Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Leslie Camick was convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, making a material false statement to the U.S. Patent Office, three counts of aggravated identity theft, and obstruction of justice, all stemming from his unlawful use of his deceased brother’s name and identity. Following his conviction and sentencing, defendant was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him on each count. He also challenged the district court’s restitution determination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed defendant's convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, material false statement, and aggravated identity theft, as well as portions of the restitution award, finding that the evidence presented at trial was indeed insufficient to support those charges. But the Court affirmed the conviction for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Camick" on Justia Law

The government brought criminal charges against Brandon Richter and Tor Olson for fraudulently obtaining the electronic devices they exported for sale overseas, and for violating federal law governing the exportation of hazardous electronic waste. After a fifteen-day trial, the jury found them guilty of committing fraud and facilitating the illegal exportation of hazardous waste. The jury also convicted Richter on a single count of obstruction of justice. On appeal, Richter and Olson raised a variety of legal and evidentiary challenges to these convictions. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit reversed defendants' convictions for smuggling and fraud, based in part on testimony by the government's rebuttal witness. This witness was not qualified as an expert witness, and was allowed to opine as to the nature of the defendants' business and the devices they were exporting. The Court found that the admission of the witness' testimony did not have a "substantial influence" on the other charges against defendants, and as such, was harmlessly admitted. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Richter" on Justia Law

Defendant Belisario Domingo Martinez-Torres raised challenges to three conditions of his supervised release. In July 2008, Defendant, who was 23 years old at the time, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana. Although two conditions were not objected to in district court, the government conceded that they had to be set aside on plain-error review. The Tenth Circuit concluded remand was also necessary on the third challenged condition of release. "The error may not be an obvious one, but it might well have been avoided by additional advocacy and exploration of the issue at the sentencing hearing." The third condition restricted Defendant's access to sexually explicit materials: "the district court may have relied on scientific literature or personal experience, but none was cited for the record. record. Further, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Defendant ever viewed pornography of any kind or that sexually explicit materials contributed to his prior offense in any way." The Court therefore concluded on the trial court record that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the special condition prohibiting Defendant from viewing or possessing sexually explicit materials. The three challenged conditions were vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Martinez-Torres" on Justia Law

Defendant Tracey Moore appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle following a traffic stop. Moore was pulled over for speeding, for which he was issued a warning. However, an Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper continued to detain Moore in order to conduct a dog sniff. The dog alerted to Moore’s vehicle and a subsequent search revealed a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition in the trunk. Moore moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the stop. After the district court denied Moore’s motion, he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. On appeal, Moore argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him after the purpose of the stop was met. He also argued his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the narcotics-detection dog jumped into his vehicle. “Reasonable suspicion is not, and is not meant to be, an onerous standard.” The Tenth Circuit, after review of the district court judgment, found that Moore’s nervousness, his admission that he had been in trouble before, and the recent addition of his name to the vehicle’s registration, when considered together, were sufficient to indicate criminal activity. Accordingly, the trooper did not violate Moore’s Fourth Amendment rights when he continued to detain Moore after the purpose of the stop was completed. With regard to the dog's search, the Court found that "Jester" properly alerted before he jumped inside Moore’s vehicle. A responding trooper testified that when he was doing his first pass around the exterior of Moore’s vehicle, Jester “gave a positive alert” with “a really good change of behavior” by snapping his head around before he jumped into the window of Moore’s car. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant David Craig was convicted of possessing a stolen firearm for which he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. After his release from prison, he violated various conditions of his supervised release. He stipulated to several violations, and the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 14 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. On appeal, he contended the district court denied him the right to allocute, as afforded him by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. Under the then-current Rule 32.1, the trial court was required to give the defendant the opportunity to make a statement and present any mitigating information. Reading further in the context of defendant's argument on appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether Rule 32.1 required a trial court to affirmatively extend to the defendant a personal invitation to make a statement. If yes, then the trial court record in this case would have established that the district court erred. While number of federal courts of appeals have held that Rule 32.1 did contain such a requirement, many reached the conclusion that the failure to let a defendant allocute might constitute "plain" error if "clear or obvious" under "well-settled law." Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit interpreted Rule 32.1 to require a personal invitation to allocute, the Tenth Circuit concluded any potential error in not addressing defendant personally was not "plain." Furthermore, the Court concluded that any potential error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding: defense counsel explicitly acknowledged that defendant both understood the district court’s proposed sentence and had no intention to challenge its severity. After careful consideration of defendant's argument on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction. View "United States v. Craig" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant John Snyder was stopped for a traffic offense and, upon approaching the vehicle, the investigating officer smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. Officers then searched his car and discovered a firearm under the driver's seat, which Snyder admitted was his. Snyder was convicted for unlawful possession of the firearm and because of a number of previous felony convictions, received a lengthy 180-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) mandatory minimum sentencing provision. On appeal, Snyder argued: (1) his vehicle was searched without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the ACCA's residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, and applying it to increase his sentence violated due process. The Tenth Circuit concluded: (1) the smell of burnt marijuana was sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle cabin search; and (2) the residual clause of the ACCA was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in "Johnson v. United States," which held that the statute's residual clause was void for vagueness. As a result, the Court remanded for the district court to vacate Snyder's sentence, and to re-sentence him. View "United States v. Snyder" on Justia Law

In 2006, Kimberly Sharp was living homeless in Kansas with her two children. One day while she was with three homeless men at a camp site, David Owen approached the group and harangued them for being homeless. An altercation ensued. Two of the homeless men dragged Owen into the woods and tied him to a tree, where he was later found dead. While investigating the death, police interviewed Sharp. During the interview, she confessed to playing a role and accompanied officers to the camp site to re-enact the events. The police videotaped the interview and re-enactment. She was subsequently charged in state court with first-degree felony murder and kidnapping. Sharp moved to suppress her confessional statements, arguing they were involuntary because the police promised leniency and help finding shelter for her and her children to live. The court denied the motion, concluding her statements were voluntary based on its factual finding that Sharp was not operating under any promises. A jury later found Sharp guilty, and she was sentenced her to life in prison (with a chance of parole after 20 years) on the murder conviction and 61 months in prison on the kidnapping conviction, to run concurrently. She appealed the denial of her motion to suppress. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the record supported the trial court’s finding that Sharp was not operating under any promises. She then filed for habeas relief, arguing her confessions were not voluntary and were admitted in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied her petition and granted her a certificate of appealability (“COA”). On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Sharp challenged the state supreme court’s factual findings and again sought habeas relief. the Tenth Circuit concluded Sharp overcame the deferential constraints of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), as to the court’s fact-finding. Thus reviewing this matter de novo, the Court determined Sharp’s confessional statements following a promise of no jail time were involuntary, the state trial court erred by admitting them at trial in violation of Sharp’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the error was harmful. The district court was reversed and Sharp’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to her convictions, subject to the state’s right to retry Sharp within a reasonable time, was granted. View "Sharp v. Rohling" on Justia Law

Defendants Pedro Garcia and Gonzalo Ramirez were convicted of conspiring with other members of their criminal gang to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They were also convicted of committing various violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR), and multiple firearm counts. They challenged their convictions, arguing that: (1) the government violated "Brady v. Maryland" (373 U.S. 83 (1963)) by failing to disclose promises made to a key cooperating witness; (2) the government put on false evidence at trial in violation of "Napue v. Illinois" (360 U.S. 264 (1959)); (3) the jury was incorrectly instructed that the jurisdictional element of RICO required showing only a minimal effect on interstate commerce; (4) VICAR was unconstitutionally applied because their violent crimes did not affect interstate commerce; and (5) the court erroneously admitted testimonial hearsay under the guise of a gang expert’s opinion, in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: (1) the government did not violate Brady because the undisclosed evidence was not material; (2) the government did not violate Napue; (3) the challenge to the interstate-commerce jury instruction on the RICO charge failed because it was based on a false premise that there was no evidence that the RICO enterprise engaged in economic activity; (4) the challenge to the VICAR convictions failed because it was based on the same false premise; and (5) testimonial hearsay was erroneously admitted but harmless because it was cumulative of other testimony. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ryan Ridens received a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence enhancement established by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for certain felons with three or more prior convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].” He claimed the district court erred in imposing the enhancement because: (1) a burglary conviction used to trigger the sentence should not have counted as a “violent felony” because there was insufficient proof that it was a qualifying burglary within the meaning of the ACCA; and (2) triggering the mandatory minimum with the judicially found fact of his three prior qualifying convictions violated the Sixth Amendment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Ridens" on Justia Law

Oklahoma tried petitioner-appellant Keynon Owens twice for the first degree felony murder of Javier Carranza during a botched robbery of Javier and his cousin, Jesus Carranza. The first trial resulted in a guilty verdict on felony murder, but an acquittal on the predicate charge of the armed robbery of Javier. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) reversed the murder conviction and remanded for retrial on the ground that error committed by the trial court resulted in a substantial possibility of prejudice - that Owens may have been convicted based on his involvement in the robbery as a whole rather than the predicate felony charged in the information. Owens was convicted again after a second trial. On his second appeal to the OCCA, Owens unsuccessfully argued that his retrial was in violation of Double Jeopardy Clause. He contended the jury's acquittal on the predicate robbery felony (of Javier) at his first trial should have barred the State from retrying him for felony murder under constitutional principles of collateral estoppel. Owens next sought habeas relief in federal district court. Deferring to the OCCA's interpretation of federal law, the district court held the denial of Owens's collateral estoppel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Tenth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (COA) to decide whether Owens's retrial for felony murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. In the Tenth Circuit's view, Owens did not meet his burden of "show[ing] that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the petition and dismissed this appeal. View "Owens v. Trammell" on Justia Law