Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kimberly Meadows appealed a district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop, arguing that the officer’s stop was unreasonable because it was based on probable cause of a Utah equipment violation, and the state decriminalized such violations. On December 4, 2017, a Utah highway-patrol officer pulled Meadows over after he observed that tinted glass obscured the brake light inside the rear window of her car, which he believed violated Utah law. He issued Meadows a warning citation for an equipment violation. During the stop, he found drugs and drug paraphernalia. The Tenth Circuit rejected Meadows' argument, concluding that the officer’s stop was reasonable regardless of whether Utah has decriminalized such violations. Accordingly, the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Meadows" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant-appellant Donovan Muskett was indicted by grand jury, charged with four counts: assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian Country; aggravated burglary in Indian Country (based on New Mexico’s aggravated burglary statute by way of the federal Assimilative Crimes Act); using, carrying, possessing, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to and in furtherance of a crime of violence; and negligent child abuse in Indian Country. Muskett entered into a plea agreement, under which he pled guilty to the brandishing a firearm charge, the government dismissed the remaining three counts. The parties agreed that, contingent on the district court's acceptance of the plea agreement, Muskett would be sentenced to 84 months in prison. The district court accepted Muskett’s plea and sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release. In this matter, Muskett appealed the denial of his motion to vacate the brandishing conviction as a crime of violence based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidating the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” as unconstitutionally vague). The parties’ primary disputed whether Muskett’s predicate federal felony—assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3)—qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause, thereby rendering harmless the Davis defect in his conviction. Muskett suggested the Tenth Circuit conduct this analysis using the law as it existed at the time of his conviction because application of current law would violate due process limits on the retroactive application of judicial decisions enlarging criminal liability. The Tenth Circuit found precedent compelled the conclusion that assault with a dangerous weapon was categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause. "And we conclude that at the time of his offense, Mr. Muskett had fair notice that section 924(c)’s elements clause could ultimately be construed to encompass his commission of assault with a dangerous weapon." The Court thus affirmed the district court's denial of Muskett’s section 2255 motion. View "United States v. Muskett" on Justia Law

Petitioner Everett Johnson, a citizen of the Bahamas, became a United States permanent resident in 1977. But in 2016, he pleaded guilty to possessing a schedule II controlled substance in violation of Colorado law. Soon after, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Johnson as removable from the United States based on the state drug conviction. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) then ordered Johnson’s removal from the United States back to the Bahamas. He appealed, challenging that the state drug conviction subjected him to deportation from the United States. The Tenth Circuit determined Colorado Revised Statute section 18-18-403.5(1), (2)(a) was overbroad and indivisible as to the identity of a particular controlled substance. Therefore, Johnson’s conviction could not subject him to removal from the United States. The Court therefore granted Johnson’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Barr" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Lozado appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Lozado was tried by jury and convicted of possessing ammunition as a previously convicted felon. The Presentence Report (“PSR”) prepared by the probation office in January 2014 recommended that he be sentenced as an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on five predicate violent-felony convictions, all from the state of Colorado: (1) a juvenile conviction for second-degree assault with a deadly weapon; and adult convictions for (2) robbery; (3) second-degree burglary of a building; (4) felony menacing; and (5) theft from a person. This increased the recommended offense level from 28 to 33. With Lozado’s criminal-history level of VI, the advisory Guidelines range was thus raised from 140–175 months to 235–293 months. Application of the ACCA changed the statutory maximum penalty of ten years for Lozado’s offense to a statutory minimum penalty of fifteen years. At Lozado’s sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the PSR with only a few non-substantive amendments. The district court then sentenced Lozado to 235 months of imprisonment, the bottom of the ACCA-enhanced advisory Guidelines range. In his 2255 motion, Lozad contended his sentence should have been vacated based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Lozado contended the Johnson ruling affected the violent-felony classification of at least three of the five prior convictions the district court had relied on at his sentencing. The district court denied his 2255 motion, holding that Johnson affected the classification of two of his prior convictions but that the remaining three convictions were sufficient to sustain the enhancement. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the sentencing court classified two of the prior convictions as violent felonies based on the invalidated residual clause, and that a third conviction should not have been counted as a violent felony because it was a juvenile offense that did not involve a firearm, knife, or destructive device. Furthermore, the Court concluded the government could not show harmless error because none of these three convictions would have qualified as a valid ACCA predicate if Lozado were sentenced under current law, thus Lozado no longer has enough qualifying convictions to trigger the ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Lozado" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Tenth Circuit's review in this matter involved a police traffic stop that ended with the tragic death of the motorist. In 2016, Okfuskee County Sheriff Deputy Blake Frost shot and killed James Coale, as Coale was fleeing in his truck from a roadside police stop. Coale’s estate sued Deputy Frost, alleging the use of excessive force in violation of Coale’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Deputy Frost’s motion for summary judgment that was based on qualified immunity. Because the Tenth Circuit found it was clearly established that Deputy Frost’s use of deadly force to stop Coale’s fleeing vehicle was objectively unreasonable, it affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. View "Reavis v. Frost" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Edgar Mier-Garces was separately charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in both the Western District of Texas and the District of Colorado. After pleading guilty in Texas, Mier-Garces argued that the District of Colorado indictment violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied his motion to dismiss. Mier-Garces was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 178 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s Double Jeopardy Clause ruling, arguing the district court erroneously calculated his advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines range by applying an enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(12). After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in either ruling and affirmed. View "United States v. Mier-Garces" on Justia Law

In 2001, two chiropractors, defendant-appellant Dr. Thomas Forster Gehrmann, Jr., and Dr. Eric Carlson, opened Atlas Chiropractic Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado. They hired a newly graduated chiropractor, Dr. John Davis, as a preceptee, who eventually completed his preceptorship at Atlas, enabling him to become an associate at the business. In the last few months of 2006, Dr. Davis negotiated with the other two doctors for a one-third share of the business. In January 2007, Dr. Davis became a full partner in the practice. Drs. Gehrmann and Carlson advised Dr. Davis of an income-diversion scheme: placing cash payments and checks written to the treating doctor (as opposed to the business) in a cookie jar and regularly split those proceeds. Dr. Davis understood that the purpose of the scheme was to avoid claiming the diverted money as income on their tax forms. After splitting the money, each doctor deposited his share of this diverted money into his personal bank account instead of Atlas’s business account. They neither reported this income to Atlas’s bookkeeper or tax preparer nor paid taxes on it. Federal agents executed a search warrant at Atlas' office in 2011. By July 2015, a grand jury indicted Drs. Gehrmann and Carlson on four felony charges each: one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and three counts of filing false tax returns. A month later, Dr. Davis, who was cooperating with investigators, and not indicted, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor willfully delivering a false tax return to the Internal Revenue Service. In October 2018, after the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order suppressing evidence seized under the search warrant, Dr. Carlson pleaded guilty to a felony count of filing a false tax return; Dr. Gehrmann went to trial, and a jury convicted him on all four counts. Dr. Gehrmann appealed a portion of the sentence he received. At district court, Dr. Gehrmann never objected to the adequacy of the sentencing court's explanation of its sentencing decision. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court did not adequately explain its basis for imposing its level adjustment to the sentence. But the Court also concluded that Dr. Gehrmann could not show a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome on a remand. The sentence was therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Gehrmann" on Justia Law

Jimmie Moses plead guilty to a federal firearm charge after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence uncovered in a search conducted on his property in Norman, Oklahoma. The search was intended to uncover evidence of an illegal automobile “chop shop” operation, but law enforcement also found a firearm that Moses should not have possessed as a former felon. Moses reserved the right to challenge the suppression order and argues on appeal that the district court impermissibly denied him an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to challenge the search warrant. He specifically contended Norman police recklessly neglected to tell the state judge issuing the warrant that the police had materially exculpatory evidence in the form of video footage of his property. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the video footage was not materially exculpatory and did not negate the strong probable cause established by the affidavit submitted to the state judge. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law

After a routine traffic stop in New Mexico led to Raquel Cortez and Josefina Reyes-Moreno’s indictment for conspiring to transport undocumented aliens, both defendants jointly moved to suppress evidence based on Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations they alleged occurred during the stop. The district court found no constitutional violations and denied the motion. After review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concurred no constitutional violations occurred during the stop. "No Fourth Amendment violation occurred because none of the law enforcement officers’ initial questions impermissibly delayed the stop and, during the stop, the officers developed reasonable suspicion the defendants were transporting undocumented aliens, justifying a further detention until Border Patrol arrived. No Fifth Amendment violation occurred because neither Cortez nor Reyes-Moreno faced custodial interrogation during the stop, rendering the absence of Miranda warnings harmless." View "United States v. Reyes-Moreno" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Wyatt challenged two convictions for conspiring with others to deal in firearms without a federal firearms license. The Government conceded that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, in order to convict Wyatt of these conspiracy offenses, the jury had to find that Wyatt and his alleged co-conspirators acted willfully -- that they knew they were agreeing to do something unlawful. The Government further conceded that this error warranted vacating Wyatt’s conspiracy convictions and remanding for a new trial. But Wyatt contended that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial for a reasonable jury to find that he and his co-conspirators acted willfully and, therefore, the Tenth Circuit court should instead, dismiss the conspiracy counts charged against him with prejudice. The Tenth Circuit declined to dismiss, concluding there was sufficient evidence presented at trial that, if believed, would have supported a reasonable jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyatt and his co-conspirators knew they were agreeing to violate the law. Wyatt’s two conspiracy convictions were vacated and the matter remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law