Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Asael Linares was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after an attempted carjacking. He pled guilty, but objected to a sentencing enhancement and the failure to apply a sentencing decrease proposed by the government, arguing that he did not complete an attempted carjacking, nor did he meet the required mental state for the carjacking enhancement. Finding that Linares was about to complete a carjacking while possessing an AK-47, the district court overruled Linares’s objections and sentenced him to 63 months. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the district court did not err in concluding that the facts—the presence of a rifle while confronting a car owner, demanding the keys, approaching the car, threatening the car owner and her family while they were calling 911, and leaving the scene when the victims continued calling 911—met the Sentencing Guideline requirements for carjacking. View "United States v. Linares" on Justia Law

In July 2021 defendant-appellant Anthony Prestel entered into a plea agreement with the government under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) providing that he would plead guilty to sexual abuse in Indian country, and would receive a term of imprisonment of 300 months. The agreement did not specify the term or conditions of Prestel’s supervised release. But under the heading “MAXIMUM POSSIBLE IMPRISONMENT AND/OR FINE,” the agreement stated, “The defendant understands that the maximum possible penalty for Sexual Abuse in Indian Country is imprisonment for a period of Life and/or a fine of $250,000.00, a term of supervised release of at least 5 years up to a lifetime term to be determined by the Court, and a special assessment in the amount of $100.00 and up to $5,100.” Arguing that the district court unlawfully imposed three special conditions of supervised release as part of his sentence Prestel appealed the imposition of those conditions. The Tenth Circuit concluded Prestel waived his right to appeal the three conditions. View "United States v. Prestel" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joseph Chatwin appealed the district court’s denial and dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. In 2013, Chatwin pleaded guilty to two counts: (1) bank fraud and (2) using or carrying (and brandishing) a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). As part of the plea agreement, the government recommended dismissal of seven other charged counts, and Chatwin waived any right to collaterally attack his sentence (though not his convictions). In 2016, Chatwin filed a pro se § 2255 motion challenging his conviction and sentencing as unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2016). As “supporting facts,” Chatwin simply wrote that “police chase not a violent crime.” In 2020, by then represented by counsel, Chatwin moved to amend his motion after the issuance of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Though neither the plea agreement nor the plea colloquy stated whether the court based the § 924(c) conviction on § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause, or both, Chatwin contended that the district court relied solely on the residual clause (a question not yet resolved by the district court). From that, he argued under Davis that the district court needed to vacate his § 924(c) conviction and resentence him. In response, the government repeated its argument that Chatwin’s collateral-attack waiver in the plea agreement defeated any § 2255 claim, including one based on Davis. The district court agreed with the government’s collateral-attack-waiver argument and dismissed Chatwin’s § 2255 motion. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Chatwin showed plain error, and that the error affected his substantial rights. "Absent plainly erring on the waiver’s scope, the district court could not have dismissed on that ground." View "United States v. Chatwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roxanne Torres appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson, agents of the New Mexico State Police Investigations Bureau. The encounter between Torres and Defendants lasted only 14 seconds: Torres was sitting in her vehicle, backed into a spot in front of a suspect’s apartment and cars parked on either side. The vehicle’s engine was running and the doors were locked. Defendants approached Torres’s vehicle and Agent Williamson attempted to open the driver’s door. Defendants shouted commands at Torres to open her door, but they did not announce themselves as police officers. Torres stepped on the gas and headed forward across the parking lot. Both Defendants fired at Torres. Neither Defendant was struck as Torres drove past. Five bullets were fired at the rear of Torres’s vehicle, one of them striking her in the back. Torres ultimately entered a no-contest plea to: (1) aggravated flight from a law- enforcement officer; and (2) assault upon a peace officer. Torres filed a civil-rights suit against Defendants alleging they used excessive force. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that because Torres had successfully fled the scene, she was not seized. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. After remand from the Supreme Court the district court again granted Defendants summary judgment, finding: (1) Torres’s claims were barred because her claims against Defendants were inconsistent with her no-contest pleas to charges of aggravated flight from a law-enforcement officer and assault upon a peace officer; and (2) Torres’s claims were barred on the ground that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding: (1) Torres' pleas were not inconsistent with her claims that the officers used excessive force by firing at her after she had driven past them and no longer posed a threat; and (2) because Defendants did not know Torres would escape when they shot at her, and facts unknown to officers at the moment they use force were not relevant to the qualified-immunity analysis. The Court remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues raised by Defendant's arguments on appeal. View "Torres v. Madrid, et al." on Justia Law

After a shoplifting incident at a Colorado Kmart and a shootout two days later, the federal and state governments both indicted Defendant Joshua Garcia. The federal government waited nearly twenty-three months to prosecute Defendant, while the state prosecution ran its course. The district court held the delay violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and dismissed the federal indictment against him. "Violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right compels a severe remedy: dismissing the indictment with prejudice. But a defendant cannot avail himself of that protection when he did not diligently assert that right." The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held the delay in this case did not violate Defendant’s speedy-trial right and the district court improperly dismissed his indictment. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant Ahmad Salti appealed a district court’s determination of how to calculate his restitution obligation when his co-conspirator also paid some of it. Defendant was sentenced to pay the victim $35,000 in restitution, which was a “Joint and Several Amount” also owed by co-conspirator Pattrick Towner. Towner’s sentence required him to pay restitution to the victim of $72,000, owed jointly and severally with Defendant. After Defendant deposited $35,000 with the court clerk as restitution, the clerk informed the government that Defendant should receive a refund for overpayment. The clerk explained that Towner had paid $5,117.92 in restitution and the clerk had apportioned that amount pro rata between the obligation owed by both Defendant and Towner ($35,000) and the amount owed solely by Mr. Towner ($37,000). Because 35/72 of Towner’s payments ($2,487.87) had been credited to the $35,000 in restitution owed jointly and severally by both defendants, Defendant had overpaid by that amount. The government moved the district court to order the clerk not to pay Defendant a refund of $2,487.87. The district court agreed with the government, declaring that Defendant had to continue to make payments toward his $35,000 obligation unless (because of payments by Towner) the victim had already been fully compensated for its $72,000 loss. Defendant appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the decision of the district court maximized compensation to the victim and treated both Defendant and Towner fairly. View "United States v. Salti" on Justia Law

Doctor Shakeel Kahn (Dr. Kahn) was convicted in federal district court in Wyoming, in part, for dispensing controlled substances not “as authorized,” in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (the CSA). Included in his appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was his contention that the jury instructions issued by the district court improperly advised the jury regarding the mens rea requirement of CSA § 841(a). The Tenth Circuit affirmed Dr. Kahn’s convictions, rejecting both his challenge to the instructions given, and his challenges to multiple searches and the evidence seized. In upholding the instructions, the Tenth Circuit relied on precedent, United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2004), and further reaffirmed its holding, which was guided by 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). Dr. Kahn appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, raising only his instructional challenge. The Supreme Court held that § 841(a)’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applied to the “except as authorized” clause of the statute, vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The parties submitted supplemental briefing, and the matter went again before the Tenth Circuit. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the jury instructions issued in Dr. Kahn’s trial incorrectly stated the mens rea requirement of § 841(a) and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This prejudicial error infected all of Dr. Kahn’s convictions. Therefore, Dr. Kahn’s convictions were v View "United States v. Kahn" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Taberon Honie confessed to murder. About two weeks before trial, following his lawyer’s advice, Honie waived his Utah statutory right to jury sentencing in favor of sentencing by the trial judge. Years later, Honie sought habeas relief, arguing: (1) soon after he waived jury sentencing, a fellow inmate told him that he had made a mistake in doing so; (2) a week before trial, Honie asked his trial counsel to withdraw the waiver; and (3) that counsel told him it was too late. During the defense’s opening statement at the murder trial, Honie’s counsel conceded that Honie was guilty of the aggravated-murder charge, telling the jury that the case would be about punishment. After hearing the evidence, a Utah state jury convicted him of aggravated murder. The trial judge imposed the death sentence. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence. In seeking state postconviction relief, Honie argued under the Sixth Amendment that his trial counsel performed deficiently in two ways: (1) by inadequately explaining his right to jury sentencing, and (2) by not following his direction to retract his waiver. The Utah Supreme Court rejected Honie’s first claim, concluding that Honie’s counsel had performed competently. On the second, the court didn’t rule on the deficient-performance question. For both claims, the court ruled that Honie had suffered no prejudice. Before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Honie argued the Utah Supreme Court's application of the substantive-outcome test for prejudice announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) was unreasonable. Honie argued the holdings of three more-recent Supreme Court cases required the Utah Supreme Court to instead use the process-based test as done in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). If Hill’s standard applied, Honie would have instead needed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have chosen jury sentencing. The Tenth Circuit denied relief, finding: (1) the Supreme Court never applied Strickland’s general prejudice standard in a case involving a waiver of jury sentencing in a capital case; and (2) the Supreme Court has never held that a process-based prejudice test applied to jury-sentencing waivers. View "Honie v. Powell" on Justia Law

Jane Doe and two boys were accused of killing Doe’s parents. Even though Doe was a juvenile at the time of the murders, the government charged her with two counts of first-degree murder. The government successfully moved to transfer her case to adult court, where the punishments for first-degree murder are death or mandatory life imprisonment without parole. These punishments would be unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile. Doe argued she could not be transferred to adult court because, even if guilty, there was no statutory punishment available for her alleged crime. She also argued the district court used an incorrect legal standard for transfer from juvenile to adult court and improperly weighed the relevant factors for transfer. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found her constitutional argument was not ripe, the district court applied the correct legal standard, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the transfer factors. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s transfer of Doe’s case from juvenile to adult court. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Leib challenged the 100-month sentence he received for his conviction for being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The specific sentencing question presented by this appeal was whether the district court clearly erred in calculating Leib’s advisory prison range under the sentencing guidelines by enhancing his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence for the sentencing court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this enhancement applied in Leib’s case. The Court therefore affirmed Leib’s sentence. View "United States v. Leib" on Justia Law