Justia U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Environmental Law
Iron Bar Holdings v. Cape
Iron Bar Holdings, LLC, a private landowner in Wyoming, owns a checkerboarded ranch interspersed with federal and state public lands. The only way to access these public lands, other than by aircraft, is by corner-crossing, which involves stepping from one public parcel to another at their adjoining corners without touching the private land in between. In 2020 and 2021, a group of hunters from Missouri corner-crossed to hunt elk on the public lands within Iron Bar's ranch. Iron Bar's property manager confronted the hunters, and law enforcement was contacted, but no citations were issued. In 2021, the hunters were prosecuted for criminal trespass but were acquitted. Iron Bar then filed a civil lawsuit for trespassing, seeking $9 million in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted summary judgment in favor of the hunters, holding that corner-crossing without physically contacting private land and without causing damage does not constitute unlawful trespass. Iron Bar Holdings appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while Wyoming law recognizes a property owner's right to exclude others from their airspace, federal law, specifically the Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA) of 1885, overrides state law in this context. The UIA prohibits any inclosure of public lands that obstructs free passage or transit over them. The court found that Iron Bar's actions effectively enclosed public lands and prevented lawful access, which is prohibited by the UIA. The court affirmed the district court's decision, allowing the hunters to corner-cross as long as they did not physically touch Iron Bar's land. View "Iron Bar Holdings v. Cape" on Justia Law
Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency
The Center for Biological Diversity and 350 Colorado challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule that partially approved Colorado’s plan to reduce ozone pollution. The Clean Air Act required Colorado to lower ozone levels by July 2021, but the state failed to meet this deadline. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan violated the Clean Air Act in three ways: by approving the plan after the deadline, by including state-only emissions reductions, and by violating the anti-backsliding provision.The EPA approved Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration and motor-vehicle-emissions budget, determining that the state showed emissions reductions of at least three percent per year from 2018 to 2020. The EPA also found that the SIP’s projected emissions reductions were based on creditable, federally enforceable measures and complied with the anti-backsliding mandate. Petitioners argued that the EPA’s approval was unlawful because the state failed to attain the required ozone levels by the deadline and included non-federally enforceable control measures in its calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA did not act unlawfully in approving Colorado’s reasonable-further-progress demonstration after the state missed its attainment deadline. The court found that reasonable-further-progress demonstrations are distinct from attainment demonstrations and that the EPA’s approval was based on compliance with reasonable-further-progress requirements. The court also held that the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s motor-vehicle-emissions budget was lawful, as it was consistent with reasonable-further-progress requirements. Additionally, the court found that the EPA’s approval did not violate the anti-backsliding provision, as the SIP revisions would not increase emissions and would not hinder attainment.The court denied the petition for review, upholding the EPA’s approval of Colorado’s plan. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. NL Industries
Atlantic Richfield Company acquired a mine in Colorado, which had been leaking sulfuric acid into a nearby river. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened in 2000 to stabilize the situation, but the leaks persisted. In 2011, the EPA ordered Atlantic Richfield to build water treatment systems, and in 2021, Atlantic Richfield settled with the EPA, agreeing to continue the cleanup and pay $400,000. Six months later, Atlantic Richfield sued NL Industries, Inc. and NL Environmental Management Services for contribution towards the cleanup costs.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted partial summary judgment in favor of the NL entities, ruling that Atlantic Richfield's claims to recoup part of the cleanup costs were time-barred. Atlantic Richfield appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and determined that the action was one for contribution, not cost recovery. The court noted that the Supreme Court has clarified that cost recovery and contribution are distinct actions. The court found that Atlantic Richfield's claim fell under the contribution category because it sought to recoup expenses following a settlement with the EPA, which required Atlantic Richfield to perform a removal action at the site.The Tenth Circuit concluded that the statute of limitations for contribution actions under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) should apply, even though the specific types of claims listed in that section did not include Atlantic Richfield's situation. The court held that the three-year limitations period for contribution actions applied, making Atlantic Richfield's lawsuit timely. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. NL Industries" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Environmental Law
Rocky Mountain Wild v. Dallas
The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land within the Rio Grande National Forest in Colorado, owned by Leavell-McCombs Joint Venture (LMJV). The land, obtained through a land exchange with the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) in 1987, was intended for development into a ski resort village. However, access to the parcel was hindered due to a gravel road managed by the USFS that was unusable by vehicles in the winter.In 2007, LMJV invoked the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), claiming it required the USFS to grant access to inholdings within USFS land. The USFS initially proposed a second land exchange with LMJV to secure access to Highway 160. However, this proposal was challenged by several conservation groups under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In 2017, the district court vacated the USFS decision and remanded to the agency.The USFS then considered a new alternative in the form of a right-of-way easement to LMJV across USFS land between the Parcel and Highway 160. The USFS consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to secure a new biological opinion (BiOp) and incidental take statement (ITS) for the proposed action in 2018. The USFS then issued a final Record of Decision (ROD) in 2019, approving the easement.The conservation groups challenged this latest ROD under NEPA, the ESA, and ANILCA. The district court vacated and remanded under the law of the case doctrine, concluding that it was bound by the reasoning of the district court’s 2017 order. The Agencies appealed the district court’s decision vacating the 2018 BiOp and 2019 ROD.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and affirmed the Agencies’ decisions. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter under the practical finality rule, and that the Conservation Groups had standing. The court held that the district court incorrectly applied the law of the case doctrine because the Agencies considered a different alternative when issuing the 2019 ROD. The court also concluded that ANILCA requires the USFS to grant access to the LMJV Parcel. The court determined that even if the Conservation Groups could show error under NEPA, they had not shown that any alleged error was harmful. Finally, the court held that the Conservation Groups failed to successfully challenge the 2018 BiOp under the ESA, and that the Agencies correctly allowed the ITS to cover not only the proposed easement, but also LMJV’s proposed development. View "Rocky Mountain Wild v. Dallas" on Justia Law
Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Forest Service
The case revolves around a dispute over the management plan for the Rio Grande National Forest (RGNF) in Colorado, particularly its impact on the Canada lynx, a species listed as threatened. The United States Forest Service (USFS), tasked with managing the RGNF, revised its Land Management Plan in response to a significant spruce beetle epidemic. The revised plan was assessed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as required by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), to consider the plan's effects on the Canada lynx. FWS issued a Biological Opinion in 2021 concluding that the plan would not likely jeopardize the lynx's continued existence. The Defenders of Wildlife contested this conclusion, arguing that the Biological Opinion violated the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and that USFS improperly relied on the opinion in preparing the plan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the Defenders’ petition. The Court held that FWS did not violate the ESA or the APA in its assessment, and that USFS appropriately relied on FWS's conclusions. The Court noted that the FWS had reasonably considered all relevant data, including information about the Canada lynx subpopulation in Colorado, and had made a reasoned decision based on this data. The Court also found that the FWS adequately addressed the potential impact of the plan on both low-use and high-use lynx habitats. The Court concluded that because the FWS's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, the USFS did not act arbitrarily in relying on the Biological Opinion. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Utah v. Environmental Protection Agency
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has decided to transfer petitions for review to the D.C. Circuit. The petitions challenge a final rule by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In the contested rule, the EPA disapproved state implementation plans (SIPs) for 21 states, including Oklahoma and Utah, considering that these states failed to sufficiently address their contributions to air-quality problems in downwind states. The EPA argued that the petitions should be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit because the disputed rule is nationally applicable. The Tenth Circuit agreed, stating that the jurisdiction for review depends on the nature of the EPA's final action, not the specifics of the petitioner’s grievance. The Tenth Circuit ruled that, on its face, the final EPA action being challenged is nationally applicable, hence, any challenge to that rule belongs in the D.C. Circuit. Therefore, the court granted the EPA's motion to transfer the petitions. View "Utah v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Lazy S Ranch Properties v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution
In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant Lazy S Ranch Properties, LLC (Lazy S) filed a lawsuit against Defendants-Appellees Valero Terminaling and Distribution Company and related entities (collectively, Valero), alleging that Valero's pipeline leaked and caused contamination on Lazy S's property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Valero.Lazy S runs cattle operations on a large property in Oklahoma, beneath which several pipelines transport hydrocarbons. In 2018, a representative of the ranch noticed a diesel fuel odor emanating from a cave near a water source on the property. Samples were taken and tested, and these tests revealed trace amounts of refined petroleum products in soil, surface water, groundwater, spring water, and air on the ranch.Lazy S brought several claims against Valero, including private nuisance, public nuisance, negligence per se, and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valero, holding that Lazy S did not present sufficient evidence to establish a legal injury or causation.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Lazy S had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to legal injury on its claims of private nuisance, public nuisance, and negligence per se. The court noted that Lazy S had presented evidence of a strong odor emanating from a cave near a water source on the property, headaches suffered by individuals due to the odor, and changes in behavior due to the odor. As such, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the odor injured the ranch.The Tenth Circuit also found that Lazy S had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The court noted that the pipeline was a major source of potential contamination beneath the ranch, that it had leaked in the past, and that a pathway existed for hydrocarbons to travel from the pipeline to the water source.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lazy S's claims of constructive fraud and trespass, finding that Lazy S had not presented sufficient evidence to support these claims.The court remanded the case to the district court for trial on the issues of negligence per se, private nuisance, and public nuisance, including Lazy S's claims for damages. View "Lazy S Ranch Properties v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution" on Justia Law
Stone v. High Mountain Mining Company
In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, private citizens and a non-profit organization sued High Mountain Mining Company for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act. The plaintiffs claimed that High Mountain Mining, which operates a gold mine in Colorado, allowed pollutants from its settling ponds to seep into the groundwater, which then migrated into a nearby river. Under the Clean Water Act, a permit is required for any discharge of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the settling ponds were a point source and that the operation of these ponds constituted an unpermitted discharge of pollutants into navigable waters, thus violating the Clean Water Act. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court made a legal error by not adequately considering all the relevant factors to determine whether the connection between the point source and the navigable water was the functional equivalent of a direct discharge. Given the potentially broad implications of the Clean Water Act for mines throughout the Western United States, the appellate court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Stone v. High Mountain Mining Company" on Justia Law
Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, et al.
In a May 2022 final rule, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved a revision to Colorado’s State Implementation Plan (SIP) certifying Colorado’s existing, EPA-approved Nonattainment New Source Review (NNSR) permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution in the Denver Metro-North Front Range area met the requirements for attaining the 2015 National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone. The Center for Biological Diversity challenged the final rule on procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the Center argued the EPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to include the state regulations that comprised Colorado’s permit program in the rulemaking docket during the public-comment period. And substantively, the Center argued the EPA acted contrary to law when it approved Colorado’s SIP revision because Colorado’s permit program excluded all “temporary emissions” and “emissions from internal combustion engines on any vehicle” in determining whether a new or modified stationary source was “major” and therefore subject to the permit process. The Tenth Circuit found the EPA’s notice of proposed rulemaking was adequate under the APA, but agreed with the Center that the EPA acted contrary to law in allowing Colorado to exclude all temporary emissions under its permit program. The Court found the federal regulation the EPA relied on in approving this exclusion plainly did not authorize such an exclusion. But the Center identified no similar problem with the EPA allowing Colorado to exclude emissions from internal combustion engines on any vehicle. The Court therefore granted the Center’s petition in part, vacated a portion of the EPA’s final rule, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law
Wyoming v. EPA, et al.
This case involved Wyoming’s plan to regulate emissions from powerplants within its borders that produce pollutants that contribute to regional haze, reducing visibility in and the aesthetics to national parks and wilderness areas. Wyoming produced a state implementation plan (SIP) in 2011. In a 2014 final rule, the EPA approved the SIP in part (as to Naughton) and disapproved it in part (as to Wyodak). Through a federal implementation plan (FIP), the EPA also substituted its determination of the proper technology to install at Wyodak, replacing Wyoming’s SIP. Wyoming and PacifiCorp petitioned for review, arguing the SIP should be entirely approved and claiming the EPA failed to grant Wyoming the deference required by federal law when it disapproved the Wyodak portion. Several conservation groups also challenged the rule, arguing the Naughton 1 and 2 portion should have been disapproved because the EPA failed to require the best available technology to reduce regional haze in a timely manner. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition as to Wyodak and vacated that portion of the final rule. The Court found the EPA erred in evaluating the Wyodak portion of the SIP because it treated non-binding agency guidelines as mandatory in violation of the Clean Air Act. The Court remanded that part of the final rule to the agency for further review. But because the EPA properly approved Wyoming’s determination of the best technology for Naughton, the Court denied the petition as to those units and upheld that portion of the final rule. View "Wyoming v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law