Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellee James Durkee sued defendants Sheriff John Minor, Sheriff, and Sergeant Ron Hochmuth, both of Summit County Sheriff’s Department, in their individual capacities. Plaintiff argued defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when he was attacked by Ricky Michael Ray Ramos, a fellow inmate, at the Summit County Detention Center. In a written order, the district court denied defendants qualified immunity in the context of their motion for summary judgment, and they appealed. Ramos had a history of aggressive behavior at the jail, and had been charged with several violations of jail rules on several occasions for threatening behavior towards jail staff, including a threat to stab a deputy in the neck, and toward other inmates, including the Plaintiff. Ramos had threatened Plaintiff shortly after Plaintiff’s arrival at the jail, and Plaintiff requested that he be reassigned to another housing pod away from Ramos. After an argument between Ramos and Plaintiff, Plaintiff again expressed concern about Ramos’ aggression toward him. In 2012, Ramos was being escorted back from a court proceeding by Defendant Hochmuth, and was unshackled in the booking area of the jail, which was adjacent to the professional visitation room. At that time, Plaintiff was in the visitation room, meeting with a mental health counselor. Defendant Hochmuth proceeded to unshackle Ramos in the booking area, and instructed him to return to his housing pod. After taking one or two steps toward the housing pod door, Ramos suddenly turned around and ran into the visitation room through its unlocked door and assaulted Plaintiff. Although the altercation was brief, Plaintiff suffered a facial fracture from the assault. After review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of immunity as to Defendant Hochmuth and reversed as to Defendant Minor. View "Durkee v. Minor" on Justia Law

Defendant Elias Amado appealed two district court decisions denying his respective motions for reduction of sentence. Defendant, an illegal immigrant, was caught in 2013 with lots of guns, ammunition, drugs, money, and other incriminating evidence. As part of his plea agreement, Defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] his right to . . . move to modify under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by the court[.]” Based on an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of II, Defendant’s guideline range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment on the drug count. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months’ imprisonment on that count and a concurrent term of 120 months’ imprisonment (the maximum allowable) on the illegal reentry count. Consistent with the terms of his plea agreement, Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. Subsequently, Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines took effect on November 1, 2014. Despite his plea waiver, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for a reduction of sentence. Three months after filing his first appeal, Defendant moved to “hold briefing in abeyance.” According to Defendant, the Government had decided not to oppose any subsequent motion he might make for a sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782. The Tenth Circuit tolled briefing. With his first appeal still pending, Defendant returned to district court and again moved for a reduction of sentence. And again the district court denied the motion. This time, however, the court explained in a written order not only why it denied Defendant’s second motion but also his first motion: Defendant’s first motion did not present a close question. Turning to the second motion, the court initially questioned its jurisdiction over the motion, relied on "an obscure federal rule" to exercise jurisdiction, considered the second motion as one for a sentence reduction, then denied it. After review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's ruling on the first motion. Defendant’s second motion fell "within the very definition of a motion to reconsider," and the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in denying it. View "United States v. Amado" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ashley Tidzump was convicted of assault and requested an 18-month prison term, admitting an addiction to opiates and a need for treatment. Tidzump would have ordinarily qualified for the prison’s drug treatment program only if she began treatment with at least two years remaining on her sentence. The district court lengthened her prison sentence to 31 months. Though the sentence dipped below the guideline range, the sentence was long enough to allow Tidzump to become eligible for the prison’s drug treatment program. Tidzump appealed the sentence, presenting the issue for the Tenth Circuit’s review of whether the district court’s explanation for the sentence was permissible under “Tapia v. United States,” (564 U.S. 319 (2011)). In “Tapia,” the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal district court could not impose or lengthen a prison term to promote rehabilitation. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the sentence was impermissible because the district court expressly lengthened the sentence for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation. View "United States v. Tidzump" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Tremale Henry was on supervised release after term in prison when he got into an altercation with another man outside an Oklahoma City night club. At the probation revocation hearing that followed, the district court found Henry responsible for two separate assaults with a dangerous weapon. In the first assault, the court found that Henry swung a knife at his victim but missed. In the second assault an hour later, the court found that Henry struck again, this time successfully stabbing his victim. The court found each assault independently sufficient to warrant revocation of Henry’s supervised release. It then concluded that the two assaults, along with a third violation for lying to his probation officer, collectively warranted a new prison term of 24 months followed by six further years of supervised release. On appeal Mr. Henry argues that the district court erred by relying on hearsay in reaching its judgment. Finding only that the district court relied on hearsay for the second assault, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part, remanding for recalculation of Henry's sentence. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

In 2012, a grand jury indicted Frank Sharron Piper, III for participating in a cocaine conspiracy and other related offenses. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 135 months in prison. Piper appealed the district court's denial of he motion for a sentence reduction based on retroactively applied Sentencing Guideline amendments. Piper argues the district court: (1) failed to address the policy arguments in his motion; (2) exceeded its statutory authority when it considered newly alleged presentencing conduct not addressed at the original sentencing; (3) made fact findings regarding a rap video he made (referencing those "who told on me" and "stop snitchin'") without holding a hearing; and (4) erroneously concluded Piper intended the video (posted online at YouTube) to be viewed by and construed as a threat to the cooperating witnesses. The Tenth Circuit found none of these arguments availing and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Piper" on Justia Law

Defendant Manuel Maldonado-Palma pled guilty to one count of illegally reentering or remaining in the United States after having been removed, excluded, or deported. Before sentencing, Maldonado objected to the recommendation in the Presentence Report (PSR) that his guideline base offense level be increased to reflect that he had a prior conviction for a crime of violence. The district court overruled his objection and, calculating the guideline range to be 77-96 months, sentenced Maldonado to 77 months in prison. On appeal, Maldonado argued the district court miscalculated the guidelines range, making his sentence procedurally unreasonable, because his prior New Mexico conviction for aggravated assault was not a “crime of violence” under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Finding no miscalculation of the sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Maldonado-Palma" on Justia Law

Two criminal cross-appeals stemmed from a physical altercation between Defendant Leslie Chapman and his then-wife, D.V. The altercation occurred in Veterans Administration (“VA”) housing where the couple was staying while Chapman recuperated from surgery. As a result of the altercation, the Government charged Chapman, under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (“ACA”) with committing the New Mexico offense of aggravated assault on a household member, and a jury convicted him of that offense. In case No. 15-2143, Chapman challenged the district court’s decision to permit the Government’s expert witness, a certified sexual assault nurse examiner, to testify at trial that D.V.’s conduct in scratching herself across the chest after the altercation was consistent with conduct exhibited by sexual assault and domestic abuse victims to cope with the trauma they have experienced. In case No. 15-2173, the Government challenged Chapman’s sentence. Finding no reversible error in either case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Defendant Emanuel Godinez-Perez pleaded guilty to three criminal counts arising out of his role in a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Godinez to a term of imprisonment of 108 months, to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release. Godinez appealed his sentence. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Godinez that the district court erred in calculating his base offense level and, in turn, his advisory Guidelines sentencing range. Specifically, the court erred in failing to make particularized findings regarding relevant conduct attributable to Godinez. Consequently, the Court remanded this case back to the district court with directions to vacate Godinez’s sentence and resentence him. View "United States v. Godinez-Perez" on Justia Law

Brayan Alexis Osuna-Gutierrez was arrested in Kansas. He was a passenger in a rental vehicle on a cross-country trip. The police found approximately seven grams of marijuana belonging to Gutierrez that he had legally purchased in Colorado. Police also found approximately three kilograms of methamphetamine in the rear portion of the car. The government charged Gutierrez and his co-defendants with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gutierrez ultimately pled guilty to “Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute" (the government dropped the methamphetamine charges). The district court sentenced him to time served, approximately seven months. After leaving jail, Gutierrez was immediately transferred to immigration custody and served with Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order (the expedited removal process). During the removal process, an officer within DHS concluded that Gutierrez was not a legal permanent resident, having come to the United States from Mexico with his mother when he was one year old without being legally admitted. Further, Gutierrez had pled guilty to an aggravated felony. Gutierrez timely petitioned for review of his removal and was deported back to Mexico. Gutierrez argued his deportation was improper because: (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) expedited removal process is illegal; and (2) in any event, it was improper for DHS to use the expedited removal process on Gutierrez because he pled guilty to a misdemeanor, not a felony. The Tenth Circuit found Gutierrez was wrong on both counts, and denied Gutierrez's petition for review. View "Osuna-Gutierrez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

George Rouse hanged himself shortly after defendants, Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation Agents Francia Thompson and Marvin Akers transported him to the Grady County Law Enforcement Center (GCLEC) for booking. Rouse’s mother, Regina Williams, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She alleged the defendants knew Rouse was suicidal when they delivered him to GCLEC but failed to inform GCLEC’s booking staff of that fact. Defendants appealed, arguing the district court erred in its order denying their motion to reconsider its denial of their motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that defendants didn’t expressly designate the district court's order in their notice of appeal. "And we can’t fairly infer an intent to appeal that order from any of the other relevant documents before us." View "Williams v. Akers" on Justia Law