offense, specifically arson, even though the actual damage did not meet the felony threshold. Aragon was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment, and he appealed the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court misapplied § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The enhancement requires either the use of a firearm to facilitate an actual felony offense or the possession of a firearm with the potential to facilitate a committed felony offense. The court clarified that the guideline does not apply to potential felony offenses that were not committed. Since Aragon did not commit felony arson, the enhancement was improperly applied. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing without the enhancement. View "United States v. Aragon" on Justia Law

Julian Manzano was pulled over by Oklahoma City police on March 26, 2022, just twenty-five days after being released from a thirteen-year prison sentence. During the stop, officers smelled burnt marijuana and found a .45 caliber pistol and ammunition in his car. Manzano admitted ownership of the firearm. Due to a prior 2009 conviction for second-degree murder in Oklahoma, he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and pled guilty.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sentenced Manzano, applying a higher base offense level based on the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) which classified his prior second-degree murder conviction as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Manzano objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the criteria for a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. The district court disagreed and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Oklahoma's second-degree murder statute, which includes homicides committed during the commission of any felony, does not categorically match the federal definition of "murder" under the Guidelines. The federal definition requires the underlying felony to be "dangerous," whereas Oklahoma law allows for potentially dangerous felonies to qualify. This broader scope means that Oklahoma second-degree murder criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "murder." Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing, finding that Manzano's prior conviction should not have been classified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). View "United States v. Manzano" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted on 12 counts related to fraudulently obtaining federal funds intended for COVID-19 relief. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the district court erred by reading the jury instructions only at the outset of the presentation of evidence and not again after the close of evidence.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas had indicted the defendant on 19 counts, including bank fraud, false statements to a bank and the Small Business Administration, wire fraud, and money laundering. The indictment alleged that he obtained COVID-19 relief funds by making false representations regarding the workforce of three entities. During a pretrial conference, the district court decided to read the jury instructions before the presentation of evidence and provide jurors with individual copies of the instructions. The trial proceeded, and the court read all 40 primary instructions to the jury before any evidence was introduced. After the close of evidence, the court denied the defense's motion to reread eight specific instructions, allowing defense counsel to refer to them during closing arguments instead.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the defendant did not preserve his argument that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c) required the court to instruct the jury after the close of evidence. The court applied plain-error review and determined that the defendant could not prevail because he did not show that any error was plain or that it affected the outcome of the proceeding. The court noted that the district court had provided jurors with written copies of the instructions and allowed defense counsel to refer to them during closing arguments. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Capps" on Justia Law

A mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, Luis Quiroga, was assaulted by a man wielding a knife while delivering mail in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Quiroga described the assailant to police as a Hispanic man in a yellow sweater and blue jeans. Shortly after, police apprehended Elias Gallegos, who matched the description, following a chase during which he discarded his sweater and a knife. Quiroga identified Gallegos in a show-up procedure, despite the suggestive nature of the identification.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico admitted Quiroga’s identification testimony and evidence of Gallegos’s flight. Gallegos was convicted of assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon. He appealed, arguing that the identification was unreliable due to the suggestive show-up procedure and that the evidence of his flight was improperly admitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that, despite the suggestive nature of the show-up, Quiroga’s identification was reliable based on the totality of the circumstances, including his opportunity to view the assailant, the accuracy of his description, and his certainty during the identification. The court also upheld the admission of evidence of Gallegos’s flight, finding it relevant to his consciousness of guilt and intrinsic to the charged offense. The court concluded that the probative value of the flight evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.The Tenth Circuit affirmed Gallegos’s conviction, holding that the district court did not err in admitting the identification testimony or the evidence of flight. View "United States v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

In May 2023, Enrique Martinez-Espinoza was found illegally reentering the United States from Mexico while on supervised release for a prior unauthorized reentry. He pleaded guilty under a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, but the district court rejected the plea because his criminal history disqualified him from the proposed downward departure. The court also revoked his supervised release without a separate hearing, based on the same conduct.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico initially handled the case. Martinez-Espinoza was charged with reentry of a removed alien and pleaded guilty. A petition to revoke his supervised release was also filed. The district court rejected the plea agreement due to his criminal history and proceeded to sentencing without informing him of his rights under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5). The court also revoked his supervised release without a separate hearing, relying on his admission to the reentry offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court plainly erred by not informing Martinez-Espinoza of his rights under Rule 11(c)(5) but concluded that this error did not affect his substantial rights. The court also determined that the revocation of supervised release was adequately supported by his admission to violating the terms of his supervised release. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Martinez-Espinoza" on Justia Law

Josh and Mackie were partners in a marijuana business, Culta, LLC, in Maryland. Josh temporarily relinquished his ownership due to concerns about a past misdemeanor affecting their license application, with an agreement to be reinstated later. However, Mackie prevented Josh from rejoining. Josh sued Mackie and Trellis Holdings Maryland, Inc. (Trellis), Mackie’s company, for breach of contract. The district court found Mackie and Trellis liable and awarded Josh $6.4 million in damages. Mackie and Trellis did not appeal or pay the judgment.Josh sought to enforce the judgment. The district court ordered Mackie and Trellis to sell Trellis’s equity in Culta and turn over the proceeds to Josh, and to avoid devaluing the equity until the sale. Mackie and Trellis appealed, arguing for the first time that enforcing the judgment would violate the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and that the district court lacked authority under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure (C.R.C.P.) 69(g). They also moved the district court to reconsider the original judgment, which was denied, leading to a second appeal. The appeals were consolidated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the original judgment, rejecting Mackie and Trellis’s argument that Josh lacked standing. The court found that Josh had standing as he suffered an injury from the breach of contract, caused by Mackie and Trellis, and the damages awarded were redressable. The court also held that the district court had authority under C.R.C.P. 69(g) to issue the judgment enforcement order, as a charging order was not the exclusive remedy and Mackie and Trellis had sufficient control over Trellis’s equity.However, the Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment enforcement order due to concerns that it might require Mackie and Trellis to violate federal drug laws, and remanded the case for further proceedings to address these public policy concerns. View "Bartch v. Barch" on Justia Law

Dr. Francis Joseph, founder of Springs Medical Associates in Colorado Springs, submitted false applications to federal COVID-19 relief programs between March and June 2020. He received over $250,000 in federal aid, which he concealed from the practice's leadership and used for personal expenses. Joseph was convicted by a jury in 2023 on two counts of fraud.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado oversaw the initial trial. Joseph was found guilty of embezzlement or theft of health care benefit program funds and wire fraud. He was sentenced to thirty months in prison and ordered to pay restitution. Joseph appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of intent, improper limitations on cross-examination, erroneous admission of expert testimony as lay testimony, improper admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, and incorrect jury instructions. He also challenged the calculation of economic loss under the sentencing guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found ample direct and circumstantial evidence supporting Joseph's intent to commit fraud. It upheld the district court's limitations on cross-examination and exclusion of certain exhibits, finding no abuse of discretion. The court acknowledged an error in admitting expert testimony as lay testimony but deemed it harmless due to corroborating evidence. The court also upheld the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, finding it relevant to Joseph's intent and not unduly prejudicial. The court found no error in the jury instructions and affirmed the district court's calculation of economic loss, including Joseph's first failed PPP loan application as relevant conduct.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Joseph's convictions and sentence were supported by sufficient evidence and proper legal procedures. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law