Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Defendant Marconia Green pleaded guilty to three counts of using a communication facility to facilitate the acquisition of cocaine powder. The district court sentenced him to 130 months’ imprisonment. Three years after Defendant’s sentencing, the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 782, which reduced the base offense levels assigned to certain drug offenses by two levels. Invoking this amendment, Defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Over a year later, Defendant filed another motion to reduce his sentence, again citing Amendment 782. The district court also denied this second motion. Defendant appealed the denial, arguing the district court abused its discretion in not considering all the facts and circumstances of his case. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit again affirmed. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant Marconia Green pleaded guilty to three counts of using a communication facility to facilitate the acquisition of cocaine powder. The district court sentenced him to 130 months’ imprisonment. Three years after Defendant’s sentencing, the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 782, which reduced the base offense levels assigned to certain drug offenses by two levels. Invoking this amendment, Defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Over a year later, Defendant filed another motion to reduce his sentence, again citing Amendment 782. The district court also denied this second motion. Defendant appealed the denial, arguing the district court abused its discretion in not considering all the facts and circumstances of his case. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit again affirmed. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Death row Oklahoma prisoner, petitioner Donald Grant sought habeas relief. In 2001, he was convicted with two counts of first degree murder and two counts of robbery with a firearm for the murders of Brenda McElyea and Suzette Smith during the robbery of the La Quinta Inn in Del City, Oklahoma. With respect to the murder counts, the State sought the death penalty. It charged several aggravating circumstances to support its request. In October 2012, Grant filed this instant 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition with the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, raising numerous propositions of error, five of which are relevant here: (1) he argued he was denied procedural due process because the trial court failed to hold a second competency hearing in response to Grant’s alleged manifestations of incompetence leading up to and during trial; (2) he raised several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims relating to trial counsel’s failures to investigate and present evidence regarding his competence and other mitigating circumstances; (3) he challenged the constitutionality of a jury instruction and related prosecutorial statements concerning mitigation evidence; (4) Grant raised a constitutional challenge to the peremptory strike of a potential juror on the basis of race; and (5) Grant argued that he was prejudiced by cumulative error. The district court denied Grant’s petition and granted a COA on the single issue of procedural competency. Grant moved the trial court to expand his certificate of appealability (COA). The Tenth Circuit concluded after review of the facts of this case, "no reasonable jurist could debate the correctness of the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Grant a COA regarding the exclusion of the Grundy Reports and the other expert reports, or deem the matter one that was worthy of encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, we deny Mr. Grant’s motion to expand the COA." View "Grant v. Royal" on Justia Law

Abraham Gonzalez-Alarcon filed a habeas petition alleging specific facts which, if proven, would have demonstrated he was a United States citizen. He sought release from custody from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) following ICE’s reinstatement of a prior order of removal on that basis. Dismissing Gonzalez-Alarcon’s petition, the district court concluded that he was required to exhaust administrative remedies, jurisdiction was barred by the REAL ID Act, and the petition for review process was an adequate substitute for habeas such that the REAL ID Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not offend the Suspension Clause. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the exhaustion provision at issue did not govern facially valid citizenship claims; that subsection applies only to aliens. And because district courts had jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit held a court must first consider whether a petitioner was in fact an alien before requiring exhaustion. Furthermore, the Court held the REAL ID Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions raised serious Suspension Clause concerns in one limited context: with respect to a United States citizen subject to a reinstated order of removal for whom the deadline to seek judicial review has passed, the REAL ID Act appeared to bar federal court review. “These restrictions would effectively strip citizenship from those who do not clear various procedural hurdles. Citizenship cannot be relinquished through mere neglect. . . . and ‘[t]he very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.’” Under the Suspension Clause, the Tenth Circuit held Gonzalez-Alarcon had to be granted some path to advance his facially valid claim of citizenship in federal court. Before permitting Gonzalez-Alarcon to proceed under the Great Writ, however, he should first attempt to obtain review of his citizenship claim through the REAL ID Act. View "Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias" on Justia Law

Petitioner Paulo Afamasaga was a native and citizen of Samoa who entered the United States on a nonimmigrant tourist visa and remained beyond the date authorized. After he pleaded guilty to making a false statement when applying for an American passport, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b, but the immigration judge (IJ) deemed him ineligible on the ground that violating Section 1542 was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed and dismissed his appeal. “Exercising jurisdiction to review questions of law decided in BIA removal orders (see Flores-Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2017)), the Tenth Circuit upheld the BIA’s determination that petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal. View "Afamasaga v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Defendant Ortiz-Lazaro pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1326(a)(1) and (b)(1), and he admitted that he violated the supervised release terms of his prior illegal reentry charge. He appealed his above-guidelines sentence for the supervised release violation as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. In looking at the detailed explanation the district court gave for its deviation from the guidelines, the Tenth Circuit concluded the sentence was reasonable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro" on Justia Law

Defendant Ortiz-Lazaro pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1326(a)(1) and (b)(1), and he admitted that he violated the supervised release terms of his prior illegal reentry charge. He appealed his above-guidelines sentence for the supervised release violation as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. In looking at the detailed explanation the district court gave for its deviation from the guidelines, the Tenth Circuit concluded the sentence was reasonable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro" on Justia Law

In 2014, defendant Joseph Degeare pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the sentencing court imposed a 15-year prison sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In doing so, the sentencing court treated five of Degeare’s previous Oklahoma convictions as ACCA predicates: (1) his 1990 conviction for forcible sodomy; (2) his two 1994 convictions for forcible sodomy; (3) his 1994 conviction for lewd molestation of a minor; and (4) his 2003 conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Degeare didn’t appeal. But in 2015, he sought habeas relief . After the district court denied his motion, Degeare filed an untimely notice of appeal. The Tenth Circuit dismissed, and the Supreme Court denied review. Relying on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), Degeare then sought and received authorization to file a second or successive postconviction motion for relief. In that motion, Degeare argued that the sentencing court erred in treating his previous convictions as ACCA predicates. The Tenth Circuit was faced with the issue of what offenses constitute violent felonies to make them predicate offenses for the ACCA. The Tenth Circuit hadn’t yet addressed the precise level of certainty this standard requires; whatever the term “certainty” might mean, “it doesn’t encompass the significant doubt we’re left with here. And because we can’t be ‘certain’ that the offense at issue in this appeal is ‘necessarily’ a violent felony,” the Court concluded the district court erred in treating it as one for purposes of denying defendant’s successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "United States v. Degeare" on Justia Law

Denver Detention Center (“DDC”) prisoner Craig Ralston filed a 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 civil rights suit against Hosea Cannon. Ralston alleged Cannon, the official charged with “coordinating, directing[,] and monitoring the religious activities” of DDC inmates, violated his First Amendment right to free exercise by denying his request for a kosher diet. Cannon moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, asserting his conduct was, at most, negligent and, thus, did not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. The district court denied Cannon’s request for qualified immunity. The district court concluded it was clearly established that a kosher-meal accommodation was necessary if Ralston had an honest belief the accommodation was important to his free exercise of religion. Importantly, the district court further concluded the record, read in the light most favorable to Ralston, was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find Cannon consciously or intentionally interfered with Ralston’s right to free exercise by denying the kosher-diet request. Cannon appealed. The Tenth Circuit determined that each aspect of Cannon’s appeal amounted to a challenge of the district court’s determinations of evidentiary sufficiency. Accordingly, the Court lacked jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, and dismissed Cannon’s appeal. View "Ralston v. Cannon" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant Joseph Pacheco was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and Pacheco was sentenced to a within-guidelines term of 355 months in prison. On appeal, Pacheco argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence gleaned from a cell phone recovered by officers at the scene of his arrest because the device was originally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In the alternative, he maintained the evidence from the cell phone should have been suppressed because the warrant ultimately authorizing officers to search the phone was authorized in Kansas but executed at a computer lab in Missouri. Further, Pacheco contended the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included charge of simple possession. As for his sentence, Pacheco argued the district court further abused its discretion in how it defined the amount and type of methamphetamine with which Pacheco was charged for sentencing purposes. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Pacheco’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law