Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anthony Buntyn, an employee of a private company that transported detainees for law enforcement agencies, was charged with willfully violating the detainees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause due to inhumane conditions of confinement. The conditions developed while Buntyn transported the detainees in a van to various detention facilities. The government alleged that Buntyn had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause through deliberate indifference to intolerable conditions of confinement and that this indifference had resulted in bodily injury to three detainees. The jury found Buntyn guilty of depriving the detainees of humane conditions, acting willfully and with deliberate indifference, and causing bodily injury to one detainee.Buntyn appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for a finding of guilt, that the district court erred in preventing his attorney from using the term malice in closing argument, and that the court coerced the jury to reach a verdict. The Tenth Circuit rejected Buntyn's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of inhumane conditions, deliberate indifference, and willfulness. The court also found that the district court did not err in prohibiting the use of the term malice in closing argument, and that Buntyn had waived his challenge to the district court's instruction for the jury to continue deliberating. View "United States v. Buntyn" on Justia Law

The case involves Alonzo Cortez Johnson, a state prisoner who petitioned for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Johnson, a Black man, claimed that his constitutional rights were violated because the state court failed to follow the appropriate procedural steps under Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits racial discrimination in jury selection. Johnson alleged that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory strikes based on race. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the state court had mishandled the Batson procedural framework and remanded the case to the district court to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing, unless doing so would be impossible or unsatisfactory.On remand, the district court granted Johnson conditional habeas relief, deciding that holding a Batson reconstruction hearing would be “both impossible and unsatisfactory.” The court reasoned that it could not sufficiently reconstruct all relevant circumstances to meaningfully apply Batson’s third step, which involves determining whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the strikes were actually a pretext for discrimination.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's decision. The court found that the district court had enough evidence to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing at step two, which involves the prosecution providing a race-neutral reason for the objected-to strike(s). The court concluded that the district court had applied the “impossible or unsatisfactory” standard too harshly and remanded the case back to the district court to hold a Batson reconstruction hearing. View "Johnson v. Rankins" on Justia Law

Steven Robert Venjohn pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced him to 41 months' imprisonment, considering his prior conviction for Colorado felony menacing as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). This classification increased his sentencing range. Venjohn appealed, arguing that the district court's ruling improperly inflated his sentencing range.The district court's decision was based on the probation officer's calculation in the presentence investigation report. The officer found that Venjohn's previous conviction for Colorado felony menacing qualified as a § 4B1.2(a) "crime of violence" and increased his base offense level accordingly. The district court agreed with this assessment and sentenced Venjohn to 41 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Taylor, Colorado felony menacing no longer categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that the district court's characterization of Venjohn's prior conviction as a "crime of violence" and the subsequent enhancement of his sentence was an error. The court concluded that this error was plain under current federal law and Colorado law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Venjohn" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Lewis Dear Jr., who was charged with attacking a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs, Colorado, in 2015. Dear was found incompetent to stand trial due to a diagnosis of delusional disorder, persecutory type. Despite being found incompetent multiple times, the district court ordered Dear to be involuntarily medicated in an attempt to restore his competency, following a motion by the government.Previously, Dear had been in state custody for about four years, during which he was continually found incompetent to stand trial. In December 2019, the federal government indicted Dear on 68 counts. The government moved for a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which led to Dear being transferred to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. There, a psychiatrist evaluated Dear and determined that although he remained incompetent due to his delusional disorder, he was substantially likely to be restored to competency through the administration of antipsychotics.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order for involuntary medication. The court held that the district court made sufficiently detailed factual findings and that those findings were not clearly erroneous. The court placed greater weight on the government’s experts due to their extensive experience restoring competency and their personal experience observing and interacting with Dear. View "United States v. Dear" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a mobile home fire that resulted in two deaths. The government accused Mr. Joseph Allen Hernandez of intentionally setting the fire, supported by expert testimony from a fire investigator. Mr. Hernandez claimed that he had accidentally started the fire. The trial resulted in convictions on two counts of second-degree murder in Indian Country and one count of arson in Indian Country.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma had allowed the fire investigator to give expert testimony, despite objections from the defense. The court also permitted the investigator to testify that he did not believe Mr. Hernandez's explanation of the fire's cause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court had erred in allowing the fire investigator's expert testimony and whether the investigator's disbelief of Mr. Hernandez's explanation had intruded on a reasonable expectation of privacy. The appellate court found no error in the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court had not abused its discretion in allowing the fire investigator's expert testimony. It also found that the investigator's disbelief of Mr. Hernandez's explanation did not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court affirmed the district court's rulings and Mr. Hernandez's convictions. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

In this case, law enforcement officers responded to a drug overdose at the home of Corban Elmore. After securing the scene and prohibiting anyone from entering the house, the officers waited almost eight hours before applying for a search warrant. Once they had a warrant, they searched Elmore’s home and discovered two firearms in his bedroom. Elmore, a convicted felon, entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the firearms.The District Court for the District of Colorado denied Elmore's motion to suppress the firearms, finding no Fourth Amendment violation. The court determined that the officers reasonably seized Elmore’s home because they had probable cause to believe the home contained evidence of drug possession and had good reason to fear that evidence would be destroyed before they could secure a search warrant. The court also concluded that the officers acted reasonably throughout the seizure, finding it appropriate for them to prohibit anyone from entering the home and to delay obtaining a warrant so that the lead detective could focus on his investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the eight-hour seizure of Elmore’s home was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the firearms. The court found that the officers made no effort to reconcile their law-enforcement needs with Elmore’s Fourth Amendment interests in his home and extended the seizure longer than reasonably necessary to diligently secure a warrant. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

The case involves Bobby Pena, who pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. He reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress child pornography that was recovered on his devices pursuant to a search warrant. Pena argued that the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based did not present probable cause and that the federal agents did not act in good faith in executing the search warrant. He also argued that in the absence of probable cause and good faith, evidence of child pornography would not have been inevitably discovered on his electronic devices.The district court denied Pena's motion to suppress, concluding that the magistrate judge had a substantial factual basis to find probable cause. The court found that the file and folder names observed by Agent Kucenski indicated the presence of child pornography. The court also concluded that Pena's suspicious statements to officers supported a finding of probable cause. The court found that Pena's practices with his digital devices and Agent Kucenski's declarations regarding the practices of child pornography collectors supported a finding of probable cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court did not err in finding that the affidavit established probable cause and provided a sufficient basis for the search warrant. The court also declined to remand Pena's fraud procurement case for resentencing. View "United States v. Pena" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kimberly Graham, who was convicted for first-degree manslaughter and leaving the scene of a fatal accident. After her convictions became final, she applied for postconviction relief, arguing that she was a Native American and the events took place on a reservation. The state district court granted her relief and vacated her convictions based on the Supreme Court's ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which stated that the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by Native Americans within a reservation. However, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals later overruled the precedent that allowed for the application of McGirt to convictions that had already become final. Consequently, the state district court reinstated Graham's convictions.Graham then sought a writ of prohibition from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that a liberty interest had arisen from the order vacating her convictions. The court denied her request, stating that the new precedent prevented the application of McGirt to convictions that had become final and that the initial order vacating the convictions was unauthorized under Oklahoma law. Graham then sought habeas relief, claiming that the reinstatement of her convictions had arbitrarily stripped her of her liberty interest. The federal district court agreed with Graham and granted habeas relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of habeas relief. The court held that regardless of whether the state appeals court had erred, its rejection of the due process claim was at least reasonable based on the facts and Supreme Court precedent. The court concluded that the state appeals court did not unreasonably determine the facts or apply a Supreme Court holding. Therefore, the federal district court should have deferred to the state appeals court. View "Graham v. White" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Mr. Lyndell Daniels, who was detained by law enforcement officers who linked him to a stolen Glock firearm based on his name. Daniels was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Daniels moved to suppress his name as the fruit of an unlawful investigative detention, arguing that the officers had no reasonable suspicion to detain him. The district court agreed with Daniels and granted his motion. The government appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred because there was reasonable suspicion to detain Daniels.The case originated from a near-anonymous call to the Aurora Police Department, expressing concern about three Black men, wearing dark hoodies and jeans, intermittently taking guns in and out of their pockets and getting in and out of a dark SUV. The caller believed they were “getting ready to do something,” but reported no illegality. The police arrived at the scene and detained Daniels, who was standing near the SUV. The officers did not observe any illegal activity or firearms when they arrived.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the totality of the circumstances known to the officer when he detained Daniels did not amount to reasonable suspicion. The court noted that the 911 call, the presence and actions of the SUV, the time of the encounter, and the location of the encounter were not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that Daniels' detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and the district court's grant of Daniels' motion to suppress was proper. View "United States v. Daniels" on Justia Law

The case involves Douglas Smith, a non-Indian, who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for an act he committed on his property located within the exterior boundaries of the Pueblo of Santa Clara. Smith shot and killed Maria Gallegos, who he saw trying to break into a trailer on his property. Prior to trial, Smith moved to dismiss the case for lack of federal jurisdiction, arguing that the federal district court lacked criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on his property and that Congress acted outside its constitutional authority when it passed the Indian Pueblo Land Act Amendments of 2005. The district court denied his motion.Smith's case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The appellate court had to decide whether federal criminal jurisdiction extends to land owned by a non-Indian within the exterior boundaries of a Pueblo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Smith's property is Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151, and therefore, his crime is subject to federal criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1152.Smith also claimed that the 2005 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to him. The court disagreed, holding that the 2005 Amendment did not unconstitutionally extend federal criminal jurisdiction to Smith's land. The court reasoned that the 2005 Amendment only exercised preexisting federal jurisdiction over Smith's land and was thus not an unconstitutional enactment as applied to Smith.Lastly, Smith contended that the district court erred in declining his request for a two-level sentence reduction for accepting responsibility for his crime. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's determination, noting that Smith had challenged the factual element of intent at trial, which provided a clear basis to conclude that he did not accept responsibility. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law