Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved a protective sweep of a house incident to the arrest of one of its occupants, defendant-appellant Stephen Bagley. The protective sweep yielded items that allowed law enforcement officials to obtain a search warrant for the entire house. Executing this warrant, officials found incriminating evidence. Bagley was a convicted felon who was named in an arrest warrant for violating the terms of his supervised release. Bagley moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the protective sweep had gone too far. The district court denied the motion. The Tenth Circuit, after review of the district court record, concluded the protective sweep under the circumstances of this case was not permissible under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Abeyta challenged the sentence he received for pleading to being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The district court enhanced Abeyta’s sentence pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.2(c), counting Abeyta’s prior conviction for “damaging, defacing or destruction of private property” under Denver Revised Municipal Code (“Den.”) section 38-71 as a local ordinance violation that also violates state criminal law. Because Den. 38-71 offense was a local ordinance violation, it qualified as an exception under 4A1.2(c)(2), meaning that it did not count toward Abeyta’s criminal history score. But, if a Den. 38-71 offense also violated state criminal law, then the exception to the exception applies, meaning that it did count under the guidelines. Abeyta argued (among other things) that his Den. 38-71 conviction was a local ordinance violation that did not necessarily violate state criminal law. He noted that Colorado has a similar offense, Colo. Rev. Stat. (“Colo.”) section 18-4-501 (making it “unlawful for any person knowingly to damage, deface, destroy or injure” another person’s property), but argued that the Colorado statute only criminalized conduct that actually damaged property, whereas Den. 38-71 criminalized broader conduct, including defacement that does not cause damage. Because a violation of Den. 38-71 does not necessarily violate Colo. 18-4-501, Abeyta argued, the “exception to the exception” did not apply. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court erred by applying a "common sense approach" in making the Den. 38-71 conviction count towards his criminal history score. The Court remanded this case with direction to vacate Abeyta's sentence and for resentencing. View "United States v. Abeyta" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Gabriel Acosta and his girlfriend, Chante Dillon, killed their roommate, Kimberly Dotson, after Dotson wrecked their car. Acosta and Dillon duct-taped, beat, and suffocated Dotson to death, then bagged her body in trash bags and threw her in a dumpster. Patricia Medina was the only eyewitness to the murder. Acosta and Dillin were both charged with first-degree murder. Before Acosta’s trial, Medina described the killing in a recorded statement to the police, in two criminal depositions at which she was cross-examined, and at Dillon’s trial, where she was again subjected to cross-examination. But Medina was deemed unavailable to testify at Acosta’s trial, so the transcripts of her testimony were read to the jury. Acosta was convicted and sentenced to life without parole. The Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA) affirmed his conviction. Acosta then sought habeas relief in federal court, claiming he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him and to the assistance of counsel, both in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied relief. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Acosta v. Raemisch" on Justia Law

Anthony Kendall pleaded guilty to forcibly assaulting a federal officer and inflicting a bodily injury. Kendall had two prior felony convictions: a federal conviction for aggravated assault while carrying a firearm and a conviction for assault on a District of Columbia police officer in violation of a local provision. At sentencing, the district court held all three of these convictions supported a career offender sentence enhancement because each constituted a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Kendall appealed, contending the district court erred in classifying his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 111(b) in this case and his prior conviction under D.C. Code 22-405(c). Finding that all three of his convictions constituted crimes of violence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence Kendall received. View "United States v. Kendall" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Wayne Benton challenged his sentence. Benton pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His presentence investigation report (PSR) concluded Benton’s 2006 Kansas conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was a crime of violence as defined in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applied to his guilty plea, resulted in a six-level enhancement. Benton appealed, arguing his aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence, and that he should have had a base offense of 14 and a corresponding Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months, instead of the 92 to 115 month range he ultimately received. Benton argued that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon could not be a crime of violence because, in some cases, a perpetrator may commit the crime with a harmless object. Yet, under Kansas law, the actual ability to effectuate harm is irrelevant because assault “requires only an apparent ability, not a present ability, to do bodily harm.” The Tenth Circuit concluded the 2006 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction qualified as a predicate offense under the Sentencing Guidelines and affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Gabriel Mirabel, a convicted felon and acting pro se, appealed when he was convicted on drug and weapon possession charges. Authorities thought that they saw Mirabal put an assault rifle in the trunk of a car. This sighting led authorities to arrange for a local officer to stop Mirabal for a traffic violation and to search the trunk. After telling Mirabal that he had been speeding, a sheriff deputy looked for an assault rifle. Though he didn’t find one, he did find a kilogram of cocaine in the car’s interior. The discovery of cocaine in the car became key evidence for one of the eventual charges against Mirabal. In defending against these charges, Mirabal argued that the search had violated his constitutional rights. At trial, the Government presented testimony by the owner of the car, Dominic Anaya, who had pleaded guilty to his own drug crimes. Anaya testified that he and Mirabal had worked together to sell cocaine. So Mirabal set out to impeach Anaya, asking Anaya about how much he expected his sentence to drop as a result of his plea agreement. Mirabal was allowed to probe the plea agreement in general terms, but not in detail. On appeal, Mirabal challenged the evidence involving the cocaine found in the care. He also challenged the restrictions placed on his cross-examination of Anaya. Furthermore, Mirabal challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, alleging certain evidence was destroyed or otherwise withheld. Finding none of these challenges availing, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Mirabal’s convictions. View "United States v. Mirabal" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from the sentencing of Paul Turrieta for possession of a firearm and ammunition after a felony conviction. The district court imposed a 15-year sentence based on the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and three past convictions in New Mexico for residential burglary. Turrieta moved to vacate the sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that the district court had relied on the ACCA’s residual clause and that this clause was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied the motion, and Turrieta appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Turrieta" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit expedited consideration of this bail appeal to consider Mario Ailon-Ailon’s argument that the government has misinterpreted the word “flee” as it appeared in 18 U.S.C. 3142(f)(2), resulting in his illegal pre-trial detention. He argued that involuntary removal by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) did not constitute flight of the sort that would justify detention. On initial consideration, a magistrate judge agreed and determined that Ailon-Ailon should not have been detained before trial. On review of the magistrate judge, the district court reversed, ordering that he be detained. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the plain meaning of “flee” refers to a volitional act rather than involuntary removal, and that the structure of the Bail Reform Act supported this plain-text reading. View "United States v. Ailon-Ailon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Marcus Woodson, a prisoner of Oklahoma, sued several Oklahoma prison officials in Oklahoma state court, proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) under state law. The defendants removed the case to federal district court. As required by federal statute, they paid the filing fee. The federal court, however, determined that Woodson, who had previously abused the federal courts by filing frivolous lawsuits, was not eligible to proceed IFP and dismissed his case because he failed to pay the filing fee. Woodson appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed finding state-court plaintiffs whose cases are removed to federal court have no obligation to pay a filing fee; nothing in the federal IFP statute was to the contrary. View "Woodson v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Defendant Delano Medina filed an application for habeas relief, seeking dismissal of the charges against him on the ground that he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He apparently proceeded under 28 U.S.C. 2241 rather than under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because section 2255(a) required he be “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress.” At the time of his filing for relief, he had not yet been tried, much less sentenced. The district court dismissed Defendant’s application for failure to exhaust available remedies. He appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "Although there may be exceptional circumstances in which [section] 2241 is available to a federal prisoner awaiting trial in federal court, no such circumstances are present here." View "Medina v. Choate" on Justia Law