Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Tenth Circuit expedited consideration of this bail appeal to consider Mario Ailon-Ailon’s argument that the government has misinterpreted the word “flee” as it appeared in 18 U.S.C. 3142(f)(2), resulting in his illegal pre-trial detention. He argued that involuntary removal by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) did not constitute flight of the sort that would justify detention. On initial consideration, a magistrate judge agreed and determined that Ailon-Ailon should not have been detained before trial. On review of the magistrate judge, the district court reversed, ordering that he be detained. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the plain meaning of “flee” refers to a volitional act rather than involuntary removal, and that the structure of the Bail Reform Act supported this plain-text reading. View "United States v. Ailon-Ailon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Marcus Woodson, a prisoner of Oklahoma, sued several Oklahoma prison officials in Oklahoma state court, proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) under state law. The defendants removed the case to federal district court. As required by federal statute, they paid the filing fee. The federal court, however, determined that Woodson, who had previously abused the federal courts by filing frivolous lawsuits, was not eligible to proceed IFP and dismissed his case because he failed to pay the filing fee. Woodson appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed finding state-court plaintiffs whose cases are removed to federal court have no obligation to pay a filing fee; nothing in the federal IFP statute was to the contrary. View "Woodson v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Defendant Delano Medina filed an application for habeas relief, seeking dismissal of the charges against him on the ground that he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He apparently proceeded under 28 U.S.C. 2241 rather than under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because section 2255(a) required he be “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress.” At the time of his filing for relief, he had not yet been tried, much less sentenced. The district court dismissed Defendant’s application for failure to exhaust available remedies. He appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "Although there may be exceptional circumstances in which [section] 2241 is available to a federal prisoner awaiting trial in federal court, no such circumstances are present here." View "Medina v. Choate" on Justia Law

Defendant Delano Medina filed an application for habeas relief, seeking dismissal of the charges against him on the ground that he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He apparently proceeded under 28 U.S.C. 2241 rather than under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because section 2255(a) required he be “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress.” At the time of his filing for relief, he had not yet been tried, much less sentenced. The district court dismissed Defendant’s application for failure to exhaust available remedies. He appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "Although there may be exceptional circumstances in which [section] 2241 is available to a federal prisoner awaiting trial in federal court, no such circumstances are present here." View "Medina v. Choate" on Justia Law

A jury found Steven Meisel guilty of distributing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he argued the district court: (1) violated his right to present a complete defense by preventing him from adducing alternative perpetrator evidence; and (2) erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on “identity.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed: even assuming the district court erred in limiting Meisel’s ability to present alternative perpetrator evidence, any such error was harmless. And, since the jury instructions, considered as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury the gist of Meisel’s defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Meisel’s proffered instruction. View "United States v. Meisel" on Justia Law

A jury found Steven Meisel guilty of distributing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he argued the district court: (1) violated his right to present a complete defense by preventing him from adducing alternative perpetrator evidence; and (2) erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on “identity.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed: even assuming the district court erred in limiting Meisel’s ability to present alternative perpetrator evidence, any such error was harmless. And, since the jury instructions, considered as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury the gist of Meisel’s defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Meisel’s proffered instruction. View "United States v. Meisel" on Justia Law

The question presented in this appeal for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether Petitioner Juan Lucio-Rayos’s municipal theft conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), which would have made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Lucio-Rayos was convicted under a divisible municipal code provision that set forth several different theft offenses, some of which qualified as CIMTs and some of which did not. Applying a modified categorical approach, the Tenth Circuit determined it was not possible to tell which theft offense was the basis of Lucio-Rayos’s conviction. The Court held it was Lucio-Rayos’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal, and because the record was inconclusive to this end, the Court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)’s determination that Lucio-Rayos did not show that he was eligible for cancellation of removal. Furthermore, the immigration judge (“IJ”) did not deprive Lucio-Rayos of due process by refusing to recuse from hearing his case. View "Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The question presented in this appeal for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether Petitioner Juan Lucio-Rayos’s municipal theft conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), which would have made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Lucio-Rayos was convicted under a divisible municipal code provision that set forth several different theft offenses, some of which qualified as CIMTs and some of which did not. Applying a modified categorical approach, the Tenth Circuit determined it was not possible to tell which theft offense was the basis of Lucio-Rayos’s conviction. The Court held it was Lucio-Rayos’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal, and because the record was inconclusive to this end, the Court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)’s determination that Lucio-Rayos did not show that he was eligible for cancellation of removal. Furthermore, the immigration judge (“IJ”) did not deprive Lucio-Rayos of due process by refusing to recuse from hearing his case. View "Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Kenroy Benford of being a felon in possession of a firearm based on his constructive possession of a loaded pistol that police seized from an apartment bedroom he shared with his girlfriend. On appeal, Benford argued the district court: (1) abused its discretion by admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) about (i) his possession of a different firearm during a recent sidewalk confrontation, and (ii) text messages he had sent three months earlier suggesting he had firearms to trade; (2) letting the jury’s guilty verdict stand despite insufficient evidence that he had constructively possessed the pistol in the apartment by knowingly having the power to exercise dominion or control over the pistol; and (3) it incompletely instructed the jury on constructive possession by not advising the jury that it could convict only if it also found that Benford intended to exercise dominion or control over the pistol. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its denials of Benford’s motions for acquittal, but reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the erroneous jury instruction. View "United States v. Benford" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Kenroy Benford of being a felon in possession of a firearm based on his constructive possession of a loaded pistol that police seized from an apartment bedroom he shared with his girlfriend. On appeal, Benford argued the district court: (1) abused its discretion by admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) about (i) his possession of a different firearm during a recent sidewalk confrontation, and (ii) text messages he had sent three months earlier suggesting he had firearms to trade; (2) letting the jury’s guilty verdict stand despite insufficient evidence that he had constructively possessed the pistol in the apartment by knowingly having the power to exercise dominion or control over the pistol; and (3) it incompletely instructed the jury on constructive possession by not advising the jury that it could convict only if it also found that Benford intended to exercise dominion or control over the pistol. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and its denials of Benford’s motions for acquittal, but reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the erroneous jury instruction. View "United States v. Benford" on Justia Law