Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Walter Flaugher pled guilty in 2006 to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to 57 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. In 2014, the U.S. Probation Office filed a petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging several violations. Flaugher stipulated to one of the violations, use of methamphetamine. The district court revoked his supervised release, resentenced him to another 12 months and 1 day in prison, and imposed 3 years of supervised release. Over his counsel’s objections, the court also imposed a condition to the supervised release, requiring Flaugher to be subject to a search of his house, car or person, by a probation officer. On appeal, Flaugher argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) prohibited district courts from imposing warrantless-search conditions except in cases involving felons required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). He challenged the condition because he was not required to register under SORNA. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Flaugher" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Shelton Jackson appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and death sentence. In 1997, Jackson was charged with the murder of Monica Decator in Tulsa, Oklahoma and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Jackson raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether the state court’s submission to the jury of an allegedly invalid sentencing aggravator unconstitutionally skewed the jury’s deliberations during the penalty phase of his trial; (2) whether his defense lawyers provided constitutionally deficient representation during the penalty phase; and (3) whether the combined effect of these two errors warrants habeas relief even if, viewed individually, each error is harmless. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Jackson v. Warrior" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the district court's grant of defendant-appellee Zachary Krueger motion to suppress evidence seized in Oklahoma pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate judge in Kansas. Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) learned that child pornography was being distributed over the internet from an IP address registered to Krueger, a Kansas resident. An HSI agent thereafter obtained a warrant from a United States magistrate judge in the District of Kansas to search Krueger’s Kansas residence for items such as computers and cell phones that may be used to depict child pornography visually. Upon executing the warrant, the agent discovered that Krueger was not home and that his computer and cell phone were not in the residence. Krueger’s roommate, who was present at the time, indicated that Krueger was in Oklahoma City visiting a friend, and that Krueger may have taken his computer and cell phone with him to Oklahoma. Based on this information, the Kansas-based HSI agent asked an Oklahoma-based HSI agent to verify Krueger’s whereabouts and execute a second warrant, obtained from a different United States magistrate judge in the District of Kansas. This warrant authorized law enforcement to search both the Oklahoma residence and Krueger’s automobile parked outside the Oklahoma residence for electronic devices belonging to Krueger or in his possession. Krueger was present when the agents executed the second warrant, and they seized (among other things) Krueger’s computer and external hard drive. In granting Krueger’s motion to suppress this evidence, the district court concluded that suppression was necessary because: (1) the warrant violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, which generally limits a federal magistrate judge’s warrant-issuing authority to the district where he or she sits; and (2) Krueger established that he was prejudiced by the Rule 41 violation. On appeal, the Government argued that reversal was necessary because the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining that Krueger established prejudice. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression order. View "United States v. Krueger" on Justia Law

Jerold Fisher entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to submitting fraudulent tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service. In return, the Government promised, among other things, not to charge Fisher with any further crimes arising out of the same underlying conduct. Following the plea agreement and before sentencing, the district court found Fisher had breached the plea agreement and released the Government from its no-new-charges obligation. The Government then indicted Fisher on related structuring charges. The court subsequently reversed itself and reinstated the plea agreement, but the Government did not dismiss the new indictment. At sentencing on the tax fraud charge, Fisher asked the district court to find that the Government: (1) had breached the plea agreement by failing to dismiss the structuring charges; and (2) had engaged in vindictive prosecution. The court sentenced Fisher to 41 months in prison without ruling on either of those requests. Fisher appealed, arguing the district court erred by declining to decide his governmental breach claim. Because that claim was moot, the Tenth Circuit concluded it lacked jurisdiction over it. To the extent Fisher tried to raise a similar argument regarding his vindictive prosecution claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded he forfeited that claim and waived it through inadequate briefing. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jesus Ibarra-Diaz appealed his possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine conviction, arguing: (1) the district court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by admitting various statements of testimonial hearsay at trial; (2) he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of inflammatory testimony from the government’s key witness; (3) he was deprived of a unanimous jury verdict by an allegedly duplicitous indictment; and (4) there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support his conviction. Taking each argument in turn, the Tenth Circuit rejected defendant’s arguments on appeal and affirmed his conviction. View "United States v. Ibarra-Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kelvin Hill boarded an east-bound Amtrak train in Los Angeles, California. The train stopped in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and was boarded by Agent Kevin Small of the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) to conduct drug-interdiction activities. Small proceeded to a common luggage area, noticing a black and white “Coogi” brand suitcase with no name tag. He removed the Coogi suitcase from the common luggage area; carried it to the passenger area; and rolled it down the center aisle of the coach, asking each passenger if the bag belonged to him. All passengers present in the coach, including defendant, denied ownership of the bag. Deeming it abandoned, Small searched the bag, finding a large quantity of cocaine and items of clothing linking the bag to defendant. A grand jury charged defendant with possessing with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress, arguing that Small’s taking the Coogi bag from the common storage area and moving it about the coach amounted to an illegal seizure, rendering defendant’s subsequent abandonment of the bag legally invalid. The district court denied the motion. Defendant’s appeal of the denial of his suppression motion framed a particularly narrow legal question for the Tenth Circuit’s review: did Small’s actions in removing defendant’s bag from the train’s common luggage area and carrying it through the coach as he questioned passengers constitute a seizure of the bag? The Tenth Circuit answered in the affirmative: Small’s actions amounted to a “meaningful interference with [Hill’s] possessory interests in” the Coogi bag. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Rodella, the former sheriff of Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, was convicted by a jury of one count of depriving a person of his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable force and seizure, resulting in bodily injury and including the use of a dangerous weapon. The conviction stems from a “road rage” incident in 2014 in which Michael Tafoya, outraged he was being tailgated by a Jeep containing Rodella, “flipped off” the driver, Rodella’s son Thomas Junior. According to Tafoya, both men started walking towards his Mazda in an aggressive fashion while simultaneously telling Tafoya to “come on.” At no point, according to Tafoya, did Rodella flash a badge or otherwise identify himself as a law enforcement officer. Tafoya, unaware of either man’s identity and believing that the two men wanted to fight him, sped off in his vehicle. Rodella and his son got back in their Jeep and, with Rodella Jr. again driving, began to follow Tafoya. In an attempt to elude the Jeep, Tafoya’s vehicle got stuck on a metal pole. The Jeep caught up with Tafoya. Rodella and Tafoya struggled before additional deputies arrived on the scene. Tafoya was arrested and jailed before being bailed out by his grandfather. The criminal charges were ultimately dismissed. Tafoya recounted this experience to the FBI. For violating Tafoya’s Constitutional rights, Rodella was sentenced to a total term of 121 months. On appeal, Rodella challenged his convictions on several grounds. But finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Rodella" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit in this matter was whether appellant Jonathan Madrid’s prior conviction for statutory rape in Texas qualified as a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In light of “Johnson v. United States,” (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Tenth Circuit held that it did not. Accordingly, the Court vacated Madrid’s sentences as a career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Madrid" on Justia Law

Defendant Albert Alexander pleaded guilty in 2012 to violating California Penal Code section 266c, which prohibited inducing another to engage in sexual conduct by misrepresentations creating fear. As required by California law, he registered as a sex offender in that state. But he did not register as a sex offender in Oklahoma when he moved, and he was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma for failing to register. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his California section 266c conviction did not trigger SORNA’s registration requirement. He argued that section 266c covered only consensual sexual conduct and so falls within SORNA’s exception from the definition of sex offense for an “offense involving consensual sexual conduct . . . if the victim was an adult . . . .” When the motion was denied, he entered a conditional plea of guilty. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendant challenged: (1) his classification as a tier III sex offender when the district court imposed sentence; and (2) the denial of his motion to dismiss. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, rejecting defendant's argument that a violation of section 266c did not qualify for tier III, and holding that sexual conduct induced by the misrepresentations required under section 266c was not consensual within the meaning of the term in SORNA. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Upon release from jail, petitioner-appellant Scott Eizember went to his ex-girlfriend's hometown to lie in wait for her. She had tipped off authorities about his violation of a protective order. Eisember noticed an elderly couple leaving a house across the street from the ex-girlfriend's home. After the couple left, Eizember broke in. But A.J. and Patsy Cantrell didn't stay away as long; when they returned home they found Eizember pointing their own shotgun at them. Mr. Cantrell saw an opportunity to grab the gun away from Eizember; a shot hit Eizember in the hand, but also struck and killed Mrs. Cantrell. In what followed, Eizember wrestled the gun away from Mr. Cantrell and proceeded to beat him with it until he fell unconscious. Eizember headed across the street, shotgun in hand, toward the ex-girlfriend's house. Her son saw him coming and tried to run, but before he could, Eizember shot him in the back. Eizember turned on Montgomery's grandmother and beat her too. Montgomery recovered enough to run out of the house and into his pickup truck with Eizember leaping into the truck bed. Eventually Montgomery crashed into a pole, jumped out, and ran for help. Eizember headed in the other direction and managed to hitch a ride. For the next eleven days Eizember hid in wooded areas around Depew, until eventually stealing a car, then hitchhiking further away. Dr. Sam Peebles and his wife stopped and offered him a lift. Eizember turned his pistol on the couple and ordered them to drive him to Texas. The journey lasted hours. During a roadside break in Texas, Dr. Peebles drew his own revolver and shot Eizember. Eizember wrested the revolver away and bludgeoned Dr. Peebles with the pistol he'd stolen back in Oklahoma. Eizember tried to shoot Mrs. Peebles. When the pistol wouldn't fire, he struck her in the head instead and ran off. At a nearby convenience store, the clerk heard he'd been shot and called the police. It was only then that the authorities arrested Eizember, taking him first to a hospital to recover, and, in time, to Oklahoma for trial. There, a jury there found Eizember guilty of: first-degree murder, second-degree felony murder, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, shooting with intent to kill, and first-degree burglary. Eizember was sentenced to death. Eizember managed to obtain a certificate of appealability permitting him to raise a number of issues to the Tenth Circuit. But finding no basis upon which to grant relief, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Eizember v. Trammell" on Justia Law